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Abstract 
While transitional justice and democracy literature bristles with the expectation that 
human rights conditions would improve with the progression from the “darkness” of a 
dictatorship to the “light” of democratic rule, Nigeria’s transition to civil rule in 1999 
would seem to provide a sobering contra-reality. Democracy does not seem to have 
produced a better human rights environment in the post-transition Nigerian context.  This 
dissertation answers the question why the restoration of civil rule in Nigeria has not 
translated to results in human rights practices that come close to matching the 
expectations of its citizens and the predictions of transitional justice literature? It 
investigates, however, only the extent to which human rights violations correlates with 
the lack of effective judicial protection of those rights between 1999 and 2009. 
The methodology is mostly interdisciplinary. The discussion is organized around 
doctrinal legal reasoning and case-law analysis. First analyzed were cases decided prior 
to 1999 to show the slippery provenance and inadequacy of the current rights-based 
adjudication standards. Cases decided since 1999 were then evaluated to measure the 
claim that the judiciary is failing in its duty as guardians of human rights post-transition. 
To that extent, the dissertation has not limited itself to a single theoretical model. 
It was found that some of the biggest problems afflicting human rights 
adjudication in Nigeria are historically defined. A major challenge is the apparent lack of 
a clear standard for reviewing laws and actions against the constitutional requirement that 
they be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. This creates a culture where human 
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rights cases are approached on an ad hoc case-by-case basis such that contradictory 
decisions are possible from cases with similar facts. Dealing with this challenge is not 
helped by the country’s legal history and the doctrines of the British legal system that a 
colonial relationship fostered after independence. The current approach is therefore still 
orientated towards British administrative law principles which did not demand the 
standard of intense scrutiny required for the effective protection of human rights norms. 
The dissertation therefore recommends a reformed system of legal education with strong 
comparative approaches to change this orientation. 
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Chapter One 
Constructing the Democratic Transition and the Human Rights 
Adjudication Problematique 
 
1.1 Introduction 
It is reasonable and intuitive, within a liberal normative and institutional framework, to 
expect that human rights conditions would improve when a country makes the transition 
from authoritarian government to democratic rule. There are substantial hints, for 
example, that transitional regimes,1 in contrast to their autocratic and abusive 
predecessors, are much more committed to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.2 
It has further been contended that “just after a successful revolution every member of the 
society and citizens feel that they deserve their goals for which they fought.”3  
In the Nigerian context, as the struggles of the people made clear and as 
symbolized by the blood of those who died in the process, one of the obvious goals for 
which its people fought, was for the restoration of human rights (including civil, political, 
economic and social rights) previously repressed by military decrees.4 But the goal has 
                                                          
1 See Guillermo O’Donnell, Philip Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) at 
6 (describing transition as “the interval between one political regime and another.”). See also Christine Bell 
& Johanna Keenan, “Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and Problems of Transition” (2004) 
26 Hum Rts Q 330 at 331 (arguing that in transitions “The new arrangements for holding power in some 
cases are aimed at moving from a failed state or an undemocratic state to coherent and accountable political 
structures.”); Elin Skaar, Human Rights Violations and the Paradox of Democratic Transition: A Study of 
Chile and Argentina (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens Institute, 1994) at 10 (stating: “Maximalists and minimalists 
alike agree that the form or mode of transition will have an impact on the resulting type of democracy. 
Although the outcome of transition may in principle be any kind of political regime, we are primarily 
concerned with the transition process from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime.”). It is in 
Skaar’s sense in particular that the term “transition” will be used in this study. 
2 David Gray, “An Excuse-centered Approach to Transitional Justice” (2006) 74 Fordham L Rev 2621. 
3 Apurba Khatiwada, “Constitutionalism of Transition” (2008) 1 Kathmandu L Rev 41 at 45.  
4 See Philip C Aka, “Nigeria Since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule and Human Rights 
Violations under President Olusegun Obasanjo” (2003) 4 San Diego Int’l L J 209 at 211 (stating that 
“because army rule between 1983 and 1999 was characterized by massive human rights violations, the 
return to civil rule left renewed hope for improved human rights”).  
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arguably not been optimally realized in the country which restored civil rule in 1999 after 
many years of military dictatorship but which has not shown as much progress as might 
be expected in positively altering its human rights standing.  
Evidence from several local and international reports on the human rights 
situation in Nigeria indicate continuing human rights violations under a democratic 
constitution in which human rights guarantees (contained in the Constitution itself and 
international agreements that Nigeria signed into) are prominently prioritized, at least on 
paper. Nigeria is a large country with a large economy and massive developmental 
obstacles. These challenges were exacerbated by military dictatorship up to the 1999 
transition. Like most similarly situated countries, it grapples with questions about the 
human rights practices of its government and especially its internal security forces. What 
separates these challenged and transitioning countries from more stable ones is therefore 
the prevalence of human rights violations and the unlikelihood that those responsible 
could be held accountable. In Nigeria’s case, therefore, while it is true to say that those 
accused of human rights violations are taken to justice on some occasions, this happens 
rather sporadically in a non-institutionalized fashion and often only after public protests 
and pressure.  Thus, in its report for 2010 on the state of human rights around the world, 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated in the section on Nigeria that:  
More than halfway through his term of office, President Umaru Yar”Adua 
and his administration have done little to improve Nigeria’s poor human 
rights record. Bloody sectarian clashes claimed hundreds of lives in late 
2008 and 2009, while the government failed to investigate, much less hold 
accountable members of the security forces implicated in numerous 
incidents of extrajudicial killings, torture, and extortion.5 
                                                          
5 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2010: Events of 2009 (Human Rights Watch, 2010) at 142; See also 
United State Bureau of  Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Nigeria: Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices, 2003 online: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27743.htm>  (“The Government's 
human rights record remained poor, and the Government continued to commit serious abuses. Elections 
held during the year were not generally judged free and fair and therefore abridged citizens' right to change 
their government. Security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to apprehend 
criminal suspects, and to quell some protests. There were several politically-motivated killings by unknown 
persons during the year. Security forces regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and 
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The main question in this research is: why has the restoration of civil rule in 
Nigeria not translated to results in human rights practices that come close to meeting the 
expectations of its citizens and the predictions of transitional justice literature? In 2000, a 
survey covering Nigeria’s six informal geopolitical regions and 22 of the country’s 36 
states was conducted. In the report issued thereafter an overwhelming 80.9 percent of the 
respondents stated that democracy is preferable to any other system of government. 
When asked to state their understanding of democracy, “nearly two-thirds of respondents 
offered definitions that emphasized political freedoms and procedures, including 
‘government by the people.’”6 I will examine an aspect of the above question by 
investigating the degree to which human rights violations in Nigeria correlate with the 
lack of effective judicial protection of those rights. My focus is however restricted to the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
convicted prisoners; however, there were fewer reported incidents of torture by security agents than in 
previous years. Impunity was a problem. Shari'a courts sentenced persons to harsh punishments including 
amputations and death by stoning; however, no amputation or stoning sentences were carried out, and one 
of the judgments was dismissed on appeal during the year. Prison conditions were harsh and life- 
threatening, and those conditions contributed to the death of numerous inmates. Security forces continued 
to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, including for political reasons. Prolonged pretrial detention 
remained a serious problem. The judicial system often was incapable of providing criminal suspects with 
speedy and fair trials. Government authorities occasionally infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The 
Government at times limited freedom of speech and press. The Government continued placing limits on 
freedom of assembly and association, citing security concerns. Some state governments placed limits on 
some religious rights, and some government programs discriminated between religious groups. The 
Government occasionally restricted freedom of movement for security reasons in areas of unrest and used 
lethal force at checkpoints.”); the report for 2008 did not indicate any positive changes as the Bureau noted 
that “The government's human rights record remained poor, and government officials at all levels continued 
to commit serious abuses. The most significant human rights problems included the abridgement of 
citizens' right to change their government; extrajudicial killings by security forces; the use of lethal and 
excessive force by security forces; vigilante killings; impunity for abuses by security forces; torture, rape, 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects; harsh and 
life-threatening prison and detention center conditions; arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial detention; 
executive influence on the judiciary and judicial corruption; infringement on privacy rights; restrictions on 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and movement; domestic violence and discrimination against 
women; female genital mutilation (FGM); child abuse and child sexual exploitation; societal violence; 
ethnic, regional, and religious discrimination; trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution and 
forced labor; and child labor.” Online: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119018.htm>. 
6 Peter Lewis & Michael Bratton, “Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria” (Michigan State 
University, Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa, Afrobarometer Paper 3, 2000) at 5-6.  
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ten-year time period commencing from 1999 when civil rule was restored and ending in 
2009.  
I am persuaded that this time period is sufficient for the civilian regime to have 
dealt with major transitional justice issues as well as given a satisfactory indication of its 
inclination towards sound human rights practices. The time period fits into certain 
estimates as well, particularly Backer’s. He believes that “transitional justice issues in 
postconflict settings often entail processes that will and should unfold over an extended 
period of time – a decade, if not considerably longer.”7 He states further that “In many 
cases, measures are implemented piecemeal or progressively in stages. In others, initial 
steps are limited, halted or even reversed, but are occasionally revisited at a later 
time…”8 
By choosing to focus attention on the judiciary, I am merely underscoring that 
institution’s role as a major forum for the delivery of remedies for human rights 
violations. By no means will I argue that a lack of effective judicial remedies or what 
seems to be the failure of the courts to hold human rights violators to account is the only 
reason that democracy is yet to meet the expectation that crime suspects will not be 
tortured in detention, that they will not be coerced to pay to be admitted to bail, that those 
charged would be granted expeditious trial and that citizens would not be repressed for 
holding political views or expressing them. Instead my contention is that while there may 
be many factors accounting for the apparent limited realization of the dreams of 
improved human rights practices in a democratic Nigeria, it pays to focus on the judiciary 
which is a major institution charged by the constitution with reversing this trend.  
 In conducting this investigation, I will pursue two related lines of inquiry. First, I 
will discuss substantive legal, adjudicatory and procedural practices which hinder the 
                                                          
7 David Backer, “Watching the Bargain Unravel? A Panel Study of Victims’ Attitudes about Transitional 
Justice in Cape Town, South Africa” (2010) 4 Int’l J Transitional Just 443 at 444. 
8 Ibid. 
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courts from effectively protecting human rights notwithstanding clear constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing those rights. Secondly, I will relate the shortcomings 
demonstrated through the first line of inquiry to the politics of human rights and judging, 
and as well the socio-political context in a pluralist society like Nigeria. 
While not arguing, as I earlier indicated, that lack of effective judicial protection 
is the only reason human rights violations remain relatively endemic in Nigeria, I will 
identify it as a major contributing factor. Nor do I assert that the human rights situation 
has been identical under civil rule as under the military. Compared to the many years that 
the military dominated the political landscape, some changes indeed have taken place. 
The claim here is that those changes have been marginal and have not significantly 
addressed the more systemic and institutionalized manifestations of human rights abuse. 
To a large extent, this study covers conditions specific to Nigeria that may have 
undermined the capacity of the courts to effectively redress human rights violations. My 
discussion covers as well, but only to a limited extent, the distortion brought by military 
involvement in the politics of the country, which had only negative effects on human 
rights and the institutional standing of the courts.9     
Beneath the main thesis question mentioned above, the following sub-questions have 
been addressed as well:  
 What informs the manner in which the courts approach the resolution of human 
rights cases in Nigeria? What do the courts actually do as opposed to what they 
claim to do in treating those cases? In addressing these questions, I emphasize 
more the textual, legal justifications for judicial decisions (i.e. written judgments 
                                                          
9 Abiola Ojo, “The Search for a Grundnorm in Nigeria – The Lakanmi Case” (1971) 20 Int’l & Comp L Q 
117; Akinola Aguda & Oluwadare Aguda, “Judicial Protection of some Fundamental Rights in Nigeria and 
in the Sudan before and during Military Rule” (1972) 16 J Afr L 130; Okechukwu Oko, “Confronting 
Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes towards a more Pragmatic Approach” (2003-2004) 11 Cardozo J 
Int’l & Comp L 89. 
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in law reports). To a lesser degree I will underscore through an analysis of 
secondary materials some external influences not immediately accessible to the 
reader from text but which nonetheless provide essential context for 
understanding the reasoning in human rights cases. 
 Is the performance of Nigerian courts reflective of their colonial origins? Are they 
hampered because of their strong British colonial roots marked by parliamentary 
sovereignty coupled with high deference to legislative authority? If so, does this 
orientation not diverge from the opposite doctrine requiring both justification of 
human rights restrictions as well as a broader understanding of judicial 
responsibility in limiting governmental, and in particular, legislative as well as 
executive power?10 
 Have Nigerian appellate courts adopted an analytical standard or standards for 
reviewing human rights cases comparable to those in other constitutional 
jurisdictions? If a standard is in place, how consistently is it applied in actual 
litigation? If there is no standard, what might be the reason for this?  
  Are the courts hampered because they have to choose among several human 
rights norms, some of them being domestic, (state versus federal), others regional, 
and yet others international? Though the Supreme Court has apparently 
                                                          
10 Hakeem Yusuf, “The Judiciary and Political Change in Africa: Developing Transitional Jurisprudence in 
Nigeria” (2009) 7 Int’l J Const L 654 at 664 (stating: “The minimalist interpretative approach of the Court 
is rooted in its history. The attitude from which it has rarely departed is that it is beyond the purview of the 
judiciary to embark on wholesale striking down of legislation. The Nigerian legal and judicial system, 
though a hybrid of customary, Islamic, and common law, is in its operation and outlook essentially 
dominated by its colonial heritage of the British legal system”). 
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established a hierarchy of legal norms,11 controversies persist over whether the 
court took the best possible path in Nigeria’s peculiar context.12  
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I examine the overall context of the research by 
way of secondary literature review. I start by discussing how past human rights practices, 
particularly under a dictatorial dispensation could impact human rights adjudication 
during a transition from that period. I also look at the peculiar challenges that courts face 
during transitions and how they might respond to those challenges. Further down the road 
I look at the triangulation of transitional democracy, law and human rights. After briefly 
stating the conception of human rights that animates my research, I will analyze the 
significance of law and the legal strategy as a method for the protection of human rights. 
In addition, I look at the factors that could trigger human rights abuses both historically 
and in contemporary times. As importantly, I will explain the role that courts perform in 
human rights cases and the obsession which the controversy over this role has unleashed 
on the legal academy. Even so, I will also discuss the practical manner in which courts in 
different jurisdictions carry out this function of reviewing human rights cases. Following 
this, I will make recommendations towards redressing shortcomings in the current 
practice of human rights adjudication in Nigeria.    
1.2 Human Rights: Tracking from the Past to the Present 
Between 1983 and 1999 Nigeria was ruled by military regimes. That period was largely 
characterized by rampant repression and abuse of human rights.13 The military tortured 
                                                          
11 See the Supreme Court decision in Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health 
Practitioners of Nigeria & Others v Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria, [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt 
1072) 575 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
12 AO Enabulele, “Implementation of Treaties in Nigeria and the Status Question: Whither Nigerian 
Courts?” (2009) 17 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 326. 
13 See for example Clement Nwankwo, Basil Ugochukwu & Dulue Mbachu, Human Rights Practices in the 
Nigerian Police, (Lagos: Constitutional Rights Project, 1994) (A publication of which discusses how police 
practices endangered human rights in Nigeria); Also Josephine Effah, Modernised Slavery: Child Trade in 
Nigeria (Lagos: Constitutional Rights Project, 1996) (discussing trafficking in children); Osaro 
Odemwingie, A Harvest of Blooms (Lagos: Media Rights Agenda, 2000) (reporting human rights atrocities 
against the media in Nigeria in 1999); Chukwuemeka Gahia, Human Rights In Retreat: A Report Of Human 
Rights Violations Of The Military Regime Of General Ibrahim Babangida (Lagos: Civil Liberties 
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its opponents, took political prisoners, and in some extreme cases carried out massive 
extra-judicial killings. The impunity of that period provided incentive for the police and 
other internal security forces to routinely violate the civil and political rights of the 
citizens.14 The pre-trial rights of prison detainees, for example, deteriorated throughout 
this period.15 Many of the remand prisoners could not be promptly put to trial and often 
stayed in detention awaiting trial for far longer than would have been warranted were 
they convicted of the offences alleged.16 
The constitution was for the most part suspended under military decrees which 
generally prohibited the courts from questioning their implementation by means of 
several oppressive ouster provisions.17 Much as the courts toiled to bring the military 
under the rule of law, they did not achieve much in this regard. In fact their ambivalence 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Organization, 1992) (a publication chronicling human rights violations committed by the military regime 
headed by Babangida from 1985 to 1992). Also Civil Liberties Organization, Annual Report on Human 
Rights in Nigeria (1990 – 1996) (Yearly reports of violations of various human rights in the country); Other 
human rights organizations had similar reports. See for example Committee for the Defence of Human 
Rights, 1997 Annual Report On The Human Rights Situation In Nigeria (1998). 
14 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Modest Harvests: On the Significant (but limited) Impact of Human Rights 
NGOs on Legislative and Executive Behaviour in Nigeria” (2004) 48 J Afr L 23 at 27; Basil Ugochukwu, 
“The State Security Service and Human Rights in Nigeria” (1996 - 1997) Third World Legal Stud. 71; 
Philip C Aka, “Prospects for Igbo Human Rights in Nigeria in the New Century” (2004 – 2005) 48 Howard 
L J 165; Tunde I Ogowewo, “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative for the 
Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy” (2000) 44 J Afr L 135; Julius Ihonvbere, “Where is the Third Wave? A 
Critical Evaluation of Africa’s Non-Transition to Democracy” (1996) 43 Africa Today 343.    
15 It is a notorious fact that at least the rights of prisoners in Nigeria to satisfactory health conditions are 
often put to great risk by the very fact of incarceration. See for example M. A. Lawal, et al “Tuberculosis in 
a Nigerian Medium Security Prison” (2009) 11 Benin J Postgraduate Medicine 1. See also “Mission to 
Nigeria” UN Commission on Human Rights, 62nd Sess Item 11(b) of the provisional agenda, UN 
Doc./E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.4 (2006) at 17; Osaze Lanre Ehonwa, Behind the Wall: A Report on Prison 
Conditions in Nigeria and the Nigerian Prison System (Lagos: Civil Liberties Organization, 1996); 
Chukwuma Innocent, “The Legal Structure of the Police and Human Rights in Nigeria” (1996-1997) Third 
World Legal Stud 41 at 49.    
16 For instance though the total capacity of Nigeria’s 148 prisons is 25, 000 inmates, they often hold far 
more than this number. The overall prison population was at one time put at 48, 899 of which 25, 579 or 
52.3 per cent were awaiting trial. See Mark Eze & Emeka E Okafor, “The Prison as an Instrument of Social 
Reformation and Rehabilitation: A Study of Nigerian Prisons (Medium) Kiri-kiri, Lagos” (2007) 4 Pakistan 
J Soc Sci 23 at 25. 
17 Okechukwu Oko, “Lawyers in Chains: Restrictions on Human Rights Advocacy under Nigeria’s Military 
Regimes” (1997) 10 Harv Hum Rts J 257. For a list and discussion of those decrees see Niki Tobi, 
“Development of Constitutional Law and Military Regimes in Nigeria” in Emmanuel G Bello & Bola A 
Ajibola, eds., 1 Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 673. 
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in upholding the rights of individuals during military rule was noted.18 On the one hand, 
in the case of Nwosu v. Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority,19 a judge of the 
Nigerian Supreme Court advised victims of human rights violations to look elsewhere 
other than the courts for redress. According to Justice Modibbo Alfa Belgore regarding 
court litigation to redress human rights violations under the military “legal practice will 
attract more confidence if administrative avenues are pursued rather than journey of 
discovery [sic] inherent in court action in such matters.”20  
Yet on the other hand there were cases like Barclays Bank of Nigeria Limited v 
Central Bank of Nigeria,21 where the court appeared to guard its power to intervene on 
behalf of the victims of human rights violations notwithstanding any law purporting to 
oust that jurisdiction. In this case, the Supreme Court held that when a law seeks to deny 
a person’s right to access the courts, its language would be watched to ensure it does not 
extend beyond its onerous meaning. In other words, that law would have to be construed 
strictly.   
It was therefore generally anticipated that a return to civil, constitutional rule 
would limit human rights violations. This has not quite happened even though the country 
has practiced civil rule for over ten years now.22 Instead, the civilian regimes continue to 
use in most cases the same style used by the military used while in power. For example, 
the repressive tactics of a supposedly democratic government seeking to crush or diffuse 
mass action led by the labor movement in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007 has also been 
                                                          
18 Hakeem Yusuf, “The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions: A Critique” (2007) 7 Global Jurist 
(Advances, Art. 4) at 11. 
19 [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt 135) 688 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
20 Ibid. See also Chinonye Obiagwu & Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, “Nigeria: Combating the Legacies of 
Colonialism and Militarism” in Abdullahi An-Na’im ed., Human Rights under African Constitutions: 
Realizing the Promise for Ourselves (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
21[1976] 6 Sup Ct 177.  
22 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2009: Events of 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2009) at 93; Akeem 
Akinwale, “Repression of Press Freedom in Nigerian Democratic Dispensations” (2010) 35 Afr Dev 47.  
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well documented in the literature.23 The government has in addition been implicated in 
the denial of the right to life,24 and several other constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
According to the International Commission of Jurists:25  
[n]otwithstanding the return to democratic rule since 2002 civil freedoms 
have remained in a mixed and contrasting state of enjoyment. While the 
atmosphere is certainly freer [some would say much freer] than under the 
military rule on the exercise of some civil rights, repression and other 
forms of human rights violations continue to take place.26 
 
The relationship of democratic transition, the protection of human rights, and the role of 
the courts in this regard, is particularly salient. Transitions and the clamor for democracy 
often happen against the background of repression. In many instances the social 
mobilization needed to stop and remove autocracy is met with equal resolve to remain in 
power, causing it to apply even more repression. Therefore, the social call for democracy 
is entwined with the goals of the human rights movement - the latter being only a naïve 
hope until the former is realized. While Petman sees “the struggle for human rights [as] 
part of a grander fight for progressive causes,”27 Mutua submits that “A political 
democracy built on the protection of the liberal constitution is the best guarantee for the 
enjoyment of a wide gamut of human rights.”28 Upon completion of a transitory cycle, an 
improvement should occur between the practices of the old order and the promises of the 
                                                          
23 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Remarkable Returns: The Influence of a Labor – led Socio-Economic Rights 
Movement on Legislative Reasoning, Process and Action in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007” (2009) 47 J Modern Afr 
Stud 241 at 263. 
24 Reference is often made to the towns of Odi in Bayelsa state and Zaki-Biam in Benue state where armed 
troops opened fire on defenseless civilians, killing them in their hundreds, and in which Odi in particular 
was flattened with every single house demolished from the foundation or set on fire. See Aka, supra note 4 
at 253-254.   
25 International Commission of Jurists, ICJ Report Attacks on Justice: Federal Republic of Nigeria online: 
International Commission of Jurists <http://www.icj.org/IMG/NIGERIA.pdf >. 
26Ibid at 2.  
27 Jarna Petman, “Human Rights, Democracy and the Left” (2006) 2 Unbound 63. 
28 Makau Mutua, “The Iraq Paradox: Minority and Group Rights in a Viable Constitution” (2006) 54 
Buffalo L Rev 927 at 940. 
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new one. This is so for the simple reason that democracy is assumed to be more 
facilitative of a satisfactory human rights regime than under any other political form.29  
Yet, Aidoo cautions against the uncritical assumption that democracy necessarily 
guarantees human rights protection directly or substantially. He says that while the 
process of democratization could provide an environment conducive to the realization of 
human rights, it would by no means guarantee it. Though his claim may be over-
generalized, Aidoo offers Africa as an example where “human rights are routinely and 
systematically violated”30 and in which “whether a country is democratic [or not] does 
not make a significant difference.”31 Secondly, he argues that to accept that democracy 
immediately leads to favourable human rights conditions has implications for the human 
rights movement at the national level. He asserts that “[t]he idea that human rights would 
be almost automatically guaranteed if there is democracy logically leads to a conceptual 
devaluation of the cardinal importance of human rights organizations under democratic 
conditions.”32  
Aidoo’s claims are cogent and persuasive at some level. But they are not properly 
contextualized. For one, he does not clarify his understanding of a “democratic” 
government. It is well known that democracy appeals to all ideological leanings, even to 
those who would misappropriate this appeal to non-democratic ends. There are at once 
“strong” democracies and “weak” ones.33 According to Fareed Zakaria, half of the 
“democratizing” countries in the world are illiberal democracies.34 He uses “illiberal” in 
contrast to “liberal” which he describes as “a political system marked not only by free 
                                                          
29 Joseph K. Young, “State Capacity, Democracy, and the Violation of Personal Integrity Rights” (2009) 8 J 
Hum Rts 283 at 284 (contending that “Democracy is asserted to be one of the most important structural 
factors that reduce human rights violations. Most quantitative studies find a strong association between 
democracy and respect for human rights.”)  
30 Akwasi Aidoo, “Africa: Democracy without Human Rights” (1993) 15 Hum Rts Q 703 at 707. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See Allan Hutchinson, “A ‘Hard Core’ Case Against Judicial Review” (2008) 121 Harv L Rev F 57. 
34 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 22 at 24. 
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and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, separation of powers, and the protection of 
basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.”35  
Therefore, while Aidoo’s claims would fit more properly into democracies that 
could be described as illiberal, marked out only by formal and functional attributes of that 
system of government (like routine elections whether or not they are free and fair), they 
may not fit democracies of the more liberal and, therefore, substantial category. In 
making this claim, however, I am mindful that many so-called liberal democracies have 
been shown to tolerate various human rights violations especially of those living in 
poverty or belonging to other marginalized social categories.36 It would be more useful 
therefore to discuss degrees and the availability of recourse mechanisms than whether or 
not abuses are present in the first place.  
 It is also valuable to stress that the way a regime more specifically or a state more 
generally treats human rights is usually contingent upon its understanding and/or 
perception of democracy. This is the view of Louis Henkin who also states that different 
histories can give two countries different perceptions of rights, democracy and the 
relation between them.37 He uses the experiences of France and the United States to 
demonstrate the distinct ways in which the two countries received both rights and 
democracy into their systems after the Second World War. According to him: 
France came into the post-War period without a living tradition of 
constitutional rights, but with a living tradition – rudely interrupted – of 
political rights and of rights-through-law. Rights were realized through 
[his emphasis] democracy; freedom was by law, not from law. Rights 
were granted and protected by a democratic parliament, and even today 
Parliament continues to be the principal source and basis of rights in 
France. Law was not a limitation on freedom but the articulation and 
                                                          
35 Ibid at 22. 
36 See for example with regard to Canada, Bruce Porter, “Judging Poverty: Using International Human 
Rights Law to Refine the Scope of Charter Rights” (2000) 15 JL & Soc Pol’y 117; for the United States see 
John T Cook & Deborah Frank, “Food Security, Poverty, and Human Development in the United States” 
(2008) 1136 Annals New York Academy Sci 193.   
37 Louis Henkin, “Revolutions and Constitutions” (1988-1989) 49 La L Rev 1023 at 1051. 
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safeguard of freedom. In the United States, rights came first, government 
later; rights came first, democracy later. Democracy came through the idea 
of rights, and rights limited democracy: ‘Congress shall make no law.’38 
 
    
1.3. On a Jet-Plane: Courts in Transition 
For the purposes of this study, there is great value in understanding the relationship that 
exists among: the transition from dictatorship (which was the case with Nigeria), the 
promise of democracy and human rights, and the role of the courts. Establishing this 
relationship would perhaps provide an appropriate response to Ruti Teitel’s terse but 
profound query: “What, if any, is the relation between a state’s response to a repressive 
past and its prospects for creating a liberal order?”39 In Nigeria’s case, as I have already 
noted, the repressive past belonged to the military while the liberal order is the civil 
governance now in place. For this study, Teitel’s question cannot but be apt in the sense 
that, as is the case in Nigeria, the same courts which tended to serve the needs of the old 
dictatorial regime are looked upon to support the liberalism promised by the new 
democratic order. It is not impossible therefore, for the courts to be in the same dilemma 
as the other branches of government, and even the larger public, about how to discharge 
this role. Dyzenhaus, reflecting on courts’ role in promoting justice in a context of 
historical and present injustice, broadened Teitel’s concerns when he asked: 
How does a society produce a stable and just political order out of a state 
of instability and injustice? Is it better for a society composed of groups 
which have done terrible things to each other in the past to confront as 
fully as possible past atrocities or to suppress the memory of the atrocities 
and get on with the job of living together? If the past is confronted, should 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation” (1996-1997) 106 
Yale L J 2009 at 2011; Jeremy Sarkin, “The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: 
Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with Genocide” (2001) 
45 J Afr L 143 at 144 (asserting that “knowing about the abuses of the past and acknowledging them seems 
to be the crucial issue in a transitional process. Ignoring history leads to collective amnesia, which is not 
only unhealthy for the body politic, but is essentially an illusion – an unresolved past will inevitably return 
to haunt the citizens.”). See generally Diane F Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute 
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime” (1990-1991) 100 Yale L J 2537. 
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the confrontation be a formal one in the court room or are other means of 
confrontation more effective?40 
 
An important question that arises in the aftermath of any political transition is whether 
judicial systems which may have served dictatorial causes in the past are suitable centres 
for the new role of giving a traumatized society a fresh liberal beginning. It is ostensibly 
in this sense that Dyzenhaus perceives “curious, perhaps even paradoxical”41 problems 
for judges in transitions. He therefore identifies three factors which complicate the task of 
judges in achieving the independence upon which rests their authority in transitional 
situations.  
First, it is likely that many of the judges will be those who served the old regime 
and so are thought to be deeply compromised from the start.42 Second, many of the newly 
appointed judges are likely to be appointed for the same reason that qualifies the new 
political leaders which is their record of opposition as “political” and “human rights” 
lawyers.43 Third, judges in a transition are often faced with deciding deeply political 
matters, which force the issue of their authority and their independence to the surface. 
This might arise from the usual efforts to use the law to deal with past wrongs. It may 
also involve judges interpreting new constitutions. “They will do this in a society 
unaccustomed to a culture of constitutional judicial review; so that they might have to 
consider striking down as invalid a statute of the very popular new regime.”44  
 But while Dyzenhaus appears to sympathize with courts that have found 
themselves in this difficulty, Yusuf thinks that to earn the legitimacy they would need to 
                                                          
40 David Dyzenhaus, “Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law” (2001-2004) 10 
Otago L Rev 345 at 345-346. 
41 Ibid at 347. 
42 Ibid. See also Gray, supra note 2 at 2626 (arguing: “Transitions also must face the reality that many of 
those who could carry out criminal trials are tainted by the past. If these officials are forced to step down 
there are even fewer prosecutors, judges, [my emphasis] clerks, jailers, investigators, and defense attorneys 
available to conduct prosecutions. But if tainted officials are left in place transitions must be concerned that 
former agents of abuse cannot be relied upon to blame their cohorts, much less themselves.”) 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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overcome the challenges of transition, courts and judges need to come clean with their 
own past as well. He urges that the same accountability procedures applied to the other 
branches of the past autocratic regime be extended to the judges who functioned under 
them.45 Yusuf disclaims the assumed “self-limiting factor” of the judiciary [that courts do 
not initiate the process for the exercise of their powers].46 Rather than seeing the judiciary 
either as an insignificant player in the previous dictatorship or as another victim of the 
past repression (which is very true of the Nigerian situation), Yusuf says judicial 
decisions have impact well beyond the parties involved in litigation.47  
Court judgments, he continues, affect the wider society and “in some cases dictate 
outright the course of political, cultural, and economic development.”48 In this manner, he 
contends, the judiciary shares in the burdens of governance, the nature of this role 
constituting it as a major element of the machinery of the state as well as a participant in 
political decision-making.49 If this thesis is accepted, it means that the judiciary cannot 
then escape scrutiny in a transition by simply claiming not to have participated in 
decisions taken during the repressive period. 
 In addition to the above, Yusuf offers an even more compelling reason why the 
courts should account for their performances throughout an authoritarian period. He asks: 
why do military usurpers sack the executive and legislature but leave the judiciary intact? 
First, he says, the courts are crucial to legitimizing the regime of the usurpers. Tayyab 
supports this theory as well. Like Yusuf he states that “[u]surpers appear to recognize that 
                                                          
45Hakeem Yusuf, “Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial 
Accountability in Nigeria” (2008) 30 Law & Pol’y 194 at 198.   
46Ibid at 195.  
47Ibid at 196.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. See also Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, “The Role of Constitutional Courts in the 
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government” (2001) 35 Law & Soc’y Rev 117 
at 119. These authors noted that some comparativists had persistently neglected the role of courts in 
governance, perhaps reflecting “a belief that judiciaries are separate from or ‘above’ ordinary political 
processes and, as such, must be studied as independent entities.” Yet they contended that all “explanations 
of politics are incomplete unless they incorporate courts”. 
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judicial pronouncements about the nature and merits of the change and quantum of their 
legislative capacity have an impact on the legitimacy of the new regime… securing 
judicial recognition [therefore] appears to be the key to gaining political 
legitimacy.”50And second, because the military does not possess the skills required to 
administer the judicial function, there is doubtless incentive to retain that institution in 
governance during a dictatorship. 
 Without doubt, the judiciary bears an unusually critical responsibility in 
transitional situations especially where the old order from which the society is transiting 
was characterized by severe human rights abuses. This duty exists whether or not the new 
regime decides to take institutional steps to address those prior abuses.51 The judiciary 
could still find itself called upon to examine those past abuses as the victims seek to 
obtain redress under a newer, more liberal environment. How the courts respond to these 
demands would go a long way in establishing or disproving the liberal credentials of the 
new order. Jennifer Widner identifies one such response as what she calls a “signaling” 
technique. Through it, judges in transitions demonstrate “their receptiveness to new kinds 
of cases or new lines of argument in their decisions.”52 Where human rights atrocities had 
                                                          
50 Mahmud Tayyab, “Jurisprudence of a Successful Treason: Coup d’etat & Common Law” (1994) 27 
Cornell Int’l L J 49 at 103-104. 
51 One such way has been the establishment of Truth Commissions. See Kieran Mcevoy & Lorna 
Mcgregor, “Transitional Justice from Below: An Agenda for Research, Policy and Praxis” in Kieran 
McEvoy & Lorna McGregor eds., Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle 
for Change (Oxford & Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 2; Paul van Zyl, “Dilemmas of 
Transitional  Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (1999) 52 J Int’l 
Affairs 647; Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” (2003) 16 Harv Hum Rts J 69 at 78; Darryl 
Robinson, “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal 
Court” (2003) 14 Eur J Int’l L 481; J. Shola Omotola, “Democratization, Good Governance and 
Development in Africa: The Nigerian Experience” (2007) 9 J Sustainable Dev Afr. 247 at 260. Another 
way of dealing with past human rights abuses under a new regime is through the process of “lustration” 
popularized in Central Europe following the demise of Communism. It refers to “the screening (or vetting) 
of candidates for holders of important public offices to eliminate (usually bar for a certain period) former 
secret police collaborators.” See Maria Los, “Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in 
Central Europe” (1995) 20 Law & Soc Inquiry 117 at 121; see also Roman David, “Lustration Laws in 
Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Lustration Policy in Czech Republic and Poland (1989-2001) 
(2003) 28 Law & Soc Inquiry 387 at 388. 
52 Jennifer Widner, “Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist’s Perspective on 
the African Case” (2001) 95 Am J Int’l L 64 at 73. 
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been committed prior to transition, even if the institutional mechanisms to address them 
are not established, the courts through their decisions would need to show that they are 
sensitive to the changed legal situation and its consequences. 
1.4. Compulsory or Elective Triangularity? Democracy, Law, and Human 
Rights 
Human rights protection and the law have a very strong and intimate intersection. The 
rise of a new form of constitutionalism following the demise of communism, one party 
dictatorships and military regimes in different parts of the world in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s has increased scholarly interest in this area of law. The world has since 
become fertile for written constitutions,53 complete with bills of rights, special courts – 
specifically Constitutional Courts – to implement them, and an ever expanding culture of 
not only traditional judicial review but also the judicialization of democratic politics. This 
means the involvement of courts in deciding various aspects of the democratic and 
political process.54 
To understand how the judicial protection of human rights works in practice, it is 
without doubt important to suggest an understanding of the concept that would animate 
my research. This attempt at clarification is constrained to a large extent by the fact that 
                                                          
53 Various reasons have been offered for this shift towards democracy. A writer argues, for example, that 
“As with any large-scale social phenomenon, many forces have helped produce the democratic wave – a 
technological revolution, growing middle-class wealth, and the collapse of alternative systems and 
ideologies that organized society. To these grand systemic causes add another: America. The rise and 
dominance of America - a country whose politics and culture are deeply democratic - has made 
democratization seem inevitable.” See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at 
Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004) at 14-25. 
54 Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “From Democracy to Juristocracy” Book Review of “From Democracy to 
Juristocracy? The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy” by Carlo Guarneri & 
Patrizia Pederzoli, “Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe” by Alec Stone Sweet & 
“Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism” by Ran Hirschl, 
(2004) 38 Law & Soc’y Rev 611; Ran Hirschl, “The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial 
Empowerment through Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, (2000) 36 Stan J Int’l L 74; 
Ran Hirschl, “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from 
Four Constitutional Revolutions”, (2000) 25 Law & Soc Inquiry 91; H. Kwasi Prempeh, “A New 
Jurisprudence for Africa” (1999) 10 Journal of Democracy 135; K.D. Ewing, “A Theory of Democratic 
Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable and Independent Judiciary” (2000) 38 Alta L Rev 
709. 
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this dissertation is not framed as a theoretical debate about human rights. But perhaps 
because a generally acceptable meaning of “human rights” has polarized legal 
scholarship and defied the most intense debate the necessity for such a conceptual 
clarification is the more compelling. As Fields and Narr explain, “[w]ithout an adequate 
conceptualization, we can never be sure what human rights are and if they are indeed 
being respected.”55 I would add that understanding the nature of human rights makes it 
easier to explain how those rights might be protected in practice and what role, if any, 
there is for the courts in that process. 
In their most popular understanding, human rights are described as inherent and 
inalienable entitlements attaching to human beings for the simple reason of their 
humanity.56 They are not a gift from any government nor do they become attached to 
persons because of constitutional statements. This notwithstanding, I am more persuaded 
by Fields and Narr who argue that human rights are not just ideology but constitute a 
socially constructed fight57 and that they “become realized only by the struggles of real 
people experiencing real instances of domination.”58 They add further that the world is a 
field of struggle over rights without any guarantees of success.59 I should caution that it is 
only in the description of human rights as the object of an on-going struggle that I agree 
with these authors and not in their other claim that people are not born with human rights 
but may only have the potential for rights. This view is too positivistic and would seem to 
                                                          
55 A. Belden Fields & Wolf-Dieter Narr, “Human Rights as a Holistic Concept” (1992) 14 Hum Rts Q 1. 
56 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2003); Aka, supra note 4 at 212; John Ayotunde Bewaji, “Human Rights: A Philosophical Analysis of 
Yoruba Conceptions” (2006) 37 Cambrian L Rev 49 at 50.  
57 Petman, supra note 36. 
58 See Fields & Narr, supra note 53 at 5. 
59 Ibid. Another scholar divides conceptions of human rights into four different schools of thought. The first 
school comprises “Natural scholars who conceive human rights as given. The second or “Deliberative 
scholars” who view them as agreed upon. “Protest scholars” believe human rights are fought for. Finally, 
the “Discourse scholars” see human rights as talked about. The author says that “For the protest school, 
human rights are realized through a perpetual fight for their realization. They conceive of human rights not 
so much as tangible but as a utopia or a project always in the making (and reversible).” See Marie-
Benedicte Dembour, “What are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought” (2010) 32 Hum Rts Q 1. See 
also Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, “Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language” (2000) 2 Hum Rts 
Dialogue 3 (“Throughout history, the protection of human rights has been won by struggle…”). 
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make human rights contingent upon factors outside the specific human qualifications of 
the claimant, even though some form of struggle is required to realize them. If human 
rights are accepted as involving some struggle, the courts in turn form one of the open 
forums where it might be waged, and in which the level of success or otherwise would 
depend on the existence of certain objective social conditions that are part of the subject 
of this study. Stammers therefore emphasizes the importance of social action to the 
construction of human rights.60 
In my view, by looking at how the judiciary operates as an institution for the 
protection of human rights we can understand one of the many ways that the very concept 
itself could be appropriately conceptualized as a struggle. Human rights guarantees, 
whether conceived as natural and inalienable or as positive entitlements in constitutional 
texts can only have meaning within the context of remedies available when they are 
violated. Even though those rights may be important symbols and goals in their 
declaratory state, they take more concrete shape and acquire greater meaning when a 
violation occurs and a remedy is applied to redress it.  
But for various reasons and in many legal regimes across the world the mere fact 
that a human rights violation has taken place does not mean that the victim would obtain 
redress. Judge D. Re distinguishes human rights as ideology or goals from human rights 
that are realizable in practice and can be vindicated by effective remedies. He said the 
question “should no longer be whether there is a right not to be tortured. The question 
                                                          
60 Neil Stammers, “Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights” (1999) 21 Hum Rts Q 
980 at 981. (Stating: “To say that human rights is [sic] socially constructed is to say that ideas and practices 
in respect of human rights are created, re-created, and instanciated by human actors in particular socio-
historical settings and conditions. It is a way of understanding human rights which does not require them to 
have any metaphysical existence (for example, through nature or God), nor does it rely on abstract 
reasoning or logic to ground them. The emphasis on the potential creativity of human actors in this 
understanding of social constructism also stands in contrast to forms of structuralist explanation that reduce 
the role of social actors to nothing other than bearers of structural determinations.”). See generally Neil 
Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (London: Pluto Press, 2009).  
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today is: How can the victim obtain an effective remedy?”61 It is therefore the effort 
mobilized towards getting redress in these situations that give the human rights idea the 
character of a struggle.62 
It is relevant here to ask: why is this so? The victim of a human rights violation is 
often ranged against both the state and established political order. Though governments 
might claim to respect human rights, such claims sometimes turn out to be deceitful 
especially in those cases where for the government what is at stake is a choice between 
protecting rights - which sometimes could be a question on the legitimacy of power - and 
stabilizing the political status quo.  In an African context Aidoo contends: 
Political movements and parties are by nature more concerned with 
organizing of periodic national elections than with the defense of universal 
human rights per se. The evidence in Africa so far is that rights are of 
importance to parties only in so far as they impinge most directly on the 
questions of political power and electoral contests. Indeed only in very 
few of the programs and manifestoes of existing political parties does one 
notice any ample concern with working for human rights. Rather, political 
leaders often attempt to coopt well-known human rights activists into 
leading positions of political parties. Too often, these activists are 
regarded as agents of external forces.63  
 
To victims of human rights violations in this political context, the search for protection 
against abuses becomes a struggle in an experiential sense when, relying on dry 
affirmations of rights by the political regime, they apply to courts for remedies. The 
struggle takes different shapes. If the victim is not sufficiently enlightened about rights 
and confused about going one way or the other, he/she would first have to seek and 
                                                          
61 Judge Edward D Re, “Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective Remedies” (1993) 67 St John’s L 
Rev 581 at 592. 
62 Beth Simmons, however, offers a cautionary dimension to the debate on litigation and remedies. She 
argues: “…much research suggests that litigation’s power resides not so much in its ability to provide every 
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the same point see also Douglas NeJaime, “Winning through Losing” (2011) 96 Iowa L Rev 941. 
63 See supra note 29 at 708. 
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obtain helpful information. He/she has to think through the financial implications of 
mounting a legal challenge against the injury to his/her rights. Competent lawyers do not 
come cheap and sometimes the administrative cost of filing complaints discourages even 
the most straightforward claims. But more importantly, the victim has to factor in the 
prevailing social and political conditions. What is the character of the regime in power? 
Are the courts free and independent to decide in favor of rights without unpleasant 
repercussions to their personnel? How long might it take from the time a claim is filed 
until a final decision is rendered?  Would judgment be timely or would it be delayed for 
so long as to amount to a denial of justice?  
For all the above reasons and more, some scholars have discussed the limitations 
of using the courts and the legal strategy for the enforcement of human rights.64 Meydani 
and Mizrahi cite the example of Israel to support the theory that turning to the courts as 
forum for the defence of human rights may, for various reasons, prove ineffective in the 
long term.65 According to them, the situation would have been mitigated were it only 
about just the courts and human rights organizations. But the human rights project often 
includes relations among politicians, bureaucrats and the public. Secondly, they argue, 
Israeli political culture favors the bottom-up rather than top-down relations between 
citizens and politicians. “Thus, directing all human rights strategies towards an elitist 
institution such as the Supreme Court may bear results in the short run but in the long run 
attitude change as well as policy decisions towards defending human rights are likely to 
emerge due to demands from society.”66 Lastly, they assert that by empowering courts 
and discounting other avenues of mass mobilization towards more effective rights 
protection, human rights organizations disconnect the issues from the people, thereby 
discouraging belief. Thus, some of the limitations to the use of courts for human rights 
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protection could be political, others institutional, and yet others economic.67 There might 
be in fact a cross - fertilization of internal and external conditions that inhibit the capacity 
of courts to accept rights-based cases let alone provide remedies for violations.68 
The institutional constraints on using law for human rights protection are first 
analyzed here. In doing so, I adopt the distinction which Cross makes between the role of 
law per se on the one hand, and legal institutions (of which the courts are part) on the 
other in the protection of human rights.69  Courts do not exist in a vacuum. They exist for 
some important public reasons the major one being to apply the law and mediate concrete 
situations in which legal disputes have arisen. The law’s independent existence is only to 
the extent that persons whose actions it constrains are willing to live within those 
constraints. The courts and other institutions of the state intervene when those persons 
step outside the legally prescribed boundaries. The same applies to the human rights 
situation where the courts get called in to mediate in cases where one party alleges abuse 
from the other. According to Cross, it may be plausible that the law is deemed 
meaningless or viewed as a formality absent the cultural or economic incentives for it to 
implement and enforce itself. But this is not self-evident and could even be reversed.70 
Would the state of law, for example, correlate with human rights protection only because 
a third factor produced both the law and the regime for protection? He does not think so 
and instead maintains that: 
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The law and legal institutions might explain the measures of economic 
human welfare and/or unrest that have been correlated with human rights 
protections. Economists increasingly emphasize the important role of legal 
institutions to economic growth, so it is surely reasonable to believe that 
such institutions could affect human rights. Those who bother to draft 
constitutions obviously consider the documents important, as does the 
plenitude of constitutional law scholars inhabiting law schools.71  
Abdullahi An-Na’im on his part discussed the dilemma of using courts as the primary 
centres for the protection of human rights in Africa.72 His argument simply is that African 
societies should do more for the implementation73 of human rights with less reliance on 
the legal strategy. While admitting that it might sound heretical at first, his approach 
acknowledged both the importance of legal protection of human rights and the inability 
(not simply the unwillingness) of the post-colonial African state to provide adequate legal 
protection for human rights.74 His belief is that an implementation strategy will more 
appropriately address human rights violations in Africa if it is aimed at countering the 
structural, cultural and other root causes of violations. This will deal with violations more 
comprehensively than a legal strategy which only seeks redress for violations on a case-
by-case basis.75 
 An-Na’im argues that the lack, or weakness, of the legal protection of human 
rights may indicate broader structural and institutional inadequacies of the legal system as 
a whole. Given that access to effective legal remedies is itself a human right, its absence 
is by implication a violation of human rights. Secondly, he states that the lack or 
weakness of legal enforcement could be symptomatic of other problems such as 
executive interference with the courts or the failure to comply with judicial decisions. He 
continues: 
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Problems with the legal enforcement of human rights may be due to 
underlying cultural and institutional difficulties with the rule of law or 
evidence of a lack of public confidence in the ability of the courts to 
vindicate rights that is a reflection of other problems. In other words, one 
expects weak legal protection of human rights in situations of political 
instability, economic underdevelopment, institutional incapacity, and the 
unwillingness or inability of the public at large to resort to the courts for 
the enforcement of their rights.76 
 
To conclude this section, it is obvious that whether speaking about regular or transitional 
situations, the interaction among democracy, the rule of law, and human rights is a 
normative imperative rather than an optional one. They are all positive values and 
mutually re-enforcing. Democracy is hollow without the rule of law while human rights 
protection is impossible without both. There is therefore the likelihood that the judiciary 
would be more effective in protecting human rights when democracy is present and the 
rule of law thrives. But while these values provide the structure upon which to build a 
strong system of respect for human rights, there is also the role of human agency in the 
process. These values, in and of themselves, cannot dent arbitrariness if there is a lack of 
human agents who believe in them and are willing to let them flourish. This will therefore 
make moot the debate on whether it is the legal or political strategy that is better for 
human rights enforcement. In reality, there has to be a balance between both strategies. 
 
1.5. Paradoxes: Failing on the Promises of Democracy and Human Rights 
 
While the Nigerian constitution of 1999 like all similar constitutions in other countries in 
transition contain several human rights guarantees which courts are empowered to 
enforce in theory, in practice that expectation often hangs in the balance. The difficulty of 
balancing human rights practice with its theory is perhaps the reason the subject is among 
the most contested in domestic and international law. Many reasons could account for 
this. The capacity of courts to deliver human rights remedies may be affected by the 
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range and gravity of human rights violations that are placed before them for adjudication. 
Might it not be that the courts are ineffective because their resources are stretched and 
they are overwhelmed by the sheer volume of cases brought before them that are directly 
related to the level of human rights violations taking place within the society? It could be 
argued that constitutional provisions are mere words that do not amount to much. And 
that it is human agents in the legislature, executive and courts that should take the blame 
when constitutions fail to deliver on their often lofty promises. This is a valid concern 
that will be accounted for in the analyses that follow. 
 Nigeria is a developing country with a colonial past. Attention has usually been 
accorded in the literature to the specific characteristics of “developing” and “post-
colonial” states that make them the centres of widespread human rights violations.77 
What is clear from those writings is that in much of Africa as elsewhere in the world, the 
form of government – whether a “democracy” or “dictatorship” – is of limited 
significance because human rights abuses occur to some degree in both forms of 
government.78 Since the early 1990s a wind of democracy has blown through much of 
sub-Saharan Africa with new constitutions incorporating bills of rights. There is, 
however, much skepticism about “whether these constitutional reforms can improve 
human rights protection for citizens in the region.”79 In fact, a study covering the period 
1976 to 1997 established little correlation between rights-friendly constitutional 
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provisions and states’ abuse of personal integrity in the region.80 So apart from 
investigating why human rights violations occur to the level that they do, it is also worth 
asking why constitutional provisions guaranteeing human rights appear insufficient to 
discourage those abuses. 
 Colonialism is generally implicated in the prevailing unsatisfactory human rights 
situation in much of Africa. And this had to be because the process of colonization itself 
was a violation of human rights81 and it was therefore impossible for a culture of human 
rights to develop alongside it. Carey agrees that colonial influences still animate current 
human rights practices in the post-colonial state but only indirectly.82 By contrast An-
Na’im asserts that colonialism and its aftermath burdened those states with structural 
obstacles that impeded their progress towards constitutionalism and democracy.83 Carey 
himself writes that colonial socialization was impelled by subjugation and hypocrisy and 
that colonialism “prematurely introduced quasi-liberal institutions, which were generally 
undeveloped, whose institutions were designed more for economic exploitation than 
‘civilizing’ the population.”84 Therefore, the constitutional recognition of rights was often 
belated and tended to protect the European expatriate population’s rights over the native 
majority’s rights.85 It was hardly surprising that the states delivered at independence in 
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much of Africa had no culture of human rights to fall back on. In the event, indigenous 
human rights violators only took the baton from the departing colonial powers.86 
 In some countries, including Nigeria, military interruption of civil rule further 
complicated an already tough situation. In the period covered by this study, Nigeria was 
transiting from one such long era of military interregnum. Generally, military regimes are 
believed to be more likely to resort to repression as the primary means of control and 
coercion.87 When they do leave the political scene, it takes some time before a liberal 
orientation overtakes the repression of the immediate past. Stohl, et al suggest that 
“within a state which has an ‘efficient’ repressive apparatus, state repression seems to 
radiate an ‘after-life’ which lingers and has effects for some time after the observable use 
of coercion by state agents.”88 Continuing, they state that “[t]he threat remains implicit 
because a general learning process has taken place. In essence, the behavioral terror 
process has become a part of the political structure …”89 
An important insight to this section of my study is offered by Davenport who 
conducted empirical research into the correlation between the provisions of national 
constitutions and how governments treat their citizens.90 His intention was to find out 
whether national constitutions affect the manner in which governments restrict political 
and civil rights or whether the content of national constitutions is generally irrelevant to 
how governments behave. According to Davenport, what the literature on repressive 
behavior yields are three factors that account for variance in government use of 
                                                          
86 Amani Daima, “Challenges for Emerging African Democracies” (1998) 10 Peace Rev 57 at 59 (arguing 
that colonialism did not build a climate conducive to constitutionalism. It rather produced states that were 
and still remain “totalitarian, oppressive, and exploitative” and only supported the “colonial purpose of 
dominating African peoples and exploiting their resources”). 
87 Camp Keith & Ogundele, supra note 77 at 1075. 
88 Michael Stohl et al., “State Violation of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of Measurement” (1986) 8 
Hum Rts Q 592 
89 Ibid at 595. 
90 Christian A Davenport, “Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series 
Investigation of why Political and Civil Liberties are Suppressed” (1996) The Journal of Politics 627. 
 28 
 
repression: system type, political conflict and economic development.91 The system type 
consideration explores the relationship between the character of the government in place 
(is it democratic or dictatorial?) and its willingness or reluctance to apply political 
repression. The second variable is that repression heightens in societies experiencing 
political conflicts. Finally, if a country is going through significant economic 
development, there is the tendency for political repression to be consequential.92  
 Davenport’s contribution to this debate takes on added significance when he 
analogizes his theory to two arguments, the one of “constitutional promises” and the 
other of “constitutional threats.”93 The constitutional promise paradigm theorizes that 
when particular rights are mentioned in a constitution, it is evidence of great concern for 
them by government and therefore less likelihood that it will restrict them. On the other 
hand the constitutional threat argument states that mentioning those rights in the 
constitution is not evidence of government commitment to them at all. It is rather an 
indication of government’s sensitivity to those rights, and the likelihood that it will 
restrict them. I might add that it could also relate to the people’s sensitivity to those rights 
if they were involved in drafting the constitution.  
Davenport noted the results of two earlier studies on this issue with interesting 
results. In the first study, “greater acknowledgment of rights in constitutions was found to 
result in lower actual enjoyment of (those) rights.”94 The second study suggested that four 
variables determined the possibility that constitutional guarantee of rights would 
discourage repression. These are: [1] constitutional guarantee of an independent 
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judiciary, [2] the constitutional guarantee of a federal system of government, [3] the 
actual independence of the judiciary, and [4] the actual decentralization of government 
operations.95 Davenport summarized the findings of this study as follows: 
First, constitutional provisions are not found to significantly influence 
repressive practices. This finding … is in support of the null hypothesis 
that constitutions do not matter. Second, it was found that the structure 
of the political system (i.e., the independence of the judiciary and the 
decentralization of government operations) did affect the use of 
repression at statistically significant levels. Both factors examined 
increased the respect for political and civil rights. Third, and last, 
constitutional guarantees were found to indirectly affect political 
repression through their influence on the structure of the political 
system.96 
 
Nigeria is at a stage in its development where all the factors capable of increasing 
political repression are present. This would be a concern both in terms of the level of 
human rights abuses as well as the inability of the courts to effectively address them. 
None of the three factors that Davenport says the literature identifies as largely 
influencing the use of repression (regime type, political conflict and economic 
development) are favorably accounted for in the Nigeria legal system. The country is 
under civil rule, which many prefer to the past military regimes. But several basic 
ingredients of democracy, like the rule of law, are still lacking.  Political conflicts 
(partisan, ethno-religious, economic) have remained intractable for the most part and the 
government occasionally uses the economic development justification as cover to protect 
economic capital at the expense of rights.97 Notwithstanding, the judiciary is not 
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sufficiently independent to mediate these tensions. There is, therefore, a visible culture of 
impunity and lack of accountability which not only discourages litigation to enforce 
rights, but also has a likely demoralizing effect on those seeking to use the courts to 
confront the system. The next section takes a closer look at the justifications and 
methodology of court intervention in human rights litigation. 
1.6. The Heart of the Matter: Courts and Human Rights 
What is the nature of the tasks that courts perform when they hear complaints of human 
rights abuses with a view of redressing them? Legal scholarship identifies this task first 
as “judicial review” of legislative, executive and administrative actions. Courts could be 
reviewing legislation to assess their compliance with constitutional provisions but 
especially those provisions enshrining human rights and freedoms. This is even more so 
where the application of such legislation may have implications for human rights 
guarantees. Courts could be reviewing the exercise of executive or administrative 
authority against the same standards. Higher courts could also be calling to question the 
activities of inferior courts or tribunals to ensure that they have not acted in excess of 
their powers. Rawlings describes judicial review as a “slippery concept,” yet defines it (at 
least in terms of England and Wales) as “a supervisory – inherent – jurisdiction directed 
on grounds of legality to the decisions and other public functions of public bodies.”98 
Take note that the use in this description of the word “inherent” clearly reflects, in my 
view, the English common law understanding of the concept in the absence of a written 
constitution.  
Historically, Fitzgerald writes, “judicial review in the United Kingdom was 
confined to restraining the exercise of executive or administrative discretion in excess of 
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the authority granted by legislation.”99 This is what O’Cinneide typifies as the traditional 
understanding of judicial review100 and for which Seidman provides a pithy description. 
He says “In Britain, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy101 combined with an 
unwritten constitution… meant that the judiciary… had, in theory, no role in reviewing 
the validity of legislation.”102 The clearest understanding of this principle, in my view, is 
that provided by Wellington to the effect that: 
We tend to think of courts at common law as acting because the legislature 
has not and as making law the legislature can unmake. When statutes are 
involved, we see [the] courts either effectuating legislative will or, through 
an occasional misreading of legislative intent, as producing an incorrect 
decision that can be remedied easily by a legislative reform.103 
 
Therefore, judicial review in classical English constitutionalism concerned only executive 
and administrative actions. Such judicial evaluations were eschewed in relation to 
legislation. This in effect represents the understanding of judicial review in countries 
applying the unwritten model of constitutionalism. 
As opposed to this model, O’Cinneide identifies a different variant that he calls 
“rights review.” This alternative establishes “a form of judicial scrutiny that could review 
democratically derived decision-making by public authorities for compliance with a set 
of recognized basic rights.”104 According to this model, parliament is no longer supreme. 
                                                          
99 Peter L Fitzgerald, “Constitutional Crisis over the Proposed Supreme Court for the United Kingdom” 
(2004) 18 Temp Int’l & Comp L J 233 at 245. 
100 Colm O’Cinneide, “Democracy, Rights and the Constitution – New Directions in the Human Rights 
Era” (2004) 57 Curr Legal Probs 175 at 176. 
101 Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 
1996)  at 37- 38 (where he described parliamentary sovereignty as “the dominant characteristic of our 
political institutions” and meaning “neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament … has, under 
the English constitution, the right to make and unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or 
body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament”). 
102 Robert B Seidman, “Judicial Review and Fundamental Freedoms in Anglophone Independent Africa” 
(1974) 35 Ohio St L J 820 at 826. 
103 Harry H Wellington, “The Nature of Judicial Review” (1981-1982) 91 Yale L J 486 at 487. 
104 See supra note 98 at 176. This corresponds as well to what another scholar calls “constitutional 
adjudication.” See Michel Rosenfeld, “Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: 
 32 
 
The constitution pre-empts that position and since in the nature of things legislation 
ordinarily precedes adjudication, the judiciary comes to pass upon the validity of 
legislation after parliament has acted. This role thus impresses final authority on the 
matter upon the courts.105 In Seidman’s view, judicial review of legislation takes place in 
either of two ways. It could be that the action of the administration is within the scope of 
a particular statute, but that the statute on its face or as it has been construed is 
unconstitutional.106 Alternatively, the claim could be that while the statute under which 
action is claimed to be taken may not in most cases permit unconstitutional activity, in 
this case the particular action taken was ultra vires or in other words, beyond the powers 
granted by the statute or constitution.107 While in the first the courts exercise control 
powers over the legislature in the latter the judiciary controls the executive branch. 
But more significant is the parallel that Stone draws between what she refers to as 
“rights-based review” and “structural judicial review.”108 While recognizing judicial 
rights review in the same manner that O’Cinneide does, she still noted that judges in 
countries with written constitutions, apart from enforcing rights, also interpret and 
enforce those provisions of the constitution that establish the basic structure of 
government. This she called “structural judicial review,” encompassing “the 
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interpretation and enforcement of the division or powers that is part of federal 
constitutions as well as the enforcement of those provisions establishing the basic 
institutions of government.”109 
Jeremy Waldron’s perspective is as well crucial to this debate. He distinguishes 
two forms of judicial review: judicial review of legislation and judicial review of 
executive action or administrative decisionmaking.110 He admits that the argument in 
favor of judicial review applies to the executive (which “has some elective credentials of 
its own with which to oppose decisionmaking by judges”)111 as well as the legislature. He 
adds that “it is almost universally accepted that the executive’s election credentials are 
subject to the principle of the rule of law, and as a result, that officials may properly be 
required by courts to act in accordance with legal authorization.”112 The same proposition 
as it relates to the legislature, he says, is essentially contested and is the main ground for 
the polarization that the debate about judicial review of legislative enactments has 
engendered. 
Secondly, Waldron makes a further distinction between what he calls strong 
judicial review and weak judicial review.113 In a system of strong judicial review, 
according to him, courts have the authority to decline to apply a statute in a particular 
case (even though the statute on its own terms plainly applies in that case) or to modify 
the effect of a statute to make its application conform with individual rights (in ways that 
the statute itself does not envisage). Courts here also have the authority to establish as a 
matter of law that a given statute or legislative provision will not be applied, so that as a 
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result of stare decisis and issue preclusion a law that they have refused to apply becomes 
in effect a dead letter.114 He cites some European courts as possessing this authority and 
stating that though it looks like American courts do not; the real effect of their authority 
is not much short of it.115 
In jurisdictions that apply the weak version of judicial review, courts may 
scrutinize legislation for its conformity to individual rights but may decline to apply it 
because rights would otherwise be violated.116 Waldron gives as an example of this the 
practice in the United Kingdom since the enactment of the Human Rights Act, 1998 under 
which courts may review a legislation with a view to issuing a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility” if the court finds that the provision under review is incompatible with a 
right protected under the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, the 
European Convention). Under the Human Rights Act, such declaration of incompatibility 
“does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in 
respect of which it was given; and … is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in 
which it is made.”117 Yet the declaration may have the effect of causing a minister to 
initiate legislative procedure to ameliorate the incompatibility. 
This study does not treat judicial review in the classical English sense. My interest 
is with judicial review in cases where the violation of human rights is alleged whether 
arising from the application of statute or the exercise of executive and administrative 
functions. This focus notwithstanding, I would make appropriate references to the British 
model while mapping the trajectory of the concept in Nigeria’s constitutional and human 
rights jurisprudence. I should state that this is the case because Nigeria at independence 
had a written constitution with a bill of rights and therefore from that very beginning was 
not suited for British style judicial review. Yet for various reasons that would also form 
                                                          
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid at 1355; See also Mauro Cappalletti & John Clarke Adams, “Comment, Judicial Review of 
Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations” (1966) 79 Harv L Rev 1207. 
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part of later analysis, the British tradition still exerted an intense influence on the 
Nigerian practice. This study is also not concerned with Stone’s structural judicial review 
except in so far as human rights might be impacted as a result of the court interpretation 
and enforcement of constitutional provisions detailing governmental structure or 
institutions. One area that this is prominent is in those circumstances where state 
governments and individuals in those states as well invoke cultural or more frequently 
religious observances to oppose clear constitutional principles.  
1.7. Tower of Babel: The Birth of an Academic Obsession 
Judicial review has engendered perhaps one of the most polarizing debates ever known to 
legal scholarship. The issue is surrounded by controversies from all possible approaches. 
The least of these debates perhaps concerns its origins. Much more divisive, however, is 
the disputation about the consequences of judicial review in a constitutional democracy. 
While English-style judicial review valorized parliamentary supremacy, judicial review 
under a written constitution as practiced in the United States, for example, handed the 
judiciary extensive jurisdiction to meddle in majoritarian decision-making. In 1962, 
Alexander Bickel described judicial review as “a deviant institution in the American 
democracy.”118 He also famously declared that “[W]hen the Supreme Court declares 
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive; it thwarts the will 
of the representatives of the actual people of the here and now.”119  
This view constitutes in brief outline what has been described in constitutional 
theory as the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”120 To Friedman, the question which 
judicial review poses in a democracy is: “to the extent that democracy entails 
responsiveness to popular will, how [do you] explain a branch of government whose 
members are unaccountable to the people [meaning the judiciary], yet have the power to 
                                                          
118 Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale: 
Yale University Press, 1986).  
119 Ibid at 16-17. 
120 Mark A Graber, “Foreword: From the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to Juristocracy and the Political 
Construction of Judicial Power” (2006) 65 Md L Rev 1. 
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overturn popular decisions?”121 Thus, Klarman describes judicial review as the “courts 
heroic Countermajoritarian function.”122 But before analyzing whether this difficulty does 
indeed exist from available literature, let me first deal briefly with the question of the 
origins of judicial review. 
 It is customary to relate the early history of judicial review in the American sense 
with the decision of that country’s Supreme Court in the now famous case of Marbury v. 
Madison.123 But Mary Bilder has a more intriguing account of its origins. She claims that 
the practice arose from “a longstanding English corporate practice under which 
corporation’s ordinances were reviewed for repugnancy to the laws of England.”124 
Continuing, she states: 
                                                          
121 Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial 
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122 Michael J Klarman, “Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions” (1996) 82 Va L Rev 1 
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Court Made More out of Less” (1999) 56 Wash & Lee L Rev 787; Dean Alfange Jr., “Marbury v Madison 
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124 Mary S Bilder, “Corporate Origins of Judicial Review” (2006-2007) 116 Yale L J 503 at 504; See as 
well Miguel Schor, “Mapping Comparative Judicial Review” (2008) 7 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 257 at 
261-262 (contending that “The origin of judicial review in the United States is not well understood because 
it has become the stuff of myth. Marbury v Madison is remembered today as establishing judicial review 
and as the fountainhead of judicial protection of individual rights. Neither belief is well founded”). See also 
TRS Allan, “The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or Interpretative 
Inquiry” (2002) 61 Cambridge L J 87; Andrew Halpin, “The Theoretical Controversy concerning Judicial 
Review” (2001) 64 Mod L R 500; Bradley Selway, “The Principle Behind Common Law Judicial Review 
of Administrative Actions: The Search Continues” (2002) 8 Adel L Rev 1; Naomi Sidebotham., “Judicial 
Review: Is there still a Role for Unreasonableness?” (2001) 8 Murdoch UEJL 1. 
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This English corporation law subsequently became a transatlantic 
constitution binding American colonial law by a similar standard of not 
being repugnant to the laws of England. After the Revolution, this practice 
of bounded legislation slid inexorably into constitutional practice, as the 
“Constitution” replaced the “laws of England.” With the Constitution 
understood to embody the supreme authority of the people, the judiciary 
would void ordinary legislation repugnant to this supreme law. Over a 
century later, this practice gained a new name: judicial review. The 
widespread acceptance of this name eventually obscured the degree to 
which the origins of the practice lay in older practices regarding the 
delegated nature of corporate and colonial authorities, rather than in a new 
constitutional theory of judicial power.125 
 
But in spite of Bilder’s position, the very idea that it is possible for courts to invalidate 
acts of Parliament belonged to Sir Edward Coke. A renegade of sorts, Coke lived 
possibly well ahead of his time, being perhaps the first English judge to question the 
omnipotent law making powers of the British Parliament. Why Coke’s exertions take the 
cake is simply because they were happening at a period of absolute parliamentary 
supremacy. Allen Dillard Boyer in his interesting narration of Coke’s judicial 
involvements notes that “One of Coke’s most important contributions to the history of the 
law grows out of the energy of the Elizabethan courts. This contribution is judicial 
review, the idea that judges may invalidate statutes passed by the legislature.”126 Even 
though Coke’s reputation was already well-established in the British realm at that time, it 
was his decision in the Bonham’s Case127 that further solidified it. In that case, Coke 
entered the famous opinion: 
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will 
control acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; 
for when an act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or 
                                                          
125 Ibid. 
126 Allen Dillard Boyer, “Understanding, Authority, and Will”: Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan 
Origins of Judicial Review” (1997-1998) 39 BC L Rev 43 at 73; See also Theodore Plucknett, “Bonham’s 
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repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, 
adjudge such act to be void.128  
 
However, Boyer said the judicial review that Coke authored was dead by the end of the 
Seventeenth Century, a period coinciding with the emergence of Sir William Blackstone 
on the horizon.129 While recognizing the precedents that Coke had laid out, Blackstone 
had a totally divergent view of their utility and of judicial review more generally. He was 
of the opinion that even if parliament positively enacted an unreasonable thing to be 
done, “I know of no power … to control it.”130 He rejected the very notion that courts had 
powers to reject statutes whose main objects were unreasonable, “for that were to set the 
judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive of all 
government.”131 
1.8. Stalemate: Judicial Review in Action 
From the time of both Coke and Blackstone until more recently, and only to a very 
limited extent, the British had no document containing its constitution. It always came up 
first among countries operating unwritten constitutions.132 Separation of powers did not 
feature much in its constitutional practices. The Crown headed both the executive and 
legislative arms of government and the most prominent members of the judiciary also 
belonged to the legislature. And apart from the brief spell when Coke seemed to irritate 
the system, British courts were forbidden to invalidate legislative acts; their judicial 
review powers being only restricted to the actions and omissions of administrative 
bodies.133 This is despite Lakin’s contention that rather than parliamentary sovereignty, 
the British constitution actually rests on “the ideal government under law or the principle 
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129 See Dillard Boyer, supra note 125 at 89. 
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131 Ibid. 
132 See Seidman, supra note 101 at 826. 
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of legality.”134 Even so, it often was the case that judges claimed that judicial review is 
concerned not with the substantive decision of the administrative body itself but with the 
decision-making process that it adopted.135 
 The American war of independence was waged in part on the basis of what were 
seen as the shortcomings of the British system.136 This was pointed out in the Federalist 
Papers mostly relied upon by those who negotiated the American constitution. In the 
Federalist Papers No. 47, it was asserted: 
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the 
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally 
separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an 
integral part of the legislative authority … All the members of the 
judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the 
address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to 
consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the 
legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the 
executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial 
power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme 
appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far 
connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate 
in its deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote.137 
 
Yet upon its promulgation, the American constitution avoided the two main issues that 
were later to raise controversy in the understanding of judicial review. It contained no 
Bill of Rights and did not so much as mention the power of the courts to invalidate 
                                                          
134 Stuart Lakin, “Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor of Legality in 
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legislation inconsistent with its provisions. While the Bill of Rights became entrenched 
through the Constitution’s First Amendment, the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Marbury v. Madison is generally believed to have laid the foundation for judicial review 
in the manner it is understood in American constitutional theory even though this is by no 
means the only view on this matter.138  
The most significant portion of the Marbury decision for my purpose is where 
Justice Marshall held that if any law is inconsistent with the constitution, it is the duty of 
the court to not only pronounce on that inconsistency but to resolve it in favor of the 
constitution. According to him, “If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, 
is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it 
effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if 
it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and 
would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on.”139 
 Friedman contends that two different positions are embedded in the power of 
courts to review governmental action. At once there is a “threat” and as well a “hope” in 
judicial review, he says.140 It is perhaps by understanding how both the threat and hope 
clash against one another that one could contemplate one of longest running debates in 
contemporary legal scholarship. Friedman postulates that when judicial review is viewed 
as a threat, it is basically because it contains the tendency to diminish or interfere with 
democratic governance. This is usually identified as the countermajoritarian role of 
courts.141 Yet judicial review viewed as hopeful or optimistic is conceived to perform “an 
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admirable function – ensuring that government adheres to constitutional commands.”142 
He believes strongly in the proposition that “judges enforcing the Constitution will 
protect minority rights and enforce constitutional safeguards.”143 Most scholars therefore 
defend judicial review on the grounds that it is necessary to protect individual rights and 
protect those minority groups who ordinarily lack the wherewithal to protect themselves 
and thus at the mercy of the impulse of the majority to politically self-perpetuate.144 
Just like Justice Marshall alluded to in the case of Marbury v. Madison, there are 
two views in contention in this debate. The first is the power of the legislature to enact 
laws. Those who view judicial review as being countermajoritarian hold that since the 
legislature is a representative body, its lawmaking powers should not be subjected to the 
whims and caprices of an unelected judiciary. The other is the check placed on those 
powers by the provisions of the constitution, most notably those guaranteeing individual 
rights. Adherents of this view believe that when there is a written constitution containing 
a bill of rights, it places a constraint on legislative powers. And since legislative 
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majorities are only interested in self-perpetuation, they cannot possibly be relied upon to 
redress the adverse consequences of their legislative judgments; hence the courts are 
presumed better placed to perform that role. The courts are typically said to be engaged in 
representation reinforcement145 while carrying out this protective role. This has been 
described by one writer as “the most widely accepted normative account of constitutional 
judicial review…”146 
There is no debate in the Nigerian context that the courts are empowered to 
review laws and actions that infringe on constitutional provisions, especially those 
enshrining basic constitutional rights. The Nigerian constitution of 1999 in its Supremacy 
Clause provides for the absolute priority of the constitution over all other laws which if 
they are inconsistent with any provisions of the constitution are void to the extent of that 
inconsistency.147 Nigerian courts are generally recognized as the only institution that has 
powers under the constitution to keep an eye on all laws and governmental actions to 
ensure that they do not transgress the provisions of the constitution. That the courts could 
invalidate laws inconsistent with the constitution is accepted practice. The widely 
believed countermajoritarian impact which legal scholarship ascribes to judicial review 
while useful as an issue in the Nigerian context may not have the same resonance as in 
other jurisdictions. I will return to this point much later in this study. 
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1.9. The Importance of the Study 
Ruth Gavison identifies two strategies for defending human rights: the primarily legal 
and the predominantly political.148 These broad categories can be further broken down 
into multiple sub-categories. Those who act through the courts or other legal decision-
makers to achieve human rights protection apply a strategy much narrower than that 
applied by those who use instead the political channel. This is an opinion shared by other 
scholars.149 But these strategies are not mutually exclusive as sometimes the same actors 
could deploy both political and legal strategies. It could in fact be argued that often 
litigation is a component of a broader political strategy.  
As Gavison contends, where there is a lack of public consensus regarding the 
importance of human rights, the legal strategy may be ineffective.150 This fact 
notwithstanding, I shall in this dissertation devote significant attention to the legal 
strategy, especially the role of the courts, in spite of the acknowledged challenges to 
deploying that strategy as the only or major one for the improvement of human rights 
situations. The importance of the legal process for the protection of human rights is 
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generally acknowledged and need not be over-stressed.151 As a leading authority on 
British administrative law observed, “There is something particularly exasperating about 
broad affirmations of human rights [without] giving them legal protection”152 
An important issue which is generally overlooked in the literature concerning 
using the law courts to expand human rights protection in Nigeria is the relationship 
between the historical characteristics of her courts dating all the way back to colonialism 
and the extraordinary changes made through various post-independence constitutions to 
the texture of human rights norms and the demands which those, at times, revolutionary 
provisions placed on the courts. As Nwabueze noted,153 though appearing to be one of the 
major reasons for the apparent ambivalent posture of the courts in protecting human 
rights in the country, this issue has suffered both insufficient theorization and a lack of 
satisfactory academic scrutiny. The works of Okere,154 Dakas,155 Okonkwor156 and 
Nwauche157 reflected some of the concerns covered in my research, but discussed the 
issues from specific thematic positions, and in a manner different than the approach I 
propose to adopt in my research. 
Okere discusses the competing theories of judicial interpretation of the 
constitution where the declaratory theory enjoins courts simply to declare the law as 
opposed to the constitutive variant which is more purposive in nature. Dakas’ piece is 
similar to Okere’s as it also discusses the proper role of courts in constitutional 
interpretation. He made a similar distinction between mere declaration of the law and 
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interpreting in a manner that averts injustice in all cases where mere declaration will lead 
to that end. Okonkwor on his part examines the legal framework for the practice of the 
right to freedom of expression in Nigeria. He also highlighted the shortcomings of the 
Nigerian rights limitation regime. Nwauche was more concerned in his piece with the 
troubling distinction that the Nigerian Supreme Court established between “main” and 
“accessory” claims in human rights litigation.  
Significant as these interventions are, they did not go far enough in interrogating 
the Nigerian ideology of human rights adjudication especially from a comparative 
standpoint. This is a major concern of this research. A proper contextualization of this 
concern is perhaps appropriate at this juncture. At independence Nigeria had the 
Westminster parliamentary model of democracy.158 Yet the constitution contained an 
elaborate Bill of Rights with clear guidelines for its application in the courts. This 
suggested some form of rights-based judicial review and striking down of laws 
inconsistent with the contents of the Bill of Rights. Under English common law which 
had prevailed prior to independence, individual rights availed only against the executive 
but not against the legislature. As one writer noted, “Courts in the common law 
jurisdiction have never countenanced the view of individual liberty as embodying eternal 
reason, unalterable by the legislature.”159 Britain which colonized Nigeria at that time 
“had no constitutional bill of rights, its judges [were] remarkably conservative, and its 
legal culture greatly [favored] parliamentary sovereignty to the nearly complete exclusion 
of judicial creativity.”160  Reconciling a rights-based approach to judicial review with 
parliamentary supremacy was therefore bound to stir up a methodological conflict, which 
it certainly did.  
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I will demonstrate in this study that in resolving this conflict, Nigerian courts did 
take the path of least resistance. They have over the years favored a more conservative, 
rights-constraining attitude suited to the early British tradition161 over and above the 
dynamic, rights-expanding process more widely applied in the American tradition even 
after Nigeria abandoned the British parliamentary system for the American presidential 
model of government.162 This attitude seems therefore to have stifled the creative 
capacity of the courts in developing this area of law and probably accounts for why they 
have not done as much as they could have to develop definite analytical standards in 
human rights cases. This appears to me to be one explanation for why the courts appear 
to have not been very effective in redressing widespread abuses even under the supposed 
democracy that has been in effect in Nigeria since May 1999. Sadly, this subject is 
evidently under-researched within the Nigerian legal academy. In fact I could go so far as 
to say that the problem has persisted because of this apparent lack of scholarly interest. 
While an explanation for this lack of interest is outside the boundaries of this dissertation, 
I suggest that it might be a useful theme for further research.  
Given this scenario, my dissertation proposes that Nigeria’s constitutional and 
judicial review practices pertaining to human rights violations warrants a considerably 
different trajectory. I am also hopeful that my study will positively alter current methods 
for the teaching of constitutional and administrative law in Nigerian universities. This 
stems from my belief that the seemingly unhelpful attitude of the courts to human rights 
litigation in Nigeria is directly related to the exposure of the judges to a particular regime 
of education and training. The emphasis has been on British constitutional and 
administrative law practices going back several decades. In contrast, I argue that the 
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their scope”). 
162 See United States v. Caroline Products, [1938] 304 U.S. 144 at 152 where the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation 
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
amendments [Bill of Rights] …” 
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Nigerian human rights adjudication regime should follow more the practices of legal 
environments that operate written constitutions and rights-based judicial review which is 
the model that obtains presently in Nigeria.      
 
1.9.1. Methodology 
My approach is a combination of interdisciplinarity (including such other disciplines as 
political science, economics and sociology), doctrinal and legal reasoning as well as case-
law analysis. I will apply forms of legal and social science analytical methods. Some 
parts of my analysis will also take the character of historical narratives. I will consult 
secondary sources to evaluate previous literature on the subject, contextualize it, map its 
limits and establish a framework. These sources shall include books and journal articles 
treating broadly the human rights theme, adjudication of human rights cases and how 
these are impacted by a transitional situation. I will also apply reports of human rights 
organizations working within and outside Nigeria if only to show the state of human 
rights protection or lack of it in the country. 
Since case-law evaluation will form an essential component of the research, I will 
use doctrine, legal reasoning, analysis and jurisprudence of human rights cases decided in 
Nigeria prior to 1999 to show the slippery provenance and inadequacy of current rights-
based adjudication while applying those decided since 1999 to measure the claim that the 
judiciary is failing in its duty as guardians of human rights. I will also apply primary 
information and legislation, including the constitution and international treaties to which 
Nigeria is a state party. In doing so, I will discuss the nature of legal obligations that 
Nigeria undertakes by acceding to international agreements and what impact this has on 
domestic human rights adjudication.  
Because it was impossible to cover all the cases of a human rights nature decided 
by all the courts in Nigeria during the period that my research covered, I will limit my 
choice of cases for analysis to those decided by the Nigerian Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal, and especially those cases that were commenced by the Fundamental 
Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. My primary means of case selection will be by 
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consulting the major law reports published in Nigeria, particularly the Nigeria Weekly 
Law Reports published by the Nigeria Law Publications Limited. I will also locate some 
cases by consulting the websites of Nigeria’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.  
I will pay special attention to decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
in case selection because they are the ones with widest jurisprudential impact in Nigeria’s 
precedent-based legal system. Because lower courts are under obligation to follow 
decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, it was evident that I should place 
more emphasis on the judgments of those courts. My case sampling method would 
therefore be more purposive than arbitrary. This will enable me to capture a broader 
range of cases that fit within the research agenda. In analyzing the cases, I will test those 
selected for the outcome of the litigation, jurisprudential rigor as well as for consistency 
with previous judgments. Where contradictions or inconsistencies were evident, I will 
draw them out. Overall, the Nigerian constitution was the major legal document for case 
analysis. 
 In addition to the jurisprudence of Nigerian courts, I will utilize as well those of 
comparative jurisdictions. For this reason, my analysis will be substantially 
comparative.163 It will be an opportunity for me to explain how other national legal 
systems approach issues similar to the ones I am investigating with respect to Nigeria. 
More specifically, I will support my analysis with accounts from United Kingdom whose 
legal traditions continue to influence Nigerian practices due to its colonial history, as well 
as the United States whose presidential constitutional system Nigeria has been operating 
since 1979. To a lesser degree, I will also refer to South African practices and 
jurisprudence in my analysis.  
 
 
                                                          
163 John C. Reitz, “How to do Comparative Law” (1998) 46 Am J Comp L 617. T Koopmans, 
“Comparative Law and the Courts” (1996) 45 Int’l & Comp L Q 545. WJ Kamba, “Comparative Law: A 
Theoretical Framework” (1974) 23 Int’l & Comp L Q 485. Max Rheinstein, “Comparative Law – Its 
Functions, Methods and Usages” (1968 – 1969) 22 Ark L Rev 415. 
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1.9.2. Scope of Study and Outline  
It is important to sufficiently constrain my research so as to limit it to its identified focus. 
I do not have the liberty of discussing human rights from all of possible angles that it 
could have been approached. Doing so would detract from my fundamental goals and 
possibly hamper my inquiry. Though I have already offered an understanding of the 
concept of human rights that animates this work, it does not follow that I was engaged in 
any detailed philosophical or conceptual debate about the subject. As well, the 
information provided about the actual state of human rights in Nigeria and the manner in 
which their violations is intended not to distract focus but to provide a nuanced 
background and insight to the major issues that this study deals with.  
 Furthermore, because my concern was to evaluate the performance of Nigerian 
superior courts in human rights adjudication for the stated period, I will not limit the 
cases generated for analysis to those in which the decisions of the courts left very much 
to be desired but also will include those where the decisions were positive for the 
litigants. Discrepancies in the position of the courts will be highlighted on a case by case 
basis and the probable reasons for those discrepancies were offered.    
The dissertation is divided into seven chapters this one included. This chapter puts 
the entire study in its proper context. It sets out its goals, the problem it investigated and 
its overarching social, legal and political background. It also contains the review of 
secondary literature and the methodology adopted. The chapter as well constrains the 
study by mapping out its limits, especially with regards to those issues that it did not 
cover. 
In chapter two I address the theoretical and conceptual concerns of enforcing 
human rights through the courts. After explaining why a single theoretical approach may 
not be suitable for discussing the research questions in the Nigerian context, I will 
identify theories that might be in contention including those taken from other disciplines 
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with which the law and human rights adjudication might have more than casual 
connection. 
 The third chapter discusses human rights in Nigeria from historical and cultural 
perspectives. The chapter is a vehicle for understanding social and political events and 
incidents that occurred in the country’s past and how they shaped and influenced 
contemporary developments. This chapter also traces the process of constitutionalizing 
human rights in Nigeria as well as the impact of military rule in the development of 
human rights in the country. 
 Chapter four of the study discusses the analytical standards for the review of 
human rights cases from a comparative standpoint. After evaluating the various standards 
used across different jurisdictions, I situated them alongside the dominant approach 
adopted by Nigerian courts in human rights cases. This helps us to assess whether 
Nigerian courts operate according to comparable standards to those evaluated and if not 
to offer some insights as to why this is the case. 
The fifth chapter takes a look at Nigeria’s human rights architecture. It first 
discusses the various sources through which the norms applied in Nigerian courts are 
derived. These will include the constitution, international law and other municipal 
sources. I will also discuss how domestic human rights norms interact with international 
norms. In this chapter as well, I will treat Nigeria’s court structure and jurisdictional 
issues in human rights cases. 
Chapter six of the research is the major portion of the study because it will 
examine the work of Nigerian appellate courts pertaining to human rights cases from 
1999 to 2009. But before that analysis and by way of a background, this chapter also 
discusses analytical and doctrinal attitudes of the courts to human rights cases for the 
period following the adoption of the independence constitution in 1960 and the demise of 
the country’s second republic in 1983. I will analyze changes to the constitutional 
framework, if any, introduced by the 1999 constitution as well as how that framework 
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governed judicial determination of cases brought through it. In this chapter, I will test and 
apply the theoretical approaches and threads earlier identified in the study to the court 
cases and as well to the judicial orientation that may have informed them. 
 The seventh chapter is no less important because it discusses major challenges 
and constraints to the judicial enforcement of human rights in Nigeria. Some of the issues 
this chapter addresses are procedural (like issues of standing) and others are political. The 
chapter also discusses structural shortcomings such as the weakness of the rule of law 
regime and judicial independence.  
The last chapter concludes the study and offers some recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
“Hello, what are you looking for?” Theorizing Human Rights 
Adjudication in Transitions 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Theories are helpful for the purposes of understanding and unpacking phenomena as well 
as explaining individual and group behavior in different fields and contexts. They are 
often abstract generalizations about specific research engagements and the social realities 
that give them character. The objective of this chapter is to identify theoretical models 
suitable for the subject area that could be used to test human rights decision-making and 
where those models could apply with reference to Nigerian courts. In accomplishing this 
task, I will briefly discuss an understanding of adjudication in its broadest sense and not 
as restricted to human rights decision-making. Thereafter, I will tease out specific 
theories of adjudication that could apply to the judicial function more generally and how 
those theories could apply to the human rights reasoning and decisions-making of 
Nigerian courts in transition more specifically.  
From the discussion on the role of courts in transitions, it is obvious that the 
judiciary is perhaps the most durable institution of political governance. Neither the 
violent civil revolutions in the former Communist countries of East and Central Europe in 
the late 80’s and early 90’s nor military seizure of power in parts of Africa and Latin 
America for substantial periods in the course of the Twentieth century led to any 
displacements of the judiciary as an organ of government. Rather we saw how each and 
every unpopular regime relied on the courts for much needed legal legitimacy. Dictators 
are in most cases worried by the prospects of an independent judiciary and therefore 
generally attempt to muzzle that arm of government. But they always stop short of 
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completely proscribing it as an institution of government.164 There must be some 
important reasons why the judiciary as an institution is generally considered essential to 
the functioning of government during periods of relative peace, at war times, during 
periods of repression or conflicts and even more so at those periods when the society is 
passing through a transitional phase. 
The reason the judiciary is considered durable is not so much because it fits much 
of the character depicted above but more so because its personnel pass through more 
elaborate, rigorous and focused training that makes them the only ones suited to perform 
the function that society assigns to them. The judiciary is the guardian of the law.165 
Judges are not supposed to be respecters of persons and are meant to stand between the 
subject and any attempted encroachment on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that 
any coercive action is justified in law.”166 Courts may be the mechanisms to defend 
democracy itself against the tendency of government to perpetuate its own power167 or 
they are the bulwark of individual rights.168 It is also the understanding in most societies 
that courts should develop and adapt the law in line with changing social 
                                                          
164 An example that readily comes to mind is the experience of Pakistan in 2007 under the regime of Pervez 
Musharraf. Just days before the country’s Supreme Court was to rule on his re-election as President, and 
fearing that the judgment would go against him, he imposed emergency rule. The Supreme Court quickly 
convened and issued an interim order against the declaration of emergency and ordered the Pakistani armed 
forces not to obey illegal orders. In response, Musharraf dispatched soldiers to the Supreme Court who 
arrested the judges. Because of these events, some judges refused to take oath to serve under Musharraf and 
left their offices altogether. Yet he did not achieve a complete proscription of the judiciary as an arm of the 
Pakistani government. See Jane Perlez, “Musharraf Declares State of Emergency” New York Times (3 
November 2007) online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/03/world/asia/04pakistan.html>; “Musharraf 
Suspends Pakistan’s Constitution: State of Emergency Declared, Chief Judge Replaced and 
Communications cut in Capital” online: 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/03/world/main3448594.shtml> Matthew J Nelson, “Pakistan in 
2008: Moving Beyond Musharraf” (2009) 49 Asian Survey 16; Mohamed A El Khawas, “Musharraf and 
Pakistan: Democracy Postponed” (2009) 20 Mediterranean Q 94; Gretchen Helmke & Frances Rosenbluth, 
“Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective” (2009) 12 Annu Rev 
Pol Sci 345.  
165 See Nwabueze, supra note 152 at 3. 
166 Per Lord Atkins in Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] AC 206. 
167 See Gavison, supra note 143 at 222. 
168 See Henkin, supra note 36 at 1052. 
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circumstances.169 These notwithstanding, several significant aspects of the judicial 
function remain essentially contested. In no other area is this perhaps even more so than 
in the field of judicial responsibility for the enforcement of human rights. There are as 
many questions hanging over what the courts should do in this area as there are over how 
they should do it. 
In putting this aspect of my study through a theoretical exploration, one caveat is 
necessary. The role expected of courts in any society extends well beyond the narrow 
parameters of enforcing the human rights of individuals. That role includes enforcing 
private contracts, punishing tortious acts, hearing criminal cases, settling family disputes, 
and so on.170 Though human rights questions may not too infrequently arise from these 
categories of cases, they are not my concern in this study. A better way of understanding 
this dimension of my inquiry might be therefore to take to heart Perry’s distinction 
between “human rights understood as a category of moral rights” as opposed to those 
other “legal rights” that are not of a human rights nature. 171 While all human rights 
would most often qualify as legal rights, local contexts permitting, the opposite claim 
cannot be true of the other legal rights. Most of them are not human rights.  
Hartney provides a more persuasive explanation of the difference between legal 
and moral rights. With regard to legal rights he states that: 
Law differs from ordinary life or more discourse in that the truth of any 
legal statement depends ultimately on the acts of certain authorities. [His 
emphasis] Whatever is legal or illegal is so because it was made so [His 
emphasis] by legal authorities. The ultimate touchstone therefore of all 
                                                          
169 Allan C Hutchinson, “Heydon’ Seek: Looking for Law in all the Wrong Places” (2003) 29 Monash U L 
Rev 85 at 91. 
170 Tunde I Ogowewo, “Self-Inflicted Constraints on Judicial Government in Nigeria” (2005) 49 J Afr L 39 
at 41 (identifying those roles as “ ensuring government accountability, protecting fundamental rights, 
assuring certainty in commercial transactions, protecting property rights and dispensing justice 
efficiently”). 
171 Michael J Perry, “Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?” (2003) 38 
Wake Forest L Rev 635 at 638. 
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legal statements (and of the meaning of legal terms) is therefore the acts 
(and especially the utterances) of these legal authorities.172 
  
As it concerns moral rights on the other hand, this scholar, invoking in part Dworkin’s 
conception of rights as trumps against the larger interest of the public, contended as 
follows: 
Not all goods or interests generate rights; it is only when there is a 
particularly important moral reason for protecting the good or interest in 
question that we speak of there being a right to it. This idea is expressed in 
Dworkin’s well-known claim: “Individual rights are political trumps held 
by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective 
goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as 
individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing 
some loss or injury upon them.”173 
 
Therefore, my concern in this study is the nature of the judicial function when what is at 
stake is the enforcement of human or moral rights. In other words, those rights 
constitutionally protected and in which constitutional provisions entrenching those rights 
are cited shall be the main focus of this research. 
There is a great meshing of factors that may make undesirable any effort to put 
human rights adjudication through a single theoretical lens. Human rights concerns 
implicate law and politics as well as economics and history. Those concerns happen at 
ordinary times, in times of crises and conflict as well as in transitional moments. At the 
point where all these historical, social, political and economic realities intersect, 
therefore, different theoretical justifications are most likely to be in contention. The 
judiciary as an institution of government functions in different societies at various stages 
                                                          
172 Michael Hartney, “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights” (1991) 4 Can JL & Jur 293 at 301; 
See also Patrick Grim, “The ‘Right’ to a Fair Trial” (1978) 2 J Libertarian Stud 115 (where he differentiates 
“legal” from “ethical” rights).  
93Ibid at 303. 
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of development. Economic and sociological conditions are hardly uniform across all 
regions and legal jurisdictions. In fact, legal systems vary in ways that they function and 
those ways in turn shape the orientation of the courts. What works in one system may not 
necessarily produce similar results in another system. Even in systems claiming the same 
historical legal heritage, diversities remain most times obvious.  
An example is that the English and American legal systems are grouped together 
within the common law legal system. Yet as was clear from my earlier discussion, the 
attitude of their courts to judicial review, for one, had for years been at roughly opposite 
tangents. Nigeria also belongs to the common law family but operates in a different 
social, political and economic context from, say the United States or United Kingdom. 
Even in those countries which recognize wide powers of judicial review, marked 
differences exist in the forms of the review.174 In addition, though in Western liberal 
democracies where constitutional theory is dominated by the disagreement as to which 
institution between the courts and the legislature is better able to fulfill the aims 
constitutional government, Ramraj suggests that when context is factored into the 
discussion and it takes place on a broader frame, this obsession should be at the periphery 
and not the core of the discussion.175  
While in the more developed democracies there is an assumption on the part of 
the legal and political elite of an enduring commitment to constitutionalism, the presence 
of strong, stable public institutions, and an entrenched legal culture that makes possible 
the realization of substantial constitutional values, this is not always the reality in other 
contexts.176 On the contrary, Ramraj cited the example of the Southeast Asian process 
where legal institutions are weak and the legal culture is not conducive to 
                                                          
174 See Ackermann, supra note 103 at 60. 
175 Victor Ramraj, “Constitutional Tipping Points: Sustainable Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice” 
(2010) 1 Transnat’l Legal Theory 191 at 192. 
176 Ibid. 
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constitutionalism as support for his theory that the legislative-judicial divide should be at 
the margins and not at the core of constitutionalism discussions.177 
With the above orientation in mind, applying the same theoretical justifications of 
how courts function uniformly across the many existing legal divides would most likely 
produce opaque results. It is in appreciation of this diversity among legal systems that 
one is cautioned against any attempt to uniformly theorize on the role of courts but more 
specifically regarding their attitudes in human rights adjudication. Instructively, as well 
“[a]ny attempt, then, to understand constitutionalism by examining judicial decisions in 
constitutional cases in a purely acontextual way is unlikely to shed much light on the true 
state of constitutionalism…”178  
It is therefore very clear that the duty of the courts in government and how they 
go about fulfilling that duty is an issue of passionate public concern. This concern is 
exemplified by the fact that lawyers (or those with legal training) and, as well, persons in 
other fields and professions have persistently shown interest in explaining judicial 
behavior using analytical tools taken from those diverse backgrounds. These fields have 
ranged, apart from law, to sociology, economics and political science. At the beginning 
of the Twentieth Century, for example, Roscoe Pound questioned the atomization of 
jurisprudence which he said did not account for law in action as it did law in the books. 
He admonished the legal experts of that period to: 
Let us not be afraid of legislation, and let us welcome new principles, 
introduced by legislation, which express the spirit of the time. Let us look 
the facts of human conduct in the face. Let us look to economics and 
sociology and philosophy and cease to assume that jurisprudence is self-
sufficient.179 
 
                                                          
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Roscoe Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action” (1910) 44 Am L Rev 12 at 35-36; See also G 
Edward White, “From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early 
Twentieth-Century America” (1972) 58 Va L Rev 999. 
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Pound’s counsel has been put into practice. Discussions about law and how it is 
implemented through adjudication have passed through the lenses of different fields of 
scholarship. If the idea was to unpack law from strict rules and principles and to impart a 
new thinking that “effective judicial performance came not from obeisance to such 
principles but from an awareness of the social context of adjudication,”180 then it is 
already happening.  
Therefore, in carrying out this section of my research, I will start by providing a 
general description of the judicial function that covers not just what judges and courts do 
when faced with human rights cases but more so as it relates to adjudication as a general 
theme. Secondly I will consider scholarship from disciplines outside law that seek to 
explain how factors taken from studies in those non-legal areas could be applied to 
understand judicial behavior, and what, if any, differences would result from applying 
those theories specifically to human rights adjudication. In particular, I will discuss 
theories taken from economics, political science and sociology. Thirdly, I will treat 
theories related to the functioning of the judiciary as an institution as well as how its role 
in governance is affected by institutional characteristics, social context realities and the 
political environment. I will proceed further to analyze theories about how the individual 
character of judges, their training and socialization influence their adjudicatory choices. 
2.2. First things First: Adjudication as Norm Creation 
This study, as I have already mentioned, engages the question of the judicial function in 
society. Adjudication is at the core of that function. That process is understood in the 
opinion of Stone-Sweet and Matthews to involve a “reductive theory of third party 
dispute resolution (TDR)” or in other words a triadic two-against-one governance 
principle.”181 Fuller agrees with this conception of adjudication in its broadest sense. But 
                                                          
180 White, Ibid at 1007. 
181 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 
Colum J Transnat’l L 72 at 81 (“When two parties in dispute ask a third party for assistance, they build, 
through a consensual act of delegation, a node of social authority, or mode of governance. By ‘mode of 
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in his specific elaboration, Fuller says the function includes [a] “adjudicative bodies 
which owe their powers to the consent of the litigants expressed in an agreement of 
submission,” as well as [b] “tribunals that assume adjudicative powers without the 
sanction either of consent or of superior governmental power, the most notable example 
being the court that sat in the Nuremberg Trials.”182  
But while Fuller’s [a] above fits perfectly into Stone Sweet and Matthews’ 
consensual TDR, his [b] stands at an extreme that the two authors never even considered. 
In reality, Fuller’s categorization did not therefore mention Stone Sweet and Matthews’ 
own version of the compulsory TDR, though I suspect that it lies somewhere in between 
the two extremes in his own categorization. 
 However, Fuller’s most illuminating contribution to the debate about the true 
nature of adjudication lies in his belief that any notion of “true adjudication” runs heavily 
against the grain of modern thought. He therefore set out early to accept A.D. Lindsay’s 
thesis that “it is scarcely possible to talk intelligently about social institutions without 
recognizing that they exist because and insofar as [all the emphases are his] men [and 
women] pursue certain goals or ideals.”183 Therefore while noting the futility of chasing 
an absent “true” model of adjudication, Fuller still conceded that “it is only with the aid 
of this nonexistent model that we can pass intelligent judgment on the accomplishments 
of adjudication as it actually is.”184  
Even though it is customary to view adjudication in terms of settling disputes and 
controversies, Fuller conceives it more fundamentally as a form of social ordering of 
which there are two basic forms: organization by common aims and organization by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
governance’ we mean a process a process through which the rule systems (norms, law) in place in any 
society are applied and adapted, on an on-going basis, to the needs and purposes of those who live under 
them. The theory focuses on the dynamics and political consequences of moving from the dyad 
(cooperation, conflict, dispute settlement between two parties) to the triadic context, and moving from 
consensual TDR to compulsory TDR”). 
182 Lon L Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978-1979) 92 Harv L Rev 353 at 354. 
183 AD Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press, 1943) at 42. 
184 Fuller, supra note 181 at 357. 
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reciprocity. While organization by reciprocity envisages participants wanting different 
things, organization by common aims requires that participants want the same thing or 
things.185 He considers government as a highly formalized variety of organization by 
common aims. And because the proper province of organization by reciprocity lies in an 
area where divergent human objectives exist, Fuller says it comes into play where an 
exchange or something equivalent to it may enrich both parties. A good example is one 
giving out twenty cents to a grocer in exchange for a loaf of bread.186 
 Fuller’s understanding of adjudication also differs from that offered by Stone 
Sweet and Matthews in another sense. While the latter scholars analyzed the practice by 
overt reference to the position of the disputing parties to the TDR, Fuller offers a 
different distinguishing factor: the role of the disputants in the process. He states that  
[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it 
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the 
decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision 
in his favor. Whatever heightens the significance of this participation lifts 
adjudication toward its optimum expression. Whatever destroys the 
meaning of that participation destroys the integrity of adjudication 
itself.187  
 
Fuller also discussed the limits of adjudication by which he examined the kinds of tasks 
that are inherently unsuited to adjudication. First he said, courts cannot carry out 
“polycentric” tasks. He gives as an example of such a task, a wealthy lady who willed a 
miscellaneous collection of paintings to two different organizations in equal shares but 
indicating no particular apportionment. Fuller says this task is polycentric for a court 
because “the disposition of any single painting has implications for the proper disposition 
of every other painting.”188 He also stated that if the proper apportionment were set for 
argument, there would be no clear issue to which either side could direct its proofs and 
                                                          
185 Ibid at 358. 
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contentions. He, however, sees little merit in views that adjudication is limited to 
declaration of rights and duties or that the courts cannot undertake an affirmative 
direction of affairs.189  
My analysis thus far makes apparent the fact that the framework for the analysis 
of adjudication developed by Stone-Sweet and Matthews and that discussed by Fuller 
could well apply to any individual or body called upon to decide upon a dispute. They are 
not restricted to the courts as an institution of government. But my concern in this study 
is with courts in the sense of an arm of government charged specifically with hearing and 
resolving disputes whether between individuals inter se or between individuals and the 
government. My discussion, relative to the courts, will therefore fit more into Stone-
Sweet and Matthews’ compulsory TDR model as well as Fuller’s understanding of 
adjudication as a form of social ordering and not so much as a means of settling 
individualized disputes.  
I understand that while human rights adjudication by courts might involve 
settlement of individual disputes in a variety of conditions, a majority of human rights 
cases are filed against government institutions. In that case, the outcome of those cases 
generally has the possibility to bind persons and institutions that may not have 
participated in the immediate case. Further, at least one of the parties to the case would 
not have voluntarily appeared in court but have to do so at the behest of the other party 
with the possibility of legal sanctions for failure to appear.   And having disposed of this 
dimension to my inquiry, I now turn to the theoretical consideration of the role of courts 
in both individual dispute resolution and in social ordering. 
 
 
 
                                                          
189 Ibid at 404. See further Robert G Bone, “Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy 
Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation” (1995) 75 BU L Rev 1273; Owen M 
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2.2.1 What Judges Do: A Positivist View of Adjudication? 
Discussions on the role of judges in society and how they perform those roles take 
positivism as the major point of departure. It is the one model that provides safe haven 
for all judicial comers; the temperate and abusive as well as the scrupulous and those 
lacking proper discretion. It is a formalist understanding of the functioning of law, 
according to Bourdieu, which sees law as “an autonomous and closed system whose 
development can be understood solely in terms of its ‘internal dynamic.’”190  
Positivism inevitably glorifies the position whereby law and adjudication are 
constrained by rules, principles and doctrine; where judges are involved only in the 
mechanisms of identifying those factors and applying them to the case at hand. 
Conceived in this manner, White observes, law is obsessed with “ineluctable rules, 
principles and axioms…, judges began their decisions by making verbal distinctions, 
defining concepts in useful ways. They then pronounced their definitions as axiomatic. 
From then on it was a rush downward to the result: the axiom was applied to the facts of 
a case, certain things ‘inevitably’ followed.”191  
 Spaeth calls this the legal theory of judicial action. He describes this conception 
as the justification of judicial decisions on the basis of the facts of the case interacting 
with one or more of four different considerations. These considerations are (1) the 
language of the applicable law, (2) the intentions and motivations of those who made the 
law, (3) precedent established in previously decided cases, and (4) a balancing of societal 
interests.192 It is also called the positivist or traditional view of law and adjudication in 
which law is “a system of settled and certain rules from which it is possible to deduce by 
logical operations ‘the law’ applicable to any given set of facts.”193  
                                                          
190 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field” (1987) 38 Hastings L J 
814. 
191 White, supra note 178 at 1001. 
192 Harold J Spaeth, “The Attitudinal Model” in Lee Epstein ed., Contemplating Courts (Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995) at 296. 
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 63 
 
 There are clear reasons for this understanding of law and how it functions. To 
claim that there are other considerations besides rules, doctrine and precedent by which 
judges arrive at their decisions would be to rid those decisions of their objectivity. It had 
to be stated quite plainly that judges are constrained by these factors in their decision-
making activities in which case the losing parties to litigation would have to blame those 
factors as applied to the facts of the case for their losses and not the individual judge who 
made the decision.194 The tendency is to isolate the judiciary and its work though part of 
the government from political decision-making and to prevent courts from morphing into 
theatres for the deployment of political judgment and rhetoric.195 This, it seems, is the 
major goal of positing adjudication as an objective and rationally-bounded process, in 
stark contrast to the non-rational, and often arbitrary/self-interested, character of political 
decision-making.196 For this reason, in most countries, judges are not elected unlike those 
who occupy executive and legislative positions.197 
 This model fits into my research because it is perhaps the favorite of the Nigerian 
judicial establishment. In the portions of this research that follow, I will show through 
case-law how Nigerian courts often justify their judgments on the basis of laws, rules, 
doctrine and precedent and their disavowal of extraneous considerations in their 
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196 Allan C Hutchinson & Patrick J Monahan, “Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The 
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought” (1984) 36 Stan L Rev at 202. 
197 The United States is an exception in this regard. Some judges are elected and often Judges to the 
Supreme Court are appointed on the basis of their political ideology which perhaps accounts for why there 
are more analyses of the political content of judgments of US courts than that of any other country in the 
world. See generally Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2007, 2008); David S Law, “How to Rig the Courts” (2011) 99 Geo L J 779.  
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decisions. This is against the common understanding that when courts review actions of 
other branches of government, that task engages policy at a high threshold. It therefore 
gives the courts considerable latitude to not just influence the policy choices of the 
government but to actually shape those choices in very significant ways.198 In the sections 
that follow, I will explore insights from other disciplines and even within the legal field 
by critical theorists that have risen to challenge the positivist view that law and 
adjudication are conditioned by only doctrine, rules and precedent.  
  
2.2.2. The Politics of Adjudication 
Courts do not operate in a political vacuum.199 All around us, the impact of politics on 
law and vice versa is very stark that it cannot be ignored. Hutchinson, in fact, describes 
adjudication, a major component of the judicial function as “inescapably political and 
non-objective.”200 The judiciary is the third arm of government and operates under the 
shadow of politics as it cooperates with more representative branches of government to 
create a stable society. Yet being a part of the government does not make the courts or 
judges practitioners of politics of the traditionally partisan kind. Judges are not elected201 
and so do not compete for votes. But every so often, cases that come before courts 
contain political ingredients or may lead to crucial political consequences. How extensive 
                                                          
198 See Maurice Adams & Gehard Van Der Schyff, “Political Theory Put to the Test: Comparative Law and 
the Origins of Judicial Constitutional Review” (2010) 10 Global Jurist (Article 8) 1. 
199 Ibid at 206, (They credit Critical Legal Scholars with the theory that “Law is simply politics dressed in 
different garb; it neither operates in a historical vacuum nor does it exist independently of ideological 
struggles in society. Legal doctrines not only does not, but also cannot, generate determinate results in 
concrete cases … Legal doctrine can be manipulated to justify an almost infinite spectrum of possible 
outcomes.”); Jack M Balkin, “What Brown Teaches us about Constitutional Theory” (2004) 90 Va L Rev 
1537 at 1538 (stating that, “Political scientists have long argued that the Supreme Court is part of the 
national political coalition, that Supreme Court decisionmaking is strongly influenced by national political 
majorities and national public opinion, and that the Supreme Court tends to impose values of national 
majorities on regional majorities”).   
200 Allan C Hutchinson, “Judges and Politics: An Essay from Canada” (2004) 24 Legal Stud 275. 
201 Barring some states in the United States where judges are elected. See Stephen B Bryant & Patrick J 
Keenan, “Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in 
Capital Cases” (1995) 75 BU L Rev 759; Nathan S Heffernan, “Judicial Responsibility, Judicial 
Independence and the Election of Judges” (1996-1997) 80 Marq L Rev 1031. 
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is the impact of politics on the work that judges do? How should judges treat cases that 
show traces of political sensitivity? Is it possible to separate politics from judging? 
 These concerns relate as well to pure partisan politics as they do in the world of 
the contemporary phenomenon known as political judicialization by way of judicial 
empowerment through the constitutionalization of rights. This process allows hegemonic 
elites possessing a disproportionate access to influence upon the legal arena to contrive 
the constitutional entrenchment of rights so that power is transferred to the courts.202 This 
is more so in divided, mostly transitional societies of which Nigeria makes a near perfect 
fit. However, while under this model the hegemonic elite seeks to milk the “judiciary’s 
public reputation for political impartiality and rectitude,”203 it is in this sense that it 
departs from providing a complete account of the Nigerian scenario where the courts do 
not enjoy that level of public affirmation.204 But the model’s relevance to that scenario is 
maintained to the extent that it describes a process by which the partisan political branch 
of the hegemonic elite cedes control to its judicial branch under pressure from those 
described as “peripheral groups.” In a sense therefore, whether or not the judiciary enjoys 
a high credibility rating within the society, the results achievable remain the same.  
 The questions asked earlier and the concerns highlighted above provide focus for 
some of the issues that have historically agitated political science scholars and which they 
have tried to capture in some coherent theory.  My intention here is not to analyze the 
growing judicialization of politics and global expansion of judicial power which allows 
the courts to have the final word in several generally contentious political dilemmas. My 
immediate concern at this point is to provide an analysis of adjudication from a political 
science perspective. In this regard, David Robertson identifies three distinct models by 
                                                          
202 Ran Hirschl, “The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment through 
Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities” (2000) 36 Stan J Int’l L 73 at 75. 
203 Ibid. 
204 See for example Basil Ugochukwu, “The Pathology of Judicialization: Politics, Corruption and the 
Courts in Nigeria” (2011) 4 Law & Dev Rev 58; Wen-Chen Chang, “Strategic Judicial Responses in 
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which political science characterizes the judicial role. These are the realist, class and 
orthodox models.205  
He associates the realist model with American traditions following such works as 
Jerome Frank’s Law and the Modern Mind and Karl Llewellyn’s The Bramble Bush 
which assume broadly that “legal decisions are never determined in any firm way by the 
rules, precedents and arguments in the court. Rather a judge does, and must, come to his 
decision intuitively, and then only rationalize it by the legal material.206 This might be 
characterized as a very strong version of realism. The class model argues that 
“discretionary problems in law are solved by judges consulting their own notion of 
‘public interest’, which is made up of a belief that the State must be protected from 
danger, including ‘moral’ danger, that legislation should be limited in its effects on 
property and other ‘bourgeois’ freedoms, and that a general political philosophy 
associated with the Conservative party should prevail.”207 Secondly, this model assumes 
that “judges in so acting, are acting out of class-conditioned perspective, as agents of a 
dominant socio-economic group. Thus, it is not so much the private and perhaps 
idiosyncratic intuitions of judges unprovided with determinate law, but the deliberate and 
systematic protection of a particular class that characterizes discretionary judgments.”208  
 Finally, the orthodox model Robertson says is hard to describe. Yet he identifies 
three different assumptions upon which it is raised [1] Discretion does exist, because 
statutes are sometimes vague, or precedents missing or conflicting. [2] Most judges most 
of the time will try hard to stick within clear meaning of the statute or the guidance of 
precedent. Some will from time to time try to develop the law to fit modern needs, but 
this “public policy horse” is dangerous, to be ridden seldom and cautiously. [3] Where 
‘difficult cases” do crop up, some judges will act from personal idiosyncrasy, but these 
                                                          
205 David Robertson, “Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords: A Jurimetric Analysis” (1982) 12 Brit J Pol 
Sci 1. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid at 2 
208 Ibid. See also Glendon Schubert, Political Culture and Judicial Behavior: Subcultural Analysis of 
Judicial Behavior: A Direct Observational Study (Maryland: University Press of America, 1985); Thomas 
A Cowan, “Group Interests” (1958) 44 Va L Rev 331. 
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are mainly self-cancelling unsystematic quirks, not representing an intrusion of class 
ideology, and too limited to fit the realist model of permanent intuition.209 
 Robertson foresees the difficulty, if not impossibility of testing these models. But 
he decided to do so using empirical data. He started on the basic premises that judicial 
decision-making in English Appellate Courts is partly discretionary and that where such 
discretion exists, an individual judge’s voting “will be influenced by his beliefs and 
attitudes inside a specifically legal and ‘professional’ ideology. This ‘ideology’ will vary 
from judge to judge, and whether it is conservative or not, will be complicated both by 
individual variation with respect to any one aspect of the ideology, and also by the 
ideology having several aspects.”210 
 But much more than the above, political science research into how in particular 
the United States Supreme Court arrives at its decisions developed another distinct 
model, called the attitudinal and associated by Frank Cross with both Jeffrey Segal and 
Harold Spaeth.211 This model is confrontational to orthodox legal scholarship on the same 
subject. While orthodox legal research ascribes judicial decisions to reasoned judgment 
on the basis of precedent or statute, and a consideration of the role of courts in the legal 
system, political science theory, built on the attitudinal conception of decision-making 
holds that “a judge’s decision depends primarily upon her individual political ideology 
and the identities of the parties.”212 Some even go as far as suggesting that legal goals 
have essentially no effect on Supreme Court behavior and that jurisprudence is entirely 
result-oriented.213 Cross puts the stalemate between legal and political science research in 
this area in context when positing that:  
Legal scholars cannot ignore this political science research on grounds of 
social scientific weakness. To the contrary, political scientists have 
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produced abundant support for the attitudinal model, far more than legal 
scholarship have mustered on behalf of more traditional legal models. 
While legal scholars may ignore political science research because it is 
inconvenient, its results strike at the central underpinnings of conventional 
legal research. Ignoring the political science research will not make its 
results disappear. If legal scholars fail to confront the attitudinal model, 
the resultant legal research will appear increasingly irrelevant and 
agennesic.214  
 
 
Deriving from the above concerns, there is a strong likelihood that political 
considerations may influence human rights adjudication. That possibility is not restricted 
in time or space and for that reason could also be a concern in the Nigerian context. As an 
issue of practical significance, the main question in judicial review is the actual 
government branch - legislative, executive or judicial - that qualifies to issue the last 
word on specific policy choices. The courts cannot very much run away from the political 
calculation that answering this question engages. Therefore, this theoretical thread is 
relevant to my research and I will demonstrate this relevance through case-law in 
subsequent chapters of this research.     
   
2.2.3. Self-Interest and Adjudication: The Public (Rational) Choice Model 
Just as has been done with political science research, similar efforts have been devoted to 
understanding judicial behavior when applying the tools of economic research. I may not 
explore all the ramifications of those efforts in this study. Therefore I have chosen for a 
brief consideration the public (or rational) choice theory popularized by Anthony Downs 
as the economic theory of political action215 as well as Richard Posner’s “positive 
economic theory of judicial behavior.”216 Downs’ theory is relevant only in so far as it 
took account of shortcomings in previous economic research before his which treated 
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215 Anthony Downs, “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy” (1957) 65 J Pol Econ 135; 
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government action “as an exogenous variable, determined by political considerations that 
lie outside the purview of economics.”217 His own theory therefore sought to integrate 
government with private decision-makers in a single general equilibrium theory.218 In 
applying his theory here, courts are viewed (as I have earlier indicated) as being a part of 
the government whose actions are suitable for consideration using the theory as are all the 
other branches of government.  
 Downs’ theory goes something like this: There is an assumption that the proper 
function of government is to maximize social welfare. There are difficulties associated 
with defining ‘social welfare” and discovering the means of maximizing it. Even if it is 
possible to define social welfare and could agree on the methods of maximizing it, “what 
reason is there to believe that the men who run the government would be motivated to 
maximize it?”219  
Downs would rather the government is treated as part of the division of labor in 
which every agent has “both a private motive and a social function.”220 He cited the 
example of a Coal-Miner whose social function is removing coal from the ground and 
who is motivated to carry this out by his desire to earn income, not by any desire to 
benefit others. Similarly, Downs argues, every other agent in the division of labor carries 
out his social function primarily as a means of attaining his own private ends: the 
enjoyment of income, prestige, or power. “Much of economic theory consists in essence 
of proving that men thus pursuing their own ends may nevertheless carry out their social 
functions with great efficiency, at least under certain conditions.”221 
 As the public choice theory, Downs’ analysis could also be turned the other way 
round: “although people acting in the political market place have some concern for 
others, their main motive, whether they are voters, politicians, lobbyists, or bureaucrats, 
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is self-interest.”222 Or put differently, the theory “integrates structural and individual 
aspects in the sense that the social reality is determined by the acts of individuals who are 
acting rationally under the influence of structural factors.”223 On his part Richard Epstein 
understands the theory to mean that “self interest rules behavior in public as well as 
private transactions,”224 and that “individuals in all their roles act to maximize their 
individual self-interest under conditions of uncertainty.”225 
 Notwithstanding the above, the public choice theory is thought by some scholars 
not to be appropriate in explaining judicial behavior. According to Epstein, while the 
theory has achieved important breakthroughs in understanding legislative behavior, it has 
not achieved similar successes in dealing with judicial behavior.226 He says that the 
judiciary presents a special challenge in the context of the self-interest proposition. His 
reasoning is that if the theory of individual self-interest that grounds public choice is as 
strong as claimed by its proponents, then it should supply insights into the behavior of all 
classes of public officials.227 But all success in the use of the theory has been largely with 
legislative and other political actors while the judiciary is left out because “judges are 
typically thought, by conscious constitutional design, to lie in some qualified space 
outside the political process, immune from the temptations that pervade the legislative 
and executive branches of government.”228 The public choice model is therefore 
considered ill-suited to the analysis of judicial behavior because enough institutional 
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steps229 are taken to make judges objective and remove any incentive for them to 
misappropriate their offices to advance personal self-interest. In Epstein’s summation, 
Judges may well act only out of self-interest, but the system is so 
organized that they do not face the pressures and temptations necessarily 
encountered by other political actors. The structure of the ‘independent’ 
judiciary is designed to remove judges from the day-to-day pressures and 
temptations of ordinary political office, and with some qualification it 
achieves that end. It is a strategy that recognizes the forces of self-interest, 
regards them as potentially destructive, and then takes successful [his 
emphasis] institutional steps to counteract certain known and obvious 
risks.230 
 
In deciding the impact of self-interest on the behavior of judges, and how individual 
judges could maximize it, Epstein distinguished the two roles that courts ordinarily 
perform: [1] deciding cases and, [2] judicial administration. In the second role he 
included such tasks as hiring clerks, appearing before Congress and participating in 
professional organizations.231 My concern here is not with this second role, which leaves 
us with how judges might maximize their self-interest while performing the role of 
deciding cases. In Epstein’s view, judging cases is at the core of the judicial function. 
Judges who err while performing it often attract to themselves powerful sanctions. He 
adds that judges may not talk about pending business with any outsider, nor reveal 
privately the decision in any case prior to its disclosure to the immediate parties and to 
the public.232 They are not to allow money or connection to influence or appear to 
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influence the outcome of cases. There are also very strong and unyielding rules barring 
judges from adjudicating cases in which they have personal or financial interest.233 
To ensure that judges operate within these restrictions and thus forestall the 
application of the sanctions, Epstein says “the legal system generates a wide range of 
prophylactic rules that allow judges to escape even the suspicion of bias.”234 They can 
excuse themselves from some cases, avoid socializing with lawyers who have or are 
likely to have cases before them as well as limit their other activities. They cannot 
practice law, work in business corporations, or lobby Congress. Their activities outside 
the courts are therefore limited to writing books, giving speeches and teaching.235 These 
institutional constraints, Epstein therefore argues, “offer a good explanation of why hard-
nosed public choice analysis loses its force and allure when applied to the judiciary’s 
ordinary business of deciding cases.”236 His contention is that since the dominant sources 
of gain, loss, and influence are closed to judges the incentive for them to be self-
interested does not exist. 
While not discounting the shortcomings of the public choice model as Epstein has 
presented it,237 my view is that his analysis could be faulted on at least one ground. His 
explanations apply to courts in the United States and most of the institutional constraints 
on judges that he mentioned, though they could be successfully extrapolated to other 
contexts, he applied them in the article only to American courts. But it is common 
knowledge that political contexts and legal cultures vary; what is taken for granted in the 
United States may prove intractable in a different environment. It is therefore not unlikely 
that different outcomes could be achieved if the most essential ingredients of his analysis 
are applied to a different legal system. Thus, I would show later while analyzing the 
human rights cases decided in Nigeria during the period that this study covers that even 
though some of the institutional constraints he mentions may be available on paper, the 
                                                          
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid at 835. 
237 Raymond Boudon, “Limitations of Rational Choice Theory” (1998) 104 Am J Sociology 817. 
 73 
 
practical reality in most cases is indeed a far cry from the theory. Therefore, most of the 
reasons Epstein advances for why the public choice theory would not suit an analysis of 
judicial behavior may in fact prove the appropriateness of the theory in analyzing courts 
in Nigeria. 
Another reason Epstein’s position could be challenged is that it failed to account 
for a particular practice for which the United States is very well known: the fact that 
some judges are actually elected on political platforms and Supreme Court judges, as I 
earlier pointed out, are generally appointed on the basis of their policy ideologies. This 
situation is hardly conducive to the blossoming of rules, prophylactic or not, for the 
insulation of judges from political or other biases. An elected judge would normally be 
expected, indeed required, to have a massive self-interest in the next election.  
Secondly, suburban judges and those operating in small cities but seeking more 
prominence and recognition may have an interest in not remaining in the social 
wilderness by their decisions. Particularly with respect to Supreme Court judges, 
promotion – and if it comes with appointment, however much this is vetted by the 
legislature – may depend on judges showing certain ideological leanings depending on 
their assessment of the likelihood of that increasing their chances of elevation. On the 
other hand, judges in some countries outside of the United States, including those in 
Nigeria, may in fact be constrained by a desire not to be too liberal or “activist” if that is 
going to reduce their chances of elevation within the judicial hierarchy.238 
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Posner supports this viewpoint through what he calls a positive economic theory 
of judicial behavior. His is, however, a limited intervention because he makes the 
analysis only with regard to appellate judges like those of the United States Federal Court 
of Appeals and the Supreme Court even though he says the model could be extended to 
elected judges, Continental European judges, jurors and even legislators. Posner’s basic 
argument is that “the effort to insulate judges from significant economic incentives, 
through devices such as life tenure and stringent conflict of interest rules, has not 
rendered judicial behavior immune to economic analysis.”239 He generally agrees with 
Epstein that economists have had a hard time crafting their own theory of how judges act. 
In his words, “The economic analyst has a model of how criminals and contract parties, 
injurers and accident victims, parents and spouses – even legislators, and executive 
officials such as prosecutors – act, but falters when asked to produce a model of how 
judges act.”240 Continuing, he states that:  
Politics, personal friendships, ideology, and pure serendipity play too 
large a role in the appointment of federal judges to warrant treating the 
judiciary as a collection of genius-saints miraculously immune to the tug 
of self-interest. By treating judges and Justices as ordinary people, my 
approach makes them fit subjects for economic analysis; for economists 
have no theories of genius.”241 
 
Posner’s conclusion is that judges operate rationally and pursue instrumental and 
consumption goals of the same kind and in the same general way that private persons 
do.242 
 Does the self-interest theory apply to human rights adjudication in Nigeria and 
therefore relevant to this research? It is unlikely judges would contemplate the relevance 
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of this theory to their human rights adjudicatory work. For them to say otherwise would 
clearly undercut any claim to disinterestedness they may make in carrying out their 
functions. But outside judicial circles and having regard to the institutional procedures 
governing appointment, promotion, and discipline of judges, it is possible to conclude 
that as Posner argues above, Nigerian judges are as personally interested in their work as 
other persons in society pursuing rational goals.   
 
2.2.4. Adjudication in aid of Global Capital: Upendra Baxi’s TREMF Theory 
The orthodox view of human rights captured in fine print by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) is that the values thereby enshrined “were designed for the 
attainment of dignity and well-being of human beings and for enhancing the security and 
well-being of socially, economically and civilizationally vulnerable peoples and 
communities.”243 But Baxi claims that the UDHR understanding of human rights is being 
steadily, but surely supplanted by a new one: a trade-related, market friendly (TREMF) 
paradigm.244  
Obiora Okafor articulates the major strands of this TREMF human rights theory 
in four related propositions.245 [1] The emergent TREMF paradigm (unlike the UDHR 
paradigm) insists on promoting and protecting the collective human rights of various 
formations of global capital mostly at the direct expense of human beings and 
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communities.246 [2] Much more than in the past, the progressive state – or at least the 
progressive “Third World” state – is now conceived as one that is a good host state to 
global capital; as one that protects global capital against political instability and market 
failure, usually at the significant cost of the most vulnerable among its own citizens. Such 
state is one that is in reality more accountable to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (WB) than to its own citizens.247 [3] A progressive state is also 
conceived under this theory as one that is market efficient in suppressing and de-
legitimating the human rights-based practices of resistance of its own citizens and that is 
also capable of unleashing a reign of terror on some of its citizens, especially those of 
them that actively oppose its excessive softness toward global capital.248 [4] The UDHR 
paradigm of human rights which assigned human responsibilities to states to construct 
progressively, and within the community of states, a just social order, and that will meet 
the basic needs of human beings is being pushed aside in favor of the TREMF paradigm 
which denies any significant redistributive role to the state; calls upon the state to free as 
many spaces for capital as possible, initially by pursuing the three Ds of contemporary 
globalization: deregulation, denationalization, and disinvestment.249 
 Okafor applies the TREMF theory to discuss the determination of the Nigerian 
government between 1999 and 2005 to implement the neo-liberal socio-economic plan 
and the resistance of Nigerians to it, led primarily by the labor union. This centered 
largely on government insistence on the removal of what it called the subsidy on 
petroleum products leading to the steep rise in price of vehicle fuel prices by up to 250 
per cent between May 1999 and August 2005.250 Considering that the major means of 
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movement in the country is by road transportation, this had great implications for the 
economic well-being of the vast majority of the population. The Nigerian Labour 
Congress (NLC), the umbrella body of all labor organizations in Nigeria provided 
leadership and several segments of Nigeria’s civil society rallied behind it to resist these 
price hikes.  
A supposed democratic regime in Nigeria offered repression in return, and key 
Western governments appeared complicit in this behavior by their silence. Or instead, 
Okafor says that the attitude of the West signified either studied ignorance or willful 
acceptance of the crackdown on the labor-led coalition. The Government used public 
appeals, obtained court rulings [my emphasis], and often ordered – or at least tolerated - 
the harassment, assaults, detentions, and killings perpetrated by the Nigerian Police Force 
on labour and allied activists, as well as ordinary citizen protesters.251 Not always did the 
judges dance to the tune the government called.252 But it is instructive still that some 
judges were mobilized along with other government institutions in the effort to break the 
mass resistance to the unacceptable economic policies. By so doing, certain elements in 
the judiciary acted in concert with those other institutions to actualize an unpopular 
policy which violated basic human rights without considering its role as the guardian of 
individual liberties.  
In the course of this study, it will become clearer with the aid of some cases 
decided by Nigerian courts during this period that the judiciary did not play much of an 
even-handed role in some of the cases arising from the entire saga. Rather than remain be 
open-minded and examine litigation arising from the government crackdown on the basis 
of their legal legitimacy, the judicial institution, in some of those cases, took the position 
of bastion of political stability by deploying its powers in support of the impugned 
policies.  
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 Yet this is by no means a concern peculiar to Nigeria or indeed the developing 
world. The issues may not play out similarly across legal contexts, but sometimes, the 
parallel in how they happen make them so obvious it is ridiculous not to take notice. Judy 
Fudge and Harry Glasbeek reached a somewhat similar conclusion regarding socio-
economic rights litigation under the Canadian Charter of Rights even though they did not 
do so under the TREMF explanation.253 But this is of little moment given that their 
analysis ties well into the Baxian theory without saying so in distinctly clear words. They 
noted the frustration of persons without property who seek to translate liberal Charter 
rights into substantive rights without much success.254 They argued further that: 
Precisely because the entrenched rights are abstract and universal and only 
bind the state, they tend to reinforce those aspects of the Canadian polity 
which need to be challenged: libertarian individualism and the 
commodification of everything. The business classes are able to translate 
their economic desiderata into valid liberal rights claims under the Charter 
because its implicit acceptance of the Adam Smithian ideology of the free 
market makes the right of individuals to do as they like with their private 
property politically [their emphasis] sacrosanct. Fetters on owners in 
respect of speaking about their private property, dealing with it whenever 
they want to do so, through whatever vehicles they like, in association 
with whomever they like, are easily translatable into claims of freedom of 
speech, religion, corporate participation in politics, the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the right 
to association with other property owners, etc.”255 
 
In terms of how courts go about deciding cases presented before them, two variables are 
traditionally at play. The first variable is how decisions reached are shaped by the nature 
of the adjudicatory task itself. The theories I have analyzed thus far address this portion 
of the variable. The second dimension is the impact that the individual qualities of those 
who perform judicial functions and their real life experiences have on how they perform 
that task. It is to this variable that I now turn. 
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2.2.5. Judging in Social Context 
Courts operate in plural and diverse legal, social and political environments. Those who 
use their services are often not socially homogenous. They typically belong to different 
racial groups, speak different languages, are at diverse locations on the socio-economic 
ladder, belong to different gender, may have distinct sexual orientations, belong to 
different political groups and adhere to different religions. At the same time, law and its 
operation is often related to its sociology as a discipline. This is especially relevant 
considering Emile Durkheim’s particular emphasis upon the professions, including law, 
as representing “intermediate bodies” between the individual and the state.256  
Durkheim’s view was that “in the context of increased division of labour and 
related social and political upheaval, such groups embodied the social forces which were 
required to prevent a breakdown in moral authority.”257 The formal view of law is that its 
goals are served when it is applied objectively in dealing with this wide-ranging social 
diversity. A judge before whom a case is brought is not to account for factors lying 
outside the law as applied to the facts of the specific case in reaching a decision. Nor is 
the judge permitted to consult his/her own prejudices in deciding the case. This view was 
greatly criticized by other disciplines as I have already stated. In this part of the study, I 
present the sociological riposte to the formal, positivist conception of law as well as the 
increasing role of social context considerations in the contemporary understanding and 
application of law.  
Therefore, I will approach the discussion of the sociological milieu of 
adjudication from two points. First I will examine what Bourdieu refers to as “field” 
structure and the socially patterned practices of the juridical field as it is disciplinarily 
and professionally defined and understood. Secondly, I will consider the importance of 
understanding social context for those who use the courts, including litigants and to a 
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lesser extent lawyers. I will give lawyers a lesser degree of prominence here because they 
will be discussed along with judges from the first point in terms of professional 
formation. 
In Terdiman’s introduction to the Bourdieu piece and writing from the perspective 
of one who translated it from French into English language, he states that “field” and 
“practices” occupy distinct worlds in the author’s usage. He said if one wanted to 
understand the “field” metaphorically, its analogue would be a magnet: like a magnet, a 
social field exerts a force upon all those who come within its range.258 Continuing, he 
asserts that those who experience these “pulls” are generally not aware of their source 
and that as is true with magnetism, the power of a social field is inherently mysterious. 
Therefore Bourdieu’s piece aimed to explain the invisible but forceful influence of the 
juridical field upon patterns of behavior in the legal world.259 
Bourdieu recognized the formalist or positivist theory that I had mentioned earlier 
which he contrasted with an instrumental viewpoint that tends to conceive law and 
jurisprudence as direct reflections of existing power relations, in which economic 
determinations and, in particular, the interests of dominant groups are expressed, which is 
a view of law as an instrument of domination.260 Dismissing these two perspectives as 
antagonistic, one from within the legal field the other from without, Bourdieu stated that 
they both ignored the existence of an entire social universe, which is in practice relatively 
independent of external determinations and pressures.261 Further, he argues that:  
The social practices of the law are in fact the product of the functioning of 
a “field” whose specific logic is determined by two factors: on the one 
hand, by the specific power relations which give it its structure and which 
order the competitive struggles (or, more precisely, the conflicts over 
competence) that occur within it; and on the other hand, by the internal 
logic of juridical functioning which constantly constrains the range of 
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possible actions and, thereby, limits the realm of specifically juridical 
solutions.262  
 
Bourdieu’s theorizing leads him to construct the concept of “habitus.” He states that the 
juridical field tends to operate like an “apparatus” to the extent that the cohesion of the 
freely orchestrated habitus of legal interpreters [that is judges] is strengthened by the 
discipline of a hierarchized body of professionals who employ a set of established 
procedures for the resolution of any conflicts between those whose profession is to 
resolve conflicts.263 In terms of the understanding of habitus, it tends to suggest that 
practices within the legal universe are strongly patterned by tradition, education, and the 
daily experience of legal custom and professional usage.264  
They operate as learned yet deep structures of behavior within the juridical 
field… They are significantly unlike the practices of any other social 
universe. And they are specific to the juridical field; they do not derive in 
any substantial way from the practices which structure other social 
activities and realms. Thus, they cannot be understood as simple 
“reflections” of relations in these other realms. They have a life, and a 
profound influence, of their own. Central to that influence is the power to 
determine in part what and how the law will decide in any specific 
instance, case, or conflict.265     
 
There is no denying that Bourdieu’s account is sitting well with the practices of the legal 
field in most jurisdictions, including Nigeria. He is absolutely on point when he values 
the impact of training and socialization in the legal field over doctrine, rules the 
constitutional texts. An issue that recurs with interesting regularity throughout this study 
is the fact that tendencies acquired by Nigerian courts mostly through training and 
indoctrination since the country gained independence in the 1960s continue to repress 
judicial dynamism even though the political and legal contexts have changed many times 
over. It is therefore safe to wager that only training, for instance, can account for the 
insistence of post-independence Nigerian courts upon following the pathway of English 
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jurisprudence in constitutional matters even though the English system has little to offer 
by way of insights into the constitutional model chosen for Nigeria at independence.266 I 
will elaborate more on this in the third chapter.      
Further to the above sociological consideration of law and its uses, the theory is 
also gaining ground that recognizing social diversity is now a critical factor in 
understanding the functioning of law. It is also suggested that being well-rounded in 
education about social contexts is now, or should be, integral to the most basic 
qualifications of a modern judge.267 Lawyers who argue cases before judges are also 
being encouraged to “understand contemporary social contexts, and appreciate the need 
to acquire the knowledge and skills that make competent practice within them 
possible.”268 Accepting the relevance of this kind of education to judges, Devlin asks: 
“When judges make pronouncements, do they tap into popular legal consciousness or 
shared community standards of morality, or do they rely on the coercive fiat of their 
                                                          
266 See for example Haim Sandberg, “Legal Colonialism: Americanization of Legal Education in Israel” 
(2010) 10 Global Jurist (Article 6) 1 in which the author refers to American influence arising from the 
increased training of more and more Israeli jurists in the United States as some form of “legal colonialism.” 
The author asserts as a result that “These phenomena have negative influences on the interaction of 
academy and legal practitioners in Israel. Moreover, theories that emerged in an American environment are 
percolated from the academic world to policy makers and judges. These policies have been applied as a 
solution for local and unique Israeli problems. The unique characteristics of the Israeli situation are 
neglected.” 
267 According the National Judicial Institute of Canada, their Social Context Education Project, (SCEP) is 
established on the philosophy that “judges become better judges when they are more knowledgeable.” See 
“National Judicial Institute, Canada: The Social Context Education Project” online: 
<http://www.nji.ca/nji/internationalforum/SCEP_summary.pdf> The project itself, according to the 
Institute was intended to assist judges to [1] understand the nature of diversity, the impacts of disadvantage 
and the particular social, cultural and linguistic issues that shape the persons who appear before them; [2] 
explore their own assumptions, biases and views of the world with a view to reflecting on how these may 
interact with judicial process; [3] examine relevant research and community experience in order to enhance 
processes of judicial reasoning and [4] to provide jurisprudential and analytical tools to enable judges to 
examine the underlying basis of legal rules and concepts to ensure that they correspond with social realities 
and conform to the constitutional guarantee of equality; See also Rosemary Cairns-Way, “What is Social 
Context Education?” (1997) 10 National Judicial Institute at 5 (suggesting that Social Context Education 
“is intended to provide information about the social backdrop against which and out of which particular 
issues and particular litigants come before the courts”). 
268 Rose Voyvodic, “Lawyers meet the Social Context: Understanding Cultural Competence” (2005) 84 
Can Bar Rev 565 at 567. 
 83 
 
word?”269 He answers his own query by stating that every act of judgment no matter at 
what level it is constructed takes place in the context of a larger set of judicial practices 
and conventions. He concludes that only a portion of these practices and conventions is 
ever articulated while much of it is “internalized through acculturalization to a particular 
judicial environment.”270  
In the specific instance of Nigeria and other developing societies, in which social 
divisions are pervasive and widespread poverty is a reality of everyday existence, it was 
suggested long ago by Taslim Elias, a Nigerian jurist that law must acknowledge this 
context and therefore be useful as an instrument of economic development. Elias 
envisaged a situation in which the law is in continuous dialogue with the society.271 But 
to achieve this he said, lawyers in terms of their ideology must be more than positivist, 
utilitarian or social engineers; they must be “something of each.”272 Law in context 
proponents, like Elias, canvass the use of law as an instrument of economic and social 
development.273 
It is not difficult to fault social context education. Its utility in the administration 
of justice should therefore not be overstretched. Even where there is no conscious policy 
of increasing judges’ understanding of the social context in which they work, their 
recognition of such in their duties may be of negative consequence to the attainment of 
justice. The ideal that every legal system aspires is to enforce justice on the basis of a fair 
opportunity for the parties concerned to present their cases without pre-empting their 
outcome by any preconceived notions.  
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For the above reason, the symbol of justice is the picture of a maiden in 
blindfolds, holding a scale in one hand and the sword in the other. The philosophy of 
justice which this symbol signifies, therefore, is that the adjudicator needs not have prior 
knowledge of the parties to a suit or their particular circumstances. The adjudicator’s only 
concern is with the facts and the law when applied to it. This picture of neutrality that is 
presented of justice is defeated were a judge to probe into or recognize the background of 
the parties in dispute to be able to reach a decision. Otherwise, the judge is at risk of 
being accused of deciding not on the basis of facts or law but on grounds of extraneous 
considerations. This might even be more complex in societies like Nigeria where ethnic 
and religious feelings run at an all-time high. 
This image of legal impartiality built on objectivity and neutrality is often 
criticized by some theoretical branches within the legal field. American critical feminist 
and race theorists in particular are disturbed by accounts of law as a neutral 
phenomenon.274 But non-Americans like Nedelsky also happen to fall into this category. 
To her, only those completely unaware of their own understanding that experience, 
education and culture are the starting points of decision-making can rely on such dated 
principles as neutrality in legal power relations. She argues that we “can observe that 
things that seem self-evident, natural or beyond dispute to one group are perceived very 
differently by people from a different background.”275 In other words, she is stating that 
judgment which one set of individuals would ordinarily consider fair and impartial may 
be interpreted as inappropriate and unfair by persons of a different social or cultural 
background. Those who favor social context awareness suggest that to deal with 
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situations that present this way might require having a judiciary that reflects the full range 
of the diversity of the society in question.276 Nedelsky then asks:  
[…] how can any given person be guaranteed a judge who shares her 
experiences, assumptions and affective starting points? And were we to 
have such a judiciary, how would the judges manage to reason together 
and deliberate with each other given their different affective starting 
points?277  
 
To answer these queries, Nedelsky falls back to Hannah Arendt’s theory of the genuine 
subjectivity of judgment.278 By this she understands judgment to refer to matters about 
which no objective truth-claim can be made. It is not therefore arbitrary or simply a 
matter of preference but rather valid for the judging community.279 There is thus a 
difference between making a judgment and stating a preference. Unlike when stating a 
preference, forming judgments is in fact persuasive in nature.280 Arendt therefore sees 
impartiality as not a stance taken above the fray, but the characteristics of judgments 
made by taking into account the perspectives of others in the judging community.281 
Bearing all of this in mind, Nedelsky rebuts the claims of those who believe that a social 
context-sensitive judiciary would destroy the autonomy of judges. She argues instead 
that: 
To understand judicial impartiality we must ask who judges are, and with 
whom they imagine themselves to be in conversation as they make their 
judgments. Whom do they imagine persuading and on whom do they 
make claims of agreement? If their attention is turned only to a narrow 
group…, then judges will surely remain imprisoned in their limited 
perspective. But if the faculties and student bodies of law schools, the 
practicing bar as well as the judiciary actually reflected the full diversity 
of society, then every judge would have had long experience in exercising 
judgment, through the process of trying to persuade (in imagination and 
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actual dialogue) people from a variety of backgrounds and perspectives. 
This would better prepare judges for judging situations about which they 
had no first- or even second-hand knowledge. It would vastly decrease the 
current likelihood of a single set of very limited perspective determining 
the judgment.282 
 
Nevertheless, while the above understanding of social context theory in adjudication is 
limited perhaps to institutionalizing social context knowledge and making it integral to 
the system of judicial decision-making, Grossman offers a slightly different variant of it. 
His own analysis covers those situations in which a judge’s own personal experiences, 
and not just his knowledge of surrounding social issues, are critical to her/his decision-
making ideology.283 Grossman acknowledges earlier insights, which he described as 
rudimentary, into the relationship between process and policy outcomes. However, he 
proclaimed them inadequate for neglecting “that portion of the process in which personal 
values inputs allegedly derived from background experiences are translated into policy 
outcomes.”284 To mitigate this inadequacy and advance the theory, he consults three 
different concepts - conversion, consensus and rationality.  
 Grossman describes conversion as the process by which background experiences 
and derivative values influence decisions. He identifies three problems within this 
concept. First is the assumption “without further delineation and exploration” that certain 
values can be attributed to certain background characteristics. He suggests that this 
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factual assertion is in need of demonstration.285 Second is that no distinction is made 
between background characteristics and actual individual experiences “although common 
sense and common knowledge warn us of the danger in such reasoning.”286 Finally, 
Grossman says, some theorists fail to account for the impact of on-the-bench 
socialization processes. He argues that old values frequently change, and prior 
experiences take on new meanings in the light of newer involvements. “By treating 
values derived from background characteristics as constants, an unnecessary element of 
rigidity is inserted into the theoretical structure.”287 
The notion of consensus in Grossman’s theory is only useful in collegial courts. It 
plays a negative role and within it, “background experiences are seen as relevant and 
explored only in those decisions in which the courts are divided.”288 Where there are 
polarized opinions among judges, this is blamed on contrasting background experiences. 
On the other hand, where there is unanimity, the assumption is that background factors 
were either not present or marginal to the outcome of the dispute. Finally, Grossman 
states that judicial decision-making could also be explained in terms of rationality of 
choice. According to this notion, “each case presents each judge with a clear choice of 
value alternatives, one of which best expresses his own policy preferences.”289 It assumes 
that each judicial vote represents an explicit value choice of comparable intensity and that 
judicial decisions are no different from other political, economic and social decisions. 
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2.2.6.  Moving with the Times: A “Transitional” Theory of Human Rights 
Adjudication 
 
There is little debate that human rights adjudication is considerably important in the legal 
processes of a country going through a transition. This is simply because of the different 
calculations that often form part of the transitional agenda and the need to not put the 
transition at risk by taking an overly rigid or dogmatic view of those calculations. A 
country recovering from internal insurrection, civil war or moving from authoritarianism 
to a democracy is often concerned more about holding together a fragile peace to prevent 
a relapse to the past it is recovering from than with plain rule of law considerations. As is 
clear with the example of several countries fitting this context, legal calculations alone 
would not suffice in such situations. Other factors often residing at the realm of pure 
pragmatism and politics, or even stark compromise generally overshadow all pretentions 
to ordinary legality. 
 Judicial behavior in times of political transformation provides the single most 
potent bedrock for this theory of adjudication. The South African case of The Azanian 
People’s Organization & Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa & 
Others290 best illustrates this theory.  In this case, the applicants challenged various 
provisions of the South African Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 
34 of 1995 (otherwise known as the Peace and Reconciliation Act). In particular, they 
impugned the constitutionality of section 20(7) of the Act which prohibited civil or 
criminal liability for persons who had been granted amnesty under its provisions. In their 
claim, the applicants submitted that various agents of the South African state acting 
within the scope of their powers and in the course of their employment killed and 
maimed leading activists during the apartheid era. They argued that they had “a clear 
right to insist that such wrongdoers should properly be prosecuted and punished, [and] 
that they should be ordered by the ordinary courts of the land to pay adequate civil 
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compensation to the victims or dependants of the victims.”291 They also requested an 
order requiring the South African state “to make good to such victims or dependants the 
serious losses which they have suffered in consequence of the criminal and delictual acts 
of the employees of the state.”292 
 In terms of principle, it is very clear that the applicants in this case presented an 
important constitutional question. Were those who committed atrocious acts under 
apartheid to be allowed easy escape from the justice warranted by their actions or should 
they be held accountable before the law? The court had to answer this question in a 
pragmatic fashion recognizing the choice it had to make between deepening 
reconciliation as part of the transitional process and providing remedies to individual 
victims that might endanger rather than enhance the transition. The South African 
Constitutional Court showed sufficient presence of mind to mark and delimit the 
decisional issues it faced in this case. The court stated in its judgment: 
Every decent human being must feel grave discomfort in living with a 
consequence which might allow the perpetrators of evil acts to walk the 
streets of this land with impunity, protected in their freedom by an 
amnesty immune from constitutional attack, but the circumstances in 
support of this course require carefully to be appreciated. Most of the acts 
of brutality and torture which have taken place have occurred during an 
era in which neither the laws which permitted the incarceration of persons 
or the investigation of crimes, nor the methods and the culture which 
informed such investigations, were easily open to public investigation, 
verification and correction. Much of what transpired in this shameful 
period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective 
demonstration and proof. Loved ones have disappeared sometimes 
mysteriously and most of them no longer survive to tell their tales. Others 
have had their freedoms invaded, their dignity assaulted or their 
reputations tarnished by grossly unfair imputations hurled in the fire and 
the cross-fire of a deep and wounding conflict. The wicked and the 
innocent have often both been victims.293 
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 Against this background, the court saw only a “difficult, sensitive, perhaps even 
agonizing, balancing act between the need for justice to victims of past abuse and the 
need for reconciliation and rapid transition to a new future…”294 It also saw its 
responsibility in this case as requiring it to resolve the tension “between encouragement 
to wrongdoers to help in the discovery of truth and the need for reparations for the 
victims of that truth; between a correction in the old and the creation of the new.”295  
The court described the exercise as one of “immense difficulty interacting in a 
vast network of political, emotional, ethical and logistical considerations.”296 The fact it 
did not mention law or legality as one of the considerations at play in its calculations 
shows it was less inclined to factor this in but rather felt overwhelmingly drawn towards 
achieving a political outcome fitting the overall transitional goal that it identified. It 
therefore came as no surprise that the court concluded that the epilogue to the South 
African constitution “authorized and contemplated an ‘amnesty’ in its most 
comprehensive and generous meaning so as to enhance and optimize the prospects of 
facilitating the constitutional journey from the shame of the past to the promise of the 
future.”297 
 The most important development in this decision is the willingness of the court to 
interpret its duty in such contexts of transition as discovering the overarching objective of 
the transition and to fulfill it. As is clear from carefully scrutinizing this decision, not all 
morally and ethically supported claims arising from the history of impunity can succeed 
in such situations if granting those claims would complicate rather than facilitate the 
transition. States going through similar transformational seasons design transitional 
mechanisms suited to their contexts which the courts are then called upon and obliged to 
facilitate and help deliver. In the particular context of Nigeria, much of chapter seven of 
this study is devoted to analyzing how the role of the courts in protecting human rights 
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after her transition from military to civilian rule interacted with the kinds of political and 
social calculations so painstakingly identified in the above discussed South African case.   
 
2.2.7. The Face of Janus: Courts - At once “Activist” and “Restrained” 
How courts are able to apply their discretionary powers is presumably also 
influenced by the willingness or reluctance of judges to be “activist” or “restrained.” 
Because most constitutional provisions that courts interpret while deciding human rights 
and other cases are couched in indeterminate language, this increases the operational 
latitude and range of choices available to them. In this case, the orientation that judges 
approve depends solely on their personal dispositions though we saw earlier that this 
could interact with factors taken from the broader legal and political environment. The 
activist theory holds that judges are not just robots applying the law or politicians on the 
bench acting either to stabilize the political system or safeguarding the state “against the 
machinations of the individual.”298  
According to Okere, activism is based on the liberal and teleological theory of the 
judicial function which assumes that every law made by parliament has a purpose; that 
the constitution is a social charter of a dynamic society based on certain ideological and 
philosophical presuppositions. Thus, an activist judge in interpreting the constitution 
“seeks to ascertain the underlying principles to give effect to them recognizing that 
giving effect to the ultimate goal of the constitution is the essence of the interpretative 
effort.”299 Conversely, he sees restraint or passivism as based on the declaratory theory of 
the judicial function which assigns a passive role to the courts, namely to declare what 
the law is, not to make it, and strictly in accordance with the doctrine of separation of 
powers.300 
                                                          
298 Olufemi Taiwo, “The Legal Subject in Modern African Law: A Nigerian Report” (2006) 7 Hum Rts Rev 
17 at 29. 
299 See Okere, supra note 153 at 788. 
300 Ibid. 
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Kermit Roosevelt III says the United States Supreme Court, for example, has been 
called activist by good politicians and bad ones, and by “those whose judgment history 
would vindicate, and those whose views are now marginal and discredited.”301 Most 
critics of judicial activism, he argues, start out by saying that the decisions they call 
activist are wrong, but that activism is more than error.302 Justice Heydon is perhaps 
among those who view activism with suspicion. He describes it as “using judicial power 
for a purpose other than that for which it was granted, namely doing justice according to 
law in the particular case. It means serving some function other than what is necessary for 
the decision of the particular dispute between the parties. Often the illegitimate function 
is the furthering of some political, moral or social programme...”303 
 In Nigeria, however, it is the government establishment that is often afraid of 
activist courts. The argument between activism and passivity does not have the same 
ideological and sometimes political polarization as in the United States. Many theorists 
believe that what Nigerian courts require in the area of human rights decision-making is a 
generous dosage of activism rather than the current passivity that seems to characterize 
their work.304 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
301 Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Judicial Activism: Making Sense of Supreme Court Decisions (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press, 2006) at 14. 
302 Ibid at 15. 
303 Dyson Heydon, “Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law” (2001-2004) 10 Otago L Rev 493 
at 495. 
304 See Dakas, supra note 66 at 75. 
 93 
 
Chapter Three 
 One Step Forward, then Several Backward: Historicizing the 
Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter will discuss human rights in Nigeria from a historical context. It will briefly 
treat human rights in pre-colonial Nigeria and inquire whether the various cultural 
practices rooted in the lives of the people prior to colonization contained any substantive 
human rights ingredients. I will then discuss the state of human rights in Nigeria during 
the period of colonization and the impact of the colonial constitutional system on judicial 
practices. Thereafter, I will examine the efforts that went into constitutionalizing human 
rights norms before Nigeria’s independence as well as the enduring nature of the imbibed 
colonial practices on the legal system.  
Following from the above, I will take a close look at the disruption of civil rule by 
the military and how this affected overall human rights conditions. In particular, I will 
explain how this disruption undermined both respect for human rights and judicial 
intervention to provide redress for victims of abuse. This would include a discussion of 
the military political process and its unusual law making procedures. It will be clearer at 
the conclusion of the chapter the nature of the relationship between a society, its laws and 
legal professionalization. This question feeds my interest in connecting the historical 
account of Nigeria’s long-standing human rights adjudication culture to the British 
origins of the legal system and the process through which legal professionals are trained 
and recruited.     
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3.2. Human Rights Practices in the Colony 
It is useful to situate the development of human rights in Nigeria in its historical context 
because this furthers the reflection upon one of the sub-questions dealt with in this 
research. That question is whether the performance of the courts in human rights cases 
does not owe in part to the country’s colonial experiences. As an extension of that 
inquiry, I will also examine in this chapter the social and political events that shaped the 
constitutionalization of human rights in the country on the eve of its independence as well 
as the impact of military intervention on the judicial enforcement of human rights in 
Nigeria.  
Generally speaking, human rights are a form of social expression. They are often 
described as universal in both character and application.305 What this implies is that 
human rights exist in all places at all times and that specific local factors constitute no 
barriers to their recognition. Yet the question whether human rights resonate in equal 
measure and in a universal sense notwithstanding culture and creed is essentially an 
unsettled one.306 While on the one hand the impact of human rights both nationally and 
internationally necessitates efforts to universalize their norms and practices, some 
opinions tend to question such efforts, and in the process they seem to relativize the very 
                                                          
305 It appeared to be the main goal of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 to proclaim the 
inevitability of this assertion. See Hurst Hannum, “The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in National and International Law (1995-1996) 25 Ga J Int’l & Comp L 287; Mary Ann Glendon, 
“Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (1997-1998) 73 Notre Dame L Rev 1153. 
306 David Kinley, “Human Rights, Globalization and the Rule of Law: Friends, Foes or Family?” (2003) 7 
UCLA J Int’l L & Foreign  Aff 239, Robert Sloane, “Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the 
Universality of International Human Rights” (2001) 34 Vand J Transnat’l L 527, Jack Donnelly, “Cultural 
Relativism and Universal Human Rights” (1984) 6 Hum Rts Q 400, Rhoda Howard, “Cultural Absolutism 
and the Nostalgia for Community” (1993) 15 Hum Rts Q 315, Bonny Ibhawoh, “Between Culture and 
Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State” (2000) 22 Hum 
Rts Q 838, Jason G Morgan-Forster, “Reverse Moderate Relativism Applied: Third Generation 
International Human Rights from an Islamic Perspective” (Bepress Legal Series, Paper No. 235, 2004) 
Online: <http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/235>, Sonia Harris-Short, “International Human Rights Law: 
Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child” 
(2003) 23 Hum Rts Q 130.  
 95 
 
dialogue about rights.307 Yet others think it is only through a multi-cultural understanding 
that the universalism of rights can acquire a more global resonance.308 
If we agree that the colonial administration met local structures on the ground 
even if they were underdeveloped when colonial rule was first introduced in Nigeria, the 
next line of inquiry relevant to this research is whether those local structures had 
ingredients paralleling what is known in newer times as human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. There is no agreement in the literature regarding this as well. While some 
scholars insist that human rights as it is known today is alien to African indigenous legal 
mechanisms,309 others hold a contrary opinion, contending instead that human rights and 
other notions of justice did exist in various African cultures prior to colonization.310  
However, the manner in which colonization was conducted and its disruptive 
impact on indigenous social, political and legal systems311 repose some salience on these 
opposing views. They also have implications for colonial attitudes to human rights as 
                                                          
307 Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Human 
Rights Conceptions” (1982) 76 Am Pol Sci Rev 303; Rhoda Howard & Jack Donnelly, “Human Dignity, 
Human Rights and Political Regimes” (1986) 80 Am Pol Sci Rev 80. For a critique of their position see 
Makau wa Mutua, “The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the 
Language of Duties” (1994-1995) 35 Va J Int’l L 339 at 356. 
308 Nsongurua Udombana, “Human Rights, Eurocentrism, and Africa: Towards a Multicultural Dialogue” 
in Chima C Nweze et al., Beyond Bar Advocacy: Essays in Honour of Anthony Mogboh, SAN (Lagos: 
Odede Publishers, 2010). 
309 Donnelly, supra note 306. See further Rhoda Howard, “Group Versus Individual Identity in the African 
Debate on Human Rights” in Abdullahi An-Na’im & Francis M Deng eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-
Cultural Perspectives (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1990).    
310 Mutua, supra note 306. See also Tunji Abayomi, “Continuities and Changes in the Development of Civil 
Liberties Litigation in Nigeria” (1991) 22 U Tol L Rev 1036 at 1037 (“…some African social and political 
scientists, scholars, human rights activists, and lawyers have come up with an African concept of human 
rights which flows from the culture and values of Africa. This group posits that the immateriality of 
individual rights in Africa exists because of Africa’s predominantly communal culture. Africans, they 
argue, readily subject themselves to the dictates of the community which they generally voluntarily accept 
as controlling over individuals.”) Yet not all African scholars share this view of a “rather romantic view of 
the existence and protection of human rights in traditional African societies” which languished under 
feudalism and the penetration of Islamic religion. The question was therefore asked where one can find “the 
right to life when stealing the goods of the Lord could be sanctioned by death born under feudalism and 
Islam.” Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (Lagos: Nigeria Institute of 
International Affairs & Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Limited, 1984). 
311 See James Q Whitman, “Western Legal Imperialism: Thinking about the Deep Historical Roots” (2009) 
10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 305. 
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well as the factors justificatory of their recognition in the constitutions with which 
political independence was established in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa. What is 
undeniable is that several indigenous customs and practices which the colonial authorities 
said were inconsistent with the “civilization” that they intended for the colonies were 
abolished. Where this was not the case, the continued application of such customs was 
made contingent upon their passing some stringent validity tests.312  
The question whether human rights practices were observed in pre-colonial 
Nigeria or whether their origins derive from the culture of the colonizing power, as is 
claimed in some quarters,313 seems to be a postcolonial one too. Because assuming 
human rights originated from the culture of Britain there was little evidence of that in the 
conduct of the colonial regime nonetheless. Colonialism itself was antithetical to the very 
notion of human rights. According to Howard “There were absolutely no guarantees of 
fundamental human rights in the colonial period.”314 Not only was the practice viewed as 
deleterious in this manner, in addition, the way the colonial government conducted its 
                                                          
312 In British Africa, the most prominent of those tests was the one requiring that customary law which was 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience or incompatible either directly or by implication 
with any written law for the time being in force shall not be observed by any court. Such customary law 
could also be struck down if contrary to public policy. See for example Section 18(1) of the High Court 
Law of Anambra State 1987. Nigerian courts have not been hesitant in striking down customs that they 
consider repugnant. In Okonkwo v Okagbue, [1994] 12 NSCC at 40 the Supreme Court held that a custom, 
which allowed the surviving sisters of a man who died 30 years earlier to marry a wife for him and raise 
issues in his name, was repugnant to natural justice equity and good conscience. Similarly in Eugene 
Meribe v Joshua Egwu, [1976] 3NSCC at 23 the court decided that it was repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience for a woman to be married to another woman. See generally Uche Ewelukwa, 
“Posthumous Children, Hegemonic Human Rights and the Dilemma of Reform – Conversations across 
Cultures” (2008) 19 Hastings Women’s L J 211.    
313 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1989) at 79 where he argues that “Recognition of human rights simply was not the way of traditional 
Africa” and that “human rights are centrally linked to ‘modernity’ and have been (and remain) specially 
connected to the political rise and practices of ‘the West.’” See also Donnelly, supra note 306 at 303.  
314 Rhoda Howard, “Legitimacy and Class Rule in Commonwealth Africa: Constitutionalism and the Rule 
of Law” (1985) 7 Third World Q 323 at 325. 
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rule removed whatever doubts may have existed that it was ambivalent to the very idea of 
human rights within the colonized territories.315  
There is an abundance of evidence in the literature that the practices of the 
colonial power in Nigeria did enormous violence to the pretense that [1] they had a 
civilizing mission and [2] that they were coming from a liberal culture. None of these two 
claims could be supported by happenings on the ground throughout the colonial period. 
Rather the abuse to which the colonial administration put its powers in Nigeria as well as 
elsewhere in Africa and even beyond is very well documented.316   
The colonial authority disdained dissent and crushed every protest of the natives 
with brutal force.317 They did not respect freedom of expression either and imprisoned 
without charge or deported those whose views threatened the colonial establishment.318 
                                                          
315 See Carey, supra note 76 at 65 where he states that socialization in colonial territories was “impelled by 
colonial subjugation and hypocrisy.” See also Nsongurua Udombana, “Mission Accomplished? An Impact 
Assessment of the UDHR in Africa” (2008) Hamline J Pub L & Pol’y 335 at 346 (arguing that 
“Colonialism altered the traditional balance of power, created ethnic divisions and introduced a cultural 
dichotomy detrimental to African natives”). 
316 In Kenya like in Nigeria, the colonial government imposed emergency conditions at the drop of the hat 
under which pretext it detained anti-colonial agitators without trial or bail. See for example Mary Dudziak, 
“Working toward Democracy: Thurgood Marshall and the Constitution of Kenya” (2006) 56 Duke L J 721 
at 738. In India “The British deprived the colonial subjects of basic political and economic rights, the 
independence of the country was lost and its economy was mortgaged to the needs of British Industrial 
development. It was inevitable for the Indians to fight for their rights.” Justice BN Srikrishna, “Pre British 
Human Rights Jurisprudence” (2010) 3 NUJS L Rev 129 at 130. See also Satish Kumar, “Human Rights 
and Economic Development: The Indian Tradition” (1981) 3 Hum Rts Q 47.  
317 Robert Seidman, “Administrative Law and Legitimacy in Anglophone Africa: A Problem in the 
Reception of Foreign Law” (1970) 5 Law & Soc Rev 161 at 168 (“The other face of imperial rule was brute 
force. When available resources did not permit its actuality, its illusion acted as surrogate. The lonely 
British Resident in Northern Nigeria had to maintain his position by constant reminders of the mailed fist 
behind his back. Pomp and circumstance-grandly accoutred governors, fife and drum corps, the deliberate 
creation of a vast gulf between the cantonments and the African town-played surrogate to legal-rational 
legitimacy”).  
318 John W Skelton Jr. “Standards of Procedural Due Process under International Law Vs. Preventive 
Detention in Selected African States” (1979-1980) 2 Hous J Int’l L 307 at 314. See also Howard, supra 
note 309 at 325 where she stated that “preventive detention and exile were used by the British whenever it 
was felt necessary… Sedition laws were routinely used in order to control political protest, especially in the 
press, and were much more restrictive in Africa than in Britain itself.” 
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Segregation was as well vigorously pursued by the colonial government.319 In some areas 
the best and most fertile lands were seized from the natives and given to foreigners who 
turned to local labor extorted through brutality to cultivate them.320 The colonial regime, 
to enhance the penetration of its authority either destroyed or undermined indigenous 
governance structures and imposed “quasi liberal institutions, which were generally 
underdeveloped, whose institutions were designed more for economic exploitation than 
‘civilizing’ the population.”321 As a result: 
The quasi-democratic institutions – supported by authoritarian coercion 
used to impose ultimate colonial control – posed such problems as double 
sovereignty, dual legal systems, and cultural misunderstandings. The 
establishment of European-style, colonial legal systems generally resulted 
in two legal (and political) cultures operating concurrently, a European… 
system imposed on the pre-existing or modified, indigenous legal system. 
Neither [of the two] really communicated or integrated with the other in a 
coherent or comprehensible way.322 
 
In Nigeria’s case, the position of the colonial authority was no less untenable as Britain 
which colonized the country signed to be bound by the European Convention on Human 
                                                          
319 Lord Frederick Lugard, first Commissioner of the Northern Nigeria Protectorate and upon the 
amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914, the country’s first Governor-General justified 
colonial segregation in the following words: “On the one hand the policy [of segregation] does not impose 
any restriction on one race which is not applicable to another. A European is strictly prohibited from living 
in the native reservation, as a native is from living in the European quarter. On the other hand, since this 
feeling exists, it should in my opinion be made abundantly clear that what is aimed at is a segregation of 
social standards, and not a segregation of races. The Indian or the African gentleman who adopts the higher 
standard of civilization and desires to partake in such immunity from infection as segregation may confer, 
should be as free and welcome to live in the civilized reservation as the European, provided, of course, that 
he does not bring with him a concourse of followers. The native peasant often shares his hut with his goat, 
or sheep, or fowls. He loves to drum and dance at night, which deprives the European of sleep. He is 
skeptical of mosquito theories. ‘God made the mosquito larva,’ said a Moslem delegation to me, ‘for God’s 
sake let the larva live.’ For these people, sanitary rules are necessary but hateful. They have no desire to 
abolish segregation.” Lord Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: 
Routledge, 1965) at 149-150. 
320 Dudziak, supra note 315 at 739. See also Seidman, supra note 316 at 170 (“In addition, the 
administration had to allocate land for the benefit of British interests. In East and Central Africa, the best 
land was sold to settlers without very much to the interests of Africans”). 
321 Carey, supra note 76 at 65. 
322 Ibid. 
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which was adopted in Rome on November 4, 1950 
but came into force in 1953.323 Britain’s position was awkward because at the same time 
that Europe produced this Convention to improve the human rights situation in the 
countries of that region, it ranked among several European countries that practiced 
colonialism which was understood in different parts of the world at that time as 
constituting gross and systematic abuse of human rights of native populations.324  
According to Heyns, “[A]frica and the other parts of the colonized world were far 
away, and it was felt that if adherence to the Convention was perceived to interfere too 
much with the control of States Parties over their colonies, it would impede on the wide 
acceptance required to achieve the objectives of the Convention in Europe”325 To avoid 
this possibility, the Convention contained what has been described as the “Colonial 
Clause”326 which allowed a ratifying state the discretion, by a declared notification, to 
extend the Convention to all or any of the territories for whose international relations it 
was responsible,327 but with due regard to local requirements.328 
 The United Kingdom actually filed a declaration under this article allowing the 
Convention to apply to most of its colonies in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, thereby 
“undertaking a legally binding obligation to bring the legal systems of most of its African 
territories into conformity with the Convention, and could be subjected to inter-state 
complaints before the European Commission if it did not do so.”329 But this development 
did not have much impact on the human rights situation in the territories concerned.330 
                                                          
323 ETS 5, 213 UNTS 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, and 8 which 
entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971 and 1 January 1990 respectively.  
324 Christof Heyns, “African Human Rights Law and the European Convention” (1995) 11 S Afr J Hum Rts 
252 at 254. 
325 Ibid. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Art. 63(1) 
328 Art. 63(3) 
329 Heyns, supra note 323 at 255. 
330 Ibid. In this regard, Nwabueze’s postulations would seem therefore very strange and unsupportable. He 
acknowledged that the encroachment upon private rights under British colonial administration in Nigeria 
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Rather there was an intensification of brutality on the native populations whose political 
leaders, on their part, were not indifferent to the collective yearning for change. 
 The decision of the British colonial government to grant Nigeria political 
independence in 1960 therefore followed several Constitutional Conferences held in 
London. One of such conferences was held in 1953 where the issue of incorporating a 
Bill of Rights for Nigeria was raised for the first time.331 At that time, the Secretary of 
State for Colonies was Oliver Lyttelton (later Lord Chandos). The Action Group (AG) 
which controlled the government of Western Nigeria at the time sought to accelerate 
Nigeria’s progress towards independence and therefore withdrew its support for the 
Macpherson Constitution of 1951.332 The party’s action plunged the country into a 
political crisis, prompting the scheduling of the 1953 Conference to resolve it.333 
 That Conference dealt with two major issues: the form of government for Nigeria 
and the timetable for independence. Integral to the discussion on form of government, 
particularly with their preference for the federal system, the AG and the National Council 
of Nigeria and the Cameroons (later National Council of Nigerian Citizens) (NCNC) 
proposed the inclusion of a bill of rights in the constitution. According to Parkinson, 
The impetus for the bill of rights came from Awolowo [leader of the AG], 
a teacher and trade union leader who studied law in London before 
returning to Nigeria to practice law and pursue a political career. The 
Action Group’s federal proposal anticipated directly elected seats in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
did not go “beyond what the exigencies of administering a colonial territory demanded.” Therefore, “the 
law of sedition, for example, has had to be made harsher and be more rigorously enforced than in Britain in 
order to guard against the possibility that the relatively small politically articulate section of the population 
might exploit the natural resentment against colonialism to incite the populace to disaffection.” His next 
line that “apart from such cases it might be said that civil liberties were up to the time of internal self-
government no less ample in many of the British dependencies than in Britain itself” is open to question, at 
least with reference to Nigeria. See Nwabueze, supra note 158 at 119.  
331 Charles Parkinson, The Emergence of Domestic Human Rights Instruments in British Overseas 
Territories (London: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 135. Also available online: 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/law/978019... > 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid. See also Solomon Ukhuegbe, Human Rights Decision-Making in Emergent Courts: The Supreme 
Court of Nigeria, 1961-2000 (PhD Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2009, 138) [unpublished]. 
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federal legislature based on population, meaning that half of the seats 
would be in the Northern Region. Awolowo had the ambition to be leader 
of Nigeria and he knew that to attain this position he had to win a 
proportion of Northern electorates. But the Northern People’s Congress 
actively restricted other political parties campaigning in the North. 
Awolowo, a skilled lawyer who used the law as a weapon to be employed 
for political advantage, saw the bill as a mechanism that would allow the 
Action Group to campaign freely in the North.334 
 
Lord Chandos refused to allow a discussion of the proposal to include a human rights 
provision in the constitution and there is no record of this in the official report of the 
Conference.335 In fact, his recollection of those events showed how trivially he had 
handled that proposal. In his own words: 
…[A] member representing a not very important group asked that the 
Charter of Human Rights should be incorporated in the constitution. I 
replied by saying that they could put ‘God is Love’ into the constitution if 
they so wished, but not while I was in the chair. I had the prestige of 
Nigeria too much at heart to wish that general ethical aspirations should be 
attached to the laws and constitution… If the constitution appeared to 
subscribe to the idea that freedom was absolute and unlimited it would 
merely make Nigeria look ridiculous, which I would not stomach.336  
                                                          
334 Ibid at 136 
335 Ukhuegbe, supra note 332 at 138. See also Report by the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held 
in London in July and August, 1953 Cmd 8934 (London: HMSO, 1953). Tekena Tamuno, “Separatist 
Agitations in Nigeria since 1914” (1970) 8 J Modern Afr Stud 563. 
336 Ibid. There are perhaps two main reasons the agitation for the incorporation of a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution did not appeal much to the colonial government. In the first instance, doing so would undercut 
its raison d’être and provide important incentives for pro-independence agitators. Secondly, the British did 
not have a written constitution and therefore no tradition of written bill of rights. In fact what is well known 
is the derision with which English lawyers and legal experts of that era regarded written bills of rights or 
other documents to similar effect. The most popular among them perhaps was Jeremy Bentham’s riposte to 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man issued by revolutionaries that brought down the French ancien 
regime. In Bentham’s words: “Look at the letter, you find nonsense – look beyond the letter, you find 
nothing…Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – 
nonsense upon stilts. But this rhetorical nonsense ends in the old strain of mischievous nonsense: for 
immediately a list of the pretended natural rights is given, and those are so expressed as to present a view of 
legal rights.” Similarly, the Simon’s Commission on the Indian Constitution which treated similar calls for 
the inclusion of human rights guarantees in the Indian constitution contained the following: “Many of those 
who came before us have urged that the Indian Constitution should contain definite guarantees for the 
rights of individuals in respect of the exercise of their religion and a declaration of the equal rights of all 
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It is a fact well settled by historical accounts that human rights were first 
constitutionalized in Nigeria because of fears expressed by minority ethnic groups about 
the risk to them in a post-colonial Nigeria in which the majority groups were already 
jostling for domination.337 The agitation of the minorities became noticeable at the 1957 
Constitutional Conference. It was then dressed up as a demand for new states for the 
minority ethnic groups. Their thinking was that with their own states, they could 
participate actively and without fear in the affairs of an independent Nigerian state.  
 It was, however, realized by participants at that Constitutional Conference that 
this particular solution may protract minority fears rather than address them satisfactorily. 
In fact, “It was realized… that it would be impossible, in view of the heterogeneous 
nature of the Nigeria society to meet all these fears by the creation of new states because 
irrespective of the number of states created, minorities would always remain”338 The 
Conference instead resolved that a Commission be established to look into the fears of 
the minorities and recommend ways of allaying them.339  
The Commission, chaired by Sir Henry Willink, recommended the entrenchment 
of fundamental human rights in the proposed constitution to counteract those minority 
fears. At the same time, the Commission’s justification for this suggestion betrayed its 
misgivings about its overall efficacy when it said “Provisions of this kind in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
citizens. We are aware that such provisions have been inserted in many constitutions, notably in those 
European States formed after the War. Experience, however, has not shown them to be of any great 
practical value. Abstract declarations are useless, unless there exists the will and the means to make them 
effective.” See generally SA de Smith, “Fundamental Rights in the New Commonwealth (1)” (1961) 10 
Int’l & Comp L Q 83 at 84-85. See also Godfrey Amachree, “Fundamental Rights in Nigeria” (1965) 11 
Howard L J 463 at 476.         
337 See Nwabueze, supra note 158 at 117. Ken Saro-Wiwa, Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy (Port 
Harcourt: Saros International, 1992) at 22. Philip C Aka, “Prospects for Igbo Human Rights in Nigeria in 
the New Century” (2004) 48 Howard L J 165 at 175. David Lavan Grove, “The ‘Sentinels’ of Liberty? The 
Nigerian Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” (1963) 7 J Afr L 152. Okonkwor, supra note 155; Aka, supra 
note 4. 
338 SA Oretuyi, “The Nigerian Attempt to Secure Legal Representation by a Bill of Rights: Has it Achieved 
its Objective?” (1975) 17 Malaya L Rev 149 at 150. 
339 Ibid. 
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constitution are difficult to enforce and sometimes difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, we 
think they should be inserted. Their presence defines beliefs widespread among 
democratic countries and provides a standard to which appeal may be made by those 
whose rights are infringed.”340 
This solution to the fears of the minorities stands to reason, admittedly, not 
because it lacked justification but because it provided the minorities no protection that is 
not available to the majorities as well. Its goal seems clearly similar to that ascribed to 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights341 which ostensibly 
was inserted to address the rights of minorities within national borders but which Anghie 
says “purports to protect the rights of minorities, [but] is based, significantly, on the 
rights of individuals belonging to minorities and, does little to protect minorities as a 
collectivity”342 In fact the human rights provisions suggested for inclusion in the 
constitution by the Willink’s Commission as with Article 27 provided little more than the 
rights which those provisions say are available to everyone, majority and minority alike, 
in effect endorsing the assimilation of minorities into the “universal state”343 
As it transpired, human rights provisions were incorporated into the Nigerian 
constitution in 1958 and were retained in both the Independence Constitution of 1960 and 
                                                          
340 Report Of The Commission Appointed To Inquire Into The Fears Of The Minorities And The Means Of 
Allaying Them Cmd 505 (London: HMSO, 1958).  The Terms of Reference given to the Commission 
included the following: (1) To ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of Nigeria and to 
propose means of allaying those fears, whether well or ill founded; (2) To advise what safeguards should be 
included for this purpose in the Constitution of Nigeria; (3) If , but only if, no other solution seems to the 
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the Republican Constitution of 1963. The guarantees were in sixteen sections including 
the interpretative section.344 Under those provisions, the following rights were protected: 
the right to life,345 freedom from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment,346 freedom from slavery or servitude347 and the right to personal liberty.348 
Others were the right to fair trial,349 right to private and family life,350 freedom of 
conscience and religion,351 the right to freedom of expression,352 the right to peaceful 
assembly and association353 and the right to freedom of movement.354 Equally protected 
were the right to freedom from discrimination355 and the prohibition on compulsory 
acquisition of personal property except on the fulfillment of certain conditions.356  
These provisions contain the seeds upon which a truly stable, just and functioning 
state could be built. But political independence brought with it challenges which could 
not be dealt with using mere idealistic constitutional promises. The provisions in the 
constitution guaranteeing fundamental human rights had to confront a peculiar society 
and its social and political context. In resolving the question of harnessing a fragile 
society and keeping alive the potentials for progress in post-Independence Nigeria, the 
country had to engage with the skepticism imagined by the Simon’s Commission on the 
Indian Constitution which is captured in its view that “Abstract declarations [of human 
rights] are useless, unless there exists the will and the means to make them effective.”357 
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3.3. Human Rights Practices in the Post-Colony 
The question that engages my attention at this juncture is how the newly independent 
Nigerian state applied lessons derived from this socio-political background to deal with 
everyday human rights complaints immediately after independence. In particular, how 
challenging was it to move from colonialism which denied human rights to a post-
colonial period that gave those rights constitutional prominence? If there were challenges 
at all, what was the nature of those challenges?  
It is quite clear that there were challenges to human rights protection immediately 
following Nigeria’s independence.  For one, there did not seem to be the will or the 
means to translate human rights guarantees in the 1960 Independence Constitution into 
tangible and effective safeguards in practice.  Several contradictions linked to the 
peculiar social and political character of the country that had been carefully overlooked in 
the desperate efforts to achieve independence rose up quickly to challenge a very fragile 
post-independent state.  But more importantly, the nature of the constitutional regime 
delivered at independence, which model was applied in all the African British colonies 
played into the hands of the political and legal elite that replaced the departing colonial 
powers. This resulted in what seemed like a stark unpreparedness of the said elite for the 
challenges of post-colonial government reconstruction. These challenges, and even more, 
persisted well after the promulgation of the 1963 Republican Constitution that repeated 
those human rights guarantees in a wholesome fashion. 
 Steven Pfeiffer provides a detailed treatment of some of the challenges in 
question.358 Though his intervention was set on similar events as they unfolded in British 
East Africa (comprising Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), it could actually also be 
extrapolated to the same events as they occurred elsewhere in Africa, especially Nigeria. 
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It accounts for both the paradoxes and incongruities359 of the constitutional system 
bequeathed to these countries by British colonial authorities at independence and how 
those would go on to shape the future situation of those issues in the latter histories of the 
countries studied. 
 The first issue addressed by Pfeiffer is that of the exact location of human rights 
in the constitutional framework of the newly independent post-colonial states. There 
already existed at the time when the countries he studied became independent two 
possible templates that could be adopted to deliver human rights guarantees and regulate 
their enforcement. The first was to have a “written, justiciable, fundamental human rights 
in the constitution, as in the United States”360 while the second was to have fundamental 
human rights “protected by the free expression of the national political will in parliament, 
as in the United Kingdom.”361 In all the countries of interest, including Nigeria, the 
colonial government opted for the first template as their independence constitutions 
contained guarantees of fundamental human rights. 
 By Pfeiffer’s account, this threw up “basic and numerous” differences in both 
opinion and the practice of constitutional law. The first and perhaps most fundamental 
was that the British which had ruled throughout colonization did not have any history of 
constitutionalized rights or a history of judicial review while in the United States system, 
“almost every national political issue becomes to some extent a question of interpretation 
by the federal courts…”362 Thus Britain maintained her own constitutional arrangement 
for the former colonies but now in written form, otherwise known as the ‘Westminster 
model’ export. The system was so-called because notwithstanding the insertion of human 
rights in written constitutions of the post-colonies, it still “established legislative, 
                                                          
359 Ibid at 36. 
360 Ibid at 33 
361 Ibid. Pfeiffer laments the failure of those responsible for this constitutional process in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s to look hard enough for alternative constitutional arrangements among those existing in non-
Western industrial or traditional African societies.  
362 Ibid at 34 
 107 
 
executive, administrative, and judicial institutions along lines roughly equivalent to those 
in England.”363 This left the post-colonial states in a situation where the courts took on 
roles that they had not performed throughout the colonial period. Rather than bend 
always to the will of the legislative majority as under colonialism, courts in the post-
colonial state became “structurally positioned to occupy a position of substantial political 
significance at the apex of national government.”364 
 For the courts, this was an unusual break in orientation. While they were given a 
constitutional status and role unlike that of federal courts in the United States after the 
Supreme Court decision in Marbury v Madison, they were thoroughly imbued with the 
formal conservatism of the legal and judicial culture of England, and manned by 
individuals who believed that the separation of the courts from politics was a very 
important value indeed.365 Howard offered insights corroborative of this view and 
identified the training received by Commonwealth African lawyers as a major factor. She 
argues that most of the lawyers had been steeped in the British tradition whose major 
distinguishing characteristic is that “while lawyers respect and advocate judicial review 
and the rule of law, they do not take a legally ‘activist’ position. British-trained lawyers 
and judges tend to defer to the legislature and executive in matters of legal substance.”366 
 Besides training, the post-colonial judiciary also carried over personnel who had 
served the colonial regime with insuperable zeal.367 In that case, my earlier discussion of 
the relevance of the role of judges from one regime to another and the position of judges 
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in the process is very useful here. Not only were a disproportionate majority of the judges 
in Nigeria at independence non-Nigerian, they were mostly the same judges that had 
helped the colonial government in implementing all of its objectionable laws and 
policies.  As with latter day transitional arrangements in which it is unprofitable to invest 
much hope in judges that had helped authoritarianism in the past to immediately reverse 
that tradition, this feeling held true for Nigeria’s immediate post-colonial judges. Their 
colonial adjudicatory philosophy continued to inform their decisions after independence. 
In Nigeria and Kenya at independence, for instance, “the courts and legal systems 
became closer to English common law than they had been under British colonial rule.”368  
 Further, however much training, personnel and legal tradition negatively 
influenced the conduct and attitude of post-colonial Nigerian judges to constitutional 
interpretation and response to textualized human rights, other factors were also 
implicated.  A significant one concerned politics and ethnic relations, particularly the 
latter, which though it had been noticeable throughout the period of the struggle for 
independence had been successfully kept in the background while the country presented a 
united front to thwart colonialism. The political elite which took over at independence 
continued papering over the cracks but only for a short while. 
 Clearly, the immediate post-colonial regime in Nigeria had both political (often 
mixed up in ethnic) rivalries as well as intolerance of the political opposition in ample 
proportions. In fact, to deal with the menace of the political opposition immediately after 
independence, the governing elite had no qualms whatsoever reaching back to the tactics 
of the departed colonialists. In doing so, that elite also exploited to dubious advantage 
many of the anti-democratic laws passed during the colonial period which nevertheless 
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had remained in the statute books.369 Not uncharacteristically, various extraneous 
political considerations began to intrude into judicial decision-making. For example, a 
fragile post-colonial Nigeria had to be stabilized. And if this presented huge costs to 
individual rights and democratic principles, so be it.370 As a result, the need to make the 
country stable trumped whatever libertarian pretentions that may have heralded 
independence. 
 This was a period of extreme turmoil in other parts of Africa as well. Most of the 
other Commonwealth African states that attained independence at the same period as 
Nigeria passed through teething nation-building challenges of their own.371 Though it is 
uncertain by how much and to what extent these developments interacted, and the level to 
which what transpired in one country impacted happenings elsewhere, it is unarguable 
that those events actually influenced one another. Not only did clear and present political 
realities dictate the course of those events, the narrative also included the emergent 
rhetoric of “African socialism” which was used to disengage human rights from 
nationalism and national constitutions.372  One of the major claims of this new 
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nationalism was that “African society needed a new framework for government, faithful 
to its traditional values, often referred to as African socialism”373  
 The rhetoric was typically incoherent as was to be expected from politicians 
driven less by the demands of responsible leadership and more by the imperatives of 
political survival. This catchphrase was defined to be “democratic socialism as conceived 
by Africans in Africa, evolving from the African way of life and formulated in particular 
terms as the continuing examination of the African society”374 Expectedly, in specifying 
its dimensions and especially what this brand of democracy meant, the leaders who 
coined it chose what meanings appealed to them. Julius Nyerere, the late President of 
Tanzania, for instance called it ujaama or familyhood in Swahili.375 The objective of this 
socialism, he said, was “To build a society in which all members have equal rights and 
equal opportunities; in which all can live at peace with their neighbors without suffering 
or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all have a gradually 
increasing basic level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury.”376 But 
the philosophy had detractors in equal measure who claimed that it was diluted as the 
years passed by.  A writer alleged that “Ujaama was intended to be pursued politically, 
through the education and mobilization of peasants; instead it conforms with [sic] the 
interests and methods of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.”377 
On the other hand, Kwame Nkrumah, the equally late and iconic Ghanaian leader 
called it consciencism which focused “on the necessary reconstruction of identity after 
colonization”378 Other variations ranged from black African consciousness and pan – 
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Africanism to negritude and ubuntu.379 While one could understand the need to forge 
Afrocentric systems that spoke to the continent’s peculiarities, the lack of clear consensus 
on the way forward persisted. And rather than these ideologies being built on popular 
support, a major outcome of this brand of nationalism was the crystallization of 
dictatorship across the continent. In Nigeria specifically, political fragility soon gave way 
to the instability that the elite most feared.  
At independence the country’s major political parties were organized mostly 
along ethnic lines. As if the fears earlier expressed by the minority ethnic groups and 
which led to the inclusion of human rights in the constitution had not existed at all, each 
of the three major ethnic groups in the country (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) controlled the 
political party that ruled its region. This development paralleled to a great extent Nagel 
and Olzak’s competitive theory of ethnic mobilization in which the Nigerian groups 
reached down to their ethnic levers to organize their groups in pursuit of collective 
political ends.380 The stiff competition among these various groups characteristically 
became a threat to the stability and legitimacy of the Nigerian state.  
But while the majority ethnic groups took political spoils from a competitive 
environment, the minority groups in turn faced their worst nightmares and clutched at 
political straws to remain relevant in the unfolding events. A lack of clear parliamentary 
majority for any of the three main political parties enabled an uneasy coalition between 
the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) which controlled the Northern Region and the 
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (later National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens)(NCNC) which held sway in the Eastern region.381 A third party, the Action 
Group (AG) which controlled the Western Region was the main opposition. 
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The AG would later become a thorn in the flesh of the governing coalition for 
which its leaders were marked out for political oppression. Crippling the party thus 
became an obsession for the government in power which imposed movement restrictions 
on its leaders and later would charge the main opposition leader with treason. When 
general elections were held in 1964, that region boiled with violence because its citizens 
rose up against alleged efforts to rig the election’s outcome.382 The protests led to a total 
breakdown of law and order in the region, giving a partisan federal government the 
pretext to impose emergency rule in the region.383 But by this time the violence had taken 
an almost irreversible course. All attempts to quell it failed woefully and this, coupled 
with overall public disapproval of the behavior of the post-independence politicians, 
provided the Nigerian military with the justification to intervene for the first time in the 
country’s politics.     
How the immediate post-independence Nigerian judiciary responded to the claims 
of those alleging that their human rights had been violated and seeking vindication under 
the constitutional guarantees of human rights throughout that period is treated separately 
while introducing the sixth chapter. The military offered some reasons for their intrusion 
into the political arena. This included allegation that the political elite had been 
corrupt.384 There was no direct reference by them to the judiciary as being part of the elite 
whose collective conduct had become objectionable. But that intervention was to prove 
costly both to the country’s political and democratic development and to the 
establishment of a sustainable national human rights culture. 
3.4. Introducing the Devil: The Nigerian Military and Human Rights 
Along the same historical trajectory, I would in this section turn my attention to the 
events that led to military intervention and what in real terms was the cost of that political 
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rupture on the human rights project. A lot has already been written about the events that 
culminated in the military overthrow of the civilian administration in Nigeria. Read 
identified “Ethnic particularism fuelled [by] the crises which arose over the national 
Census of 1962 and 1963-64 and the General Election of 1964”385 as the immediate cause 
of the overthrow. Apart from the violence then sweeping through many parts of the 
country, legal controversies played no small part in maintaining the crises. According to 
Read, disputes from the 1964 elections brought to the surface a different crisis over the 
powers of the President under the 1963 Constitution because though the executive 
authority of the Federation was vested in him and he was the Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces “yet he was essentially a constitutional, not an executive head of state who 
exercised his powers generally on the advice of Ministers.”386 He continues, 
Yet in January 1965 a trial of strength developed, the then President, Dr. 
Azikiwe, indicating his reluctance to appoint a Prime Minister on the basis 
of an election which had proved abortive due to partial boycotts in certain 
regions. Similar uncertainty about the proper role of a constitutional head 
at a time of crisis had arisen earlier at regional level, when the Premier of 
the Western Region had been removed by the Governor: ensuing events 
provoked Federal intervention by the declaration of an emergency. On that 
occasion the imprecision of the “Westminster Model” of executive 
government was demonstrated in the subsequent litigation in which the 
validity of the Governor’s action was denied by the Federal Supreme 
Court, recognized on appeal by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council and immediately rejected, with retrospective effect, by the 
Regional and Federal legislatures.”387  
 
On January 15, 1966 a section of the Nigerian military staged a violent coup 
d’état.388 They killed some prominent politicians including the then Prime Minister (a 
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northerner) as well as that region’s Premier. The soldiers also shot to death the Premier of 
the western region. Though the coup was led by mainly officers from the eastern Igbo 
speaking parts of the country, no prominent politician from that region was killed.389 The 
specter of ethnic domination was given new impetus especially as the new leader who 
emerged following the coup also came from the Igbo ethnic group and some of the early 
actions he took further alienated him from the section of the country most aggrieved by 
the consequences of the military action.390  
Barely six months after the first coup, military officers mostly from the northern 
parts of the country, staged a counter-coup that rivaled the scale of killings in the first 
one. The counter-coupists killed the head of state installed after the first coup and several 
officers of Igbo origin. But this time, the pent-up ethnic animosities already smoldering 
following these events got instant expression through a general uprising in the north 
where persons belonging to the Igbo ethnic group were the main targets. Thousands of 
them were killed while those lucky enough to escape fled in their thousands to their own 
ethnic enclave. On May 29, 1967 the military administrator of the eastern region declared 
a separate Republic of Biafra, precipitating a 30-month civil war that could only end 
January 1970. 
3.5. Parodying Sanity: The Military Constitution 
The political events narrated in the last section took Nigeria to the door of 
unprecedented legal and constitutional developments. The Republican Constitution of 
1963 did not contemplate its supplantation by any other kind of supreme law, martial or 
otherwise. So there were no prior legal mechanisms to address the emergency brought 
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about by the intervention of the military. But there had been “revolutions” in other 
regions of the world in the past which had led to the overthrow of constitutional 
governments in the places where they occurred and their replacement by others not 
contemplated under the old order. Did the military action in Nigeria qualify as such a 
“revolution”? If so, what were its legal and constitutional consequences?  
The first law promulgated by the military immediately it took over government 
was the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree (No.1) of 1966. This decree 
contained enough ingredients indicative of the military’s view of their relationship to the 
law. First was that the decree suspended the 1963 constitution, but left unaffected its 
provisions on fundamental human rights. The decree itself was made retroactive to 
January 17, 1966. Second it prescribed a novel law-making procedure for the country. 
Rather than through debates and discussion, section 4 of the decree granted the military 
authorities power to make laws by means of Decrees signed into law. Third, in complete 
disregard to the principle of separation of powers the legislative and executive powers of 
government were fused in the same body, the Supreme Military Council. Fourth, the 
validity of the decree was placed beyond the reach of judicial review in section 6. As it 
turned out, this was good enough notice from the military that it was not going to respect 
the rule of law as these ingredients coupled together eroded any notions that law was 
going to be supreme. But yet a fifth character of military laws pointing to their discomfort 
with the rule of law only became apparent much later into their reign and in a real-case 
situation.391   
Military constitutionalism, if there ever was anything like it, was baptized with 
fire in the case of Lakanmi v Attorney General (Western Nigeria).392 The Western region 
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government had established by edict393 a Tribunal of Inquiry to investigate the private 
assets of certain individuals, including the plaintiff in this case. The tribunal immediately 
placed an order preventing the plaintiff and others similarly being investigated from 
dealing in their properties without the authorization of the region's Military Governor. 
The tribunal also ordered rents accruing from the property to be paid into the treasury of 
the region. The plaintiff applied to the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the 
orders of the tribunal. He contended that the order violated sections 22 and 31 of the 1963 
constitution respectively protecting private and family life as well as the powers of the 
High Court to intervene when infringements are alleged. 
While the case was still pending in court, the military government passed another 
decree. It validated all the actions of the tribunal, ousted the jurisdiction of the court from 
dealing with claims arising from the activities of the tribunal. It also made the 
constitutional guarantees of human rights inapplicable to the work of the tribunal. This 
underpinned the fifth character of that decree that constituted it into an attack on the rule 
of law. Rather than a law of general application, this decree was directed at specific 
individuals. It was therefore not just simply ad hominem; it also, so long as it seemed to 
pass on the guilt or otherwise of the persons against whom it was directed ahead of any 
criminal indictment, amounted to a legislative judgment. 
This suit raised several questions covering the entire spectrum of constitutional 
characteristics of the new military regime. Some of the questions raised included: 
whether the military interruption of civilian rule qualified as a revolution, on the 
hierarchy of legal norms in Nigeria at that time, which between the retained provisions of 
the constitution and a military decree was higher on the ladder, what if the norm was 
contained in an edict. Did human rights guarantees speak the same language under the 
military as they did under civilian rule? What impact did the decree passed while Mr. 
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Lakanmi’s suit was already pending have on it and what were the implications of the 
decree on the rule of law and good administration of justice?   
The High Court dismissed the suit, citing its lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff 
took it further to the Court of Appeal. It was during the appeal that the new decree was 
issued. The Court of Appeal upheld the decree’s validity and also cited its own lack of 
jurisdiction for throwing out the appeal. It stated further that the fundamental rights 
provisions in the constitution that the plaintiff relied upon for the case were no longer 
justiciable because the decree had said so. But still undeterred, the plaintiff appealed 
further to the Supreme Court.  
A major question that faced the Supreme Court was whether the military 
government, given the circumstances of its emergence, was a constitutional interim 
government still bound to honor constitutional norms or whether its powers derived from 
a revolutionary occurrence. In a judgment that would be described later as “an 
extraordinary challenge to the power of the military government,”394 the court ruled that 
the military regime was only a constitutional interim government and therefore bound to 
uphold the principles of the constitution.395 It was the Supreme Court’s view that  
…though unprecedented in history, the invitation by the Council of 
Ministers (which validly met) in January 1966 to the armed forces, which 
was duly accepted, was to form an interim military government, and that it 
was evident that the government thus formed was expected to uphold the 
constitution and could only suspend certain sections thereof as the 
necessity arose.396  
 
The Supreme Court also deplored several provisions of Decree No. 45 promulgated while 
the plaintiff’s legal claim was pending and therefore precisely aimed at overreaching it. 
The court frowned in particular on the express naming of the plaintiffs in the schedule to 
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the Decree which made it “clear that the object of the legislature was directed to the 
[plaintiffs] while their appeal was pending.”  
 The military was however in no mood to brook such judicial audacity. They made 
their indignation known in the strongest manner possible immediately after this judgment 
was rendered by quickly promulgating the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and 
Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1970. In it the military regime declared itself a 
revolutionary one and nullified the decision in the Lakanmi’s case. The immediate 
aftermath of this latest military action was to ask troubling questions about the place of 
the courts as guardians of individual rights in a military situation. Abayomi says the 
decree “injected a degree of timidity and uncertainty into the powers of the Nigerian 
courts to protect human rights under military governments,” and that this uncertainty and 
timidity lingers to the present day.397        
Legal scholars expended much intellectual energy debating these events398 in the 
course of the next several years. Such discussions centered on the impact of military 
government in Nigeria on human rights generally and on the judicial function in 
particular. Yet it was clear the military through decree 28 had crossed the Rubicon of 
arbitrariness. Judicial protection of individual rights became an intense struggle of which 
the judiciary as an institution lacked the political capital to wage. The bookmark of this 
season was the apparent triumphalism of Austinian positivism in which the law was 
emptied of all moral content. To little avail, Nigerian judges were urged to “break loose 
from what some…considered to be maximum prison into which Austinian positivism has 
confined them.”399  
 
                                                          
397 Abayomi, supra note 310 at 1054. 
398 DO Aihe, “Fundamental Human Rights and the Military Regime in Nigeria: What did the Courts Say?” 
(1971) 15 J Afr L 213.  
399 TA Aguda, “The Challenge of Nigerian Law and the Nigerian Lawyer in the Twenty-First Century” 
cited in CN Okeke, “Judges and the Politics of Jurisprudence” in TO Elias & MI Jegede, Nigerian Essays 
in Jurisprudence (Lagos: MIJ Publishers Limited, 1993) 99 at 101. 
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3.6. Human Rights Practices of the Military Regimes 
I will dwell much later in my research on how Nigerian courts handled human 
rights questions addressed to them throughout the period that the military wielded 
political power. What I do in this section is to give a brief account of how the military 
itself as an institution impacted individual and collective enjoyment of those rights during 
that period. It is trite to also state that the cases which the courts were called upon to 
adjudicate at this time arose from the complaints of those challenging how the military 
power holders had treated them.  
Once the military used a decree promulgated by it to overrule a validly entered 
judgment of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the Lakanmi Case, the institution came to 
acquire absolute powers. The message that the military sent out was that those powers 
were beyond the reach of judicial review. Yet the judiciary was the only institution that 
could have placed any kind of limits to the assumption of unreviewable powers by the 
military. But seeing that they had crushed that possibility early on, the military proceeded 
to tamper generally with most of the fundamental human rights hitherto enjoyed and 
rendered constitutionally enjoyable by Nigerians prior to military intervention. Even 
though military power extended to all those powers, civil and political rights were the 
most substantially rolled back during that era spanning January1966 to October 1979 and 
then again December 1983 to May 1999. 
Because it is outside the general outline of this study to cover all possible 
instances of human rights violations carried out by the military during this period, I will 
only cite some situations to exemplify the narrative that is being presented. Even though 
military practices affected all human rights one way or another, the impact on those rights 
was not to a uniform degree. Some rights bore more of the brunt of military heavy-
handedness than others. Since the military showed unusual sensitivity to press freedom 
and rights of expression, I will start with instances of how those rights suffered under the 
military. 
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If the Nigerian military were to succeed in fulfilling their dictatorial aspirations, it 
was important that the popular media was placed on a short leash. Throughout the period 
that they were in power, they used different strategies to carry out this design. One 
important strategy was to arbitrarily detain and torture individual journalists. Such 
journalists would typically be accused of placing socio-political harmony in danger 
through their writings.  
The first major incident which became an issue of significant public concern and 
marker for subsequent military dealings with the media was the 1973 case involving 
Minere Amakiri who then worked for the Nigerian Observer, a state newspaper. Mr. 
Amakiri was said to have been picked up by military authorities “from his lunch table, 
[they] unevenly shaved his head and beard, physically tortured him, and then locked him 
up in a military guardroom for more than 24 hours.”400  He was also beaten twenty four 
times with a stick across his back. The military offered no justification for an action well 
considered a “watershed” and “epochal” in the annals of civil/military relations in 
Nigeria.401 It set the stage for such arbitrary military interferences with the ability of 
Nigerian journalists to carry out their duties without fear or threats of intimidation. The 
Amakiri incident was followed by similar instances culminating in the arbitrary arrest and 
detention of journalists across the length and breadth of Nigeria.402   
Some of the arrests and detentions were the consequences of the use of 
completely different strategy by the military to muzzle the media, that is, the use of 
military decrees. Under one such decree in 1984 two editors with The Guardian, a daily 
newspaper published in Lagos, Tunde Thompson and Ndukar Irabor were arrested and 
                                                          
400 Chris W Ogbondah, “The Pen Is Mightier than the ‘Koboko’: A Critical Analysis of the Amakiri Case in 
Nigeria” (1991) 8 Pol Comm & Persuasion 109. 
401Ibid.  
402 Ibid at 110 to 111 (The author showed a catalogue of arrests of journalists, both print and electronic up 
to 1990). 
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tried under a military tribunal for allegedly publishing “false statements.”403 Some of the 
decrees prescribed harsh registration guidelines for media institutions.404 Where that 
failed, recalcitrant media houses were closed down and prevented from publishing.405 If 
they beat the embargo and managed to print, circulation was aborted as the police and 
military chased vendors about the streets, snatching copies.406  At least on one occasion, a 
popular magazine editor-in-chief, Dele Giwa of Newswatch died when a bomb delivered 
to his breakfast table by security agents exploded.407   
Similar to the travails of the media during the military era was the stifling of 
political views deemed offensive by the military and harassment of the individuals 
conveying such views.  Detention and torture of political activists occurred persistently 
under the military. Where detentions were not considered effective, the military murdered 
those activists or caused them to disappear. Several examples of politically induced 
detentions408 could be given as could instances of political and judicial assassinations.409 
                                                          
403 Ibid at 111. See for example Offensive Publications (Proscription) Decree No 35 of 1993 which 
authorized the military President to ban or otherwise sanction any publication at his absolute discretion. See 
also Tokunbo Ojo, “The Nigerian Media and the Process of Democratization” (2007) 8 Journalism 545.  
404 See for example Newspapers Decree No 43 of 1993 which prescribed very stringent requirements 
including payment of huge sums of money before newspapers could be allowed to publish. See also Chris 
Ogbondah, “Press Freedom in West Africa: An Analysis of one Ramification of Human Rights” (1994) 22 
J Opinion 21. 
405 See Chris Ogbondah, “Media Laws in Political Transition” in Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie & Folu 
Ogundimu eds., Media and Democracy in Africa (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003) at 64. See 
also Augustine Ikelegbe, “The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria” (2001) 39 J 
Modern Afr Stud 1. 
406 Ayo Olukotun, “Authoritarian State, Crisis of Democratization and the Underground Media in Nigeria” 
(2002) 101 Afr Affairs 317 at 321 
407 Mercy Ette, “Agent of Change or Stability? The Nigerian Press Undermines Democracy” (2000) 5 Harv 
Int’l J Press/Politics 67 at 68. Akwasi Assensoh, “African Writers: Historical Perspectives on their Trials 
and Tribulations” (2001) 31 J Black Stud 348 at 353. 
408 Akin Ibidapo-Obe, Essays on Human Rights Law in Nigeria (Lagos: Concept Publications, 2005) at 
105; see also Karl Maier, This House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis (London: Penguin Books, 2000) at 3. 
409 The Ken Saro-Wiwa affair stands out as an example of using judicial cover to settle a political question 
as he was killed along with several other Ogoni activists after a sham trial by a military tribunal. See Johan 
Graafland, “Profits and Principles: Four Perspectives” (2002) 35 J Business Ethics 293 & 294; Marion 
Campbell, “Witnessing Death: Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Crisis” (2002) 5 Postcolonial Studies 39. 
Abiola Ojo, Constitutional Law and Military Rule in Nigeria (Ibadan: Evans Brothers Ltd, 1987) 252-287. 
M A Ajomo, “Human Rights under the Nigerian Constitutions” in Awa Kalu & Yemi Osinbajo, eds., 
Perspectives on Human Rights (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Justice, 1992) at 105. Augustine Ikelegbe, 
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Lawyers also were prevented sometimes from practicing their profession.410 To obstruct 
the internationalization of the domestic discontent with military repression during this 
time, travel documents of specific persons were routinely seized at the airports. This was 
done to stop them from traveling outside and drawing attention to the brutality of the 
military governments.411 Political and other civic gatherings were frequently broken up, 
their organizers brutalized.412 
The judiciary was not spared the agonies of that era as well. By using executive 
impunity to overrule court decisions that it disagreed with the military severely undercut 
judicial authority and eroded the institution’s powers.413 Though noting that the judiciary 
was the sole government institution that preserved an autonomous existence through 
decades of military rule, Lewis states nevertheless that the flagrant manipulation of that 
institution, particularly during the 1993 electoral impasse, critically tarnished its 
reputation.414 Under the military, judicial tenure hung on the whim of those who 
exercised executive power. The fear of removal from office therefore cautioned judicial 
behavior to a great extent.415 The question therefore was: how could the courts protect the 
rights of Nigerians when judges were intimidated by extra-legal forces?416 In a magazine 
report published 1986, then Chief Judge of Plateau state stated that the fear of removal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramifications of Civil Society for a 
Regional Resource Struggle” (2001) 39 J Modern Afr Stud 437. 
410See Oko, supra note 17. 
411 See Olisa Agbakoba v The Director, State Security Services & Anor, [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt 595) at 314; 
Chima Ubani v The Director, State Security Services, [1991] 11 NWLR (Pt 625) 129 [Ng Ct App]; Obiora 
Chinedu Okafor, “The Fundamental Right to a Passport under Nigerian Law: An Integrated Viewpoint” 
(1996) 40 J Afr L 53. 
412Sola Akinrinade, “Nigeria’s lingering Political Crisis: Internal Combustion, International Inaction” 
(1998) 87 The Roundtable: Commw J Int’l Aff 313; Chris W Ogbondah, “Political Repression in Nigeria, 
1993-1998: A Critical Examination of One Aspect of the Perils of Military Dictatorship” (2000) 35 Afr 
Spectrum 231.  
413 See for example Peter Lewis, “Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition” 
(1994) 93 Afr Affairs 323 at 326 (referring to the invocation of a military decree to overrule a judicial 
decision pertaining to the 12 June 1993 presidential election). 
414 Ibid at 332.  
415 See generally Richard Akinola, Salute to Courage: The Story of Justice Yaya Jinadu (Lagos: Nigeria 
Law Publications, 1989). 
416 Ogbondah & Onyedike, supra note 369 at 68. 
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and strict control through “back stairs influences” constituted major factors that stifled 
judges’ initiative and morale.417 
In the seventh chapter as forming part of the discussion of the various factors that 
negatively impact the judicial enforcement of human rights in Nigeria, I will explain how 
most of the hurdles mentioned above established the military on a foundation of 
lawlessness. This would have repercussions for the rule of law environment that rapidly 
spread through different periods including after the restoration of civilian rule. But the 
judiciary did not simply lie down and accept wholesale destruction of its very essence in 
the society even under the military. While it was always a struggle to exert effective 
judicial influence on the famished plain of dictatorial and authoritarian impunity, the 
courts as institutions of the government attempted nonetheless. Its most defining struggle 
would, however, be against military decrees containing provisions (ouster clauses) 
prohibiting judges from examining how those decrees had been applied, especially where 
the fundamental rights of citizens had been affected.  
The courts though adopting the posture of subservience and holding themselves 
powerless to intervene in cases of clear and unambiguous application of those decrees 
still left some room to have a say in the most egregious cases of abuse. In the case of 
Barclays Bank of Nigeria Limited v Central Bank of Nigeria,418 the court held: 
In considering whether or not a court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim, 
it is our view that while a person’s right of access to the Courts may be 
taken away or restrained by statute, the language of any such statute will 
be watched by the courts and will not be extended beyond its onerous 
meaning unless clear words are used to justify the extension. That is how 
it is well established that a provision in a statute ousting the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the court must be construed strictly. 
 
                                                          
417 Ibid. 
418 [1976] 6 Sup Ct 177. See also Chima Ubani v Director of the State Security Service, supra note 411 
where the Court of Appeal held that a military decree with an ouster provision was ineffectual to prevent a 
court from assuming jurisdiction in a case alleging a violation of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights enacted as Chapter 10 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.  
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Apart from strictly construing Decrees that ousted their jurisdiction or purported to do so, 
the courts as well claimed jurisdiction to scrutinize such Decrees to confirm that indeed 
their jurisdiction had been ousted. The court could also check to see if the military was 
taking powers that it should not exercise such as supplanting the judiciary itself.419 Even 
though the latter claim to judicial authority did not pass beyond token posturing by the 
courts, it served the useful purpose of impressing on the military authorities that it was 
possible to actually call to question their law-making authority, for whatever that effort 
was worth. In fact the period 1980-1990 has been identified as perhaps the most 
productive years of the Nigerian Supreme Court in terms of standing between the military 
government and the Nigerian citizen.420  
That period had undoubtedly the highest constellation of judicial titans who 
disavowed any encumbrance on their judicial role to do justice and enforce rights in spite 
of the arbitrary authoritarian context under which they performed their job. Yet as events 
later unfolded, it became rather clear that the relative progress made in that era owed 
more to the character and quality of the individual judges who dominated the court at that 
time and had less to do with a conscious institutional or ideological adjudicatory choice. 
And nothing demonstrates this more eloquently than the fact that at the same time the 
Supreme Court was bent on side-stepping boundaries on its authority to retrieve 
endangered rights from the clutches of a military so committed to denying and destroying 
them, a section of the judiciary still hung to the belief that such courageous efforts were 
                                                          
419See Guardian Newspapers Limited & Ors v Attorney General of the Federation & Anor, [1995] 5 
NWLR 703 online: <http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICHRL/1995/36.html> where the Court of Appeal 
held that the concept of the rule of law presupposes that the court within the framework in which it can still 
operate in Nigeria can examine any military Decree with a view to determining whether an ouster clause 
contained in it seeks to preserve something otiose such as the military government’s assumption of judicial 
powers. See also Omoba Oladele Osinuga, “The Impeachment Process, Ouster Clauses, Non-Justiciable 
Provisions and the Interpretation of Nigeria’s Constitution” online: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1658921>.    
420See Ade Ajayi & Yemi Akinseye-George, Kayode Eso: The Making of a Judge (Ibadan: Spectrum 
Books, 2002); Itse Sagay, A Legacy for Posterity: The Work of the Supreme Court, 1980-1988 (Lagos: 
Nigeria Law Publications, 1988).  
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worthless.421 This ambivalent posture was not lost on the legal system and did provide a 
tempting alternative to judges who believed that their interests were best served by 
reinforcing arbitrary rule than safeguarding human rights. 
To conclude this chapter it has to be stated that on the basis of clear evidence 
provided, the transition from colonial to post-colonial Nigeria was not smooth. And that 
is speaking in human rights terms. It was wishful to expect that the tradition of human 
rights denial integral to colonialism would dissipate by mere dint of flag independence 
especially with all the structures that enabled colonial human rights violations still in 
place. The police institution remained essentially an ordering force. The judiciary had a 
disproportionate number of English judges or those trained in the British legal tradition. 
In the circumstances, the constitutionalization of human rights though commendable 
could not translate to better human rights conditions. Moreover, the military intervened 
politically to further heighten the prevalence of violations. As the next chapters would 
should, the country never really recovered from these foundational challenges.      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
421 Note for example Nwosu v Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority, supra note 18 where a Justice 
of the Supreme Court advised victims of human rights violations to explore administrative channels for 
remedy rather than court litigation which he described as “journey of discovery.” 
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Chapter Four 
Adjudicating Constitutional Human Rights: Comparative Standards 
of Analysis 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I looked at the evolution of human rights in Nigeria. After carefully 
identifying strands of arguments for and against the claim that human rights principles 
were present in the course of social interaction in Nigeria’s cultural settings prior to 
colonization, I examined the state of human rights throughout the colonial period. 
Thereafter I presented a narrative of the nationalistic agitations for the inclusion of 
human rights in Nigeria’s independence constitution and how human rights guarantees 
were thereby constitutionalized. In addition, I looked at the state of human rights in the 
immediate post-colonial era as well as the factors that led to the initial intervention of the 
military in Nigerian political life. As significantly, I also analyzed the travails of human 
rights under the military and how the practices of that era exerted negative impact on the 
tradition of judicial enforcement of human rights in Nigeria.  
 A major claim made in that chapter is that there was a huge break in judicial 
orientation following the constitutionalization of human rights prior to independence. 
This not only derived from judicial culture but also from deep-rooted practices and values 
fostered through professional education and training as well as the pool from which 
judicial personnel were appointed. In this chapter, I will extend the discussion by 
identifying the nature of that break in orientation. I will do so by discussing the standard 
doctrinal or analytical approach adopted by Nigerian courts in reviewing human rights 
and comparing it with practices of other jurisdictions.  
This inquiry responds to one of the sub-questions posed earlier in this research 
which is: whether Nigerian appellate courts have developed definite standards for the 
review of human rights cases. I will present a historical account of the constitutional and 
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judicial practices of three countries – the United Kingdom, United States and South 
Africa – to illustrate a significant divergence in methodology and evolution in this regard. 
After analyzing the principal pillars of the three systems and their differences, I will use 
them as standards to examine the tradition of Nigerian courts and highlight what similar 
or distinct methods, if any, they (Nigerian courts) apply. My goal is therefore not to 
conduct an inquiry into how Nigeria’s human rights limitation regime compares to other 
systems with similar constitutional texts for which the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights would have been an appropriate comparator. My concern is more 
with how the constitutional models and legal systems chosen developed standards for 
substantive human rights review and specifically the role their courts played in that 
process. 
 I have chosen the United Kingdom because of her relationship with Nigeria in the 
colonial context. There is still significant influence of British legal traditions on the 
Nigerian legal system. And while it will be seen that the British standards for human 
rights review have evolved over the course of history, the Nigerian system which borrows 
a lot of doctrine from that system has not shown a similar level of dynamism. The British 
system classically illustrates how judges in a regime without a written constitution were 
not only able to formulate standards of review but kept those standards relevant to 
different historical periods. The United States system is analyzed as well to show how a 
system with a written constitution like Nigeria’s approached similar concerns and again 
how the role of the courts was central to the development of that system. South Africa is 
included because it is an African country like Nigeria and has a human rights review 
system that is probably the most developed on the African continent. 
 In introducing this chapter, I have to state clearly at the onset that two principal 
objectives are in contention in the entire agenda of enforcing human rights whether 
through the judicial system or otherwise. The first is the entitlement of individuals to 
human rights in their various forms which they can claim against governments or other 
entities as the case may be. The second is the powers of the government to preserve 
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social balance by ensuring that in their enjoyment of human rights, individuals do not 
become dangers to others or to the society at large. It is beyond question that these are 
two very significant societal objectives which have to be carefully weighted and balanced 
one against the other. 
4.2. Why Limit Rights? 
To state that human rights are limitable is actually to state the obvious. Nwabueze states 
how very obvious and trite this claim is when he argues that “rights cannot be guaranteed 
in absolute terms if for no other reason than to protect the rights of other persons.”422 
Acting otherwise, that is enshrining rights without qualification, he adds, is to guarantee 
license and anarchy.423 On another occasion and in a different text, Nwabueze noted that 
Bills of Rights in Commonwealth African constitutions (that of Nigeria inclusive) on the 
one hand and that of the United States on the other faced essentially the same problem: 
that of “reconciling liberty with authority [and] of trying to strike a reasonable balance 
between them.”424 However, by using the word “liberty” in this statement, Nwabueze 
narrowed the extent of judicial involvement in such cases to civil rights only. But in 
contemporary times, his idea is apt to be questioned because it deals with just one aspect 
of the powers that courts exercise. Judicial powers are no longer limited to enforcing 
limitations on government encroachments upon civil liberties, but include the protection 
of several economic, social and cultural rights.425 
 Crucially therefore, the governmental authority often legally charged to undertake 
the task of balancing rights against authority is the judiciary. This chapter examines the 
various techniques and doctrinal approaches adopted by courts in a range of legal systems 
to implement this competence. In countries with written constitutions, the jurisdiction of 
                                                          
422 Nwabueze, supra note 159 at 117. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Nwabueze, supra note 153 at 9. 
425 Issa Shivji, “Constructing a New Rights Regime: Promises, Problems and Prospects” (1999) 8 Soc & 
Leg Stud 253 at 262 (highlighting the developmental component of the human rights agenda and the fact 
that “no rights discourse, even at a more practical level of judicial activity, can remain passive to the 
fundamental societal goals of equity, social justice and economic democracy…”). 
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the courts to enforce constitutional limits as well as protect human rights is written into 
the text of the constitution. In countries without written constitutions or which operated 
under the common law, this power as well belongs to the courts but only in an inherent 
sense.426  
The kind of constitutionalism that a country operates is as well significant for how 
the power of the courts in this regard is exercised and its implications. Where parliament 
is absolutely supreme as in the United Kingdom before the coming into effect of the 1998 
Human Rights Act, parliament has the final word on individual rights.427 Under common 
law, legislation could trump recognized and protected rights.428 On the contrary where 
human rights are constitutionally entrenched (as in the United States or Nigeria) and the 
courts have competence to strike down legislation incompatible with them, it could be 
taken for granted that those rights would override legislative authority and that the final 
word belongs to the judiciary. Between these two alternatives, according to Justice John 
Marshall, there is no middle ground. “The constitution is either a superior, paramount 
law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, 
and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.”429  
                                                          
426 Lord Wright is credited with the view that the common law was developed “from case to case,’ like the 
ancient mariners, hugging the coast from point to point and avoiding the dangers of the open sea of system 
and science.” See Lord Wright, “The Study of Law” (1938) Law Q Rev 185 at 186. 
427 See Epp, supra note 160 at 114 (stating that “In AV Dicey’s classic discussion (which has had a revered, 
yet contested, place in British legal culture) Parliament alone is sovereign. Dicey’s view of parliamentary 
sovereignty has two elements: first, Parliament is omnicompetent, in that it may create or undo any law it 
wishes; and, second, Parliament has a monopoly of legitimate law-making power, in that no subordinate 
governmental body may legitimately create law. The role of courts is limited to applying the common law 
(so long as Parliament has not superseded it by legislation) and ensuing that administrative officials act no 
more broadly than authorized by parliamentary statute…”).   
428 John Doyle & Belinda Wells, “How Far can the Common Law Go towards Protecting Human Rights?” 
in Philip Alston, ed., Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 17. For an analysis of how parliamentary sovereignty impacts the 
rule of law see generally Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). It has also been stated that parliamentary sovereignty 
ceased to be a feature of the British legal system in 1991. See NW Barber, “The Afterlife of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty” (2011) 9 Int’l J Const L 144.  
429 Marbury v Madison, supra note 123. 
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However, where no such middle ground was in existence in Marshall’s time, 
Gardbaum says one was created between 1982 and 1998. It was the period when  
[E]ach of the Commonwealth countries of Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United Kingdom – countries that were previously among the very 
last democratic bastions of traditional legislative supremacy – adopted 
a bill of rights in a form that self-consciously departed from the 
American model by seeking to reconcile and balance the rival claims, 
to create a middle ground between them rather than adopt a wholesale 
transfer from one pole to the other.430  
 
Thus, instead of constitutional supremacy built on entrenched bills of rights and the grant 
to judges of an unreviewable power to nullify incompatible legislation, this middle 
ground model only granted courts the power to protect rights as well as decoupled 
“judicial review from judicial supremacy by empowering legislatures to have the final 
word.”431 Note that rather than a strict rejection of the American model, these three 
Commonwealth jurisdictions were more concerned with rendering “the protection of a 
bill of rights consistent with their traditional conceptions of democracy and parliamentary 
sovereignty, [each of the countries] does so in a different way and thus occupies a 
different position on this continuum between the two poles.”432 
While in Canada, for example, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms “authorized 
judges to overturn administrative practices and laws [author’s emphasis] that are found to 
be inconsistent with its principles,”433 in the United Kingdom even with the coming into 
                                                          
430 Stephen Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” (2001) 49 Am J Comp L 
707 at 709. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Ibid at 710. 
433 See Epp, supra note 160 at 171. This power is however not absolute because the Canadian Parliament is 
capable of insulating a law from judicial override by specifying that the law’s provisions shall apply 
notwithstanding any contrary judicial decision. See Section 33(1), Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11.  S. P. 
Sathe, Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 2. See also Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Student Edition) 
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 854 (“Through the use of this override power, the Parliament or a 
Legislature is enabled to enact a statute limiting (or abolishing) one or more of the rights or freedoms…). 
See also Sonja Grover, “Democracy and the Canadian Charter notwithstanding Clause: Are they 
Compatible?” (2005) 9 Int’l J Hum Rts 479. 
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force of the Human Rights Act of 1998 the courts do not have powers to nullify such 
legislation. Instead, Section 1 of this Act enumerates and defines the rights and freedoms 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(except Articles 1 and 13) which it calls “Convention Rights.” Section 3 of the Act 
requires courts to interpret and give effect to primary (as well as secondary) legislation in 
a manner that makes them compatible with those convention rights “so far as it is 
possible to do so.”434  
However, under section 4, if a High Court is satisfied that it is impossible to apply 
primary or secondary legislation in such a manner as to render it compatible with 
convention rights, it has only one option which is to make a formal declaration of that 
incompatibility. Gardbaum affirms that: 
“…under Section 4(6), notwithstanding such a declaration, no court has 
the power to set aside or disapply such legislation, which continues to 
have full effect and validity. Once a declaration has been made, HRA 
creates no legal duty on either parliament or the government to respond 
in any way, but it does empower the relevant minister to make a 
‘remedial order’ under Section 10 and Schedule 2. This ‘fast track’ 
procedure permits a minister to amend incompatible legislation by order 
laid before and approved by both Houses of Parliament.”435 
 
 Mark Tushnet places the Canadian “notwithstanding” model of review and the United 
Kingdom “pure interpretative” style at the same level. He says that they establish a weak 
                                                          
434 Gardbaum, supra note 430 at 733. 
435 In Australia, for example, debates for a Human Rights Act analogous to the United Kingdom document 
have been on-going for years. Constitutionally modeled after the UK system prior to the enactment of its 
own Human Rights Act in 1998, Australia does not have a Bill of Rights in its constitution. Twice in 1973 
and 1985 attempts were made to introduce statutory Bills of Rights in the constitution. Both attempts were 
defeated for different reasons. At the territorial level, however, the Australian Capital Territory enacted in 
2004 the Human Rights Act as did the State of Victoria in 2006. These two legislations achieved for their 
respective territories the constitutionalization of Bills of Rights in the manner that the larger 
Commonwealth of Australia had failed to do. The result in both cases was that the Acts required “statute 
law to be interpreted, where possible, consistently with the human rights set out in the Act[s]…the Act 
would also require that where a statute was found by a Court to be incompatible with a human rights then 
the Court would make a declaration of that incompatibility. Upon such a declaration being made, the 
relevant Minister would be required to inform Parliament of what he or she proposed, if anything, to do in 
response to the declaration.” See generally Robert French, “Protecting Human Rights without a Bill of 
Rights” (2010) 19 Commonw Lawyer 28.     
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form of judicial review.436  He further suggests that those accustomed to strong-form 
judicial review as in the United States may be attracted to view weak-form review as 
“fundamentally a sham, [or] parliamentary supremacy parading under the guise of effective 
judicial review.”437  
Where does Nigerian human rights judicial review practices fit into prevailing 
comparative praxis? The country has a written constitution with an elaborate bill of rights. 
The constitution provides that any law which is inconsistent with its provisions shall be null 
and void to the extent of that inconsistency.438 It also provides that any person with a claim 
that any of the rights enshrined in the constitution has been, is being or would likely be 
infringed with reference to him or her could apply to the court for redress.439 The judicial 
powers of the Nigerian government are also constitutionally entrenched and extend to such 
competencies as “all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to 
any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the 
determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.”440  
There is nowhere in the constitution where it is written in explicit terms that the 
courts are granted powers to invalidate legislation that infringes constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. However, when one reads the constitution’s Supremacy Clause together with the 
judicial powers of the government and the fundamental human rights enshrined in the 
constitution, only one conclusion is possible. A legislation which detracts from any of the 
rights guaranteed under the constitution cannot be consistent with it and a court before 
which a claim to enforce such constitutionally protected right is presented would be acting 
within its powers to invalidate the law in question. This is the posture generally adopted by 
Nigerian courts and makes them act in ways similar to the courts in India, South Africa and 
the United States. But as I will show in latter parts of this research, though the courts in 
                                                          
436 Mark Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and Democracy-Based 
Worries” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L Rev 813 at 824. 
437 Ibid at 827.  
438 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 c I, s 1(3).  
439 Ibid c IV s 46. 
440 Ibid c I s 6(6)(b). 
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Nigeria do in fact have such powers to declare invalid legislation contrary to human rights 
guarantees; it is one which they seem to apply in reluctant fashion and with a very high 
degree of caution. 
 
4.3. “Concrete” or “Abstract” Judicial Review? 
Aside the above particular stricture in the discussion of judicial review which concerns the 
exact ambit of the powers of courts to pronounce on the validity or otherwise of legislation, 
there is also the question of when this power is exercised. It is generally the case that 
different legal jurisdictions operate distinct practices on the “when” of judicial review and 
not just the “how”. In some state jurisdictions like the United States and South Africa, 
judicial review is limited to legislation that has passed through parliament and already 
forms part of the law of the land. In such jurisdictions what usually triggers the operation of 
the judicial review process is the application of the law in question to a concrete “case or 
controversy.” Because it involves the application of legislation to a real case scenario, this 
is known as concrete or collateral441 judicial review.   
Despite the silence of the American constitution on the issue of judicial review and 
standing, concrete judicial review is claimed to derive its history from that country’s 
constitutional tradition and is often associated with the provisions of Article III of its 
constitution which confers jurisdiction on the courts only over “cases” and “controversies” 
that arise under the “Constitution” and the “Laws.”442 Here, “the parties raise claims of 
constitutional rights as a defense to the actual or threatened enforcement of law against 
them by the state or by other private parties or they assert a right against the state based on 
the violation of their constitutional rights.”443 Therefore, American courts inferred from 
Article III of the constitution the requirements of direct injury, traceability and 
                                                          
441 Donald P Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1989) at 14. 
442 Alec Stone Sweet, “Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review: And Why it May Not Matter” 
(2003) 101 Mich L Rev 2744. 
443 John Reitz, ‘Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues” (2002) 50 Am J Comp L 437. 
 134 
 
redressability444 and are supposed to deny standing to parties that fail to show some degree 
of direct interest in the review of a public act…”445  
The American system is often contrasted to the French and some aspects of German 
constitutional traditions. In the two latter countries, their highest courts could pronounce on 
the validity and applicability or otherwise of statute without necessarily there being a case 
or controversy at stake. This is called judicial review in the abstract and is aimed at 
obtaining “early and authoritative rulings on all aspects” of a law before it is applied to a 
concrete case.446  Therefore, when the French Conseil Constitutionnel is ruling on 
constitutional questions, it  
[i]s not solving particular disputes between parties, but ruling in abstract 
on the validity of a loi that will affect a variety of future cases. It is said to 
judge a text, not litigants. In addition, the Conseil recognizes its 
responsibility for creating constitutional doctrine, a doctrine far more 
unsettled than private, criminal, or administrative law. In its decisions the 
Conseil has tried, therefore, to set out general principles of constitutional 
law, rather than simply to make specific rulings relating only to the 
particular loi under discussion.  
 
German constitutional jurisprudence as well accommodates abstract review on requests 
for such lodged before the Constitutional Court by the Federal or State government or by 
a third of the entire members of the federal parliament (Bundestag). The main issue 
before the court in such proceedings is the validity of the law in question.  A decision 
against its validity renders the law null and void.447 It should be noted, however, that 
German practice seems to distinguish constitutional review (Verfassungsstreitigkeit) from 
judicial review (richterlichesPrufungsrecht). Kommers states that at the time in German 
history when its constitutional thought pivoted on the concepts of state and sovereignty, 
“constitutional review provided the mechanism for defining the rights of sovereign states 
                                                          
444 Ibid at 441. 
445 Stone Sweet, supra note 442 at 2770. 
446 John Bell, French Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 48. 
447 Kommers, supra note 441 at 15. Abstract review “is typically defended as a supplemental guarantor of 
constitutional justice, since it can succeed in eliminating unconstitutional legislation before harm has been 
done.” See also Stone Sweet, supra note 442 at 2770. 
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and their relationship to the larger union which incorporated them.”448 On the other hand, 
current conception of judicial review is as a device for protecting individual rights,449 an 
understanding which already animates this study.  
There are also comparative differences on the timing of judicial review cases 
across various legal jurisdictions. Under French practice, for example, legislation can 
only be challenged after it had been enacted but not yet implemented which is called a 
priori review. On the contrary, it is a posteriori review when the review is conducted 
after a particular legislation is not just enacted but has already taken effect as in the 
United States.450 
 Nigeria, barring the specific examples given below, operates to a large extent the 
concrete form of judicial review and especially in situations where fundamental rights 
entrenched in the constitution are implicated. A person presenting a complaint of human 
rights violation would have to show that in relation to him/her, the right in question has 
been actually violated, is continuing to be violated or is threatened to be violated.451 It is 
in analyzing the kinds of cases that could trigger the jurisdiction of the courts in this 
                                                          
448 Kommers, supra note 441 at 5.  
449 Ibid.  
450 See Gardbaum, supra note 430 at 717. 
451 See supra, note 438 above. In the case of Uzoukwu v Ezeonu II, [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt 200) 708 [Ng Ct 
App], the Nigerian Court of Appeal interpreted s 42 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979 which is similar to s 46 of the 1999 Constitution. The court divided the provision into three 
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other words, the act of contravention is completed and the plaintiff goes to court to seek for redress. The 
second limb is that the fundamental right is being contravened. Here the act of contravention may or may 
not be completed. But in the case of the latter, there is a sufficient overt act on the part of the respondent 
that the process of contravention is physically on the hands of the respondent and that the act of 
contravention is in existence substantially. In the third limb, there is likelihood that the respondent will 
contravene the fundamental right or rights of the plaintiff. While the first and second limbs may ripen 
together in certain situations, the third limb of the subsection is entirely different. By the third limb, a 
plaintiff or applicant need not wait for the completion or last act of contravention. It might be too late to 
salvage the already damaged condition. Therefore the limb gives him the power to move to court to seek 
for redress immediately he senses some move on the part of the respondent to contravene his fundamental 
rights. But before a plaintiff or applicant invokes the third limb, he must be sure that there are enough acts 
on the part of the respondent aimed essentially and unequivocally towards the contravention of his rights. A 
mere speculative conduct on the part of the respondent without more cannot ground an action under the 
third limb.”    
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regard that the relationship between whether review is actually concrete and the standing 
of aggrieved persons to lay complaints become very apparent.  This is so because 
Nigerian courts previously denied standing to those who cannot show a personal interest 
in having a particular actual or threatened human rights violation redressed.452 However, 
the new Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules issued in 2009 appear to 
have amended this provision. In chapter six, I will analyze the impact of the new rules on 
human rights enforcement as well as show how the old rigid standing requirements 
undermined effective human rights litigation. 
 Further, Nigeria does not operate on the basis of a priori review as all cases of 
human rights nature directed against the application of statutes must reveal actual laws 
fully enacted and not those yet to be enacted. In fact, a litigant complaining about a 
specific legislation or some other person or institution acting on that litigant’s behalf is 
obligated to show how the application of that law has adversely impacted his/her person. 
Thus, merely alleging that a law is unconstitutional without showing how its enforcement 
has led to that conclusion would not avail a litigant. Therefore unlike in a priori review 
where litigation could be commenced to challenge a law not yet passed by the legislature, 
in Nigeria any such complaint must relate to a law that has passed through normal 
lawmaking processes.  
It is important at this point to qualify my earlier assertion that judicial review in 
Nigeria is generally concrete. Though most of the human rights cases that come before 
courts present actual controversies in which a violation of one or more of the 
constitutionally entrenched rights is alleged, it is possible also to present cases where the 
violation has not taken place but only anticipated. This follows the wording of section 46 
of the constitution which covers not only violations that have been completed and those 
                                                          
452 Tunde I Ogowewo, “Wrecking the Law: How Article 111 of the Constitution of the United States led to 
a Discovery of a Law of Standing to Sue in Nigeria” (2000) 26 Brook J Int’l L 527 at 536. See also ES 
Nwauche & JC Nwobike, “The Judicial Enforcement of Human Rights in Nigeria” (2002) 12 Caribbean L 
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still being carried out but includes threatened (but not yet commenced or completed) 
violations as well. A party who anticipates a violation would therefore be within his or 
her rights to apply to court to stop it from happening. This may be by way of injunction, 
declaration or prohibition; remedies none of which is mentioned as such in the 
constitution but may fall under the general rubric of “inherent powers and sanctions of a 
court of law.”453  
On its face value this could be considered as review in the abstract sense. 
However, on closer scrutiny it becomes clear that it is not the case. To understand where 
the difference lies, it is important to draw a distinction between the law being questioned 
in judicial review litigation and the action that constitutes the human rights infringement 
alleged. In those countries where concrete judicial review is prevalent, when a law is 
passed no individual can rely on it as basis to lodge a human rights complaint until it has 
been applied against such as person. A person who insists on questioning a law not yet 
applied against his/her person would first deal with the question of standing. It is 
therefore the application of that law to an individual that gives rise to a case or 
controversy. Notice in this case that the law has already gone through the natural course 
of promulgation.  
The situation anticipated in the Nigerian “threatened” violation scenario is that the 
alleged violator places reliance on an already passed law to threaten a constitutionally 
protected right. It does not matter much that the violation is yet to be consummated. What 
is abstract or speculative in this case is the threatened act of violation and not the law 
under which the threat is being issued. We can thus contrast this with abstraction in the 
French tradition where what makes the review abstract is the fact that the law is not yet 
passed before it becomes the subject of litigation.     
                                                          
453 s 6(6)(a) Constitutional of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
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This claim has support under American constitutional practice which may have 
much more than extrapolatory significance in the Nigerian context given that both 
countries operate substantially similar constitutional and judicial systems. According to 
Stone Sweet, the above described Nigerian practice covers one of the situations under 
which abstract review might also occur under American constitutionalism. He claims that 
“under certain circumstances, plaintiffs may seek declaratory or injunctive relief by a 
judge that, if granted, suspends the application of the law in question pending judicial 
determination of its constitutionality.454 In such situations, plaintiffs file such applications 
immediately after the statute has been signed into law by the appropriate authority.455  
 The second form that abstract review takes in American practice may also have 
resonance in Nigeria though to what extent remains decidedly uncertain. American courts 
in the course of developing their First Amendment jurisprudence established a doctrine 
by which it is possible for a litigant to challenge a law on its face and plead the rights of 
third parties.456 In Thornhill v Alabama,457 that country’s Supreme Court held that a 
statute which extends government authority to activities protected by the First 
Amendment is presumptively overbroad, and therefore unconstitutional on its face 
regardless of whether, or how, the statute has been applied in concrete situations. The 
court adopted a unique model which “views the normal methods of constitutional 
adjudication – which allegedly proceeds on a case-by-case basis and enables the judicial 
branch to correct the law overtime, with reference to problems raised as a result of the 
law’s application – to be inappropriate for adjudicating violations of the First 
Amendment.”458 
 Where the above doctrine derives from judicial authority, in Nigeria one could 
argue that it is covered by constitutional text. Section 315(3) of the Constitution provides 
                                                          
454 Stone Sweet, supra note 442 at 2772. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid.  
457[1940] 310 US 88.  
458 Stone Sweet, supra note 442 at 2773. 
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that “Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as affecting the power of a court of 
law or any tribunal established by law to declare invalid any provision of an existing law 
on the ground of inconsistency with the provision of any other law…” Thus a court could 
invalidate the provision of any existing law in conflict with the provision of (a) any other 
existing law (b) a Law of a House of Assembly (c) an Act of the National Assembly; or 
(d) any provision of the Constitution itself. What is less clear, however, is whether this 
power could only be exercised in a concrete controversy or whether as in the American 
situation, the court could abstract this authority from a real litigation and pronounce 
against the impugned law on its facial value.  
 Contemporary studies and jurisprudential traditions in comparative 
constitutionalism within the narrow area of human rights enforcement through the 
judiciary have also centered to some extent on the court structure. Specifically, attention 
is often paid to what courts within a particular legal system are empowered to enforce 
human rights. As with my previous analysis on differences in practices from one 
jurisdiction to the other on the “whys” and the “when” of judicial review, there is no 
uniform tradition across jurisdictions concerning what courts are empowered to resolve 
cases of a human rights nature. 
 For my purpose, the nomenclature of the courts empowered to entertain human 
rights claims is not as important as the reach of their powers and how diffuse this power 
is across the judicial hierarchy. At first, it might appear unimportant what hierarchy of 
courts carry out this responsibility within a legal system and what names they go by. 
However, this could have major consequences for how accessible the courts are to the 
citizenry. At the same time it could indicate the extent to which major judicial 
functionaries (and not just an inconsequential proportion of them) are comfortable 
handling human rights litigation. 
 Two major traditions are in contention with regard to the above. They are 
represented by a system of concentrated jurisdiction that dominates most of continental 
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Europe and a more diffuse and decentralized system of which the United States and 
Nigeria are clear examples. The concentrated system is also known as the “European” or 
“Austrian” model.459  Here, only one court in the legal system – usually termed the 
Constitutional Court – is granted the power of judicial review.460 Hans Kelsen is credited 
with instigating the establishment of constitutional courts as a pillar of the European 
model of constitutional review. This has been described by one commentator as the most 
significant experiment in constitutional review in pre-World War II Europe.461 
 Kelsen’s prescription seemed to flow from the way in which he conceived the 
constitution and what role it fulfills in the political system. In a 1928 article, he argued 
that “the integrity of the legal system, which he conceived as a kind of central nervous 
system for the state, would only be assured if the superior status of the constitution, atop 
a hierarchically ordered system of legal norms, could be guaranteed by a ‘jurisdiction,’ or 
a ‘court-like’ body.”462 Judges shouldering this huge responsibility of so stamping the 
authority of the constitution, according to Kelsen, ought to be of the highest quality. He 
therefore: 
[U]rged that constitutional courts should look as much as possible like 
“judicial” bodies. He insisted that professional judges and law professors 
be recruited to the court and emphasized that “members of parliament or 
of government” be excluded; because the court would play a legislative 
role, he also proposed that elected officials should appoint the court’s 
members. Kelsen suggested that the Court be given jurisdiction over 
constitutional controversies brought forward through litigation in the 
judiciary, as a means of securing the superiority of constitutional law, and 
so as to link the Court’s work with formal judicial processes.”463 
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The European model of review therefore has four components, according to Stone Sweet. 
These components highlight the model’s distinctness from the American variant. In the 
first instance, constitutional judges alone exercise the power to review laws for their 
unconstitutionality. Therefore, ordinary judges (meaning those who do not sit in the 
constitutional courts) are precluded from invalidating norms or acts on the grounds of 
their unconstitutionality. Secondly, the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts is restricted 
to the resolution of constitutional disputes only. Those courts therefore do not participate 
in the resolution of ordinary litigation or appeals arising from them which remains within 
the purview of the ordinary judges. Thirdly, Constitutional Courts have links to both the 
larger judiciary and the legislature but are detached from them. “They occupy their own 
‘constitutional’ space, one that is neither ‘judicial’ nor ‘political,’ as those terms are 
commonly used…”464 Finally, most Constitutional Courts are empowered to determine 
the constitutionality of statutes without respect (or even prior) to their application, usually 
upon referral by opposition legislators or other elected officials.465 
 With this information in mind, one might be confused about the existence of 
“Constitutional Courts” elsewhere outside Europe that do not meet this traditional 
conception of their role in human rights enforcement. A prominent example of such 
courts that comes to mind is the South African Constitutional Court. Section 166 of the 
South African Constitution puts the country’s Constitutional Court at the apex of the 
judicial system and makes it the highest court in all constitutional matters.466 High courts 
in South Africa could also hear constitutional matters except those which only the 
Constitutional Court may decide upon.467 
 In terms of matters allocated to it in the South African Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa may decide the following: [a] disputes between 
organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning the constitutional status, 
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powers and functions of any of those organs of state, [b] on the constitutionality of any 
parliamentary or provincial Bill, but may do so only in the circumstances anticipated in 
section 79 or 121 of the Constitution,468 [c] applications envisaged under section 80 or 
122.469 
4.4. Putting Rights and Interests on the Balance 
I will now turn to what courts do when they evaluate human rights complaints. Earlier in 
the chapter I pointed out that two values are in contention in the entire enterprise of 
protecting human rights. The first value is that persons are entitled to certain rights and 
freedoms that are outside the controlling powers of the state, organizations and others in 
the society. When those rights and freedoms come under attack, those victimized have a 
legitimate right to seek judicial protection.  
The second value is that the state can impose limitations on those rights and 
freedoms to the extent that it can show that those limitations are necessary for overriding 
public or societal objectives. Among those objectives may be to protect the rights of 
others from violation, to preserve overall public health, safety or morality or to carry out 
a court judgment. What I am concerned with in this section is the strategies that courts in 
different jurisdictions utilize to organize this act of balancing personal rights and 
freedoms against the interests of the public at large. 
 Expectedly, a country’s constitutional system would be central to how its courts 
carry out this balancing exercise. However, for the purposes of this research, I have 
                                                          
468 Under section 79 the National Assembly must reconsider a Bill if the President withholds an assent to it. 
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chosen the constitutional and judicial practices of three countries – the United Kingdom, 
United States and South Africa – to illustrate a significant divergence in methodology. 
After analyzing the principal pillars of the systems and their differences, I will examine 
the tradition of Nigerian courts to highlight what similar or distinct methods, if any, they 
adopt. I consider this part of my inquiry as strongly crucial to an understanding of 
Nigeria’s human rights jurisprudence and any inconsistencies that might be present in 
judicial treatment of human rights cases. 
 But before analyzing those systems of balancing, let me first clarify the doctrine. 
Balancing could apply to all arenas where the resolution of conflict is the major issue, 
according to Aleinikoff.470 He states that: 
In almost all conflicts, especially those that make their way into a legal 
system, there is something to be said in favor of two or more outcomes. 
Whatever result is chosen, someone will be advantaged and someone will 
be disadvantaged; some policy will be promoted at the expense of some 
other. Hence it is often said that a “balancing operation” must be 
undertaken, with the “Correct” decision seen as the one yielding the 
greatest net benefit.471 
 
For the purposes of this research, however, I agree with Aleinikoff when he claims 
reference to “theories of constitutional interpretation that are based on the identification, 
valuation, and comparison of competing interests.”472 He speaks about a “balancing 
opinion” which means a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitutional question by 
identifying interests engaged by the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule of 
constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests.473 
Shriffin on his part sees balancing as no more than “a metaphor for the accommodation 
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of values.”474 While all legal disputes warrant some form of balancing (for example the 
case of party A against party B in ordinary criminal or civil litigation475 to work out their 
resolution), as a constitutional doctrine, balancing has an unusual resonance in 
constitutional theory and adjudication. It is, however, in the process of analyzing how the 
doctrine applies in different constitutional systems, that divergences become obvious. 
 I had earlier identified the interests that courts are balancing in human rights 
cases. I have therefore answered the question “what” courts are called upon to balance 
that is embedded in the doctrine. The next question is the “how” one. What is being 
considered in this arm of the inquiry is the very method that courts adopt in carrying out 
the balancing act. 
 
4.5. United Kingdom: From Wednesbury “Unreasonableness” to 
Proportionality Analysis 
It has been stated several times already in this study that the British do not operate 
a written constitution. Therefore, rather than constitutional law, they were more inclined 
to speak in terms of administrative law.476 But in so far as both branches of law are 
concerned with evaluating the actions of “public authorities”477 that have implications for 
                                                          
474 Steven Shriffin, “The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the 
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for no more than a misplacement of terms. See Chris Hilson, “The Europeanization of English 
Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Convergence” (2003) 9 Eur Pub L at 125. See also PP Craig, 
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administration effectively performs the tasks assigned to it. Yet others see the principal objective of 
administrative law as ensuring governmental accountability, and fostering participation by interested 
parties in the decision-making process.”    
477 David Jenkins, “Common Law Declarations of Unconstitutionality” (2009) 7 Int’l J Const L 183 at 184. 
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human rights, the distinction may therefore be a redundant one from a strictly human 
rights standpoint. The British also did not have, until the coming into force of the 1998 
Human Rights Act, (HRA) any document containing a list of rights to which their 
citizens were entitled. However, what they accomplished through the enactment of the 
HRA was the domestication of the European Convention on Human Rights.478  
The fact that the British had no written constitution or a bill of human rights did 
not, however, mean that the rights of its citizens were not legally protected. At common 
law, the courts developed over time adjudicatory principles and standards by which the 
exercise of public powers could be tested against rights that had been similarly developed 
as well by common law processes. But unlike in those jurisdictions where 
constitutionally entrenched rights checked legislative authority, in Britain parliament was 
supreme and had powers to use legislative means to interfere with those rights developed 
by common law.479  
In reviewing actions deemed to have violated human rights under British law, 
there seemed to be an alternation between the principles of “unreasonableness” 
enunciated in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corporation480 and “illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety” as laid down in 
the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service.481  In the 
earlier case a local authority had power to grant licenses for cinematograph performances 
under the Cinematograph Act 1909 and could grant a licensed place permission to be 
open and used on Sundays, subject to such conditions as the authority might think fit to 
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impose. The authority granted the plaintiffs in this case leave to perform on Sundays 
subject to the condition that no children under fifteen years of age should be admitted to 
such Sunday performances with or without an adult. The plaintiffs sued on the ground 
that the condition was unreasonable. The court held that the local authority had not acted 
unreasonably or ultra vires in imposing the condition. The court interpreting what was 
meant by unreasonableness in this circumstance stated that:  
It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that 
mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation 
to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word “unreasonable” in a 
rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently 
used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For 
instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct 
himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters 
which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration 
matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not 
obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 
“unreasonably.” Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no 
sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the 
authority.482   
 
This traditional principle of English public law was the only one that the system 
embraced for the purposes of substantive review but not in the absence of context since 
Wednesbury “[un]reasonableness” meant different things in different situations.483 
Therefore in applying the standard, distinct judicial formulations of it contested for the 
open spaces.484  
In some latter judicial decisions, the Wednesbury principle, in fact was made to 
stand in relative contrast to some newer articulations of it. While Lord Greene’s 
formulation considered an unreasonable decision to be “something so absurd that no 
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sensible person could ever dream it lay within the powers of the authority”, or “a 
conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it” Lord 
Cooke would later suggest that a decision would be unreasonable simply if it were “one 
which a reasonable authority could [not] reach.”485 Elliot, however, stated that although 
Lord Cooke’s formulation is as reliant as Lord Greene’s on the rather vague criterion of 
reasonableness, the two tests are very different in character.486  
Wednesbury was also criticized for other reasons apart from its apparent 
vagueness. Not only was it historically presented as a monolithic standard of review, it 
was not as structured as some other standards while at the same time engaging a higher 
threshold public interference with human rights.487 These were very significant 
complaints. Wednesbury flexibility would later give expression to a more structured 
concept of unreasonableness which, according to Elliot, was classically illustrated by 
reference to the divergent modes of substantive review operating in the distinct contexts 
of human rights and economic policy cases.488 While on matters of economic policy 
which are “not justiciable” or “less justiciable” the courts will intervene with the 
substance of the decision only in extraordinary circumstances,489 when decisions affect 
human rights, the courts were more willing to review administrative decisions.490 
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While appearing to contain a single foundation for substantive review, Elliot 
argues that Wednesbury instead concealed a range of different standards.491 As noted 
above, he substantiates this claim by reference to the scale of divergence between the 
kinds of substantive review envisaged between, for example, economic policy cases and 
human rights cases. While economic policy cases involve “an unstructured and highly 
deferential form of review,” human rights cases involved the courts in a “more structured 
and intensive mode of review.”492 Elliot therefore contends as does Hilson that it was 
inaccurate to suppose that English law through the Wednesbury test adhered to a single 
principle of substantive review. Instead he states that Wednesbury reasonableness 
embraced diversity both in the level of structure and the level of intensity with which 
different types of decisions are reviewed.493  
Widespread recognition in certain quarters that Wednesbury reasonableness did 
not properly prescribe satisfactory standards for the review of administrative powers 
under British law became more noticeable with the coming into effect of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the acceptance by the British to be bound by its 
provisions. The British are the bastion of dualism as the form for the reception of 
international law into domestic practice.494 However, in Brind495 it was the opinion of the 
court that even though unincorporated international treaties are not part of British law, yet 
where either statute or common law is uncertain or ambiguous, the courts may have 
legitimate resort to such treaties in order to resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity.496  
This dualist ideology played quite a significant role in the procedure through 
which European human rights norms and jurisprudence would permeate the British 
system of human rights review. The historically dualist zealotry of the courts in the 
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United Kingdom defies debate. It came to be metaphorized by the image of “back-door 
incorporation” which the court railed very much against in the case of Chundawadra v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal.497 In that case the court rejected an attempt to invoke the 
administrative law doctrine of legitimate expectation, describing it only as the “back 
door” by which the claimants sought to introduce the European Convention on Human 
Rights into English law.498  In particular the tribunal held that the extent to which the 
European Convention was relevant or not could be used in interpreting the law if there 
was any ambiguity or doubt, but that it could not provide a proportionality test as an 
alternative to Wednesbury unreasonableness where the domestic legislation was perfectly 
clear. Such statements Hunt states “inspired little confidence that England’s highest 
courts were capable of responding with imagination to what [at the time] could scarcely 
still be called English law’s ‘new dimension.’”499 
Though the above scenario presented only discouraging possibilities, it was also 
the case that not a few experts in the British system retained the healthy expectation that 
if international treaties could be used as aid in statutory interpretation, their potential use 
in administrative law was enormous still.500 Hunt again asserts that they seemed to offer a 
constraint on the exercise of wide statutory discretions, which were notoriously difficult 
to challenge by way of judicial review due to the inherently deferential Wednesbury 
standard applied by the courts when reviewing such discretions.501 
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The literature demonstrates that even prior to the passage of the Human Rights 
Act, and apparently pushed in that direction by jurisprudence from the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), the courts in the United Kingdom were already looking beyond 
Wednesbury as standard for substantive review. This happened at a time when the courts 
had as well developed a new enthusiasm for interpreting domestic law in the light of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.502 In the event, English courts felt obliged, as 
Hilson expertly articulates it, to view “an old principle through a new human rights 
filter.”503 It occurred with minimal flourish in R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith504 
when the English Court of Appeal again in Hilson’s words attempted “to adapt the 
traditional Wednesbury basis to provide a standard more in line with the proportionality 
test used in the ECHR jurisprudence.”505 According to Sir Thomas Bingham in that case: 
The court may not interfere with the exercise of an administrative 
discretion on substantive grounds save if the court is satisfied that it is 
beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker. But in 
judging whether the decision-maker has exceeded this margin of 
appreciation the human rights context is important. The more substantial 
the interference with human rights, the more the court will require by way 
of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable in the 
sense outlined above.506 
 
Although contested among scholars, the above case was positively reviewed for bringing 
Wednesbury closer to ECHR proportionality. Hilson provides two justifications in 
support of this viewpoint even though he comes to the same conclusion as Elliot that 
Wednesbury is a variable rather than a monolithic standard of review. First, he said, the 
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test in Smith above consists of a more structured exercise than conventional Wednesbury 
because it invites the courts to engage in a balancing exercise between individual rights 
and competing policy justifications. Secondly he points to the heightened standard or 
intensity of review in human rights cases.507 
 Elliot however maintains that to assume that following Smith, proportionality has 
replaced Wednesbury only supports what he sees as the false premise that a single new 
principle of substantive review may replace one existing principle. He argues that to 
structure the discourse in this manner “fails to acknowledge the established tradition of 
diversity in this area: the ‘reasonableness or proportionality?’ question overlooks the 
existing domestic context into which the proportionality test is being introduced.”508 
Continuing, he submits further that once the diversity in the pre-existing context is 
appreciated, the focus of inquiry shifts from the question whether proportionality may 
replace reasonableness, to the relationship between those concepts and especially the way 
in which the former complements the latter by extending the range of options open to the 
reviewing courts.509  
 
4.6. United States: Balancing, Rational Basis Review, Strict Scrutiny 
At the time of its promulgation, the United States constitution contained very minimal 
reference to human rights guarantees in it.510 Some writers therefore argued that this 
conformed to the thinking of its Framers that the Constitution is essentially designed to 
protect individual rights which did not require a different act of textualization.511 Ides and 
May contend that “many of the Framers believed that the political structure created by the 
Constitution was the primary and essential vehicle through which to protect the liberty of 
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the people.”512 A textual reference to limitations on the authority of state in the 
Constitution is, however, commonly traced to Article IV (the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause) as well as Article 1, paragraph 10 (the Contracts Clause). This is aside the 
prohibition placed on state bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.  
But later in its development and having regard to the peculiar conditions of that 
period, specific human rights guarantees were added to the constitution by way of 
amendments in 1791. However, unlike the current understandings of those rights, where 
they had to be qualified by overriding public interests, the amendments seemed to have 
granted those rights in absolute terms without any mitigating possibilities. For example, 
the First Amendment which established the freedom of religion, speech and assembly 
provided that: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.” 
 This provision seemed not to leave any room for the legislature to control or place 
limitations on the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. “Congress shall make no law…” 
could therefore legitimately be interpreted, given its unambiguous mandatory appearance, 
as absolutely prohibitive of any legislative regulation of the freedoms mentioned. The 
analysis I shall make in this section is not however limited to the First Amendment alone. 
It will include subsequent amendments incorporating what is commonly referred to as the 
American Bill of Rights which Black describes as “any document setting forth the 
liberties of the people.”513 By this Bill, Black claimed to refer to all provisions of the 
original Constitution and Amendments that protect individual liberty by barring 
government from acting in a particular area or from acting except under certain 
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prescribed procedures.514 Among these, he mentions provisions that safeguard the right of 
habeas corpus; those that forbid bills of attainder and ex post facto laws; those that 
guarantee trial by jury, and strictly define treason and limit the way it can be tried and 
punished.515   
 Does the Bill of Rights contain absolute or qualified rights? How this question is 
resolved will have obvious consequences for how the courts would approach their 
enforcement by judicial means. At the time that Black wrote, he recognized “a sharp 
difference of views as to how far its provisions should be held to limit the lawmaking 
power of Congress.”516 While one tendency (the “non-absolutists,” “balancers,” or 
“operationalists”)517 saw in the constitutional prohibitions mere admonitions which 
Congress need not always observe, the other, of which Black himself was an important 
interlocutor, believed that “there are ‘absolutes’ in our Bill of Rights, and that they were 
put there on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions 
to be ‘absolutes.’”518 With such divergent viewpoints, it will be understandable why 
others believed the First Amendment to be ambiguous.519  
   The text of the First Amendment when coupled with the differing interpretations 
they were given would only make the job of the courts heavier in responding to claims of 
violations of the amendment principles. If the absolutist argument prevailed, it meant that 
                                                          
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid at 866. 
517 Alexander Meiklejohn, “The First Amendment is an Absolute” (1961) The Sup Ct Rev 245 at 248. 
Justice Harlan rejects the absolutist theory in the case of Konigsberg v State Bar, [1961] 366 US 36 at 49-
50 wherein he stated: “At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association…, as 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments are ‘absolutes,’ not only in the undoubted sense that 
where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that 
protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its history 
this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of 
speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk…” 
518 Ibid at 867. 
519 Wallace Mendelson, “On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance” (1962) 50 
Cal L Rev 821. See also Laurent B Frantz, “Is the First Amendment Law? – A Reply to Professor 
Mendelson” (1963) 51 Cal L Rev 729. 
 154 
 
the legislature had no powers to curtail rights that in themselves could not be curtailed. 
The courts therefore had no balancing roles to perform. If the non-absolutists had the 
upper hand, the courts would be called upon to perform the same duty of balancing rights 
against higher societal interests as befits all those situations where the two interests are in 
contention. But even if that duty existed, the Constitution itself quite significantly, did not 
provide any guide or clues to the courts as to how it could be performed.  
 Fair enough, the courts did not have much to do at those early stages because as 
important as the absolutist and non-absolutist debate was, a different controversy raged 
among the interlocutors on the spread of the principles enunciated in the amendments 
within the peculiar U.S. federal structure. The question here was whether the provisions 
of the Constitutions and the amendments on individual rights limited the powers of the 
state governments as it did those of the federal government. It was widely accepted in the 
19th century that the bill of rights did not limit the power of the states.520 This view was 
given a judicial stamp of approval in the case of Barron v Baltimore.521  
However, with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 there was 
opportunity to extend the application of the bill of rights to the states. This expectation 
was scarcely met because according to Epp “the Fourteenth Amendment remained 
notoriously unclear, for the amendment referred only in relatively vague terms to the 
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, life, liberty, or property, due 
process and equal protection of laws.522 An acceptable interpretation of these broad terms 
could not be agreed upon by the courts and was disputed well into the 20th century.523 
 In addition to these controversies, neither the constitution nor the bill of rights 
contained in the amendments provided the courts with any procedural resources that 
could be used to scrutinize official actions impacting human rights with a view to 
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offering protection to the victims. It was therefore left to the courts to develop standards 
for substantive analysis.524 Historically speaking, though the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. constitution was important in articulating that 
country’s rights tradition, it had only very limited utility for a very long time after it was 
passed. Pettinga states that during the first eighty years after its enactment, the Supreme 
Court believed that it protected only racial and ethnic minorities from discrimination 
through overt or covert classifications which disadvantaged them.525 Continuing, he 
argues: 
Because the Court believed the scope of protection was so narrow, it 
interpreted the equal protection clause as scarcely limiting state power. 
State governments were essentially free to benefit or burden groups within 
their borders in any way they saw fit. At times, the equal protection clause 
hardly protected anyone; ethnic and racial minorities could rarely get relief 
from discrimination with an equal protection challenge, and other groups 
could never get relief at all.526 
 
This situation would later give way in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Pettinga says, 
starting with the famous Footnote Four of Justice Stone in the case of United States v 
Carolene Products Co.527 In that case Justice Stone called for a more searching judicial 
inquiry to protect discrete and insular groups that do not have the ordinary protection of 
democracy and therefore are incapable of any meaningful or effective engagement with 
that process. But in the Carolene case, the court considered the constitutionality of a 
piece of economic regulatory legislation which it held was entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality. Stone’s court also decided that the legislation in question should be 
upheld so long as the government could show a rational basis for enacting it. In situations 
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like this where there is a presumption of constitutionality, the onus is on the person 
challenging the law or action to show that there was no rational basis for it. 
This led to the development of what has been described as “suspect classification” 
in American constitutional practice. By this classification, “all legal restrictions which 
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect [and] courts must 
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”528 Through the doctrine, the courts “concentrate 
on devising complex categories and subcategories for identifying the kinds of rights 
infringement that merit constitutional review and the level of scrutiny that should apply 
to each one.529 Therefore the suspect classification doctrine presumed a law 
unconstitutional if it used certain classifying traits.530 And unlike in rational basis 
analysis, in suspect classification cases, the legislation or action questioned if it must 
survive such rigid or strict judicial scrutiny must be necessary to the accomplishment of a 
compelling state interest.531 Furthermore, the onus is on the government in such cases to 
show how that legislation or action furthers a compelling interest.  
 Legislation that demanded strict scrutiny, Gunther states, require a far closer fit 
between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility 
traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection.532 In his words: 
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[M]eans had to be shown “necessary” to achieve statutory ends, not 
merely “reasonably related” ones. Moreover, equal protection became a 
source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal 
protection had to be justified by “compelling” state interests, not merely 
the wide spectrum of “legitimate” state ends.533 
 
The U. S. Supreme Court with Earl Warren as Chief Justice would soon kick-start an 
ambitious policy of identifying new areas appropriate for strict scrutiny. The court did so 
by searching for two major characteristics: the presence of the old suspect classification 
or the impact of legislation on fundamental rights and interests.534 While racial 
discrimination maintained its significance as ground for intervention based on old-rule 
suspect classification, and fundamental rights could be identified by recourse to the 
amendments to the Constitution, what constituted fundamental interests were far less 
clear. While the list of such interests added by the Warren court were modest to say the 
least (including voting, criminal appeals and the right to interstate travel535), 
commentators searched for  justifications to include analogous situations of which 
“welfare benefits, exclusionary zoning, municipal services and school financing came to 
be the most inviting frontiers.”536 
 Yet there were those who reasoned that the Supreme Court’s analytical position in 
human rights cases defied an easy categorization into situations requiring rigid scrutiny 
and those warranting only deferential rational basis considerations. Such persons argued 
that a variety of standards had been applied to resolve equal protection cases. One of such 
persons was Justice Marshall. In San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez537 
he rendered a dissenting opinion, arguing that: 
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall 
into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of 
review – strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court’s [decisions] 
defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has 
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done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing 
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This 
spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which 
the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on 
the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected 
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular 
classification is drawn.”538  
 
Such thinking later produced a third standard described as “intermediate” level scrutiny 
or “rational basis scrutiny with a bite.” This is a standard clearly more intensive than the 
deferential or rational basis review yet less demanding than the rigidity of strict 
scrutiny.539 This level of scrutiny protecting persons within a quasi- suspect classification 
has been associated with sex discrimination cases of which Craig v Boren540 is a clear 
example. In that case, the court majority held that classifications by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement 
of those objectives.” 
 Pettinga identifies three major reasons that the Court created this third category. 
First, he says, was that many scholars criticized the human rights doctrine. Secondly, 
growing public awareness of discrimination against groups other than racial groups had 
increased the demands for judicial protection. Finally, the advent of legal aid for the 
disadvantaged constituencies influenced the development of creative judicial intervention 
on behalf of indigents.541 Under this analytical standard, the court is permitted to look 
more closely at the ends and means of the challenged statute, instead of merely 
pronouncing it valid or invalid under traditional analysis.542 “The court does not accept 
every goal proffered by the state, and if an alternative means exists which does not 
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disadvantage the protected group, the Court can prompt the legislature to employ the 
alternative means by invalidating the legislation.”543 
 What is clear from comparing the British and American standards of review as 
applicable today is that while the British practice supposes proportionality (though they 
are loathe to so describe it), in the United States the standard tilts towards balancing. Is 
there a real difference between “proportionality” and “balancing” or is it just a question 
of semantic quibbling? To the extent that under both systems serious efforts are made to 
actually strike a balance between individual rights and governmental interests, one might 
conclude that no real difference exists between the two. In both systems, when 
governmental action affects human rights of individuals, governmental interest 
warranting such effect must be shown to be compelling and the means chosen must be 
necessary to achieve that purpose.  
 But Choudhry believes there is actually a difference between American balancing 
and British proportionality by reference to what he calls “decisional deference” 
particularly in the context of American practice. He notes that in most jurisdictions 
(particularly those applying the proportionality model), rights adjudication consists of a 
two-stage process that determines first whether a right is violated and second whether 
that violation is justified according to a proportionality analysis. In these systems, he 
continues, rights are generally given a broad interpretation, and countervailing interests 
are addressed exclusively under the rubric of proportionality.544 This contrasts to 
“definitional balancing” as he calls it in the context of the American system. This, he 
says, is a mere one-stage approach “which conflates the scope of a right with its 
strength.”545  
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4.7. South Africa: Limitation of Rights through Text and Purpose 
Unlike in the United Kingdom where human rights analysis has moved from Wednesbury 
to a semblance of proportionality even though the courts did not call it by that name and 
the United States where courts themselves demarcated acceptable latitude for restricting 
human rights from the scratch, in South Africa (and as we will later see with Nigeria), the 
Constitution offers a guide for analyzing the limitation of human rights. Section 36 of the 
South African Constitution provides:  
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law 
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of 
the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the 
limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or any other provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
This provision is supplemented by section 39 thereof which provides: 
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) 
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must 
consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law. 
 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights 
or freedoms that are recognized or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent 
with the Bill. 
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What the South African Constitution has done is to provide the courts with a ready 
outline of how to approach the analysis of laws and governmental actions that restrict 
human rights while rendering what exact meanings to attach to the words used in the 
provisions discoverable by the courts. The South African Constitutional Court has held 
that section 39(2) of that country’s constitution creates a mandatory canon by which all 
statutes are to be interpreted. In Investigating Directorate Services Economic Offences v 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v 
Smit,546 the Court explained that section to mean that all statutes must be interpreted 
through the prism of the Bill of Rights. 
 But short of declaring a statute invalid, some constitutional experts suggest that 
this section actually enables courts to read down legislation so that it conforms to the 
dictates of the Bill of Rights.547 The Constitutional Court took similar position in S v 
Bhulwana,548 when it held that a court may save a legislative section which is 
“reasonably capable” of a more restrictive, but still constitutional interpretation. Further 
in Zimbabwe Township Developers v Lou’s Shoes Ltd,549 the court suggested what might 
be the wrong way of “reading down” a statute which is “to interpret the Constitution in a 
restricted manner in order to accommodate the challenged legislation” when the better 
method would have been to first properly interpret the Constitution and then to examine 
the challenged legislation to see whether it can be interpreted to fit into the framework of 
the Constitution. The court then laid down a two-part test for “reading down” as follows: 
(1) an assessment by the court of the ambit of the right or rights in question, and (2) a 
determination of whether the impugned statutory provision limits the right or rights so 
interpreted. 
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 There is consensus perhaps that in terms of controlling the exercise of 
governmental power in South Africa there are two requirements. There is a general rule 
of law demand which prohibits the government from acting arbitrarily or capriciously. 
Secondly, there is the requirement that the exercise of governmental powers conform to 
the human rights provisions of the Constitution.550 While the Constitutional Court has 
grappled with setting the ambit of a general rule of law imperative, on the question of 
human rights, its job expectedly has been narrowed to receiving justification for 
infringements on the basis of the limitation provisions in section 36 of the Constitution. 
 In The Affordable Medicines Trust & Others v The Minister of Health of the 
Republic of South Africa & Another,551 the Constitutional Court decided that the exercise 
of legislative and executive power is subject to two constraints, namely the minimum 
threshold requirement of rationality [the action should not be arbitrary or capricious] and 
that such action must not infringe any of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. Where 
the exercise of the right negatively engages any of the constitutionally guaranteed rights, 
it must in addition, pass the test of limitation in section 36(1). In coming to a 
determination whether or not the said action passes the test of limitation, the court applies 
the proportionality principle in which the necessary questions leading to a considered 
determination are those stated in section 36(1). 
 What is significant about this provision is how it captures in constitutional text the 
traditional elements of balancing/proportionality analysis used by a range of 
constitutional systems. This analytical framework usually consists of a three-stage 
                                                          
550 Heinz Klug, “South Africa: From Constitutional Promise to Social Transformation” in Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy ed., Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) 266 at 278. 
551[2006] 3 SA 247 (CC); L du Plessis, “The Status and Role of Legislation in South Africa as a 
Constitutional Democracy: Some Exploratory Observations” (2011) 14 Per 92 online: 
<http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/viewFile/68747/56817>; Jonathan Berger, “Litigating for 
Social Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Focus on Health and Education” in Varun Gauri & Daniel 
M Brinks eds., Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the 
Developing World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 38.    
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process all of which conform to the rationality, necessity and balancing or strict 
proportionality standards. In the rationality question the court is asking whether the 
means applied to limit a constitutional right actually furthers a legitimate governmental 
end. The necessity component disposes of the question whether the means adopted by 
government is the least restrictive one to further that end. In the strict proportionality 
component, the question is whether the benefits of the governmental objective are 
proportionate to the violation of the constitutional right in question.552 The courts in 
South Africa would reach the same results when answering similar questions under 
section 36(1) as with those in the traditional test that I have already mentioned. 
4.8. Nigeria: Struggling for Justification; Inverting the in Favorem Libertatas 
While it is clear that in both the United Kingdom and United States, the courts applied 
judicial tools to appropriately demarcate rights and other societal interests, and weigh 
them on the balance, South Africa and Nigeria as earlier stated, adopted a different 
approach. Rather than allow the courts to strike the balance from scratch, the 
constitutions of both countries provided a rather rough outline of how the courts could 
perform that function. In section 45 of the 1999 Constitution, it is provided that: 
45(1) Nothing in sections 37 [privacy], 38 [conscience, thought and 
religion], 39 [expression], 40 [assembly] and 41 [movement] shall 
invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society – 
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or 
public health; or (b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom 
of other persons  
                                                          
552 Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, “Proportionality and the Culture of Justification” (2011) 59 Am J Comp L 
463; See also Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, “American Balancing and German Proportionality: The 
Historical Origins” (2010) 8 Int’l J Const L 263 at 267 (“Wherever the proportionality test has been 
introduced, it has the same basic two-stage structure. The first stage is to establish that a right has been 
infringed by governmental action. In the second stage, the government needs to show that it pursued a 
legitimate end and that the infringement was proportional. The proportionality requirement comprises three 
subtests: first, the means adopted to advance the governmental end must be appropriate for furthering that 
goal (suitability); second, the means adopted must be those that least infringe on the right of the individual 
(necessity); and third, the loss to the individual resulting from the infringement of the right must be 
proportional to the governmental gain in terms of furthering the governmental goal (proportionality in the 
strict sense”)). 
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(2) An Act of the National Assembly shall not be invalidated by reason 
only that it provides for the taking, during periods of emergency, of 
measures that derogate from the provisions of section 33 or 35 of this 
Constitution; but no such measures shall be taken in pursuance of any Act 
during any period of emergency save to the extent that those measures are 
reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation that 
exists during that period of emergency: 
 
Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize any derogation from 
the provisions of section 33 of this Constitution, except in respect of death 
resulting from acts of war or authorize any derogation from the provisions 
of section 36(8) of this Constitution. 
 
The above is the general limitation of the human rights provisions that the Constitution 
contains. One thing noticeable is that the limitation applies to specifically highlighted 
guarantees. This justifies the proposition that it does not apply to all the rights that the 
constitution enshrines. In addition, some of the guarantees contain independent limitation 
clauses. For example, while section 33(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to life 
in general terms (save in the execution of a death sentence),553 sub-section (2) thereof 
qualifies the right by mentioning situations in which the right to life shall not be regarded 
as having been violated. Such situations include defending another person from unlawful 
violence or for the defense of property, death arising while someone is carrying out a 
lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained or for the purpose of 
suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny. 
 It is equally worth noting that the limitation clause is not applicable to section 34 
of the Constitution which places absolute prohibition on the use of torture and other 
inhuman or degrading treatment. The section also disallows slavery and servitude 
absolutely as well as the performance of forced and compulsory labor barring the 
exceptions highlighted. Furthermore, the right to liberty is guaranteed under section 35 
                                                          
553 Nigeria is among several African countries where the death penalty is still applied as a criminal 
sanction. However, some countries on the continent such as South Africa have abolished the practice. See 
Dirk van Zyl Smit, “The Death Penalty in Africa” (2004) 4 Afr Hum Rts L J 1; Lilian Chenwi, Towards the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights Perspective (Cape Town: ABC Press, 2007). 
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which also specifies the circumstances and procedure under which that right could be 
tampered with. Where such circumstances and procedure for derogation are invoked, the 
Constitution also contains ample provisions for securing the humane treatment of the 
persons involved including prompt and expeditious trial, the right to silence and legal 
consultation, a right to written details of any reasons for arrest or detention, and the right 
to bail.554  
 Finally, from the clear provisions of section 45, the right to fair hearing in section 
36 is placed outside the reach of the general limitation or any specific limitation for that 
matter. Not even emergency considerations could place this guarantee at risk. Rather the 
proviso to section 45(2) captured in text the well-known principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege – that only offenses in existence at the time of an accused person’s offending action 
would suffice (that is, there should be no retroactive criminalization) and that no heavier 
punishment should be imposed than was in force at the time the alleged offence was 
committed. 
 One could notice that the rights recognized under the Constitution for purposes of 
analyzing the limitations are grouped into three distinct categories. The first category are 
not made subject to all the restrictions that might be imposed by the state in the interests 
of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others persons. In this category are freedom from torture and 
those similar to it. The other category consists of those rights that could be restricted for 
all those justifications but only in times of emergency. The rights captured here are life, 
freedom from forced labor, personal liberty and freedom from discrimination. Rights in 
the third and final category are those that could be derogated from at all times by the state 
for all those justifications of public order, morality health, etc.  
                                                          
554 s 34(2)-(7). 
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 As in other jurisdictions already examined, the role of Nigerian courts in cases 
alleging human rights abuses is to read the guarantees relied upon in those cases and to 
find out if the abuses complained of could be justified under any of the limitations 
allowed by the Constitution. It is by no means a light duty. When constitutional terms are 
as open-textured as they often are, courts interpreting them face anxious scrutiny as to 
whether they are liberal (in favor of rights i.e. acting in favorem libertatas) or 
conservative (expanding the limitations to the detriment of rights). Apart from the words 
of the constitution itself, the Nigerian courts are not provided with any further resources 
that could guide their interpretative ideology. This lack of analytical resources makes 
Okonkwor to observe that the Nigerian bill of rights differs essentially from the rest of 
the constitution because it is a statement of principles that involves the application of 
non-legal criteria.555  
 Continuing, he argues that when interpreting the human rights provisions, the 
courts will have to consider the reasonableness and justifiability of legislative and 
executive acts. This, he says, compels a subjective, rather than a purely objective 
approach that adheres to strict statutory construction. Therefore, he asserts, the subjective 
approach involves the measurement of reasonableness and justifiability in terms of the 
historical setting, the local political and social conditions and local standards of 
acceptability.556 Though writing in the context of the human rights provisions of the 
Nigerian Independence Constitution of 1960 and the Republican Constitution of 1963, 
Okonkwor’s piece is, however, also appropriate for any analysis of the human rights 
behavior of the courts with reference to the 1999 Constitution. The human rights 
provisions in Nigerian constitutions since 1960 have been similar as have been the 
manner in which the limitations under consideration here are placed in the text. 
                                                          
555 Okonkwor, supra note 156 at 265. 
556 Ibid. 
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 Therefore, regarding the general limitation clauses in the Constitution, Okonkwor, 
as did Nwabueze too, described them as manifestly vague and flexible.557 This is 
ostensibly because it cannot be stated with any degree of certainty what the Constitution 
describes generally as “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” This would seem 
to be the bane of all efforts to expand judicial protection of human rights in Nigeria. Yet 
it has not elicited as much academic attention as is seriously needed. One would notice 
therefore how different the Nigerian limitation regime is from the South African one. The 
Nigerian Constitution does not have the equivalent of section 36(1) of the South African 
Constitution that could point it towards the development of standards of human rights 
adjudication analogous to proportionality balancing.  
 The Nigerian rights limitation clause is too open-textured and vague. It does not 
make available to the courts a structure that aids the development of clear and precise 
standard steps that are necessary for effective balancing of rights against governmental 
interests. This makes the courts read the Constitution in literal fashion. When this literal 
tradition is coupled with this limitation regime, effective judicial affirmation of rights is 
rendered illusory.558 This is not only true of situations where the courts deliver positive 
judgments in human rights cases but also in those cases where the outcomes are negative. 
In the absence of clear standards and tests for justifying governmental intrusions on 
rights, the reasoning is very ad hoc and only increases the possibility for inconsistent and 
contradictory decisions to be frequently rendered by the courts. 
 In the circumstances, the distinction that Alexy draws between the construction of 
rights as rules and the construction of rights as principles is especially relevant to the 
Nigerian practice.559 Rather than construct rights as principles, the dearth of analytical 
resources equivalent to what is available to the South African courts has foisted on their 
                                                          
557 Ibid; see also Nwabueze, supra note 159 at 118. 
558 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 552 at 266 suggest that the balancing mechanism which in more ways 
than one resembles proportionality analysis was devised by the United States Supreme Court to overcome 
an excessively literal reading of the constitutional text. 
559 Robert Alexy, “The Construction of Constitutional Rights” (2010) 4 Law & Ethics Hum Rts 20. 
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Nigerian counterparts a situation in which all rights are construed merely as rules. 
According to Alexy, rules are norms that require something definitively. They are 
definitive commands (his emphasis) of which their form of application is subsumption.560 
“If a rule is valid and applicable, it is definitively required that exactly what it demands 
be done. If this is done, the rule is complied with; if this is not done, the rule is not 
complied with.”561 
 On the contrary, principles, according to Alexy, are norms requiring that 
something be realized to the greatest extent possible, given the factual and legal 
possibilities at hand. These, he argues, are optimization requirements (his emphasis). 
“They are characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied to varying degrees, and that 
the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on what is factually possible but 
also on what is legally possible.”562 Alexy argues that when human rights are conceived 
as rules rather than principles, balancing is eschewed. Of this situation, which he refers to 
rather pejoratively as “freedom from balancing” there is positivist quantity which makes 
all questions connected with the application of constitutional rights resolvable only by 
traditional canons of interpretation. This is by appealing to the wording of the 
constitutional rights provisions, the intentions of those who framed the Constitution, and 
the systematic context of the provision being interpreted.563 
 Applied to the Nigerian context, Alexy’s double-headed theories of subsumption 
and optimization have stark significance. While those provisions in the constitution that 
contain non-derogatory rights could be interpreted as rules, those rights to which the 
limitation provisions are applicable would be construed as principles. The first category 
of rights contains rules because they express imperatives that are boundless and limitless. 
For example the constitutional prohibition of torture and other cruel and inhuman 
                                                          
560 Ibid at 21. 
561 Ibid. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid at 22. 
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treatment can only be implemented by an absolute prohibition of those practices. The 
prohibition is either honored or it is not. There are no two ways and no short cuts. There 
is therefore no room for the application of balancing and proportionality or in Alexy’s 
view the freedom from balancing applies. Nothing is available to balance or to render 
proportional. 
 On the other hand, those constitutional provisions that are derogable contain 
principles to the extent that they could be limited by government or other justifiable 
action. What the constitution mandates regarding this category of rights is that they be 
protected or as Alexy would argue optimized to the greatest extent possible. For the 
simple reason that in this case there are two competing values – the rights of individuals 
and restrictions on them by government for overriding public good – a balancing process 
is warranted. What the proportionality doctrine accomplishes in this regard therefore is to 
ensure that only a fair balance is struck between these two values and especially that the 
means used to restrict the right in question is not more than is necessary to accomplish 
the stated governmental objective.   
 Majority of the rights enshrined in the Nigerian constitution fall within the latter 
category. They should all attract the application of the balancing scheme. But the words 
“reasonably justifiable in a democratic society,” are far too vague to provide an objective 
guide for balancing. Nwabueze also claims that the introductory phrase “Nothing in this 
section shall invalidate any law…” seems to imply a presumption in favor of the validity 
of a law imposing a restriction.564 His position is shared by other commentators as 
well.565 That phrase when it interacts with the presumption of constitutionality of laws 
                                                          
564Nwabueze, supra note 159 at 118.   
565 Okonkwor, supra note 156; see also Kenneth Robert-Wray, “Human Rights in the Commonwealth” 
(1968) 17 Int’l & Comp L Q 908 at 922. This author particularly noted that the Nigerian human rights 
provisions had been informed largely by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. He states: “The point has more than once been made that Articles 8 to 11 of the [European] 
Convention, which corresponds to sections 23 to 26 [sections 37 to 40, 1999 constitution] of Nigeria’s 
Constitution, permit such qualifications as are ‘necessary in a democratic society’; and that by substituting 
‘reasonably justifiable’ for ‘necessary’ the Constitution permits greater latitude. It does. What is 
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and regularity of government actions seems to cast the onus on the person challenging a 
law imposing restriction to show that the said law is not reasonably justifiable rather than 
the other way round. Nwabueze therefore suggested instead that the Constitution could 
have been more in favor of rights and placed more demands by way of governmental 
justification if it had read instead: “any law derogating from a guaranteed right shall be 
invalid unless it is reasonably justifiable…”566 
 Nwabueze’s suggestion here accords substantially with the position that Taiwo 
holds on the same issue. The latter notes that framers of successive Nigerian constitutions 
have always seen that clause fit to include in the text and leads to a conclusion that “such 
clauses express attitudes that cut across time periods and individual preferences among 
the framers.”567 He therefore asks the question that the constitutional provision points 
inexorably to but only in reverse order: “Do Nigeria’s constitutional framers mean to 
suggest that a democratic society, so-called, may interfere with an individual’s right to 
[for example] respect for his private and family life, home and correspondence, if such 
interference is ‘in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, 
public health or economic well-being of the community?”568 Taiwo surmises that if this 
question yields a positive answer, then that is a sure sign that the framers of the 
constitutions did not take rights seriously, [and] left no room for doubt that they were 
aware of the many philosophical conundrums that their proposal might generate and 
seemed to have adopted a crude utilitarian approach in which the rights of an individual 
may be bartered away for the welfare of the many.569  
                                                                                                                                                                             
‘reasonably justifiable’ may not be ‘necessary.’ Article 15 (emergencies) is even tighter; the relevant words 
being ‘strictly required’; and Article 1 (the right to life) goes even further with ‘absolutely necessary,’ 
whereas section 18 of the Constitution dilutes this to ‘reasonably justifiable.’ But in my submission, if the 
validity of measures adopted by Parliament or the Government is liable to be canvassed in a court of law, 
this change of wording is, to say the least, most desirable.” 
566 Ibid. 
567 See Taiwo, supra note 298 at 24. 
568 Ibid. 
569 Ibid. 
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 Taiwo’s position in my view is of a more radical category. His is too broad a 
brush that tarnishes all domestic and even international human rights instruments 
permitting the restriction of rights on grounds of public order, health, etc. We have only 
to consider the alternative position – rights without limitations – to know how 
problematic his prescription is. The question really is not whether or not to permit 
derogations on rights. It is that of degree of derogations to be allowed as well as measures 
that ensure a fair balance between rights and what legitimate derogations could be 
imposed upon them. That is where the challenge facing the Nigerian model is located.  
 One of the first cases that readily come to mind when analyzing the attitude of 
Nigerian courts to what it means for a legislation to be reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society is that of Cheranci v Cheranci.570 It is important to note that this was 
a decision of the Northern Region of Nigeria High Court written by a non-Nigerian 
judge, Justice Bates. In his judgment, Justice Bates stated that there was a presumption 
that every law made by parliament was constitutional and that the courts should bear this 
in mind, and therefore apply restraint in determining whether a particular law is 
reasonably justifiable.571 He seemed to suggest that judges “should not lightly disregard 
                                                          
570 [1960] NRNLR 24. 
571 It is unclear how this presumption of constitutionality differs from the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Canada, for example, which also practiced the British system prior to adopting a Charter of 
Rights in 1982 knew better than continuing with the British human rights tradition once the Charter was 
promulgated. In the words of one Canadian author “Our Constitution Act 1867 states in its preamble that 
Canada is to have a Constitution ‘similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.’ Of course, the anchor 
of the Constitution of the United Kingdom is the principle of parliamentary supremacy. That principle was 
also central to the Canadian Constitution for 115 years. Moreover, the courts adopted principles of 
interpretation which tended to respect the role and laws of government – e.g. the presumption of 
constitutionality, the principle of strict construction, the aspect doctrine and functional concurrency. Those 
principles are simply irrelevant in Charter litigation. Government lawyers now must expect to defend their 
laws on the merits. In so doing, they must be prepared to argue civil liberties doctrine at a sophisticated 
level and to articulate candidly and persuasively the policy factors underlying the challenged law. 
Moreover, in some aspects of the Charter analysis, there is a presumption against the government. For 
example, when a law has been found by a court to violate a Charter right, the onus shifts to the government 
to demonstrate that it should be saved as a ‘reasonable limit…’” See Hon. Justice JC Macpherson, “The 
Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Executive and Judicial Behaviour” in Gavin W 
Anderson ed., Rights &Democracy: Essays in UK-Canadian Constitutionalism (London: Blackstone Press 
Limited, 1999) at 131-132. 
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the voice of the people expressed through their legislators.”572 Justice Bates also held that 
to be reasonably justifiable, a restriction on a fundamental right must be necessary for the 
relevant purposes (as led down in the Constitution) and must not be excessive or out of 
proportion to the objects which it is sought to achieve; and that the presumption places 
the burden on the complaining party of showing that the law was not reasonably 
justifiable.573 
 As an initial concern, it might appear unhelpful dwelling too long on this 
judgment because it was delivered by a regional High Court and therefore of insignificant 
precedential value in Nigeria’s common law setting. Yet it is an important decision 
because had the structure it laid out been maintained by the Nigerian courts, there could 
have been better prospects for a more effective judicial approach to the enforcement of 
rights and conception of acceptable limitations to those rights in the country. It is 
observable that there are two parts to the court’s reasoning in the case above. On the one 
hand is the presumption of constitutionality of every law passed by parliament. On the 
other hand the judgment set forth a structure which it held applicable to every decision 
whether or not a particular law restricting constitutionally guaranteed rights is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society. I will proceed by examining the justification that has 
been offered for the presumption of constitutionality and later by showing why the 
court’s approach to reasonable justifiability held out a yet to be realized opportunity for 
expanded human rights protection. 
 The one justification offered for the presumption that the legislature always acts 
constitutionally is that law-making is a policy function and that elected representatives 
are better placed to decide matters of policy than an unelected judiciary. In other words 
this assertion relates back to the counter-majoritarian argument which was discussed 
extensively in the first chapter of this study. According to Roberts-Wray, the primary 
                                                          
572 Roberts-Wray, supra note 565 at 924. 
573 Ibid. 
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responsibility for governing the country rests with the legislature and the executive, and it 
is neither the function nor, one must assume, the wish of the judiciary to hinder or 
interfere more than necessary.574 He argues further that if the law imposes upon the 
courts the duty to review Acts passed and administrative action taken by virtue of 
discretionary powers, it should not make it incumbent on judges to substitute their own 
view of how the discretion should be exercised for the views of those primarily 
responsible, provided that what has been done is reasonably justifiable.575 He then set up 
the following scenario: 
Let us suppose that a particular situation warrants legislative derogation 
from, say, the freedom of assembly and that it is generally agreed that one 
of two courses, A or B, will meet the case. Debate ensues as to which is 
the better; perhaps which is the more just or the more effective; possibly 
one is more rigorous than the other and the issue is whether it is essential 
in the circumstances. Parliament in its wisdom chooses course A. If the 
judges are of opinion that course A, though reasonably justifiable, was not 
really necessary because course B, or indeed an entirely different course 
C, would have met the situation, should it be within their province to say 
so and hold that the Act passed by the elected representatives of the people 
to give the force of law to course A is invalid? In my opinion the answer is 
“no” – with the probable exception for any qualification on the protection 
of life. They would be interfering unnecessarily in a matter of policy.576 
 
 
Therefore, as in the case of Cheranci v Cheranci, the court in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Chike Obi577 came to the conclusion that the mere fact that a law has been 
made with the approval of the legislature, representing the people, is sufficient to trigger 
judicial restraint. In furtherance of this restraint, the courts adopt a practice that has been 
variously characterized. Yusuf and Ogbu-Nwobodo call it a “plain fact” jurisprudential 
                                                          
574 Ibid at 922. 
575 Ibid. 
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577 [1961] 1 All NLR (Pt 2) 186. 
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approach.578 Okere refers to it as literalism or mechanistic interpretation borne out of 
political expediency.579 Concerning the Nigerian Supreme Court, its approach to human 
rights adjudication has been described as austere and equally as discounting the 
normative force of the explicit language of the human rights guarantees of the 
Constitution.580 This writer, in particular, seemed to suggest that the court hardly 
considers the general or specific context or structure of the Bill of Rights.581 
 This in part is traceable to the history of the court as well as the training and 
process of recruiting the judges. It is worth reiterating the total lack of a reasonable 
opportunity for Nigerian courts to develop a human rights adjudicatory philosophy 
suitable to her specific constitutional history. British practice, although in many respects 
divergent from the constitutional course Nigeria chose at independence, continues to lurk 
in the background to the courts’ responsibilities like a dead hand from the past. 
Therefore, in those cases where human rights are engaged, Nwabueze observes how 
handicapped the judges are by their English education and the thereby acquired English 
law techniques that insulate them from the values and needs of their own people.582 He 
asserts that: 
Their [Judges’] minds have become imbued with ideas about the 
unquestionability of parliamentary legislation under English law and about 
the perfection and symmetry of the common law as to render them almost 
incapable of performing effectively the more creative role demanded of 
them by constitutional adjudication under a written constitution. They are 
unfamiliar with the constitutional decisions of courts in the U.S. and with 
the vast literature of American constitutional law, which have greater 
relevance to the problems that are presented to them than the English 
decisions which are their stock-in-trade.583    
                                                          
578 Yusuf, supra note 45 at 212; Samuel Ogbu-Nwobodo, “Pluralism in the Nigerian Constitutional 
Framework: A Comparative Study of United States of America and Republic of India” in Chima Centus 
Nweze, ed., Contemporary Issues on Public International and Comparative Law: Essays in Honor of 
Professor Christian Nwachukwu Okeke (Lake Mary: Vandeplas Publishing, 2009) at 347. 
579 Okere, supra note 154 at 803. 
580 Ukhuegbe, supra note 333 at 349. 
581 Ibid. 
582 Ben O Nwabueze, Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa: The Role of Courts in Government (London: C 
Hurst, 1977). 
583 Ibid at 311. 
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I now turn to my view that the decision in Cheranci v Cheranci if it had been 
consolidated upon by the courts could have made for a more robust and effective judicial 
protection of human rights in Nigeria. My position is informed by not only the fact that it 
is the first Nigerian court decision that offered the most expanded definition and 
explanation of “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society” but also because it clearly 
introduced the element of balancing and proportionality that is now the hallmark of 
acceptable reviews of laws and actions that restrict human rights. Surprising as it turns 
out that the judgment was written by an English judge, if continued, it would have been a 
departure from dependency on unhelpful English case-law and practice and the 
development of jurisprudential principles flowing directly from the very text of the 
Constitution.  
 There is a relationship between this failure to consolidate on the Cheranci 
decision and the persistence of what I had earlier identified as “plain factism” and 
“literalism” as the dominant method adopted by Nigerian courts in human rights cases. 
While not agreeing with the component of the decision which suggests that the limitation 
provision in the Constitution apparently places the burden on the individual challenging a 
law or executive action of proving that such law or action is not reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society,584 if the decision in Cheranci v Cheranci had been built upon, it is 
unlikely such notion could have been formulated in the first place.  
 Proportionality analysis and the balancing of rights and interests usually proceeds 
in stages with specific questions asked at each stage. One of the major questions that is 
usually asked on the proportionality/balancing matrix is: what legitimate governmental 
objective is a particular restriction on a constitutionally guaranteed right serving? It 
would appear improper to place the burden of identifying the objective and justifying it 
                                                          
584 Okonkwor, supra note 156 at 263 where he argues that the words “nothing in this section shall 
invalidate any law…” seem to be tilted in favor of the derogatory law, which thereby shifts the onus to the 
challenging person to prove that the law is not reasonably justifiable.” 
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on the party challenging the restriction. The rationale for this position is simple: who 
better than the government to convince the court about what legitimate goal a challenged 
law or other governmental action is out to achieve and in the context of Nigeria how such 
law or action could be reasonably justified in a democratic society. 
 The failure to stand by the Cheranci formula has only led to a hazy and 
fragmented judicial landscape in which courts take positions without offering any 
coherent explanations for doing so. In the event, the legal problems are dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis often with the instant case benefitting little or nothing from previous 
ones by way of a structured process. Two cases illustrate this situation. In Williams v 
Majekodunmi (No. 3),585 the plaintiff who happened to be a prominent lawyer challenged 
a restriction order placed on him by the government. While he argued that the order was 
not reasonably justifiable, the government argued otherwise. In its judgment, the 
Supreme Court held that nothing showed that the restriction order was reasonably 
justifiable. While interpreting the words “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society,” 
the court stated: 
Those words…must be read in the context of the Constitution, and more 
particularly in the context of Chapter III in which they occur. The Chapter 
confers certain fundamental rights which are regarded as essential and 
which are to be maintained and preserved; and they are to serve as a norm 
of legislation under majority rule, which is the form or rule pervading the 
constitutions. If they are to be invaded at all, it must be only to the extent 
that is essential for the sake of some recognized public interest, and may 
not be farther.586   
 
Quite surprisingly, in Adegbenro v Attorney General of the Federation,587 which arose 
from similar facts as the Williams’ case, the Supreme Court upheld the restriction order 
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placed on the plaintiff which it held to be reasonably justifiable. The court in this case 
reasoned as follows: 
It seems to me that there has in this case before us been shown to be ample 
grounds for the restriction placed on the movements of the plaintiff in the 
interest of peace and avoidance of bloodshed as deposed to by the 
defendant’s witness. We have it before us that before the purported 
appointment of the Plaintiff there was a Premier of the Western Region 
who is alleged to have been removed from office; that as a result there 
were two factions in the party in power in that Region; that the plaintiff’s 
attempt to hold a meeting of the House of Assembly…sparked off the 
disturbance which has led to the restriction order served on the Plaintiff; 
and finally, that the plaintiff desires to return to the duties of Premier of 
that Region. In my judgment the steps which have been taken are 
reasonably justifiable as a preventive measure to attain peace and order.588  
 
I do not quite agree with the argument advanced elsewhere that the court was right to 
reach two contradictory judgments in two cases having similar facts, especially where 
what the author furnished by way of rationale was a couple of British authorities.589 
While the distinct facts of both cases may have played a part in the position adopted by 
the court, the judgment, especially in the latter case, can be rightly questioned. In both 
cases the court appeared more desperate to justify the restriction than strike the balance 
between the restriction and the rights of the individuals concerned.  
 Even while ruling in favor of the challenger in the earlier case, the court did not 
develop any helpful standard that could have benefitted the latter litigation. To all intents 
and purposes, the court simply said that the restriction was not reasonably justifiable. A 
critic of the court’s position could reach for the opposite point of view much in the same 
manner as the court. That is why justification is crucial. And it does not look likely that 
any such justification could be advanced without at least attempting some balancing 
activity. It is such balancing process that leads to the development of a structure and 
therefore a standard. Thus, absent any clear structure from which justification could be 
                                                          
588 Ibid at 439. 
589 Kaniye S A Ebeku, “Constitutional Guarantee of Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention in Nigerian 
Law” (1995) 7 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 620 at 637. 
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deduced in logical fashion, it was not quite surprising that the court in the second case 
reached for the opposite extreme than in the earlier case. 
 Karibi-Whyte, a retired Judge of the Nigerian Supreme Court offers what would 
seem to be an insider’s explanation for the ambivalent posture of the court. He states: 
In coming to these decisions the ordinary rules of construction of statutes 
were applied. The provisions construed were regarded as indeed they 
were, ordinary statutes of the imperial Parliament or the local legislature 
as the case may be. No special emphasis was laid on the fact that the 
liberty of the citizen was involved and that in such cases any benefit of 
doubt in a decision between the executive and the citizen should be given 
to the citizen. The court in construing the provisions of such statutes 
should in all cases lean towards the liberty of the subject but careful not 
going beyond the natural construction of the statute. The question that was 
being asked in all cases was what Parliament meant by the words used? It 
did not appear that there was at any time any anxiety to safeguard the 
liberty of the subject.590  
 
This is significant indication that a balancing scheme is not in place. This is the major 
characteristic which differentiates how Nigerian courts approach human rights and the 
practices of the other jurisdictions analyzed in this study. I have shown how American 
balancing looks generally similar to proportionality analysis that is a feature of both 
British and South African constitutional culture of the times. In those jurisdictions, the 
courts have developed standards of analysis that could guide any court faced with a 
human rights case no matter the nature of the right involved. In all of them the questions 
asked at each stage of the analysis resemble themselves. It is, however, difficult to point 
to similar standards in the practices of Nigerian courts. This has telling consequences for 
uniformity in court culture as well as with the objectivity of decisions rendered. It has to 
be clear that the approach of the courts is uniform otherwise precedent would be of 
                                                          
590 Adolphus G Karibi-Whyte, The Relevance of the Judiciary in the Polity – in Historical Perspective 
(Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1987) at 58-59. The Nigerian practice parallels to a 
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minimal benefit and there will be increased chances of courts faced with similar facts 
reaching contradictory decisions as we have seen above. 
4.9. Why Nigeria Needs the Proportionality Standard 
Given the points I have made in the earlier sections, it seems the Nigerian judiciary 
cannot much more run away from a proportionality-based system of constitutional rights 
review. Not only is this imperative because the constitutional provision that governs the 
limitation of human rights in Nigeria warrants doing so, but also because the system has 
many inherent advantages which makes it the analytical procedure more widely adopted 
by constitutional regimes across the world in contemporary times.591 It is used by among 
several other jurisdictions the European Court of Human Rights,592 the United 
Kingdom,593 South Africa,594 India,595 South Korea,596 Germany,597 Canada,598 New 
Zealand,599 and Brazil.600 It could be seen that the proportionality principle does not 
                                                          
591 See for example Stone Sweet & Matthews, supra note 181; David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law 
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in The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe Evelyn Ellis ed., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999) 
at 1. 
592Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 522. 
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discriminate in terms of the legal systems to which it could apply. This conclusion is 
justified given that the above mentioned countries comprise common law as well as the 
civil law jurisdictions. The proportionality principle has also been shown to be useful not 
only in the domestic legal arena but as well in the judicial activities of transnational 
courts and institutions.601  
 Furthermore, it applies equally to countries whose constitutional traditions allow 
the courts to discover the limitations of rights through practice and experience as for 
example the United States602 and United Kingdom in contrast to other jurisdictions like 
South Africa and India where the constitutions prescribe the range of permissible 
limitations to constitutionally enshrined human rights. Therefore, were Nigeria to adopt 
the proportionality standard, it would be for the simple reason that it offers a more 
consistent mechanism for justifying governmental abridgment of human rights and also 
because it is being embraced by large numbers of states and Nigeria would not be doing 
anything extraordinary in looking that direction as well.  
The adoption of a proportionality mechanism by Nigerian courts would also 
obviously free the courts from the rules-against-principles difficulty that Alexy identified. 
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With a balancing regime in place, there will be less reliance by the courts on traditional 
constitutional canons of interpretation that Nigerian courts have hitherto used but which 
have in no way deepened the understanding and enforcement of rights in the county. 
Such practices would also have significance for uniformity in judicial approach to the 
construction of rights and certainty in the outcomes achievable. Moreover, a 
proportionality-based system of rights review seems more impartial and neutral603 than 
the current standard-free mechanism that Nigerian courts operate. It offers a more 
coherent justification of court judgments because there would have been opportunity in 
the balancing process to weigh all the values implicated rather than just reach a decision 
in capricious fashion. 
Acting in that manner has consequences for the courts and the judge as Wechsler 
expertly articulated it several decades ago.604 He was of the view that both the judges 
who decide human rights cases and non-judges who criticize their judgments are under 
obligation to indicate the standards by which they arrive at their choices and positions. 
Wechsler’s position bears being reproduced extensively: 
If courts cannot escape the duty of deciding whether actions of the other 
branches of the government are consistent with the Constitution, when a 
case is properly before them in the sense I have attempted to describe, you 
will not doubt the relevancy and importance of demanding what, if any, 
are the standards to be followed in interpretation. Are there, indeed, any 
criteria that both the Supreme Court and those who undertake to praise or 
to condemn its judgments are morally and intellectually obligated to 
support? Whatever you may think to be the answer, surely you agree with 
                                                          
603Ibid at 188. This author also underscores one of the major contentions of proportionality proponents: that 
the system “attempts to depoliticize rights by purporting to turn the moral and political evaluations 
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Human Rights?” (2009) 7 Int’l J Const L 468 at 469. Here, the author stated that “balancing, in the form of 
proportionality, is nothing but a manifestation of the perennial quest to invest adjudication with precision 
and objectivity.” Further, Aharon Barak, “Proportionality and Principled Balancing” (2010) 4 Law & 
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me that I am right to state the question as the same one for the Court as for 
its critics. An attack upon a judgment involves an assertion that a court 
should have decided otherwise than as it did. Is it not clear that the validity 
of an assertion of this kind depends upon assigning reasons that should 
have prevailed with the tribunal; and that any other reasons are irrelevant? 
That is, of course, not only true of a critique of a decision of the courts; it 
applies whenever a determination is in question, a determination that it is 
essential to make either way.605   
 
Wechsler did not end it there, though. He said a judge’s decision should not “turn on the 
immediate result”606 because that would then imply that “the courts are free to function as 
a naked power organ, that it is an empty affirmation to regard them…as courts of law.”607 
This only leads to what he therefore describes as “ad hoc evaluation” [of the kind that I 
think Nigerian courts are guilty] which he recognizes as posing the deepest problem of 
American constitutionalism “not only with respect to judgments of the courts but also in 
the wider realm in which conflicting constitutional positions have played a part in our 
politics.”608  
 In spite of its global appeal though, proportionality analysis is often criticized as 
well. Among these criticisms is lack of clarity as to “what is weighed (interests, 
principles, rights, considerations); how it is weighted (with what metric); and who is 
doing – or should do – the balancing (judges or legislators”).609 It has also been argued 
that the goal of human rights is to protect certain individual fundamental interests from 
arbitrary state power but also from collective interests.610 This follows that any document 
for the protection of human rights already gives priority to rights. This, it is further 
argued, already reflects a balance, the outcome of which must be that human rights are to 
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609Tsakyrakis, supra note 602 at 470; see also Timothy Endicott, “Proportionality and Incommensurability” 
University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series No 40, 2012 online: 
610 Ibid at 475. 
 183 
 
be protected before other interests are even taken into consideration.611 “If that is so, what 
does it mean to say that the issue is to strike a further balance between the general interest 
of the community and individual rights?”612 
Significant as this question is, it ignores a very important fact with which 
comparative constitutional rights enforcement is grappling. The understanding of the 
value of rights in a constitutional system is not uniform across all jurisdictions. While in 
some jurisdictions it is taken for granted that rights would always prevail over 
governmental and collective interests; and that the individual deserves protection from 
the invasive activities of these social actors, in other jurisdictions, like Nigeria, the 
reverse tends to be the case. Not only are individual rights more often than not 
subordinated to governmental and collective interests, in fact it often is the case that some 
in society believe that it is the government that should be protected from the individual in 
spite of its awesome powers. Societies like this cannot run away from the imperative of 
balancing and proportionality because the level of tension between the interests involved 
suggest no better or more appropriate means of resolving of them.  
 
4.9.1. Human Rights and Constitutional Exegesis 
Given the above background it is equally important to develop a relationship between the 
status of a constitution within a country’s legal system, the interpretative approach 
adopted by the courts in construing its provisions and the possibility that the constitution, 
even if containing a Bill of Rights, may not be effectively utilized to advance those 
rights. Karibi-Whyte above states the obvious with reference to Nigeria. Nigerian courts 
generally interpret the Constitution like they do ordinary statutes and other legal 
instruments. They pay very close attention to the ordinary meaning of the words used and 
apply those ordinary meanings even where doing so would negatively engage 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. In Victor Ndoma-Egba v Chukwuogor 
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& Ors.,613 the Nigerian Supreme Court spoke in glowing terms about the literal rule of 
interpretation, describing it as the “golden meter wand” of interpretation when the words 
used in a statute are plain and unambiguous. The court went further to assert that 
It requires that such words should be given their ordinary plain meaning. 
In such circumstance, it is not permissible for the courts to refrain from the 
meaning of such plain words even though it gives unreasonable or unfair 
result, by going outside what the words themselves actually convey, in 
attempt to consider what other things they ought to be capable of meaning. 
 
What is, however, troubling about the Nigerian judiciary and an issue to which I keep 
returning to every now and then is that the Supreme Court shows its ambivalence above 
by contradicting an earlier position on its approach to interpreting the constitution. In the 
earlier case of Nafiu Rabiu v The State,614 it held that: 
[…] the function of the Constitution is to establish a framework and 
principles of government, broad and general in the terms intended to apply 
to the varying conditions which the development of our several 
communities must involve, ours being a plural, dynamic, society, and 
therefore mere technical rules of interpretation of statutes are to some 
extent inadmissible in a way so as to defeat the principles of government 
enshrined in the Constitution… It is my view that the approach of this 
court to the construction of the Constitution should he and so it has been 
one of liberalism… I do not conceive it to be the duty of this court so as to 
construe any of the provisions of the Constitution as to defeat the obvious 
ends the Constitution was designed to serve…615 
 
So on the one hand the Nigerian Supreme Court valorized the literal interpretation of 
constitutional texts in the first case while on the other hand favoring a liberal meaning to 
                                                          
613 [2004] 6 NWLR (Pt 869) 382 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
614 [1981] 2 NCLR 293 at 326; MA Ajomo Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in 
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615 See also, Bronik Motors Ltd v WEMA Bank, [1983] 6 Sup Ct 158. In that case the Supreme Court held 
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which apply to Acts of Parliament. Although the manner of interpretation of a Constitutional instrument 
should give effect to the language used, recognition should be given to the character and origins of the 
instrument. Such an instrument should be treated as sui generis calling for principles of interpretation of its 
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the text in the second. There is no indication as to what “liberal” in the second case stands 
for or which tendency trumps the other in the practices of the court, at least from the 
court’s perspective. It is also unclear whether “liberal” is necessarily progressive. There 
is, however, little doubt that the court favors the more literal interpretative model. This 
allows the court to avoid involvement in politically volatile cases because it could then 
explain its decision away as having been constrained by the words used in the 
Constitution. In other words the court hangs on to a formalistic and orthodox view of its 
function as discussed in Chapter 1. Additionally, the court could explain such decisions 
in terms of deference to representative decision-making bodies, in other words eschewing 
any role in the formulation of governmental policy. This attitude flies in the face  of what 
is more widely acknowledged which is that when courts are given constitutional powers 
to review the policy choices of the other arms of government, this makes them less of a 
disinterested institution for applying the law and more of a formidable political player.616 
 But the Constitution is not like any other statute. To favor literalism against the 
background of a transition from authoritarianism while at the same time purporting a 
commitment to a new order would not allow the courts the kind of responsiveness 
essential to curtailing impunity at the transition’s immediate aftermath and even into the 
future. There is clear engagement here with the ideology which informs constitutional 
interpretation because if the constitution is interpreted merely as any other statute would, 
the tendency for it to enhance the protection of human rights would be minimized. In this 
respect, Udombana’s very relevant and effectual comment on the judicial approach to the 
enforcement of human rights warrants detailing. According to him: 
Constitutional rights must be interpreted in such a way that they trump 
governmental interests, for the simple reason that human rights protect not 
only the individual in a democracy but democracy itself. A constitutional 
court must not be very positivistic or legalistic in its attitude, but must go 
to the spirit of the law in the defence of human rights and human beings. 
                                                          
616Samuel Issacharoff, “Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness” 
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Comp Pol Stud 397; Paul R Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, “The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, 
Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice” (1997) 59 J Pol 1206.  
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Although a court should seek logical consistency and the symmetry of the 
legal structure and should not lightly sacrifice certainty, uniformity, order 
and coherence on the altar of judicial dexterity, it is incorrect to assert that 
judges can extract the meaning of constitutional provisions from legal 
materials alone. Human rights are not merely legal rights; they are also 
moral rights, and moral decisions do not admit of mathematical certainty. 
A constitutional court may be, in the words of Hans Kelsen, ‘a negative 
legislator,’617 but it is a legislator nonetheless and it must look for 
openings and create jurisprudence – through a creative interpretation of 
constitutional rights.618   
  
Even though this research has only limited connection to constitutional theory or theories 
of constitutional interpretation as such, because of the insight which an inquiry along that 
line provides for a better understanding of the issues at hand, I will dwell a little on it 
here. This is especially necessary because of the benefits of making a comparison 
between Nigeria’s practices with those of other jurisdictions. Two questions arise from 
any attempt to theorize constitutional interpretation. The first question is the ideology that 
dominates the attitude of judges to all cases coming before them whether they are 
constitutional or not. The second is the approach that the judges adopt in adjudicating 
constitutional questions per se. 
 I addressed the first question in Chapter 1 as a general concern in dealing with all 
adjudicatory problems whether or not they arise within a constitutional context. I do not 
intend to repeat the points I stated then. That leaves us with the second question. In 
treating it, I should point out that how judges approach the interpretation of constitutional 
texts would depend to a large extent on their understanding of the constitution as a 
document and its position on the normative hierarchy of a given legal system. A process 
or interpretativist theorist would view the text of the constitution as given and settled, 
                                                          
617 See Kelsen, supra note 462 (“To annul a law is to assert a general [legislative] norm, because the 
annulment of a law has the same character as its elaboration—only with a negative sign attached. . . . A 
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618 Nsongurua Udombana, “Interpreting Rights Globally: Courts and Constitutional Rights in Emerging 
Democracies” (2005) 5 Afr Hum Rts J 47 at 57. 
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requiring only passive enforcement.619 The alternative viewpoint belongs to substantive 
or non-interpretativist theorists who believe that the constitution contains some abstract 
moral principles which a judge is obliged to interpret as containing substantive moral 
rights. Proponents of the latter persuasion enjoin judges to understand their role in 
constitutional interpretation as including shaping its text to fit prevailing social 
conditions. 
 As Aharon Barak formerly of the Israeli Supreme Court notes, judicial 
interpretation is more than filling in a gap; it gives meaning to the text. He says that all 
interpretative systems struggle with generalizations and limitations of language. The 
different systems must, however, resolve the relationship between the text and context 
and between the written word (verba) and its spirit (vountas).620 He adds that the 
Constitution is a unique legal document and its uniqueness must inform how it is 
interpreted. He concludes by asserting that  
One should take both the subjective and objective elements into account 
when determining the purpose of the Constitution. The original intent of 
the framers at the time of drafting is important. One cannot understand the 
present without understanding the past… The intent of the constitutional 
authors, however, exists alongside the fundamental views and values of 
modern society at the time of interpretation.621       
 
                                                          
619 Ely, supra note 141 at 1 where he describes interpretativism as “indicating that judges deciding 
constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the 
written Constitution…” See also SK Asare, “Accounting for Judiciary Performance in an Emerging 
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their analysis with the dictionary meaning of words. This approach tends to burden fundamental rights by 
shifting the burden of persuasion to the one alleging a violation of rights as long as the government 
establishes that its conduct does not offend the constitutional or legislative words. Au contraire, courts who 
take a broad purposeful view of fundamental rights consider any infringement of fundamental rights with 
heightened suspicion and will put the onus on the government to justify the alleged violation. The broad 
purposeful approach also starts the analysis with the dictionary meaning of words but resorts to distilling 
and upholding the underlying values that the law seeks to protect. In any conflict between law and justice, 
the mechanistic approach upholds the law and sacrifices justice while the broad purposeful approach puts 
the pursuit of justice above the law.”  
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621 Ibid at 129. 
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It is not open to contest that when the constitution is placed on its proper pedestal within 
the legal system, it will be better suited to achieve its goals including the goal of being a 
catalyst for the effective protection of human rights.   
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Chapter Five 
Nigeria’s Contemporary Constitutional and Human Rights 
Architecture 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss normative and doctrinal foundations for human rights 
litigation and adjudication in Nigeria. I will first detail the major sources of the human 
rights norms applied in Nigerian courts. As a significant component of this analysis as 
well, I will show how domestic norms interact with international norms. This concern in 
particular would respond to one of the sub-questions raised in the overall research, that is, 
whether the fact that human rights norms come from plural sources necessarily hinders 
the adjudication of human rights cases.   
I will also be providing an extensive insight into how Nigerian courts interpret the 
country’s obligation to uphold international human rights norms. In addition, an analysis 
of Nigeria’s court structure will be undertaken especially in relation to the question of the 
category of courts with jurisdiction to resolve human rights cases. Apart from the already 
stated purpose for this line of inquiry, it also will show the 1999 constitution as the 
foundation upon which rests normative and procedural human rights questions in Nigeria. 
Along this specific line, I will look briefly at other forms in which human rights questions 
could be presented in court such as constitutional reference. Doctrinally, my analyses 
would look at concepts and practices developed by the superior courts to give effect to 
norms.  
 In terms of the norms, the 1999 constitution identifies the various rights which if 
they are violated could lead to a legitimate legal claim for redress as well as the 
procedure for pursuing such claims. Looking at the constitution, it is plain what rights are 
protected and when the violation of those rights could entitle a victim to redress. There is 
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also provision as to the procedure the said victim could adopt for presenting such a claim 
in court.  
 While the constitutional dimensions of these rights appear settled at first brush 
and seem to suggest that the constitution alone is the repository of human rights norms, 
this happens not to be the case upon closer observation. Granted that the constitution 
asserts supremacy over several issues, including those related to human rights, it allows 
sufficient room for an externalization of its norm creating and generating capacity. The 
constitution recognizes, for instance, that Nigeria operates in a globalized context and 
that the country is not a self-sufficient island whose circumstances permit no external 
influences. A substantial part of the analyses in this chapter will therefore examine those 
external sources that contribute to the generation of human rights norms. I will also 
discuss the level of interaction between constitutional norms and those generated 
externally.  
 Similarly, Nigeria’s federal structure presupposes a plurality of norm-generating 
tiers of the political government. Like the external contributors to the generation of 
human rights norms, the other levels of government in Nigeria’s federal framework, of 
which the state governments are the clearest examples, also generate at their levels norms 
that have implications for human rights enforcement.622 In the latter parts of this chapter I 
will provide examples of such state laws that contribute to the production of human rights 
norms. The analyses that follow will also include a critical examination of the 
relationship between the constitution and these other human rights norm generating 
sources. I will in addition identify areas of tension where they exist among the various 
norm-generating sources as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the constitution in 
mediating those tensions. 
                                                          
622 For an analysis of the relationship between federalism and human rights practices see Paul Chen, 
“Federalism and Rights: A Neglected Relationship” (1999) 40 S Tex L Rev 846; G Alan Tarr, “The Past 
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in Ellis Katz & G Alan Tarr, eds., Federalism and Rights (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996). 
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5.2. The Constitution as Source of Human Rights Norms 
The Nigerian constitution of 1999 is the primary source of all human rights norms in the 
country. But it is by no means the only source for the generation of human rights norms. 
What is true of the 1999 constitution in this regard is also true of all previous 
constitutions that the country had operated starting with the 1960 Independence 
Constitution. Chapter IV of the 1999 constitution623 comprising sections 33 to 46 
guarantees specific human rights and freedoms, identifies the courts with jurisdiction 
over human rights cases, stipulates who may present a complaint of human rights 
violation, and provides for the manner in which rules of procedure for the enforcement of 
human rights are to be made. The constitution as a human rights norm-creating source 
stands on a distinct pedestal compared to other sources. Its Supremacy Clause624 leaves 
no room for doubt about its pre-eminent position in comparison to other norm-generating 
sources. In addition, all human rights claims must be rooted in the constitution as every 
single claim of violation must directly relate to a right specifically protected under the 
constitution.625 
 The last claim may seem controversial when viewed in relation to norms from 
other sources that may not necessarily have constitutional recognition. In this sense, the 
example that quickly emerges is with regards to social and economic rights which under 
the Nigerian constitution could be said not to be justiciable (at least not in the same sense 
as civil and political rights) but are guaranteed under international law in somewhat 
similar terms as the latter set of rights.626 The question of justiciability of social and 
economic rights under domestic law is a hotly debated one and will be given a separate 
analytical treatment in the course of this study. Without prejudice to the result of the 
                                                          
623 Comprising sections 33 – 46. 
624s 1(3).  
625s 46(1).  
626Edwin Egede, “Human Rights and the Environment: Is there a legally enforceable Right of a Clean and 
Healthy Environment for the ‘Peoples’ of the Niger Delta under the Framework of the 1999 Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria?” (2007) 19 Sri Lanka J Int’l L 51 at 65; Obiajulu Nnamuchi, “Kleptocracy 
and its many Faces: The Challenges of Justiciability of the Right to Healthcare in Nigeria” (2008) 52 J Afr 
L 42. 
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proposed analysis, that this challenge is possible would seem to imply that when human 
rights norms grow from a plurality of sources there might be collateral consequences for 
effective enforcement.627   
It is important to also stress that some of the well-known common law prerogative 
remedies in existence before specific human rights became constitutionalized in Nigeria 
have some common characteristics with some human rights norms. Such remedies 
include habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. One could be tempted to 
ascribe normative qualities to these remedies. But in reality most of their elements are 
more procedural than normative. For example, habeas corpus, has become integrated as a 
remedy into the human rights mechanism but only in terms of facilitating the realization 
of the right to personal liberty.628 The normative/procedural divide is arguably also 
applicable to certiorari, mandamus or prohibition.629  
With respect to certiorari, it seems to correspond substantially with some aspects 
of other specific human rights norms. For example, some components of a claim based on 
certiorari are very difficult to distinguish from one to enforce the fundamental right to a 
fair hearing. Under Nigerian law, certiorari could be granted on the grounds that the rules 
                                                          
627See for example Rebecca Zahn, “Human Rights in the Plural Legal System of Nigeria” (2009-2010) 1 
Edinburg Student L Rev 66 at 81; Iyabode Ogunniran, “The Child Rights Act versus Sharia Law in 
Nigeria: Issues, Challenges & a Way Forward” (2010) 30 Child Legal Rts J 62.  
628 The Constitution does not use the terms habeas corpus. However, it is coupled to the protection of the 
right to personal liberty under section 35 of the Constitution. This is accomplished through the procedure 
for human rights enforcement prescribed by subsidiary legislation, in this case the Fundamental Rights 
(Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 issued by the Chief Justice of Nigeria under powers granted to him 
under section 46(3) of the Constitution. This is present in Order 4 Rule 3(iii) which authorizes a court 
before which an application to enforce a right is presented to, among other powers, order the production of 
such applicant before the court if the allegation is for unlawful detention. The court could also order the 
person detaining the applicant to release him/her from such detention.   
629 OY Abdul, “Prerogative Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition within the Nigerian Legal System” 
(2002) 1 UDUS L J 178. The author groups remedies that may be applied to redress human rights 
violations into three categories: Constitutional remedies available through a combination of Sections 42 and 
46 of the 1999 constitution, ordinary private law remedies including damages, injunctions and declarations 
and the prerogative remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. While some of these remedies may 
provide only for procedure through which human rights claims could be carried out, others may have 
normative as well as procedural significance. 
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of natural justice had been breached by the court against which that remedy is invoked. 
The common law principle of natural justice with its twin elements – audi alterem partem 
and nemo judex in causa sua – is therefore integral to the constitutional guarantee of the 
right to a fair hearing.630  
The Nigerian Court of Appeal has held that an application for certiorari in fact is 
similar both in character and procedure to an application to enforce a fundamental human 
right, notably the right to fair hearing. In the court’s words, “An application for certiorari 
is similar to and has the same procedure with an application for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules.”631 It 
is also in this sense that the claim to enforce some human rights implicates as well 
remedies that are available in the field of administrative law.632 One could therefore argue 
that the components of certain rights constitutionally enshrined in Nigeria have common 
law origins. That being the case, the courts when faced with interpreting those rights or 
some components of them would most likely not depart from the treatment they had 
received at common law.633 
5.3. International Law as a Source of Human Rights Norms 
Nigeria as a member of the global community is among countries whose sovereignty and 
the power to create laws must coexist with the intrusion of international law. Since the 
end of the Second World War the Westphalian conception of international law634 has 
                                                          
630See PP Craig, Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) at 199. 
631 National Electric Power Authority v Akinola Arobieke, [2006] 7 NWLR 245 [Ng Ct App]. 
632Craig, supra note 630 at 381. 
633 Sadau v The State, [1968] 1 All NLR 124. This case turned on how the court should treat evidence that 
had been obtained illegally. The Nigerian Supreme Court, following an English authority on how the 
common law treated similar evidence held that if the evidence was relevant to the case it was admissible 
and it didn’t matter how it was obtained. This was obviously in clear subversion of the constitutional 
guarantee of everyone’s private life, home and correspondence. See also Pontian N Okoli & Chinedum I 
Umeche, “Attitude of Nigerian Courts to Illegally Obtained Evidence” (2011) 37 Commonwealth L Bull 
81.  
634A Claire Cutler, “Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumption of International Law and 
Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy” (2001) 27 Rev Int’l Stud 133; David Kennedy, “A New Stream of 
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since given way to a system that permits more international influence on how different 
countries treated their citizens given that that war was started in part by how German 
authorities treated their own citizens. Beth Simmons underlines the profundity of the 
resent assumption under international law that individuals have internationally protected 
rights that states are not at liberty to disregard in the name of sovereignty.635  Since the 
passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and adoption of the 
complementary International Bill of Human Rights,636 the world has witnessed a 
proliferation of international human rights documents that bind those countries signing 
and ratifying them.  
 Nigeria is not left out in this process and is State party to several such 
international instruments generating several distinct human rights norms, including some 
that are as well enshrined in the Constitution.637 Among international human rights 
treaties that Nigeria has either signed or ratified are the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),638 the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR),639 the Convention against Torture,640 the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,641 the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Kinds of Discrimination against Women,642 among several others. Some of the 
international agreements affirm norms already recognized under the domestic legal 
regime. A good example is the ICCPR which guarantees several rights also covered 
                                                                                                                                                                             
International Law Scholarship” (1988) 7 Wis Int’l L J 14; Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International 
Relations and the Westphalian Myth” (2001) 55 Int’l Org 251.   
635 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 24.  
636International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 3 January 1976) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).  
637 Edwin Egede, “Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the Domestication of Human Rights 
Treaties in Nigeria” (2007) 51 J Afr L 249. 
638Ratified 29 July 1993. 
639Ratified 29 July 1993.  
640Signed 28 July 1988, ratified 28 June 2001.  
641Signed 26 June 1990, ratified 19 April 1991.  
642Signed 23 April 1984, ratified 13 January 1985.  
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under the Nigerian constitution. Some of the agreements create new norms that domestic 
systems are then called upon to adopt. In Nigeria’s case the International Covenant on the 
Rights of the Child will exemplify such agreements. 
 Apart from treaties signed or ratified by Nigeria at the level of the United Nations 
and its various bodies, the country has also bound itself to uphold human rights norms 
recognized under the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and its protocols.643 
Through this Charter Africa was responding to its own obligations to ensure that human 
rights practices constrain state behavior across the continent as is the case in other sub-
regions of the world. In doing this, the Charter took into account Africa’s place in world 
affairs and especially its historical experiences. But with specific reference to this 
Charter, Nigeria did not just sign or ratify it but went further to domesticate its 
provisions.644 Later in this part of my research I will dwell more on this as well as show 
the place of the domesticated Charter on the architecture of human rights in Nigeria. 
 Suffice it to mention though that human rights norms generated locally, including 
through the constitution, and those obtained from external sources have different legal 
characteristics. International law as a human rights normative platform is often criticized 
especially for its non-self-executing nature in certain contexts. This is unlike domestic 
norms that are immediately applicable with further ceremony. For this reason, it appears, 
Simmons asserts that international human rights law “has raised expectations as well as 
overpromised; it has aspired to universality yet still reflects some of the hegemonic ideas 
of the most powerful actors in the world polity.”645 Thus, international human rights law 
cannot much be removed from the broader context within which international law as a 
general field operates, including but not limited to questions often asked as to its 
                                                          
643African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 
58 (1982)(entered into force 21 October 1986).  
644African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Procedure Act 1990.  
645 Simmons, supra note 635 at 23. 
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enforceability.646 In the opinion of some scholars, while international law could be a 
normative hatching machine for all they cared, this cannot mask the reality that the site 
for the struggle to enthrone human rights remains the domestic arena.647  
 Here, it is trite to pinpoint as emblematic of this viewpoint Jack Donnelly’s often 
cited theory that the struggle for human rights will be won or lost at the national level.648 
According to him,  
Unless we [i.e. international human rights scholars] begin to study such 
struggles, we will neither understand the most important issues nor be able 
to make the most effective possible contribution to the realization of 
internationally recognized human rights649  
 
 As well, concerns surround the viability of some of the human rights norms generated at 
the international level, necessitating calls for some degree of quality control in the 
production of such norms.650 In terms of the procedure for their production, norms 
growing out of international law often face harsh scrutiny as well. International law, for 
all its popularity, is considered less suited to addressing domestic challenges the same 
way domestic laws are. It is argued that this is the case because international law is made 
                                                          
646 See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, “Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public 
Law” (2009) 122 Harv L Rev 1791 at 1792 (“Measured against the benchmark of domestic law, 
international law seems different and deficient along each of these dimensions. International law has no 
centralized legislature or hierarchical court system authorized to create, revise, or specify the application of 
legal norms, and as a result is said to suffer from irremediable uncertainty and political contestation. Out of 
deference to state sovereignty, international law is a “voluntary” system that obligates only states that have 
consented to be bound, and thus generally lacks the power to impose obligations on states against their 
interests.”) 
647 Ibid. 
648 Jack Donnelly, “Post Cold-War Reflections on the Study of International Human Rights” in Joel H 
Rosenthal ed, Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1995) 236 at 252. See also Obiora Chinedu Okafor & Shedrack Agbakwa, “On Legalism, Popular Agency 
and ‘Voices of Suffering’: The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission in Context” (2002) 24 Hum 
Rts Q 662 at 663. 
649 Ibid. 
650 Philip Alston, “Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control” (1984) 78 Am J Int’l 
L 607; Philip Alston, “A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation 
of International Human Rights Law?” (1982) 29 Neth Int’l L Rev 307. 
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outside the procedure stated for enacting domestic laws and also lacks input from 
domestic legislatures.651 In addition, it has also been argued that it is appropriate to query 
a system that entrusts national law making powers to international institutions that are not 
directly accountable to the people, and further that “treaty making often takes place 
behind closed doors with little outside input.”652  
There might be much recommending these criticisms especially with respect to 
international agreements that have not met the threshold number of ratifying states. But 
the criticisms could extend to agreements that have met that threshold and therefore are in 
force is a different concern. In many countries, especially those with the dualist method 
for the reception of international treaties, though the prerogative of entering into such 
treaties belongs to the executive, the legislature does play some role in facilitating the 
signing and ratification process. If this is the case, rather than a lack of input as it is 
argued above, the legislature actually performs some role in that process.    
The criticism of international law is, however, mitigated by some positive 
evaluations of its helpful role in interpreting constitutional texts. There is a feeling that 
international law when applied in domestic adjudication, places the courts in more solid 
foundation both as an interpretative device and for the creation or conferment of 
substantive rights.653 This claim is instantiated when some constitutional provisions in 
Africa are considered. In certain African constitutions, the courts are enjoined to have 
recourse to international law in constitutional adjudication.654 Moreover, it is as well 
                                                          
651 Richard Frimpong Opong, “Re-imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the 
Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa (2007) 30 Fordham Int’l L J 296 at 
340. 
652 Ibid. 
653Ibid.  
654For example section 39(1)(b) of the South African Constitution provides that “when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must consider international law.” As well Article 9(4) of the 
Constitution of Ethiopia provides that “All international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part 
of the law of the land.” Preambular article 3(b) of the Nigerian Fundamental Rights (Enforcement 
Procedure) Rules of 2009 provides: “For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting 
the applicant’s rights and freedoms, the Court shall respect municipal, regional and international bills of 
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significant that the interaction between international and domestic law has potential to 
inspire the reform of aspects of domestic law. Opong therefore states that an awareness 
of, and reliance on, international human rights law has in fact led to reforms in many 
aspects of African customary law. The patriarchal and communal tendencies of 
customary law are coming under attack from the egalitarian and individualistic teachings 
of human rights.655.  
But again, what is unclear here is the context for the use of the terms “egalitarian” 
and “individualistic” by the scholar. While he seems to suggest that both terms are 
mutually inclusive and reinforcing, it is hardly the case always that individualism is a 
prelude to egalitarianism. In fact I would argue differently. In my view excessive 
individualism could be an affront to egalitarian values. And there is not a better way of 
demonstrating this than by looking closely at the contestation between the belief in neo-
liberal capitalism with the individual at its centerpiece and a social welfare consciousness 
that could be deployed to secure the well-being of a broader segment of any given 
society.656  
While the above analysis covers international law expressed in the form of treaties 
binding on state parties to them, I cannot but also make reference to the increasing 
penetration of transnational law and governance and the emergence in particular of what 
is known as transnational human rights and as well global administrative law. The latter 
refers to:  
The vast increase in the reach and forms of transgovernmental regulation 
and administration designed to address the consequences of globalized 
interdependence in such fields as security, the conditions on development 
and financial assistance to developing countries, environmental protection, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rights cited to it or brought to its attention or of which the Court is aware, whether these bills constitute 
instruments in themselves or form parts of larger documents like constitutions…”   
655 See Opong, supra note 651 at 333. 
656Some scholars actually associate laissez-faire capitalism with “limited government and economic 
individualism.” See Stanley Feldman & Marco Steenbergen, “The Humanitarian Foundation of Public 
Support for Social Welfare” (2001) 45 Am J Pol Sci 658 at 659.    
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banking and financial regulation, law enforcement, telecommunications, 
trade in products and services, intellectual property, labor standards, and 
cross-border movements of populations, including refugees.657 
Transnational administrative bodies not subject to the direct control of national 
governments, domestic legal systems or in the case of treaty based regimes, the state 
parties to the treaty, are now the vogue.658 Their regulatory decisions may be 
implementable directly against private parties by the global regime or, more commonly, 
through implementing measures at the national level.659 They produce norms of their own 
which may be favorable to human rights protection or subversive of them. Multinational 
corporations could fall within such category of regulatory actors. They participate in 
international law making and enforcement.660 By so doing, they contribute to the 
“inherent heterogeneity of modern partnerships in international law-making and 
international law adjudication.”661 The role of multinationals also extend to the promotion 
of what is commonly referred to as “global public goods”662 such as the protection of 
human rights and the environment as well as core labor and social standards.663 
When all factors are carefully considered, it is undoubted that these regulatory 
regimes have become a part of the international legal system and like international law at 
the more general level confront the sovereignty of states as well as shape state behavior. 
Those regimes, as Slaughter declares, have rendered the state “out of fashion, or at least 
                                                          
657 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law” 
(2005) 68 Law & Contemp Probs  15 at 16. 
658 Ibid. See also Natakani Yoshikazu, “State and Democracy Besieged by Globalization” (2010) 7 
Ritsumeikan L Rev 1 at 4. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Karsten Nowrot, “Reconceptualizing International Legal Personality of Influential Non-State Actors: 
Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities” (2006) 80 Philippines L J 563. 
661 Pierre Marie Dupuy, “Proliferation of Actors” in Rudiger Wolfrum & Volker Roben eds., Development 
of International Law in Treaty Making (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2005) 537 at 541. 
662 Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc Stern, “Defining Global Public Goods” in Inge Kaul et al eds., 
Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (London: Oxford University Press, 
1999). Peter Drahos, “The Regulation of Public Goods” (2004) 7 J Int’l Econ L 321. 
663 Nowrot, supra note 660 at 564. 
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out of focus.”664 At a time of pervasive presence of non-governmental actors at the global 
level, she states that  parts of the state have been conscripted, “from regional, provincial, 
and even local government to regulatory agencies, courts, and legislative committees, all 
interacting with their foreign counterparts in ways that challenge our very conception of 
the state.”665 The result is what she describes as government networks through which 
global rule of law norms are increasingly being constructed through transgovernmental 
legal relations, “primarily among courts and administrative agencies. National courts are 
participating in transgovernmental judicial networks to an even greater degree, both 
informally and through regional judicial organizations.”666 
 The transnational character of human rights is based on the understanding that 
human rights norms and processes are not simply statist. They are not unique to any one 
state or national legal system but could migrate globally in a web of shared values and 
physical or virtual interconnectedness. It falls within the rubric of what Epp calls the 
“rights explosion”667 which has become central to the phenomenon of globalization.668 Its 
core could be understood not only by looking at non-treaty based cooperation among 
states but also through the activities of multifarious transnational institutions that 
generate human rights norms. Even where such transnational institutions are established 
by states, the norms that they generate are not necessarily expressed in treaty form to 
                                                          
664 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System” in Yves 
Dezelay & Bryant Garth eds, Global Perspectives: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New 
Legal Orthodoxy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002) at 15. Yet other scholars believe 
that the view about the demise of the state as an international actor is certainly exaggerated. See Begona 
Aretxaga, “Maddening States” (2003) 32 Annu Rev Anthropol 393. 
665 Ibid, at 13 
666 Ibid, at 18. While she cites as an example the Organization of Supreme Courts of the Americas, I will 
point to a more informal arrangement involving the Commonwealth Secretariat which in 1988 led to a 
colloquium of Commonwealth Judges leading to the establishment of what became known as the Bangalore 
Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms and on Government under 
the Law online: <http://www.genderandtrade.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BA2407AAC-A477-
491D-ABA4-A2CADF227E2B%7D_BANGALORE%20PRINCIPLES.pdf>; see also Maria Rosaria 
Ferrarese, “When National Actors become Transnational: Transjudicial Dialogue between Democracy and 
Constitutionalism” (2009) 9 Global Jurist 1.  
667 Epp, supra note 160.  
668 Heinz Klug, “Transnational Human Rights: Exploring the Persistence and Globalization of Human 
Rights” (2005) 1 Ann Rev Law Soc Sci 85 at 87. 
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influence the behavior of those states. They could come in the form of what is known in 
current parlance as “soft law.”669  
Referring specifically to Nigeria and how these transnational institutions affect 
her domestic practices, we have to look no farther than such mechanisms as the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development,670 the Commonwealth of Nations671 and certain 
principles adopted by organs of the Economic Community of West African State 
(ECOWAS).672  In the case of ECOWAS especially, at least one of its mechanisms 
typifies the situation where a “framework” draws extensively from diverse sources for its 
normative constitution.673 It has established since 2001 the ECOWAS Community Court 
through its Protocol on the Community Court of Justice as well as the provisions of 
                                                          
669See Hartmut Hillgenberg, “A Fresh Look at Soft Law” (1999) 10 Eur J Int’l L 499.  
670 Alex De Waal, “What’s New in the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’”? (2002) 78 Int’l 
Affairs 463 at 464 (Describing NEPAD with its Peer Review Mechanism component at “both a ‘big idea’ 
and an umbrella for best practices” incorporating development partnership on the basis of good 
governance). Among major NEPAD documents is as well the “Declaration on Democracy, Political, 
Economic and Corporate Governance” which commits African governments “to promote and protect 
democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of 
accountability, transparency and participative governance at the national and subnational levels.” See 
Prempeh at 486.  
671Kimberly Proust, “International Cooperation: A Commonwealth Perspective” (2003) 16 S Afr J Crim 
Just 295; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Global Community of Courts” (2003) 44 Harv Int’l L J 191; “Judicial 
Globalization” (2000) 40 Va J Int’l L 1103.  
672 Enyinna S Nwauche, “Regional Economic Communities and Human Rights in West Africa and the 
African Arabic Countries” in Anton Bosl & Joseph Diescho eds., Human Rights in Africa: Legal 
Perspectives in their Protection (Windhoek: Macmillan Education, 2009) at 319. 
673 The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework enacted 16 January 2008 draws heavily from such 
instruments as the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace‐keeping and Security, the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance, as well as the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the 2002 Protocol Relating to 
the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. See Thelma Ekiyor, “ECOWAS 
Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF): A New Approach to an Old Challenge” WACSI Op-ed (2008) 
online: <http://www.wacsi.org/wacseries/785vc7691r2u3h68594OP-ED.pdf>. See also Ademola Abass, 
“The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems” (2000) 5 J Conflict & 
Sec L 211 ( stating that the mechanism empowers ECOWAS to intervene in the internal conflicts of 
member states in situations of massive human rights violations or the breakdown of the rule of law). 
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Articles 6 and 15 of its revised treaty of 1993 which sets forth its jurisdiction and rights 
of access.674 
5.4. Human Rights Norms from Municipal State Laws 
I now turn to the non-constitutional sources for the generation of human rights norms in 
domestic context. Nigeria is a federation of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory.675 In 
addition to the federal (central) and state governments, the Nigerian constitution also 
recognizes local governments. Law making power is shared among the three tiers of 
government; each has limits set on its competence to pass laws and regulations. The 
constitution itself allocates these law making powers. While the federal government 
makes laws covering the entire federation and the federal capital territory and over issues 
set forth in the exclusive legislative list, it also shares concurrent law making powers with 
the state governments over certain matters.676 Issues outside the exclusive and concurrent 
lists which are described as residual, belong to the states’ legislative competence. In 
addition, the states are granted powers for the regulation of local government 
administration.677 Often, disagreements arise as to the proper dimensions of these 
legislative competencies and are adjudicated upon by the courts.678     
 Nigerian governments have come to recognize that human rights as an issue is too 
important to be left in the hands of the federal government alone. State governments in 
particular have also come to appreciate that notwithstanding the clear wordings of 
constitutional human rights guarantees, local legislative support is crucial to breathing 
                                                          
674 The Protocol establishing the Court was signed in Abuja, Nigeria on 6 July 1991 and entered into force 
on 5 November 1996. See Ani Comfort Chinyere, “Access to Justice in Nigerian Criminal and Civil Justice 
Systems” in Epiphany Azinge & Bolaji Owasanoye eds., Rule of Law and Good Governance (Lagos: 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2009) 375 at 383. 
675s 2(2) and s 3(1). 
676s 4(4)(a), schedule 2, part II. 
677s 7(1), schedule 4.  
678See for example Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation and others, 
[2002] 2 SC (Pt 1) 1 [Ng Sup Ct]; Attorney General of Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation and 
others, [2006] 7 NILR 1 [Ng Sup Ct]; Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the 
Federation and others, [2003] 6 SC (Pt 1) 24 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
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life into those constitutional texts. As importantly on this point, state governments seem 
better placed to identify specific human rights concerns relevant to their peculiar contexts 
and therefore better suited to make laws to address them satisfactorily. It has therefore 
become common in Nigeria for state governments to pass laws aimed at redressing 
particular human rights problems. Several such laws were passed in various Nigerian 
states in the period covered by this research.679 
 Ordinarily, the human rights guarantees contained in the constitution seem broad 
enough to anticipate various kinds of human rights denials. The laws passed by the states 
therefore tend to support rather than supplant the constitutional provisions. But the major 
reason such state laws are necessary is because most of the concerns to which they are 
addressed are rooted in local customary practices and are often perpetrated by individuals 
or communities. What the states therefore do in such situations is to pass laws that 
reinforce constitutional provisions, absolve the state involved of complicity in the 
perpetuation of those abuses and hold those responsible accountable within the law.680  
 It is perhaps for the above reasons that state laws passed in this manner are 
generally composed in criminal terms. What this means is that those responsible for the 
perpetuation of those abuses identified in those laws are required to refrain from their 
behavior or face criminal sanctions should they persist. The state assumes responsibility 
for the prosecution of those persons for their breaches of that law. This is very different 
from the procedure adopted under the constitution for enforcing human rights which 
                                                          
679See for example the Jigawa State of Nigeria Child Rights Act No 5 of 2007; Enugu State Prohibition of a 
Widow’s and Widower’s Fundamental Rights Law No 3, 2001.  
680 This is particularly significant given the controversial nature of the public/private division in human 
rights enforcement and the question whether or not human rights are horizontally enforceable as they are 
vertically. Even in jurisdictions that have accepted the “horizontal effect” of human rights norms, the 
language of each norm has to be carefully scrutinized before a definitive position could be taken that it 
could apply horizontally or not. For exploration of the debate and competing viewpoints on it see generally 
John H Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law” (2008) 102 Am J Int’l L 1; Stephen Gardbaum, “The 
‘Horizontal Effect’ of Constitutional Rights” (2003-2004) 102 Mich L Rev 387; Gavin Phillipson, “The 
Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal Effect’ and the Common Law: A Bang or a Whimper?” (1999) 62 Mod L 
Rev 824; Richard S Kay, “The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence 
of Constitutional Law” (1993) 10 Const Comment 329. 
 204 
 
rather entitles victims of human rights abuses to launch civil litigation to redress the 
violation committed against them. It could therefore be seen from the above that rather 
than norm creation in strict terms, the state governments referred to are (in general) only 
engaged in what I would rather refer to as norm reinforcement. They are generating no 
new human rights norms but are only exploiting norms already in existence to expand the 
safeguards available to victims and would-be victims of specific human rights practices. 
 I will examine as specific practical illustration the Enugu State Law No. 3 of 2001 
known as “The Prohibition of Infringement of a Widow’s and Widower’s Fundamental 
Rights Law.”681 This law was passed by the Enugu State House of Assembly on March 8, 
2001 and describes itself as “A Law to make it unlawful to infringe the fundamental 
rights of widows and widowers, and for other related matters.” By way of background, it 
is very well known in those parts of Nigeria where Enugu State is situated that widows 
and widowers are compelled by custom to carry out what are called widowhood rites. 
Such rites could include shaving the hair, being made to sleep alone with the dead body 
of a spouse, being compelled to re-marry a relative of the dead spouse and being forced 
to drink water used in washing the corpse of the dead spouse, etc.  
 The Enugu state law therefore came into force to prohibit and criminalize these 
practices and more. In its recital, the law recognized that the fundamental right to life is 
entrenched in the Nigerian constitution as well as the rights to dignity of the person, 
personal liberty and the freedom of association and assembly. Having this in mind, 
therefore, the law provides that “Anybody who contravenes, conspires, aids, counsels, 
procures, assists another person to contravene the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of this 
Law shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine of N5, 000.00 (Five 
Thousand Naira [US$33.3]) or two years imprisonment or both.” 
                                                          
681 See Gbenga Ariyibi, “Ekiti passes Gender-based Violation law” Vanguard Online: 
<http://odili.net/news/source/2011/nov/8/304.html>.   
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 In spite of the wide disparity between the fines prescribed and the prison term that 
could be imposed, this is one major way by which state laws reinforce constitutional 
human rights guarantees. Absent this law, victims of the practices that it criminalizes 
could exploit the human rights provisions in the Constitution to protect their rights as has 
been the case in fact previously.682 Yet what the Enugu state government has done here is 
to reinforce the constitutional guarantee in penal terms. By so doing, the state 
government absolves itself of any responsibility in the perpetuation of the practices that 
its legislation has outlawed. In the next section, I will examine the relationship between 
international and domestic human rights norms in the Nigerian legal system. Given that 
this study is about human rights adjudication, I will as part of this analysis also discuss 
how the courts respond these different normative sources. In particular, I will discuss the 
normative weight assigned to the norms generated by these different sources.    
5.5. Domestic and International Human Rights Norms 
Nigerian courts in resolving human rights cases presented before them obviously have to 
apply norms from both domestic and international sources. It would be correct to state 
that these various norms, be they expressed in the form of treaties, “soft law,” 
constitutional texts or other legislation, are aimed at achieving the same objective: to 
improve human rights conditions. But they are almost useless on paper if they cannot be 
translated into concrete protection in practice. How to achieve the goal of translating 
human rights instruments from text to reality is a major challenge in the efforts to abolish 
or ameliorate human rights violations.  
Constitutions (like the Nigerian 1999 constitution) often prescribe how the 
normative guarantees enshrined in them could be enforced in practice. Whether this is 
actually done is most frequently a controversial question. Domestic human rights laws 
are enforceable by the units in a federal structure the same manner as all other laws. 
Since as I stated earlier protection could come sometimes in the form of criminal laws, 
                                                          
682See Onwo v Oko, [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 456) 584 at 595 [Ng Ct App]. 
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the strength of law enforcement or otherwise might determine success or failure in the 
long run. However, when it comes to translating international agreements into domestic 
practice, the question of which domestic institution has overall responsibility to enforce 
them is often a challenging one. 
 The judiciary plays a central role in shaping either satisfaction or derailment in 
the implementation of human rights norms at the various levels that they are generated or 
reinforced. This is a theme that resonates throughout this research. While there are 
challenges for that institution in applying norms from the sources identified above, those 
challenges are demonstrated more clearly in the context of particular kinds of norms. 
Significantly therefore, while enforcing human rights under the constitution or through 
other domestic laws may be hampered by contextualized factors, the domestic 
implementation of international human rights norms could create even bigger challenges. 
An exploration of what those challenges entail and how they might manifest is one that 
merits immediate and closer scrutiny and analysis. It is to that question that I turn next. 
 The important issue that I examine is: how do domestic judicial forums like 
Nigerian courts use international norms in the protection of human rights and how do 
those norms interact with domestic norms within the organic legal system? Nigeria 
operates the dualist mode of international law implementation as opposed to its monist 
variant.683 Dualism presupposes that treaties, including those dealing with human rights, 
cannot be applied domestically unless they have been incorporated through domestic 
legislation.684 Section 12(1) of the 1999 constitution provides that no treaty between the 
federation and any other country shall have force of law except to the extent to which 
such treaty has been enacted into law by the Nigerian National Assembly. A treaty 
incorporated by means of domestic legislation therefore becomes part of Nigeria’s 
                                                          
683Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory” (2008) 34 Rev 
Int’l Stud 42; Francisco Francioni, “International Law as a Common Language for National Courts” (2001) 
36 Tex Int’l L J 587; JG Collier, “Is International Law Really Part of the Law of England?” (1989) 38 Int’l 
& Comp L Q 924.  
684 Egede, supra note 637 at 250. 
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municipal laws. Before identifying the force accorded such domesticated treaties by 
Nigerian courts, it is necessary to locate them on the country’s normative hierarchy.  
 In the case of Abacha v Fawehinmi685 one of the questions that the court was 
called upon to answer was the status of laws domesticated under the provisions of Section 
12(1) of the constitution in relation to other domestic laws.686 In that case, the Nigerian 
Supreme Court held that a domesticated treaty cannot trump the constitution but takes 
precedence on the normative hierarchy over other domestic laws for the simple “reason 
that it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to breach an international 
obligation.”687 Because the domesticated international agreement in question was the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the court stated further that “the Charter 
possesses ‘a greater vigor and strength’ than any other domestic statute.”688 The court 
also held that the Charter is not superior to the Constitution, “nor can its international 
flavor prevent the [Nigerian] National Assembly…[from] removing it from our body of 
municipal laws… by repealing [it].”689 
 Nigeria’s practices in this regard parallel that of several other countries especially 
those operating the common law tradition.690 While one might consider the stand of the 
Supreme Court in the above case laudatory, it falls far short of expectation when 
                                                          
685 [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt 660) 228 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
686 Egede, supra note 637 at 251. 
687 Abacha v Fawehinmi, supra note 685 at 289. 
688 Ibid. 
689 Ibid. This decision represents the current position of Nigerian law on the matter and has been followed 
in subsequent cases. See for example Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria v Minister of Labor 
and Productivity & Others, [2005] 17 NWLR (Pt 953) 120 [Ng Ct App] (“An international treaty entered 
into by the government of Nigeria does not become binding until enacted into law by the National 
Assembly. Before its enactment into law by the National Assembly, an international treaty has no such 
force of law as to make its provisions justiciable in Nigerian courts. Where, however, the treaty is enacted 
into law by the national assembly, it becomes binding and our courts must give effect to it like other laws 
falling within the judicial powers of the court.”) 
690 See for example Chilenye Nwapi, “International Treaties in Nigeria and Canadian Courts” (2011) 19 Afr 
J Int’l & Comp L 38; see also Gib van Ert, “Canada” in David Sloss ed., The Role of Domestic Courts in 
Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 166; A 
Kodzo Paaku Kludze, “Constitutional Rights and their Relationship with International Human Rights in 
Ghana” (2008) 41 Isr L Rev 677. 
 208 
 
appropriately placed in perspective. One might agree with the court in being reluctant to 
place domesticated treaties above the constitution, yet placing such treaties under the 
constitution, a document which in the case of Nigeria is still hotly contested and alleged 
to have been illegitimately made, may not serve much public purpose. Raising the 
sovereignty argument may make sense as justification for prioritizing the constitution 
above all other legal norms, but it is a claim that may only be effective in circumstances 
where the constitution has come through a sincere participatory production process and 
represents the will of the majority of a country’s population.  
There is also an objection that may be put forward against Nigeria placing her 
constitution above ratified international treaties. It happens to be the case that the 
constitution itself contains some anti-democratic provisions that are contradictory to 
internationally accepted best practices.691 In such situations where the constitution as the 
supreme law of the land cannot be counted upon to protect citizens from abusive state 
practices, it may be appropriate to rely on international norms than constitutional norms 
as protection for the citizenry. But for this to happen, the domestic legal system must be 
up to the task of invoking and enforcing international legal obligations. 
 With the above a background, one may ask what the real import of signing and 
ratifying international instruments is if the country concerned has no intention of 
honoring the obligations thereby imposed on its behavior. When a country signs an 
international treaty, that process of signing should stand for prima facie evidence that it 
intends to honor the obligations thereby undertaken. That is the real import of the 
international law concept of pacta sunt servanda – which holds that freely undertaken 
international obligations are solemn and meant to be honored. In the preamble to the 
                                                          
691See for example s 215(5) which contains a provision ousting the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain 
certain questions relating to law enforcement. Such clauses were widely used but very unpopular under the 
military because they undermined the rule of law and effective resolution of civil disputes. On the question 
why states abide by international commitments see Oona A Hathaway, “Why do Countries commit to 
Human Rights Treaties?” (2007) 51 J Conflict Res 588; Olga Avdeyeva, “When do States comply with 
International Treaties? Policies on Violence against Women in Post-Communist Countries” (2007) 51 Int’l 
Stud Q 877. 
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1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the State parties recognized “the ever-
increasing importance of treaties as a source of international law and as a means of 
developing peaceful cooperation among nations, whatever their constitutional and social 
systems.” They also noted that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the 
pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized.” In addition the Convention 
provides that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty.”692  There can be no better proof than these provisions 
combined that when States subscribe to international treaties, they hold themselves bound 
by their content.693 
 A natural enlargement of this argument is that when a country like Nigeria signs, 
ratifies or accedes to an international agreement, it has a responsibility to ensure that the 
agreement achieves its objectives within her domestic jurisdiction. Where, as in Nigeria’s 
case, the constitution requires further parliamentary activity to domesticate such 
agreement, that action ought to be taken. It should be a self-executing procedure. If 
otherwise, then the country in question would be in breach of the obligation imposed by 
that agreement.  There is thus a contradiction when a country signs an international 
agreement yet avoids the responsibility that it imposes by hiding under domestic legal 
justification. This is exactly the situation with Nigeria which stands engaged by 
Maluwa’s conclusion that countries that have provisions similar to Section 12(1) of the 
Nigerian Constitution only aim at “preventing the courts from invoking norms of 
international law contained in a treaty which has not been specifically transformed into 
[domestic] law through a legislative enactment.”694  
                                                          
692 Article 27 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980). 
693 Ibid art 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith.”) 
694 Tiyanjana Maluwa, “The Incorporation of International Law and its Interpretational Role in Municipal 
Legal Systems in Africa: An Exploratory Survey” (1998) 23 S Afr Y B Int’l L 45 at 64. See also Gerhard 
Erasmus, “The Namibian Constitution and the Application of International Law” (1989-1990) 15 S Afr Y 
B Int’l L 81 at 93. Compare the Nigerian provision with Section 233 of the 1996 South African 
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 Given Nigeria’s practice in this area, it is not surprising that many international 
instruments signed or ratified by the country do not have the desired degree of impact on 
government behavior given that they do not form part of the domestic legal order, having 
not been enacted as such by parliament. This also gives sufficient rationale for the 
government to be ambivalent on the matter. Even international agreements that have been 
domesticated de jure in Nigeria lack sufficient legal bite in practice. I can illustrate this 
with two contradictory positions taken by the Nigerian government in two cases 
involving how to effectively apply the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
which Nigeria has domesticated. Both cases were filed by the Socio-Economic Rights 
and Accountability Project (SERAP) a Nigerian non-governmental organization. One 
case was brought forward before the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
while the other is currently pending before the Federal High Court in Abuja. 
 The case before the African Commission complained that the Nigerian state had 
condoned egregious corruption leading to “serious and massive violations of the right to 
education, among other rights, in Nigeria.” The allegations made in this regard included 
failure of government to train teachers and the gross under-funding of the educational 
institutions. In response to this complaint the Nigerian government argued that social and 
economic rights are not justiciable under the Nigerian constitution but that the African 
Charter Act empowers Nigerian courts to enforce or give remedies under the provisions 
of the Charter which enshrines social and economic rights. However, because of the 
failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the Commission declared the complaint 
inadmissible.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Constitution (“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law,” and section 39(1) (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.”) Relevant here as well 
is section 144 of the Namibian Constitution (“Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of 
Parliament, the general rules of public international law and international agreements binding upon 
Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia.”) 
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What is relevant here is the position argued by the Nigerian representatives. The 
government recognized that under the Constitution, social and economic rights could 
possibly not be enforced except by some dynamic stretch of legal arguments. 
Nevertheless the field was covered by the African Charter already adopted as domestic 
legislation. According to this argument, the African Charter is Nigerian law and therefore 
its provisions could be enforced the same way other domestic laws are enforced. This is a 
dynamic position to take because it corresponds to the obligations that Nigerian 
undertook in not only ratifying the charter but also domesticating it. 
 In the case pending before the Federal High Court SERAP seeks an order of 
mandamus to compel the Nigerian government to publish the report of the Pius Okigbo 
Panel concerning how the government spent $12.4 billion said to have accrued from a 
sudden jump in the price of crude oil between 1988 and 1994. Earlier in 2009 the Chief 
Justice of Nigeria in exercise of powers granted him under the constitution to make rules 
for the enforcement of human rights promulgated the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement 
Procedure) Rules 2009. In Rule 3(b) it was provided that: 
For the purpose of advancing but never for the purpose of restricting the 
applicant’s rights and freedoms, the Court shall respect municipal, 
regional and international bills of rights cited to it or brought to its 
attention or of which the Court is aware, whether these bills constitute 
instruments in themselves or from parts of larger documents like 
constitutions. Such bills include (i) The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and other instruments (including protocols) in the African 
regional human rights system. 
 
As well unlike in the past when the courts frowned at public interest litigation and 
applied an inflexible standing model, the new rules opened the gates of the courts through 
a more liberal standing regime, allowing persons acting in the public interest to present 
human rights cases. But in responding to this case, the Nigerian government expressed 
annoyance at the new rules, asserting that in making them the Chief Justice of Nigeria 
exceeded his powers. Specifically the government raised objection to the new standing 
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regime as well as the inclusion of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 
the Rules.695 
 One will notice that the position adopted by the Nigerian government in the first 
case is different than that taken in the second one. What could be responsible for these 
contradictory postures? If the Nigerian government argued in the first case that the 
African Charter is Nigerian law, why would it be offended that its provisions were 
included in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules in a latter case? I 
will later return to the import of the new rules when discussing expanded standing as a 
requirement for effective human rights protection. I have raised it here, however, to point 
out how averse the Nigerian government is to being called upon to fulfill international 
obligations that it has freely undertaken. This, to me, is an untenable position built on 
sinking sand. Nigerians would be justified to look towards international law where 
domestic law is either lacking or provides only ineffective protection for their rights. The 
courts would be shirking their duties if they fail to recognize this fact. Having examined 
the sources of human rights norms in the Nigerian legal system and the significance of 
the norms from the various sources, I turn in the next section to the problem of 
jurisdiction in human rights adjudication. 
5.6. The Human Rights Adjudication Forum: Nigeria’s Diffuse Model 
The issue I address here is the jurisdictional question in human rights cases. What court 
or courts have the constitutional responsibility of pronouncing on human rights cases? 
This matter was touched in parts in Chapter four while considering models of human 
rights review adopted in different jurisdictions. I identified two prominent models 
prevalent in this field. The first is the concentrated model in which one court, usually the 
                                                          
695Registered Trustees of Socio-Economic and Accountability Project (SERAP) and others v Attorney-
General of the Federation and another, Suit No FHC/ABJ/CS/640/10. See also 
<http://www.saharareporters.com/news-page/babangidas-124bn-oil-windfall-looting-agf-cbn-fault-former-
cjn-over-rights-rules>.  
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Constitutional Court,696 is given sole jurisdiction to decide on all constitutional questions, 
including those concerning human rights. The alternative model addresses the same 
questions only this time to various courts on the judicial hierarchy and is therefore 
otherwise a more diffuse and decentralized arrangement. Rather than one forum in this 
latter model, there are several forums across the court pyramid often beginning with the 
lowest level to the highest with graduated degrees of value accorded to case-law 
precedents generated at the various levels. 
 Nigeria is among the countries where a specific procedure is enacted for the 
presentation of human rights cases. Section 46 of the Constitution which has been 
referenced earlier grants alleged victims of human rights violations permission to present 
their claims before the High Court in the state where the alleged violation occurred. 
Section 46(3) of the Constitution, in addition, enables the Chief Justice of Nigeria to 
make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of the High Court for the purpose 
of allowing victim-litigants to enforce or secure the enforcement of their rights. These 
provisions were similarly contained in the 1979 Constitution from which the text was 
actually lifted in exactly the same words.697 
 The 1979 Constitution was the first to prescribe this specific procedure for human 
rights enforcement. The procedure was set forth in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement 
Procedure) Rules of 1979. Even after the military toppled the 1979 Constitution, the rules 
continued to be used in those few cases where military impunity allowed victims to as 
much as approach the courts for remedy. However, after the restoration of civil rule in 
1999, the Chief Justice of Nigeria did not immediately re-enact the procedure as 
mandated by the new Constitution. In the absence of new rules, litigants were initially 
confused as to whether to wait for their enactment before presenting their cases or to 
continue using the 1979 rules as default procedure until a new one was enacted. If 
                                                          
696See generally Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (London: 
Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2009). 
697s 42(3) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. 
 214 
 
litigants had to wait for the new rules to become operative before presenting their cases, 
that would have led to a massive legal quandary as the new rules were not promulgated 
until 2009, a period of ten years after civil rule was restored.   
 Expectedly, defendants whose actions were questioned by way of human rights 
complaints post the May 1999 transition sought to avoid legal responsibility by arguing 
that no new rules had been issued by the Chief Justice for human rights enforcement. 
Quite rightly, in my view, the courts demurred to buy into such objections and ruled that 
in the absence of the new rules, those made under the 1979 Constitution continued to 
regulate human rights cases.698 The 1979 rules therefore continued to be used for the 
enforcement of human rights until 2009 when the incumbent Chief Justice of Nigeria 
issued the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. 
 Under the new procedure, as under the 1979 rules, High Court for the purposes of 
human rights enforcement was defined as the Federal High Court, a State High Court or 
the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.699 Though this definition has 
generated legal controversies of its own, the courts have largely settled for the position 
that Federal and State High Courts bear concurrent jurisdiction in human rights cases.700 
However, the 1999 Constitution introduced a novel element in the jurisdictional arena 
that was not there in the 1979 Constitution. Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution provides 
that 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this 
Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be 
conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal 
                                                          
698 Eva Brems & Charles Olufemi Adekoya, “Human Rights Enforcement by People Living in Poverty: 
Access to Justice in Nigeria” (2010) 54 J Afr L 258 at 260; Basil Ugochukwu, “Advancing Human Rights 
Using the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules” in Basil Ugochukwu ed, Update on Human 
Rights Litigation in Nigeria (Lagos: Legal Defence Centre, 2003) at 32. See also Ugwumadu v University 
of Nigeria, [2001] 13 WRN 181 [Fed Hg Ct]. 
699 Order 1 r 2 
700See Nwokorie v Opara, [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt 587) 389 [Ng Ct App]; Federal Ministry of Commerce and 
Tourism and Another v Eze, [2006] 2 NWLR (Pt 964) 221 [Ng Ct App].  
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High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any 
other court in civil causes and matters – 
 
(q) subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the operation and 
interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the 
Federal Government or any of its agencies; 
 
(r) any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting 
the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision 
by the Federal Government or any of its agencies… 
 
 
This provision is of a military origin. It was first introduced into the Nigerian legal 
system by the dictatorship of the late Sani Abacha. It initially was incorporated into the 
Decree that formed the foundation for the establishment of Abacha’s regime.701 The 
Abacha regime offered no explanation for introducing the provision. It is, however, 
theorized that it was included in order to keep cases against the federal government or its 
agencies relating to the kinds of issues covered by the provision (interpretation of the 
Constitution, declaration, injunction) within the purview of that section of the judiciary 
that the federal government has direct and total control over. As a background, prior to 
Abacha seizing power, Federal High Courts and High Courts in the various states had 
rendered contradictory decisions in disputes arising from the June 12, 1993 presidential 
election. While Federal High Courts tended to favor the military authorities in their 
decisions, state High Courts (especially those in the western parts of the country) 
                                                          
701 In particular the provision was enacted as Section 230(1)(q) and (s) of the Constitution (Suspension and 
Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993 and was greatly criticized upon promulgation by the courts and civil 
society as well. See Ali v Central Bank of Nigeria, [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt 498) 192 where the Court of Appeal 
held: “This amendment is likely to have adverse effects on the smooth administration of justice in the 
country. While the amendment is likely to be oppressive on the part of some litigants, particularly the 
servants and employees of the Federal Government and its agencies, like the appellants in some states of 
the federation that do not have a Federal High Court, it also most certainly would result in the increase of 
burden of the cost of litigation.” See also The Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, Annual Report 
of the State of Human Rights 1997 (Lagos: CDHR, 2008). 
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generally leaned towards the presumed winner of that election.702 This provision achieved 
the result of barring state High Courts from exercising jurisdiction over such disputes in 
the future following its promulgation. 
 This provision therefore introduced a controversy of a different kind to the 
question of jurisdiction in human rights cases. Such cases could be seeking declarations 
that the actions questioned are unconstitutional or injunctions to prohibit the person or 
authority carrying out such actions to stop. To some litigants, given the concurrent 
jurisdiction granted Federal and State High Courts in human rights cases, any of those 
courts could be petitioned for redress irrespective of the status or official designation of 
the individual or authority whose actions are challenged. This is quite different from the 
strict approach that the courts have adopted on this issue. 
 In Sunday Omotesho & Others v Abubakar Abdullahi & Others,703 the Court of 
Appeal, interpreting an apparently non-existent similar provision in the 1979 
Constitution,704 held that there was no blanket requirement that any action against the 
Federal Government or any of its agencies must be instituted at the Federal High Court. 
The court also held that jurisdiction is not determined by parties but by the subject matter 
of litigation. Accordingly, the court went further, to confer jurisdiction exclusively on the 
Federal High Court, the legal dispute must arise from or be seeking participation or role 
in administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its 
                                                          
702Ian Campbell, “Nigeria’s Failed Transition: The 1993 Presidential Election” (1994) 12 J Contemp Afr 
Stud 179; Ajayi Ola Rotimi & Julius Ihonvbere, “Democratic Impasse: Remilitarization of Nigeria” (1994) 
15 Third World Q 669. 
703 [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt 1072) 527. 
704 It is important to note that this case was filed long before the coming into force of the 1999 Constitution 
and therefore the legal authority that governed the proceedings was Section 230 of Decree 107 of 1993 and 
not Section 230 of the 1979 Constitution as the court indicated because even though there is a Section 230 
in the 1979 Constitution, it did not go into such details as similar section in Decree 107 or Section 251, the 
equivalent section in the 1999 Constitution. For the avoidance of doubt the most relevant portion of Section 
230 of the 1979 Constitution relevant for this analysis provides that “(1) Subject to the provisions of this 
Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National 
Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have jurisdiction – (a) in such matters connected with or pertaining 
to the revenue of the Government of the Federation as may be prescribed by the National Assembly; and 
(b) in such other matters as may be prescribed as respects which the National Assembly has power to make 
laws.” Therefore the Court of Appeal’s reference to Section 230 of the 1979 Constitution in the context in 
which that section was invoked in this case was clearly misleading. 
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agencies. “The matter must arise from the operation and interpretation of the 
Constitution. The process must also disclose an action or proceedings for a declaration or 
injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by 
the Federal Government or any of its agencies.” Therefore the court concluded that the 
mere naming of the Federal Government or any of its agencies as party to litigation 
would not automatically confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court.705 
 Contentions over the proper parameters of the Federal High Court jurisdiction in 
human rights cases produce not too infrequently controversial outcomes like in the case 
of Nwokorie v Opara.706 The applicants had been charged with armed robbery before a 
magistrate court. They were denied bail whereupon they appealed to the Federal High 
Court in Kano to enforce their fundamental right to bail. Even though the application for 
bail is purely of a human rights nature, the Court of Appeal on further appeal came to the 
conclusion that because the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to decide upon the 
crime of armed robbery, it therefore was incompetent to entertain the application for bail 
even though couched in terms of application to enforce fundamental rights. 
 This decision seems to defy the logic of fundamental rights enforcement 
prescribed by the constitution and the applicable rule. The right to bail is a component of 
the right to personal liberty enshrined in section 35(5) of the Constitution. At the time the 
applicants applied to the Federal High Court for bail the only charges against them were 
before a magistrate court that had no jurisdiction over the alleged crimes. Given the 
concurrent nature of jurisdiction that both State and Federal High Courts had in 
fundamental rights cases, the applicants had discretion which High Court to present their 
application. The Court of Appeal would have been justified in the conclusion it reached 
had the charges against the applicants been already presented before a competent State 
High Court in which case it would have been questionable for them to not present their 
application before that court in preference to a Federal High Court. What this decision 
                                                          
705Ibid.  
706Supra note 700. 
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illustrates is that though the jurisdictional question in human rights cases appears fairly 
well settled, it is in reality often contested. 
 Having addressed the question of the forums from which cases seeking the 
enforcement of human rights could originate I move to the next question. Assuming a 
party involved in litigation before a High Court is dissatisfied with the decision rendered, 
where else does he or she turn to? The answer could be found in the Constitution as well. 
The Court of Appeal which is Nigeria’s intermediate court is by virtue of Section 240 of 
the 1999 Constitution granted exclusive jurisdiction to determine appeals from the 
Federal High Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory and the High Court 
of a State.707 Under Section 241(1) (d) an appeal shall lie from decisions of the Federal 
High Court or any other High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right where what are at 
stake are decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to whether any of 
the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution [the Bill of Fundamental Human Rights] 
has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to any person. Similar 
jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeal where the liberty of a person or the 
custody of an infant is concerned.708 
 In the event that after the hearing of appeals concerning human rights litigation at 
the Court of Appeal any of the parties thereto remains aggrieved, such party could take 
the matter further to the Supreme Court which is Nigeria’s final court. Decisions of the 
Supreme Court cannot be appealed any further.709 The Supreme Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals from the Court of Appeal in several specific contexts including 
in relation to decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to whether 
any of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution has been, is being or is likely to 
                                                          
707 The Court of Appeal under the same provision also entertains appeals from Sharia Court of Appeal of 
the Federal Capital Territory, the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, Customary Court of Appeal of the 
Federal Capital Territory, Customary Court of Appeal of a State and from decisions of a Court Martial or 
other tribunal as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. 
708 s 241(1) (i). 
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be violated in relation to any person.710 That said, in the next section I examine the 
“constitutional reference” procedure as one that could be utilized to resolve human rights 
cases that also raise significant constitutional questions. 
 
5.7. Human Rights Cases and Constitutional Reference 
Apart from those situations in which human rights litigation are commenced in Nigeria 
through the rules enacted for that purpose, the questions that such cases raise could also 
be engaged in other contexts. One such context is the reference of questions of law 
having high constitutional significance. This jurisdiction to refer constitutional questions 
is one that cuts across the entire judicial hierarchy and includes those inferior courts 
whose competence falls outside the constitutionally prescribed rule for presenting human 
rights cases. Yet it is important to mention this jurisdiction because the questions it is 
possible to refer in this manner may relate to those involving the application and 
enforcement of human rights.  
Section 295(1) of the Constitution is one of such provisions allowing for 
constitutional questions to be referred. It provides: 
Where any question as to the interpretation or application of this 
Constitution arises in any proceedings in any court or law in any part of 
Nigeria (other than in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the Federal 
High Court or a High Court) and the court is of the opinion that the 
question involves a substantial question of law, the court may, and shall if 
any of the parties to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the 
Federal High Court or High Court having jurisdiction in that part of 
Nigeria…  
 
 
The High Court to which such a question is referred could further refer the question to the 
Court of Appeal if it is of the opinion that a substantial question of law has been raised.711 
However where such court is of the view that no substantial question of law is disclosed, 
it must send the case back to the court making the reference with directions as to how 
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such a court should dispose of the question.712 So even though those inferior courts do not 
have jurisdiction over human rights cases, matters brought before them could still involve 
human rights questions by way of constitutional interpretation. And they are under 
constitutional obligation to refer them as prescribed above. 
 Where such substantial constitutional questions arise in proceedings before the 
Federal High Court or the High Court of a state, these courts shall refer the questions to 
the Court of Appeal which shall give its decision on that question. Following that, the 
court making the reference shall dispose of the case from which that constitutional 
question arose in accordance with how that constitutional question was answered by the 
Court of Appeal.713 Where such a question arises from a suit at the Court of Appeal, that 
court is obligated to make a reference to the Supreme Court.714 The Supreme Court shall 
give a decision on that question and give such directions to the Court of Appeal on it as it 
deems appropriate.715 
 While the provision on constitutional reference is present in the constitution, it is 
rarely used by the courts to deal with human rights cases. From all indications, there is 
sufficient grounds for a proposition that the High Courts which are the base courts for the 
commencement of human rights litigation are more than capable of resolving any 
constitutional questions those cases may throw up without referring them to courts higher 
up the judicial hierarchy. The same perhaps may not be said of all other inferior courts 
below the level of the High Courts. However, it is unlikely such cases as would warrant a 
reference are ever commenced in those inferior courts given the near total absence of any 
cases where such courts ever made use of the reference procedure.  
It is also worth noting that Nigeria’s reference regime has similar features as in 
comparative legal jurisdictions, particularly South Africa. While deciding constitutional 
matters within their powers, South African courts (mainly the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
                                                          
712 s 295(1)(b). 
713 s 295(2). 
714See for example Olafisoye v Federal Republic of Nigeria, [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt 864) 580 [Ng Sup Ct] 
where the Court of Appeal referred several constitutional questions to the Supreme Court for resolution. 
715 s 295(3). 
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High Courts or other courts of similar status) could declare any law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution as invalid to the extent of that inconsistency.716 Where 
such a court makes such order of constitutional invalidity it has powers to grant a 
temporary interdict or other temporary relief to a party in the litigation. It could also 
adjourn the proceedings pending a decision of the Constitutional Court on the validity of 
that law or conduct.717 But unlike in Nigeria where the Constitution itself settles the 
referral issue, the South African Constitution requires national legislation to provide for 
referral of an order of constitutional invalidity to the Constitutional Court.718 
In this chapter, I answered questions related to the normative sources of human 
rights in Nigeria, their relationship one to the other and the questions of jurisdiction in 
human rights questions. In the next chapter, I will advance the discussion further from 
theory to practice. I will examine the extent to which the superior courts in Nigeria 
applied those norms to redress complaints of human rights violations from 1999 to 2009. 
I will also look at possible theoretical possibilities prominent in the reasoning in those 
cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
716 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 172(1)(a). 
717 s 172(2)(b).  
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Chapter Six 
Reconciling Theory and Praxis: Human Rights Adjudication in 
Nigeria, 1999-2009 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter was devoted to identifying the sources of human rights norms 
enforceable in Nigerian courts. In that chapter I also looked at the interaction among the 
various normative sources and how the courts weigh and assign adjudicatory salience to 
them.  In this chapter I will be reviewing the work of the Nigerian Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeal pertaining to how they handled human rights cases from 1999 to 2009. 
This is perhaps the most significant component of this study. As part of the analysis and 
evaluation carried out in this chapter, I will be discussing the framework for the judicial 
enforcement of human rights under the 1999 Constitution followed by a consideration of 
how the courts responded to demands upon them to enforce the various rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution.  
This chapter addresses one of the major concerns animating this research. The 
main question answered in this chapter therefore is whether, in dealing with human rights 
cases, the identified courts have lived up to the responsibilities imposed on them under 
the 1999 constitution. I will also evaluate possible theoretical insights foregrounding 
judicial attitude to human rights cases in Nigeria for the research period. This is 
accomplished not only through an examination of the text of decisions but also by 
looking at more covert external influences on judicial decision-making. In doing so, I will 
group the cases in clusters according to their theoretical and doctrinal rationale. And 
having regard to the different theoretical possibilities already identified and discussed in 
the second chapter, my analysis will proceed by reference to either a single theoretical 
approach for a group of cases or a combination of different approaches to particular 
cases. However, to provide a helpful background to the analysis that would follow, it will 
be useful to track back to the judicial culture of Nigerian courts in human rights 
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adjudication prior to 1999. I will do this by discussing the adjudication of cases from 
independence in 1960 until the military intervention of 1966 and then from the 
restoration of civil rule in 1979 until the military struck again in 1983. This historical 
analysis is helpful because as I will ultimately argue, the culture of Nigerian courts in 
human rights case was laid out during this period and it has endured. 
 
6.2. Nigerian Courts and the Culture of Restraint  
My goal in this section is to show how Nigerian courts approached the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions enshrining human rights as well as how they applied those 
provisions towards the protection of human rights during the periods of civil rule from 
independence in 1960 to the end of the Second Republic in 1983. I have removed from 
the analysis the periods that the military were in power. Those periods have been 
sufficiently covered in the latter parts of the third chapter and further will be dealt with in 
significant portions of the seventh chapter. My goal in this section is to show how the 
adjudicatory habits of Nigerian judges evolved as well as how those habits have endured 
and continue to drive judicial culture in this area.  
Given that in chapter four I discussed in parts the doctrinal standard adopted by 
Nigerian courts in dealing with cases presented before them at that historical time, I will 
concentrate in this section on how the courts approached the enforcement of some 
specific human rights guarantees. I will also capture the impact that the courts’ standards 
had on the effectiveness or otherwise of their institutional intervention to remedy human 
rights situations that came before them. 
 The manner in which the courts dealt with human rights cases during the period 
being reviewed would have no doubt been affected by some of the factors that I discussed 
in Chapter three. It occurred against the background of Nigeria’s newly attained 
independent status. The local judiciary had a dominant representation of English judges. 
The few indigenous judges present had all received their trainings in the United 
Kingdom. Though the country while under direct British suzerainty had been exposed to 
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only British style parliamentary government in which courts lacked any real powers to 
review legislative enactments, the Constitution adopted prior to Nigeria’s independence 
was built on an entirely different constitutional model. It had a Bill of Rights with clear 
suggestions that the courts now had powers to review laws passed by parliament for their 
conformance to the constitutional provisions on human rights. Where those laws failed 
the human rights test, the courts could nullify them in principle. 
 Obviously flowing directly from all or some of these factors, and others discussed 
in Chapter four, the practice of the courts regarding human rights cases immediately after 
independence was of the mixed bag variety. There appeared to be no clear jurisprudential 
direction in the path chosen by the courts and an ambivalent posture apparently took root. 
In addition, political independence did not mean the country had been completely rid of 
its colonial shackles, especially in terms of the organization of the judicial system. The 
Advisory Committee of the Privy Council continued to be the final forum for deciding all 
cases coming out of Nigeria like all other British colonial territories. This would later 
change in 1963 with the adoption of a Republican Constitution and the creation of a 
Supreme Court for Nigeria. This latter development did not, however, have much of an 
effect on the human rights enforcement regime. For my purpose here, the main change 
made by the 1963 constitution was that final appeals from Nigerian courts no longer went 
to the Privy Council. They now terminated at the newly established Supreme Court. 
 Civil rule was disrupted by the military in 1966. Therefore the first period for my 
consideration of the judicial activities of the courts in relation to the enforcement of 
human rights under the Constitution lasted only six years, that is, 1960 to 1966. Cases 
decided by the courts during this time covered a broad spectrum of the rights enshrined in 
the constitution including the right to movement, freedom of thought conscience and 
religion, freedom of expression and the right to personal liberty. As stated earlier, this 
was the period that heralded uncertainty and a clear lack of direction in the attitude of the 
courts in human rights enforcement cases. It did not really matter at this time whether a 
court’s decision had been favorable to the litigant or the claim for remedy had been 
denied. The lack of consistency in judicial pronouncements as well as absence of any 
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reasonable standard by which the decisions were derived left a completely confusing 
picture. A couple of cases are presented below to exemplify the situation. 
 The question in the case of Ojiegbe & Another v Ubani & Another 719 was 
whether holding elections on a Saturday denied the applicants who belonged to the 
Seventh Day Adventist Church their voting rights. The court was also requested to 
determine if this action infringed on the applicants’ rights to freedom from discrimination 
and freedom of conscience and religion. The applicants had claimed that the traditions of 
their church prohibited them from voting on a Saturday which is the church’s day of 
worship. However, the Federal Supreme Court surprisingly was more interested in how 
the outcome of the election in question disposed of the applicants’ rights rather than 
provide answers to the issues raised in the suit on their merits.  
The court held that even if all the six to seven thousand members of the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church had voted in the election, the result would still not have been 
affected. The materiality of this reasoning to the rights alleged by the applicants to have 
been violated in fact defies elementary logic. The court seemed to hold that where the 
alleged violations had no effect on the outcome of the election, the rights of the 
complainants had, for that reason, been rightly sacrificed. The court also queried the 
procedure that the applicants adopted in presenting the case. The applicants had presented 
the suit by way of an election petition rather than as a human rights complaint. 
 The attitude of the court in this case could not be deemed helpful from the point 
of view of articulating a durable judicial culture. This is an inevitable conclusion because 
the court made a mistake when it relied rather heavily on the result of the election which 
at best was only marginal to the questions that the litigants placed before it. Given the 
constitutional provisions that arose for determination, the court would have been better 
placed to resolve them more effectively by asking the simple question whether the law 
mandating elections on a Saturday was “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” It 
is possible the court may still have come to the same conclusion denying the application 
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if it had chosen this path. It could in fact have been far easier for it to raise residual policy 
reasons for such a position given that in a multi-religious country like Nigeria, singling 
out particular religious groups for preferential treatment as the applicants demanded in 
this suit would likely have set off an unmanageable scenario. 
 Why did the court take the course that it took in this case? It is difficult to say and 
one can only speculate. The first reason it probably relied upon was that the applicants 
adopted the wrong procedure because rather than present a complaint of human rights 
violation they had filed an election petition. The court said as much. One could also fall 
into the tempting proposition that the court was not well informed or lacked the skill to 
ask the right questions. If there ever was any doubt that Nigerian courts did not have the 
capacity or presence of mind to navigate the kinds of questions posed in human rights 
litigation at this very time, this decision would have totally dispelled it. While it may be 
helpful to definitively resolve the question of why the court adopted the posture it did in 
this case, decisions of this nature actually took the courts off-course and diminished any 
possibility that they could effectively deal with the kinds of questions that arose in human 
rights cases.  
Such bad examples will go on to shape the tradition of the courts and impede their 
development of sound human rights adjudicatory standards. Decisions like that in the 
Ojiegbe case also established a weak foundation for Nigerian courts in human rights 
cases, granting them a huge incentive to produce often contradictory and non-
standardized decisions. I captured some of those cases in the previous chapter while 
discussing the standard used by Nigerian courts in disposing of human rights cases.  
The next cases relevant for my purpose here dealt with movement restriction in 
the aftermath of the imposition of emergency rule in the Western region of the country by 
the Federal government. Two such cases stood out prominently: Williams v Majekodunmi 
(No.3)720 and Adegbenro v Attorney General of the Federation.721 The cases had basically 
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the same facts but the court delivered two conflicting judgments. I discussed those cases 
and how the court arrived at its decisions in chapter four. What is significant about these 
two decisions is that it is impossible to discern with any degree of conviction the reason 
two opposing decisions were delivered on two cases having almost exactly the same 
facts. No such reasons are yielded even by the most careful reading of the two judgments. 
 As with developments in most other countries in Commonwealth Africa, the 
sedition cases as well featured prominently in the human rights jurisprudence of the 
Nigerian courts in the period under consideration. Similar to Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Chike Obi722 which I have already referred to, there was the case of 
Amalgamated Press of Nigeria Limited v The Queen723 that also challenged the validity 
of the sedition law. This law which had colonial origins stood in direct opposition to the 
Supremacy Clause of the independence constitution while also affronting the freedom of 
expression provision of that constitution. The major question in both cases was whether 
the provisions of the Nigerian Criminal Code dealing with sedition could coexist with the 
provision of the constitution guaranteeing freedom of expression.  
The then Nigerian Federal Supreme Court though correctly calling the question 
presented by both cases – whether the sedition law could be considered reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society – held that neither the constitution’s Supremacy Clause 
nor the freedom of expression guarantee had actually abrogated the law of sedition. 
While recognizing itself as the sole arbiter of whether any law is reasonably justifiable, 
the court reasoned that it is justifiable to take reasonable precautions to preserve public 
order and that this may involve the prohibition of acts which, if unchecked or 
unrestrained, might lead to disorder, even though those acts would not themselves do so 
directly.724 Expectedly, the court leaned more favorably towards the challenged law than 
the rights it violated. It did not consider how critical press freedom is to an open and 
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democratic society and especially whether the government could explore other options to 
check the disorder it feared rather than cripple constitutionally recognized rights. 
The above two cases notwithstanding though, on some occasions, the court 
upheld the constitutional rights in question.725 But without establishing any clear 
standards by which those judgments were reached, there was always the danger that they 
would be as creatively reversed as they had been arbitrarily delivered. This orientation 
did not change until the military intervened in the governance of the country in 1966. 
With the military in power, the legal mechanism for human rights enforcement took an 
entirely different turn. I have already discussed the military approach to the protection of 
human rights in chapter three. This remained the situation until the restoration of civil 
rule in 1979 under a new constitution having similar guarantees of human rights as under 
the 1960 and 1963 constitutions. The civilians, however, ruled only for four years before 
the military again intervened and imposed rule by military decrees.  
Even though the courts during that four-year period between 1979 and 1983 were 
more inclined to recognize and enforce the constitutional human rights guarantees in the 
constitution, they still could not formulate any clear and objective standards for those 
judgments. The question often presented before the courts was, as under the previous 
constitutions, whether a challenged action or law was reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society. But unlike for the immediate post-independence years when the 
adoption of the parliamentary system of government caused a not too clear demarcation 
between the powers of parliament and the judiciary, the same was not the case under the 
1979 constitution. Under this constitution, the country established a Presidential system 
of government with obvious inspiration from the American tradition in this regard. The 
system was “expected to be the showcase for an American style democracy in Africa and 
to provide an example for the rest of the continent.”726  
                                                          
725See Gokpa v Police, [1961] All NLR 423 regarding the right to be represented by an attorney; Olasoji 
and another v Attorney General of Western Nigeria, [1965] NMLR 111 dealing with the right to a fair 
hearing. 
726 Michael P Seng, “Democracy in Nigeria” (1984-1986) 9 Black L J 113. 
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As it turned out, the 1979 constitution readopted, and in some cases made more 
specific, the fundamental rights first enshrined and incorporated in the Nigerian 
constitution just before independence in 1959.727 It also retained the limitations provision 
which required that rights could only be contravened if the contravention is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society. For the first time also, the constitution looked to the 
Indian constitution from which it borrowed the fundamental objectives and directive 
principles of state policy. Those objectives contained provisions similar to social and 
economic rights in the contemporary understandings of those terms. Under the 
constitution, such objectives are not justiciable before the courts.728  
According to Seng, most of the major human rights abuses in the Nigerian Second 
Republic seem to have occurred as a result of attempts by the majority political parties to 
stifle the political opposition.729 It was therefore not strange that one of the most 
celebrated human rights litigations of that era would involve an attempt by the ruling 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN) to illegally deport to Chad Republic Shugaba Darman, 
leader of the majority Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) in the Borno state House of 
Assembly. His deportation was based on the claim that he was not a Nigerian. While his 
mother had been born in Nigeria, his father was allegedly born in Chad. Following his 
deportation, Mr. Darman found his way back into Nigeria and launched a suit alleging the 
violation of his human rights to personal liberty, privacy and freedom of movement 
within Nigeria.730 The court upheld the suit and awarded damages to the applicant. 
Three of such cases disposed of by the courts at this time dealt with media 
freedom and the rights of citizens to receive information and impart ideas. The issue in 
Nwankwo v Nwobodo,731 was whether the Sedition Act remained valid notwithstanding 
the provisions of the 1979 Constitution guaranteeing press freedom. In other words, the 
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applicant resubmitted to the court for its decision the same questions that had been 
unsuccessfully raised in the case of Chike Obi v Director of Public Prosecutions732 under 
the 1960 independence Constitution. Arthur Nwankwo had published a book in which he 
criticized then governor of Anambra state, Jim Nwobodo. He was charged with sedition 
and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with hard labor. Further publication of the 
offending book was banned while members of the public who had already bought copies 
were warned to surrender those at the police station nearest to them. The Court of Appeal 
reversed the conviction, holding that the Sedition Act was inconsistent with the freedom 
of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.  
The two other press freedom cases engaged the privilege of journalists to protect 
their sources of information from public disclosure. In Momoh v Senate,733 a journalist 
had written an editorial on corruption and influence peddling in the Nigerian legislature. 
The law makers set up an investigation Committee which sought to compel the journalist 
in question to disclose the source of his information. The court held that confidentiality 
requirements would not permit that course of action and that to uphold the fundamental 
right to press freedom, information sources for journalists had to be protected. Similarly 
in Oyegbami v Attorney General,734 the court held that the police could not compel a 
journalist to disclose the source of her information. 
These cases show clearly that for this period, the Nigerian judiciary was very 
much alive to its duty of enforcing appropriate limitations on the exercise of 
governmental power. That said though, it is also evident that the courts as with the 
immediate post-independence judiciary did not much appreciate the need for a structured 
analysis of the balance between the rights enshrined and the limitation placed on them by 
means “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” Expectedly, this stemmed from 
the fact that the courts hardly commenced their interpretative role by asking the necessary 
questions that would inevitably lead to the balancing of rights and interests. 
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But overall, a shift was noticeable in the willingness of the courts to take a more 
hardline position against government encroachment upon human rights from 1979 to 
1983. Two factors could have accounted for this. Firstly, the country had adopted a 
presidential system of government. With its emphasis on executive power and 
recognition of stricter separation of powers among the branches of government meant the 
courts were freer than under the previous parliamentary period. More significantly, the 
Supreme Court in particular was perhaps beginning to have its most accomplished 
collection of judges at this time. But the military soon intervened to abort further 
progress. Having made this historical clarification, I now proceed to the next section 
which covers the period that this study is most concerned with. 
 
6.3. Post Transition Adjudication, 1999-2009: Way-Picking through a 
Minefield  
This is the section where I evaluate human rights cases decided by the Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeal from 1999 and 2009. I also provide an analytic critique of them 
according to their possible theoretical orientations. In chapter two I identified the various 
theoretical models that could fit an analysis of human rights adjudication in post-1999 
Nigeria. I did argue in favor of using various approaches because of the unlikelihood that 
a single theory could possibly account for judicial orientation for all the cases decided by 
the two courts throughout this period. While this is the case still, both the discussion of 
standard of review used by the courts for human rights cases in chapter four and the 
historical culture of the courts discussed earlier in this chapter give an early indication of 
what this analysis might produce. The cases decided under civilian regimes from 
independence until 1983 also indicate certain prior orientations. Part of the objectives of 
this section is therefore to show whether any changes in judicial orientation has occurred 
overtime, including whether the mere fact of a transition to civil rule in 1999 in any way 
affected adjudicatory tradition in human rights cases.  
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 Having reviewed the cases obtained during research that are relevant to the 
objectives of this study, I can conclude that not all the identified theories applied to the 
cases to similar levels of intensity. While some theories were overt or could be implied in 
judicial decisions as circumstances warranted, others were less so. By way of recap, I will 
now summarize the various theories that I mentioned in chapter two. The first theory I 
highlighted is positivist or formal orthodoxy. By virtue of this theory rules, principles and 
doctrine are the only determinants of adjudication. However, critical scholars both from 
law and political science disagree with positivism and claim instead that law is just 
politics clothed in rule-based and doctrinal justifications. This gave rise to a second 
theory discussed under what I termed the politics of adjudication.  
I also identified self-interest or a rational choice model which argues that judges 
are as self-interested in their decisions as all other rational social actors. Where this is not 
the case, Baxi’s TREMF theory would make a correlation between judicial decisions and 
the penetration of private capital often at the expense of human rights. More significantly, 
I also looked at the social context for human rights adjudication and identified in the 
process Bourdieu’s habitus as well as the incipient movement toward social inclusion in 
the legal process by way of what is known as social context education. I made a case for 
a transitional theory of human rights adjudication while in addition examining the 
activism/passivism divide. I will now turn to an analysis of the cases researched on the 
basis of how present or absent each of these theoretical orientations is in the cases. Some 
of the cases would engage with more than one theoretical thread simultaneously. But 
rather than separating the threads in those cases, what I have done is to isolate and 
analyze them together. I will start by looking at the more formal or orthodox traditions of 
the courts. 
6.3.1. Orthodoxy Reinforced: Literalism, Formalism, Plain-factism 
As a tendency in judicial decision-making, positivist rule-based orthodoxy is very 
prevalent in Nigeria. This is not only true with regard to human rights cases but to all 
litigation in general. This tradition is established first on the bases of a stubborn fidelity 
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to rules. Such rules could be in the nature of statutes, procedural regulations or previously 
enunciated judicial precedents. This orthodoxy could also emanate from the interpretation 
of words used in legislation. The custom of Nigerian courts is to never lightly depart from 
established practices and to assign only natural meanings to words used. The existence of 
this tradition was affirmed in the previously cited opinion of a former Supreme Court 
judge735 as well as by contemporary decisions like the one rendered in the case of Victor 
Ndoma Egba’s case.736 It is further reinforced in some of the cases I will now evaluate. 
The case of Fred Egbe v Babatunde Belgore737 for example, underscores both the 
positivist orientation of the courts and the presence of subtle political calculations in their 
decisions on some occasions. In this case, the court leaned in favor of a literal and plain-
meaning interpretation of constitutional human rights provisions. It arose from criminal 
proceedings that were initiated against the appellant, a well-known government critic 
under the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree 
of 1994. He was arrested, detained, arraigned and admitted to bail. He challenged the 
validity of his arrest in court but the suit was thrown out on technical grounds. He then 
commenced proceedings at the Federal High Court (FHC) to enforce his fundamental 
rights against the Attorney General of the Federation. He was granted an interim order 
barring his prosecution until his human rights application was disposed of.  
The Attorney General raised an objection to the human rights suit and also 
applied to have the case moved to a different judge than the one already handling it. But 
this latter application was denied whereupon the respondent who was the Chief Judge of 
the FHC intervened of his own discretion and transferred the case to another judge. As 
the country prepared to restore civil rule, the military regime issued a new decree which 
abolished the Failed Banks Tribunal and transferred its jurisdiction to the FHC. Acting 
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under this decree, the respondent directed the arraignment of the appellant at both the 
Federal High Courts in Abuja and Ilorin.  
The appellant was aggrieved by these directives and applied again to the Lagos 
High Court to enforce his fundamental rights. He alleged violations of sections 34(1)(a) 
dealing with right to dignity, 36(1) protecting fair hearing and 44(1) protecting right to 
both moveable and immoveable property under the constitution. The trial court granted 
him the leave to enforce his rights but dismissed the main application at the conclusion of 
hearing. Appellant took the matter to the Court of Appeal. The court dismissed the 
appeal, holding that the appellant suffered no wrong at all. It further held that where the 
words used in a statute being interpreted are clear and unambiguous, the court, while 
interpreting such situations, must ascribe to the words their ordinary meaning so that the 
import of such a statute must ordinarily evolve within the context of the ordinary 
meaning of the clear and unambiguous words that make them.  
While the court’s approach here may appear grounded at the superficial level, it 
nevertheless masks its contextual undercurrents when scrutinized more closely. The 
appellant here was a well-known critic of the government. He was arrested at a time 
when the said government was at its most intolerant and repressive. The appellant had 
also personally alleged that his ordeal before the Failed Banks Tribunal, in addition, 
derived from his criticism of a previous judgment of the Nigerian Supreme Court.738 So 
apart from the political motives that could be ascribed to what the appellant saw as 
persecution, the judiciary became also implicated. And one could see how the political 
and the judicial interacted to produce the outcome in this case which then seemed to be 
dressed up in literal legal justification. 
 From the facts, not only did the Attorney General representing the regime in the 
case apply to have the appellant’s substantive application dismissed, he also requested for 
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the case to be tried by a different judge. When these requests were rejected, the Chief 
Judge of the court, appointed by the regime’s head intervened nevertheless and 
transferred the case to another judge. The said Chief Justice therefore took by 
administrative means that which had been legally and judicially denied. In so doing, he 
obviously lent the regime a helping hand in its alleged crusade against the appellant. So 
even though the Court of Appeal’s decision rested on adherence to strict interpretation of 
unambiguous words used in a statute, it only conferred judicial legitimacy on a judgment 
that may have been politically motivated. At the same time it could be speculated that the 
arbitrary transfer of the case to another judge could stand for the effectuation of a private 
interest by the Chief Judge who carried it out. 
In a sense therefore, this is a clear case where a single decision engages three 
different theoretical possibilities. On the one hand there was the political interest of the 
regime in power to target one of its critics. When it seemed that the court would not lend 
a helping hand in this, we saw the rational choice theory in play when the Chief Judge 
(and the regime’s appointee) took matters in his own hands and transferred the case to 
another judge who delivered the hoped for kind of judgment. But ultimately the appeal 
decision overlooked these deep underlying factors in favor of a literal, plain-meaning 
justification.       
In addition, where literal application of rules means that courts cannot add to 
constitutional and statutory provisions even where applying them literally produces 
absurd outcomes, this is hardly always the case. Sometimes therefore the court’s 
approach to literalism is both curious and contradictory. For example, in Medical and 
Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo,739 a member of the Jehovah’s 
Witness Christian denomination whose belief forbids members receiving blood 
transfusion rejected a medical doctor’s suggestion along those lines. The doctor 
apparently overruled him. In an application to enforce his right to freedom of religion, the 
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Supreme Court held that the medical doctor could not validly overrule the patient’s 
rejection of blood transfusion based on his religious belief. While interpreting what it 
identified as a “public interest” element in the case, the court agreed that the duty of the 
government to prevent or curb an epidemic could qualify as public interest, which would 
only be so if the failure to act puts the general public in danger. If, however, the direct 
consequence of that failure is to be borne by only the competent individual involved, that 
could not trigger the public interest. 
In deciding the final appeal from this case, the Supreme Court proposed a 
framework through which the right to freedom of religion could be analyzed and 
enforced. The court speaking through Ayoola JSC in a unanimous decision agreed that: 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion implies a right not 
to be prevented without lawful justification from choosing the course of 
one’s life, fashioned on what one believes, and the right not to be coerced 
into acting contrary to one’s belief. The limits of these freedoms, as in all 
cases, are where they impinge on the rights of others or where they put the 
welfare of society or public health in jeopardy… Law’s role is to ensure 
the fullness of liberty when there is no danger to public interest. Ensuring 
liberty of conscience and freedom of religion is an important component. 
The courts are the institutions society has agreed to invest with the 
responsibility of balancing conflicting interests in a way to ensure the 
fullness of liberty without destroying the existence and stability of 
society.740        
 
Some of the choice words that the court deployed in this decision deserve closer scrutiny. 
First it refers to “lawful justification” and then to its (the court’s) role in “balancing 
conflicting interests.” This shows some level of appreciation by the court of its duty 
whenever individual human rights clashes with the governmental power to restrict them. 
Government has to justify the restriction and this would involve the court in some 
balancing task.  
Not always is this duty clear enough to Nigerian courts. Additionally, the court in 
the above quote throws in the doctrine of the “public interest.” Neither in the specific 
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limitation of section 38 nor in the general limitation in section 45 of the constitution is 
this “public interest” clause used in the same manner as the court in this case. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued elsewhere that the court’s lack of any reference to the 
section 45 limitation does not preclude “public interest” as used by it from referring “to 
all or any of the grounds mentioned therein [that is section 45].”741 This is open to debate. 
It does not answer the question why the court introduced the clause in the first place. Was 
the provision ambiguous and thus the clause was needed to furnish a clearer 
understanding? Assuming this is the case, does it not detract from the court’s philosophy 
of sticking by the exact terms used in the constitution? This is where the element of 
curiosity comes in. 
The next case also centred on the right to freedom of religion and similarly arose 
from the beliefs of members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect. In that case742 a child who 
belonged to the sect sued through his mother to reverse an order by a magistrate court 
mandating blood transfusion for the said child. He had experienced a shortage of blood 
because of a severe infection. The doctor recommended blood transfusion but the child’s 
mother withheld consent on the grounds of her religious belief. The police were called in 
who obtained a magisterial order for the hospital to do everything necessary to save the 
child’s life as required under the Lagos State Child Rights Law of 2007. 
The hospital carried out the transfusion which led to a rapid improvement in the 
condition of the child. He was subsequently discharged from hospital. His mother applied 
to the magistrate court for a reversal of the order for blood transfusion on the ground that 
it was made fraudulently. That application was denied. She then applied to the High 
Court for an order of judicial review. That request was similarly dismissed leading to this 
appeal. Though this case was not commenced under the Fundamental Rights 
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at 571.  
742Esanubor v Faweya, [2009] FWLR (Pt 478) 380 [Ng Ct App]. 
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(Enforcement Procedure) Rules, it is significant for the court’s peculiar approach to the 
question. 
In its judgment dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal sided with the 
magistrate court and held that it was right to have issued an order that ultimately 
preserved the life of the child. The basis for the court’s ruling was that the child in 
question was incapable of giving a valid consent to die on the basis of religious belief. In 
fact, the court was of the view that the child’s right to life took precedence over the 
mother’s right to freedom of religion. It went further to characterize the mother’s choice 
of attempting to sacrifice her child’s life for her religious freedom as both “illegal and 
despicable.”743 
Before turning to the model that could have been adopted by the court in this case, 
let me first look at its reasoning which I consider no less important and may have in fact 
informed that approach. The judgment of the Court of Appeal has been criticized for not 
recognizing that “the child had a right to refuse the transmission.”744 But while there may 
be merit in giving consideration to the interest of the child as this writer suggests, a lot of 
caution is still demanded in a situation like this where the child is thought not old enough 
to appreciate the implications of the choice he is making. Discretion is especially 
compelling in this case which involves the right to life. The right cannot be recalled once 
it is lost. On the flip side, if the law recognizes that a child is incapable of making as 
significant a decision as in this case, and transfers the right to a parent, should that 
parent’s decision not be honored?  
There is a valid assumption in law that unlike the right to life, the right to freedom 
of religion can only be exercised by persons with full capacity to appreciate the 
consequences of their choices. Therefore until a child reaches this capacity he/she cannot 
give valid consent of the kind required in this case. Therefore in a choice between the 
child’s right to life (which he/she is entitled at all times whether as a child or in old age) 
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and a parent’s personal freedom unrelated to the child’s right to life, the court was right 
in this case to prioritize the child’s right to life over the mother’s freedom of religion. 
The overall approach of the courts in this case and the one before it and the 
reasoning behind them only supports my earlier assertion. At least in terms of overall 
outcome there does not seem to be any observable weaknesses upon which they could be 
faulted. In the first case, the courts focused directly on the words used in the constitution 
and justified their decisions on the basis of those words. In the second case, the court 
introduced in a discretionary manner a clause not used in the constitution. This produced 
a result that could be described as satisfactory. But when justifications shift arbitrarily 
and the court could overthrow its own traditions in this manner, there is room to doubt 
the judges’ motives.  
To further substantiate the positivist inclination in a discretionary manner of the 
courts, I now turn to the case of Mojekwu v Iwuchukwu.745 It had been commenced in the 
first instance court as Mojekwu v Mojekwu.746 The names of the parties changed prior to 
the Supreme Court decision because one of the original parties Caroline Mojekwu died 
while it was still pending and was replaced by her daughter, Mrs. Iwuchukwu. In the 
case, the appellant Augustine Mojekwu pleaded the Ili-Ekpe custom of Nnewi town in 
southeastern Nigeria which he claimed entitled him to inherit Mrs. Caroline Mojekwu’s 
late husband’s property. Under the custom in question, if a man died without male 
surviving children, even if he had daughters, they could not inherit his property. Instead 
the deceased’s closest male relative would inherit them. 
 The Court of Appeal had an opportunity when the case went before it to filter 
customary law relating to inheritance through the human rights lens. Not only did it find 
the Ili-Ekpe custom repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, it also 
struck it down for being contrary to the constitutional prohibition on discrimination. On 
further appeal to the Supreme Court, that court upheld the portion of the judgment 
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allowing a widow to inherit her deceased husband’s estate. However, the court 
condemned as too sweeping the Court of Appeal’s opinion on the repugnancy of the Ili-
Ekpe custom. According to the court, per Uwaifo JSC: 
I cannot see any justification for the court below to pronounce that the 
Nnewi native custom of ‘Oli-ekpe’ was repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience…The learned Justice of Appeal was no doubt 
concerned about the perceived discrimination directed against women by 
the said Nnewi ‘oli-ekpe’ custom and that is quite understandable. But the 
language used made the pronouncement so general and far-reaching that it 
seems to cavil at, and is capable of causing strong feelings against all 
customs which fail to recognize a role for women. For instance the custom 
and traditions of some communities which do not permit women to be 
natural rulers or family heads. The import is that those communities stand 
to be condemned without a hearing for such fundamental custom and 
tradition they practice by the system by which they run their native 
communities.             
 
The decision of the Supreme Court in this case seems rather ambivalent and detracts 
significantly from the positive chord that the Court of Appeal had struck in its own 
judgment that triggered the appeal. On a progressive note, the court was willing to strike 
down the local custom which precluded females (including widows) from inheriting from 
deceased male relatives. This a huge step forward in the efforts to curtail customary 
practices that discriminate against women.  
 Yet there is also a negative consequence from this decision: the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to extend its force to all customs that fail to recognize the “role” of women. 
Even though the court used the word “role”, I believe it should more appropriately be 
read as “right” since what was at stake in this case was not just a role for women but their 
right to inherit from deceased husbands or other male relatives. Instead the court was 
willing to anticipate the views of those communities that do not permit women to be 
natural rulers or family heads. Ordinarily, a court ought to deem these practices 
discriminatory without much ceremony. It is because of cases like this that public interest 
litigation is considered useful in the sense that the decision in a single litigation could 
 241 
 
have ripple consequences across the legal system. The court’s reluctance to allow this to 
happen suggests that it might be sympathetic to such customs that clearly go against the 
anti-discriminatory stance of the constitution. 
 This judgment therefore fits into the orthodox model because of the court’s 
determination to give a fair hearing to other communities not represented in this specific 
litigation. Besides, it also engages the social context viewpoint that diversifying the 
judiciary is essential to the promotion of justice on the basis of equality. Equally present 
in the decision are traces of the rational choice model. In the analysis that follows, I will 
show how each of these models is reflected in the decision.  
On its surface, the court’s insistence that the rule regarding fair hearing be 
respected looks to be a legitimate concern. But when further scrutinized, it seems to 
create the impression that in human rights litigation, the court has to anticipate the 
opinion of all who may be affected by its decision. If the standard set in this case is 
adopted, the court in fact has to postpone decision until those quarters make their 
opinions known. This could lead to an unmanageable situation. The court’s duty in each 
suit should be to ascertain the constitutionality of laws and actions complained of. If any 
law or action is found to be unconstitutional, no individual or institutional opinion can 
reverse that unconstitutionality. Applied to the decision in this case, if the Ili-ekpe custom 
is found to be discriminatory, of what use to this finding would be the opinion of 
communities with similar practices? 
 The court’s decision might be explained on the basis of the rational choice model 
as well. Nigeria’s traditional patriarchal setting makes this suggestion a particularly 
appropriate one. The society is overly male dominated. As an example, the Nigerian 
Supreme Court has always been male dominated. Only in the last few years were the first 
female justices appointed to that court. Women were therefore not represented in the 
court at the time of this decision. Its first female head was only recently appointed 
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allegedly against a quiet opposition.747 Among the charges claimed to have been made 
against her was that she is a single mother! This judgment seems therefore to allow the 
male custodians of traditional values to keep advantages they have always arrogated to 
themselves. The judges being men themselves would therefore seem to have an 
underlying interest to see that this is done. In that sense, the rational choice model seems 
to apply to the extent that the all-male court might have been maximizing some interests 
in a patriarchal society.  
Therefore, law in this environment as the likes of Nedelsky would argue is not 
and should not be interpreted as a neutral force.748 The experience of judges and the 
culture that produced them are therefore quite grounded in their decision-making. When 
they pronounce judgments as such, they do so using not just the language of law but also 
that of power. This includes secular power marked by male political dominance as well 
as cultural power highlighted by the history of patriarchy still evident in most African, 
nay Nigerian societies. In this sense therefore, the failure of the Supreme Court to strike 
down the Ili-Ekpe custom fits an understanding of human rights adjudication within a 
specific social context, in this case a male dominated Nigerian society. 
Further insight into the courts’ positivist orthodox orientation could be gleaned 
from the case of Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation v. O’Silvawax International 
Ltd.749 The questions here were whether a claim arising from an ordinary business 
relationship between a bank and its client could give rise to a human rights claim and 
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under what circumstances an otherwise legal action could be considered unconstitutional. 
The facts were that 2nd respondent who was the Managing Director of the 1st respondent, 
a corporate entity, had obtained a loan from the Cooperative and Commerce Bank 
Limited. As security for the loan, respondents deposited the customary right of 
occupancy in respect of a building. However the mortgage could not be executed because 
first the Chair of the local council where the property was situated could not give consent 
and second because the 2nd respondent did not deliver his tax certificate.  
The respondents failed to repay the loan with interest. The bank went into distress 
and therefore commenced an aggressive drive to recover all outstanding loans to its 
customers, including the respondents. In the process the bank seized three cars belonging 
to the respondents. The 2nd respondent therefore filed an application before the Federal 
High Court to enforce his human right to property. The bank objected on the ground that 
the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Meanwhile, the bank was eventually 
liquidated whereupon the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) assumed its 
position in the litigation. The court rejected the notion that it lacked jurisdiction. The 
NDIC appealed. 
 The Court of Appeal held that the bank was justified in seizing the cars belonging 
to the respondents because the Anambra State Torts Law of 1986 qualified as a general 
law within the meaning of section 44(1) of the constitution. It held that the law on the one 
hand offered a defence to the appellants to take property by way of distress to recover a 
loan. On the other hand it also offered protection to the respondents to recover damages 
for detinue or trespass if their property is adjudged to have been wrongfully seized. From 
every indication, the appeal court followed a literal reading of the Anambra State Torts 
Law without necessarily considering the impact of that reading in the context of a human 
rights complaint. 
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The facts of the above case are similar to those in Ikem v Nwogwugwu750 arising 
from a claim alleging a violation of the right to freedom of movement. In Nwogwugwu, 
the main question before the court was whether respondent’s confiscation of appellant’s 
vehicle as satisfaction for appellant’s unfulfilled obligations arising from an overdraft 
facility from the respondent amounted to a violation of the appellants fundamental right 
to movement. The right was guaranteed by section 38 of the 1979 constitution which is 
similar to section 41 of the 1999 constitution. The facts were that 3rd Respondent-bank 
had advanced several overdraft facilities to the appellant. The appellant secured the 
facility with a car. When it had matured, the appellant failed to redeem it. The 
respondents therefore impounded the car that was used to secure it. The appellant filed 
this suit claiming an infringement of his constitutional rights to movement.  
 The Court of Appeal in my view correctly held that a clear reading of sections 
38(2)(a) of the 1979 Constitution shows that a citizen’s right to free movement is not 
absolute but could be restricted by any reasonably justifiable law. The court also found 
correctly that when a person is accused to having committed a crime, that person’s right 
to movement could be lawfully curtailed. But to what extent this could be done, the court 
offered no indication.  And what followed from the court thereafter cannot, in my view, 
stand up to legal scrutiny. It had noted that a contract existed between the parties and that 
this justified the restriction placed on the appellant’s right to move freely through the 
seizure of his property.  
It is hard to support the reasoning of the court. This was a contractual dispute and 
though the appellant may have breached the terms of the contract, could that breach 
possibly justify the respondent’s resort to extra-legal measures? The mere existence of a 
contract which creates rights and obligations cannot amount to a constitutional 
justification for extra-judicial interference with the appellant’s rights. While it is true that 
the constitution limits and modifies the rights enshrined in it, every such modification or 
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limitation has to be justified on the basis of its reasonableness in a democratic society. 
The limitation in this case has not been imposed by law but by the self-help action of an 
individual outside the ordinary lawful channels for dispute resolution. Clearly therefore 
respondent’s action could not, in my opinion be deemed reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.   
Though the facts of the NDIC case is similar to those in Nwogwugwu, the court 
resolved it on the basis only of its private law elements without examining the human 
rights complaint raised by the other party. This appears to be improper as well given that 
private law principles cannot possibly take priority over constitutional human rights 
guarantees. That the court did not recognize this fact therefore only enhances its 
orthodox, positivist characteristics. But even at that the constitutional guarantees which it 
ignored could have fitted perfectly into its approach in this case but with a more balanced 
result.  
In both cases, the court left the impression that an individual could act lawlessly 
to redress a perceived private legal wrong. If an ordinary business or contractual 
agreement is breached by a party to it, the court has given a license for the party 
aggrieved to take laws into both hands. This would be taking literalism to a whole new 
level that supports individual impunity. It is a call to anarchy. Notwithstanding that in the 
NDIC case, the Torts Law of Anambra state seems to condone this invitation to self-help; 
it may not answer for the constitutional consequences of its application. The court ought 
to have taken this into consideration. In fact these are two cases that bring into sharp 
focus the dangers of applying legal provisions in literal fashion especially where the 
results are absurd.   
The next case751 amplifies this difficulty even further. The respondent was 
employed as a Service Engineer by the appellant. Appellant dismissed him from the 
employment because of his insistence on joining the National Union of Petroleum and 
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Natural Gas Workers, (NUPENG) as of right. The appellant company believed the proper 
union for the respondent to be not NUPENG but the Nigerian Union of Seamen and 
Transport Workers. Respondent therefore brought this suit claiming that his fundamental 
right under the constitution to join a trade union of his choice had been contravened. The 
trial court upheld respondent’s claim whereupon the appellant filed this appeal. 
The court held that by virtue of Section 37 (Section 40, 1999) of the Nigerian 
constitution of 1979 every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with 
other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union 
or any other association for the protection of his interest. In the court’s view, the phrase 
“for the protection of his interest” does not give the citizen an unrestrained freedom to 
join any association. It is not a freedom at large but rather, one that is certainly restrictive. 
If it were the intention of the makers of the Constitution to make the right of association 
unfettered or unrestrained, it would have used the words “of his own choice” as was done 
in section 33(6)(c) of the same constitution on the right of a citizen to be represented by a 
counsel of his own choice.  
Continuing, the court decided also that a person proposing to join an association 
must show how that association would protect his interest. In this regard, section 37 of 
the constitution must be interpreted in a manner that would give effect to the intention of 
parliament to avoid lending support to unrestricted access to association at the fancy of 
individuals and not necessarily to protect any known interests. It held that the respondent 
in this case cannot rely on section 37 to insist on a right to join the NUPENG instead of 
the Nigerian Union of Seamen and Transport Workers to which he rightly belongs 
because the appellant, his employer is not engaged in oil business. 
Yet again there are obvious gaps in the court’s reasoning in this case. First is the 
court’s attempt to suggest the choice of words that ought to have been used for this right 
in the constitution instead of those actually used. This is rather contradictory to the 
court’s previously held position that constitutional texts are sacred and that when faced 
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with their interpretation, courts should restrict themselves to the actual words used and no 
more.752 Secondly, how is it the court’s duty to pick an association for an individual 
particularly when that individual insists on not belonging to such an association? Is the 
right not negated if the choice of association is not made by the individual concerned? As 
importantly, who is more suited to decide upon what is in the best interest of the 
individual seeking to join an association, the judge or the individual in question? If the 
court had continued with its literal tradition, the case may well have produced a better 
outcome for the respondent. The court took the opposite course.    
The case of Victor Ndoma-Egba v Chukwuogor and Others,753 as well fits into 
what would seem to be the courts’ literal/positivist anxieties. The main questions in the 
case were how statutes that expropriate property of citizens should be interpreted and 
whether the Abandoned Property Act of 1990 was discriminatory in its effects. The facts 
were that 1st respondent, an Igbo man resident in Ikom, Cross River state leased property 
from the Etayip community of Ikom. On the leased property he erected houses and used 
other parts for a farm. Some of the houses were rented out to tenants. His family and 
employees lived on the others.  
In August 1967 when Nigeria was at war, 1st respondent traveled outside Ikom to 
his own region of the country to check on his businesses. But he could not return to Ikom 
because war hostilities had led to the destruction of a bridge through which he must 
return. He therefore stayed in his home town until the war ended in 1970. While he was 
away, his tenants remained on the property while an agent appointed by him collected 
rent on his behalf. At the end of the war, 1st respondent returned to Ikom only to discover 
that his property had been declared abandoned by the then South Eastern state 
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Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee which sold the property to the 
appellant and the 3rd and 4th respondents.  
First respondent filed a suit contending that his property could not be declared 
abandoned because his tenants remained on it and he had an agent collecting rent from 
them on his behalf. He also argued that the Etayip community from which he leased the 
property could not be said to have deserted their own land. The trial court held that 1st 
respondent abandoned his property and dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeal reversed 
the judgment prompting appellant to take the case to the Supreme Court. 
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that in interpreting a statute which 
encroaches on a person’s proprietary right, the courts should adopt the principle of strict 
construction fortissime contra proferentes, which leans in favor of the citizen whose 
property rights are denied and against the interest of the lawmaker. The court held 
therefore that where the statute provides a procedure for divesting a citizen of his 
property, the court must construe the provisions of the statute to ensure that the stated 
procedure is adhered to or complied with in exercising the compulsive powers. In this 
case the court found that the procedure prescribed for exercising the exproprietory 
powers of the statute had not been followed. 
With specific reference to the Abandoned Property Act, the court agreed that any 
law which seeks to punish a class of people in society is a law that could destroy the 
whole fabric of a nation if such a law is not struck out the statute book. Pats-Acholonu 
JSC speaking for the court asserted that: 
I make bold to state that strict adherence by the law courts to the Austinian 
Theory of legal positivism was what brought about the Second World War 
where a villainous and devilish dictator succeeded in emasculating the 
courts and the people by spewing out laws that had horrendous effects not 
only on the Germans but more particularly on the Jews.754 
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The judge’s reference to Austinian positivism showed the court grappling with its own 
prior traditions at least in the context of this specific case. A judicial bastion of legal 
positivism appeared to be disavowing one of its most significant ideological roots. And 
the decision shows that were this to happen more frequently, victims of human rights 
abuses would in all likelihood be better treated by the court system. There does not seem 
therefore to be any valid basis to dispute either the overall decision in this case or the 
court’s reasons for rendering it. The concern is that there is not enough consistency in 
keeping to such bold affirmations of principle. There is a strong appreciation by the court 
in this case that positivist orthodoxy does not always produce the most elegant results. 
There is also an indication that the court is willing to examine better alternatives if only it 
could summon the will to do so. The court’s strict interpretation of the exproprietory 
statute emphasizes its tradition of reading laws literally. But in this case, there is at least 
evidence that such literal readings could sometimes benefit litigants complaining that 
their human rights had been violated. 
 But more than the above, there also seems to be a personal interest element within 
the rational choice theory in this decision. I had offered this in the second chapter as a 
possible explanation for judicial orientation in Nigeria. In this case, it could be argued 
that Justice Pats-Acholonu, himself an Igbo may have had a personal interest in the 
subject matter of this suit. Most Igbos are embittered by the entire “abandoned property” 
episode.755 Giving judicial traction to that bitterness would perhaps be justified. But to 
say this was the case would be to perhaps give Justice Acholonu more power than he 
actually possesses. Because the Supreme Court is collegial, he obviously had the support 
of other judges to deliver the majority opinion. While his personal interest may have been 
served no doubt, its impact on the judgment is diluted by the fact that without the support 
of other non-Igbo judges, his singular opinion could not have carried him very far.    
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 To explain this further, Downs specifically stated that all government officials 
(judges included) participate as agents in a division of labor that has both a private 
motive and social function.756 For judges like Pats-Acholonu, this social function is 
hardly in doubt. It is to arbitrate private and public disputes in order to keep society 
within acceptable legal boundaries. But the private motive that could intrude into this 
public function is less clear-cut. For this reason, applying the private interest motive to 
explain judicial inconsistency or reflexivity could, as in this case, be fraught with 
challenges.  Where lies the evidence that would support this claim?  
 It would be unusual (if not absurd) for Justice Pats-Acholonu above to confess 
that he had been motivated by personal interest in resolving this case. Yet the challenge 
of proving the personal interest of judges may not detract from the possibility that such 
personal motivations do in fact exist. Where it is possible to rely on circumstantial proof 
of such personal interest motivations, none would seem more useful in showing such than 
that reasons for decisions are unstable and rationalizations are arbitrary. In the Nigerian 
context where the appointment, promotion and tenure of judges is overly politically 
controlled, judicial officers who desire promotion and secure tenure know better than rule 
against political office holders with powers to influence their careers in significant ways. 
The same could therefore be true in this specific case where a judge may have been on a 
subtle crusade to redress a perceived historical wrong.  
Finally on the orthodox/literal traditions of the courts is the case of Mbanefo v 
Molokwu and Others.757 The main question in that case was as to the dimensions of the 
right to freedom of association under the 1999 constitution. The appellant and the 
respondents were all members of the Agbalanze society of Onitsha, Anambra state. At a 
meeting of the society held in 2004 the appellant was ostracized from the group 
apparently for committing an abominable act. The appellant commenced a suit at the 
High court of Anambra state alleging a breach of his right to freedom of association and 
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the right to fair hearing. The trial court dismissed the claim and the appellant filed this 
appeal. 
 The Court of Appeal held with respect to the freedom of association portion of the 
claim that the right given under section 40 is not absolute as same can be tampered with 
under a law or circumstance reasonably justifiable in any democratic society. Thus where 
a person voluntarily joins a political party and the party makes rules governing the 
conduct of its members (its constitution) which infringes on a member’s right to associate 
with another political party; such a member cannot challenge his party’s directive as a 
breach of his constitutional right. This is the position in a political party. Agbalanze 
Onitsha is a voluntary association to which the appellant belonged. It is entitled under its 
constitution to decide for itself what it wants and to organize itself and a court cannot tell 
such a voluntary association how it must be organized. If a member of such an 
association does not like its decision it is open to such a member to resign.  
The court of appeal achieved two milestones with this decision, one positive and 
the other negative. In the first place, it extended the ambit of laws and actions reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society that could override constitutional rights. It held this to 
include not just government laws or action but also the internal rules of voluntary 
associations. This in itself is a commendable posture. It means the same rule of 
justifiability applicable to government laws and actions are applicable as well to the 
regulations of voluntary associations. This conforms to the contemporary understanding 
that human rights norms have vertical as well as horizontal application.758 
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Secondly, the court removed from judicial oversight the internal organization of 
voluntary associations, including political parties. If a section of such association’s 
membership is oppressed by the majority or their leadership contrary to their regulations, 
the court cannot intervene on their behalf. This is not the correct understanding of the 
right to belong to an association. It also contradicts the court’s initial position above that 
before they can override constitutional rights an association’s rules must be reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society. Such rules even if they pass the test of reasonable 
justifiability are of no use if the members of such associations cannot be protected under 
them.  
The right to associate should not be just about deciding which association one 
should belong to. There should be a component of that right protecting members of an 
association within it once the choice is made. To hold that an individual has a right to join 
an association but loses all other rights once he/she has joined, defeats the entire purpose 
of the right. This cannot be the intention of the framers of the constitution. The court 
arrived at this reasoning due to its literal reading of constitutional provision. It was more 
concerned with the nature of the right in abstract terms and not its substance. Were the 
court willing to move beyond the provision’s literal surface, it would have better 
appreciated the absurdity of its decision as well as its implications for the future.  
 
6.3.2. In the Womb of Habitus 
Apart from the literal/positivist tradition, a different judicial orientation that so clearly 
has had substantial impact in Nigeria human rights adjudication takes the law in social 
context pathway. In chapter two as well, I discussed how Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus would seem to have a significant resonance in this regard. As a theoretical thread, 
habitus captures the practice of law within specific social and political contexts. It looks 
at the impact of education, training and professional socialization on the decision-making 
habits of judges. This is a particularly relevant point to reflect upon in the Nigerian 
context. It is already clear in various parts of this study that the Nigerian legal system is 
 253 
 
under the hangover of its colonial history. British legal concepts and traditions continue 
to dominate legal education and training in the country. Expectedly, these traditions have 
seeped into the consciousness of judges and continue to define not just their approach to 
human rights adjudication but the judicial function in a more general sense. In most of the 
cases already analyzed under the formalistic/literal rubric, there was obvious evidence of 
judicial habituation to a specific mindset. To add to that in the next line of cases, I discuss 
the manner that this theoretical model is further reflected in more of the cases covered in 
this study.      
The first case is that of Ukegbu v National Broadcasting Commission and 
Others.759 At a press conference on November 30 2004 the Director General (DG) of the 
National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) directed all terrestrial broadcast stations in 
Nigeria which re-transmitted live foreign news and news programs to stop doing so 
immediately. The reason this became necessary, he said, was because of the foreign 
perspectives of the news and the danger such broadcasts posed to Nigeria’s national 
interest. The same order also noted persistent broadcast of unverifiable claims of 
miraculous healings on radio and television stations. The DG insisted that all stations 
should ensure that their religious programmes conformed to the requirements of the 
Broadcasting Code.  
Appellant brought this action seeking a declaration that the DG’s directive was 
illegal, unconstitutional and a breach of his right to receive information guaranteed under 
section 39(1) of the 1999 Constitution and Article 9 of the African human rights Charter. 
He also claimed a breach of his right to freedom of religion with regard to the portion of 
the directive on unverifiable miraculous healings. The trial court after upholding the 
appellant’s locus standi to present the suit dismissed it on its merits because, according to 
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it, the directive was justifiable in accordance with section 39 of the Constitution. The 
appellant appealed that decision. 
In disposing of the appeal, the Court of Appeal recognized that the rights 
guaranteed by section 39 of the 1999 Constitution are not absolute rights but could be 
regulated with regards to wireless broadcasting, television or films. It went further to hold 
that no country conscious of its security and existence can ever have a codeless 
broadcasting environment that allows foreign news to be relayed live and directly into it. 
The court held that the trial judge was right when deciding that the NBC Code is justified 
within a democratic society and therefore not contrary to the Constitution. This portion of 
the judgment in particular seemed to suggest that the court actually scrutinized the 
dangers that the government feared before concluding its reasoning. But other than 
declaring the code “justified” in a “democratic society,” the court did not indicate by 
what standard it came to that conclusion.  
 As in many previous cases, this decision turned on the willingness of the court to 
protect what it perceived to be the government interest. In this case that interest was to 
prohibit direct foreign news broadcasts. The government only claimed it had an interest 
in controlling the direct entry into the country of such news. It did not state the exact 
nature of that interest that would be sufficient to deny persons in Nigeria the right to 
enjoy the free flow of news and information. Yet Nigerian courts which lived through the 
nightmare of military rule ought to be aware of the old tendency (similar to the one 
evident in this case) for those in power at the moment to conflate their personal interests 
in banning contrary opinion with the interest of the state as an entity.  
The duty placed upon the court in this case was to strike a balance between the so-
called government interest to prohibit direct news and the rights of the appellant and 
other Nigerians to receive and impart information. It could have fulfilled this duty by 
asking some critical questions. How compelling was the state interest involved? What 
would be the implication of sacrificing the constitutional right to information on the 
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shrine of an over-broadly defined state interest? Were other means available to the state 
that could accommodate its interest without negatively engaging the rights involved? If 
the court had paid attention to questions like these, answering them would have involved 
it in some process of putting these competing interests on an imaginary weighting scale 
and assigning to them the salience that they merited.  
This decision, in my view, engages not just a literal reading of the constitutional 
text concerned but also (and more significantly) the Bourdieuan theory of habitus. It 
reflects more the in-built traditions of the judicial system which is overly sensitive to 
“national interest” considerations however ill-articulated. There is enough from this 
decision to suggest that the court aborted further inquiry as in the Asari Dokubo v 
Federal Republic of Nigeria760 case that I will discuss later, once the government waved 
the “national interest” flag. This in my view is more a function of the judges reinforcing 
the view of law in the specific Nigerian context as an authoritarian phenomenon. It 
valorizes the broad nature of governmental power that often dissolves to cold impunity. 
Such an experience for the judges would mostly have been cultivated during the years of 
military as much as for other reasons.  
This philosophy is further emphasized by other prior influences on the choices 
that judges make. I discussed some of those influences in the third chapter but even more 
so in the fourth. British legal traditions historically built upon the concept of legislative 
supremacy were and remain to a large extent the bedrock of Nigerian legal education and 
experience. When judges submit to arguments based on unsubstantiated dangers to “state 
security” as in the above case, they create an atmosphere in which the ideology that 
government always knows best holds sway in public life. The courts’ position would 
seem to be that the state needs to be protected against its own citizens rather than the 
other way round. This decision shares obvious similarities with the earlier discussed 
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cases of Chike Obi and Amalgamated Press in terms of how the courts readily sacrificed 
constitutional rights for at best hazy state interest considerations.     
Under the military as shown in the third chapter, alleged state security concerns 
often justified gross of human rights infractions. Because of the peculiar constitutional 
character of the military, the judiciary struggled to provide remedy for victims. Under a 
constitutional democracy, things ought to work out differently. Judgments like the one 
above only demonstrate that there is yet a long way to that desired change. It also shows 
that an important issue to negotiate towards that change is the culture of the judiciary 
itself. There has to be changes at the level of education, recruitment, training and 
professional socialization among judges. Otherwise prior tendencies would continue to 
hold back the promises of the new dispensation.                 
 The case of Yusuf and another v Obasanjo and others761 in fact provides further 
evidence of why this change has to be seen immediately. It arose in the context of an 
electoral dispute but has consequences for the protection of the right to movement under 
the constitution. It raised two major constitutional questions. The first was whether it is 
constitutional for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to place 
restrictions on the movement of persons on days set aside for elections. The court was 
also called upon to answer the question whether breaches of the constitution could be 
raised in an electoral dispute. The facts were that the appellant and his political party vied 
for the office of President of Nigeria in the 2003 elections and were declared to be among 
the losers. He challenged the election on several grounds including what he termed the 
unconstitutional restriction of individual movement on election days and the deployment 
of military and paramilitary personnel in the course of the elections to enforce the 
restriction. 
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 While holding that breaches of the constitution are not recognized in an election 
dispute, the Court of Appeal also decided that the restriction placed on the movement of 
people on election days by the INEC is unconstitutional. It said that the restriction 
amounts to an infringement on the individual right to freedom of movement enshrined in 
Section 41 of the Constitution of 1999. Therefore, the court concluded, the contents of 
the manual for election officials restricting movement of people on election days is not 
law, and not being a law cannot have the force of suspending any constitutional 
provision. In other words the constitutional guarantee of right to movement trumped the 
election manual which restricted public movement on election days. 
 The court perhaps reached the correct decision when nullifying the restriction 
placed on the right of people to move freely on election days. That there is an election, 
the court reasoned, is insufficient reason to shut down individual lives. Yet the premise 
upon which the court started its conclusions is too sweeping and a little over-generalized. 
I think it is improper to excuse any court or tribunal from examining breaches of the 
constitution regardless of the context within which those breaches occurred. The 
constitution should bind every court and tribunal in a legal system. Nigerian courts and 
tribunals should be no exception. It would have been more appropriate, in my opinion, if 
the court had reasoned that allegations of human rights violations are not addressable by 
way of election petition. This is because the constitution recognizes specific courts and a 
specialized procedure for enforcing human rights which do not fit into the procedures of 
election tribunals. 
 It is instructive though that this decision has not stopped the practice of restricting 
human and vehicular movement in Nigeria on election days which speaks volumes for 
the socio-political context for the operation of law in the country. It also confirms the 
disconnection between the theory and practice of law. And as with the penultimate case 
analyzed above, the possibility that the government could take liberty with portions of the 
law that it does not favor only establishes the environment for impunity. That this has 
continued as a practice under a civil regime as under the military only indicates that those 
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responsible for putting this judgment to effect are de-sensitized to the opportunity of a 
different course in a transitional situation. This would have implications for consolidating 
the rule of law as I would discuss in the next chapter.      
The next case decided in 2001762 dealt with a problem which is of concern to 
many Nigerian communities which is how to balance local customs with constitutional 
norms. It had been filed while the military held political power. The main questions here 
were first whether compulsory levy can be imposed on a citizen of Nigeria under the 
guise of community development and second what is the relationship of custom to the 
provisions of the constitution protecting the human rights of citizens? Appellant, a 
member of the Jehovah’ Witness religious sect and respondent belonged to the same local 
community. Appellant’s religious beliefs, he claimed, did not allow him to participate in 
community development activities. Respondent sought to make appellant’s wife join the 
association of women in their community and also contribute to on-going developmental 
activities. When the appellant refused to do any of those biddings, respondent enlisted the 
assistance of armed soldiers who used force to extract the levy and fine from appellant. 
At the high court, the Judge ruled in favor of the community represented by respondent, 
leading to this appeal. 
The appeal court held that much as development projects are desirable in the 
community, there must be caution to ensure that the fundamental rights of a citizen are 
not trampled upon by popular enthusiasm. This is because these rights have been 
enshrined in a “legislation that is the Constitution”, which enjoys superiority over local 
custom. In this regard, any customary law or practice that sanctions the breach of an 
aspect of the rule of law as contained in the fundamental rights provisions guaranteed to a 
Nigerian citizen in the Constitution is barbarous and should not be enforced by the courts. 
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Only such lawful practices that encourage community development should be 
encouraged.  
There are two different angles from which this decision could be analyzed. The 
appeal court was right in condemning the community’s resort to self-help to compel 
compliance with its customs. But it was wrong on every other score in my view. Its 
description of community development as barbarous is condescending and unjustified. 
How, for example, could participating in community development activities violate a 
religious belief? Is this practice barbarous only because it is coming from a community 
and not the secular government which also imposes various kinds of taxes and dues on 
the citizenry? Would the appellant not benefit from the development projects envisaged 
in this case as a member of this community? There is no indication in the case that 
participation in this community development activity affected the appellant’s religious 
beliefs in any way. There therefore does not seem to be any valid reason for the judgment 
the court reached. 
Like all the other previous cases already analyzed in which there is the interplay 
between law and society, the court in this case reached back to acquired or borrowed 
morality to judge a typical African setting. By this I mean the belief that an African 
version of modernity is synonymous with throwing away all the cultural habits of its 
people. The concept of habitus and theory of habituation are therefore relevant for 
understanding the choice that the court made in this case. It leaned in favor of beliefs that 
had been formed through education and training that while English practices are good, 
African customs are barbarous. This belief builds upon the traditions of the system that 
dominates the educational and professional formation of a typical Nigerian judge (in this 
case based on the English legal system) while at the same time suppressing the alternative 
cultural reality of the society that this system governs.     
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6.3.3. Politics versus Rights: When the Clash Counts 
I did discuss in chapter two the relationship between law and politics, and the critique of 
adjudication that flows from that relationship. This critique stands for an understanding 
of the political calculations that affect adjudication. As a theory, it factors politics into the 
judicial function since courts do not operate in a political void. This is especially so in 
transitional situations. In such unstable moments, Ginsburg argues that “courts find 
themselves in more risky positions, but also may be called upon to perform essential 
governance functions when other institutions are weak or ineffective.”763 A host of roles 
are therefore opened to the courts when those unstable moments call. They could be 
“gadfly or scapegoat, regime supporter or opponent, protector of minorities or tool of 
majority rule.”764 A human rights complaint could easily be at issue in any such situation 
that may warrant judicial intervention. As the cases below would show in relation to 
Nigeria, when regime political interests are at stake, the courts tend to be more regime 
supporter than protector of those aggrieved.         
The case of Dokubo Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria765 arose against the 
background of skirmishes between the Nigerian government and youths of the oil-rich 
Niger Delta region who were agitating for more local control of the region’s oil 
resources. The appellant was previously a leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Salvation 
Front. But at the time of his arrest had become the leader of the Niger Delta Peoples 
Volunteer Force. He and others were accused of signing a communiqué castigating the 
government at the various levels for looting resources belonging to the people and 
aggrandizing corrupt officials. This, they alleged, left the Nigerian people in a state of 
neglect and abject poverty. They also included the hike in the pump price of gasoline to 
the list of their grievances. As a result, they threatened to take up arms against the 
government as well as revealing plans to cause civil disorder that would lead to the 
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overthrow of the federal government. Appellant was arrested and charged with 
conspiracy to commit felony, treasonable felony and forming, managing and assisting in 
managing an unlawful society. His application for bail was denied by both the trial court 
and the Court of Appeal.  
On further appeal to the Supreme Court, that court commenced by holding that 
the right to personal liberty guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution of 1999 is not an 
absolute right and that the personal liberty of an individual within the contemplation of 
section 35(1) of the Constitution is a qualified right which permits restriction on 
individual liberty. It also held that a person’s liberty can also be curtailed in order to 
prevent him from committing further offence(s). More than these though the court took a 
cliché straight out of the military template when it further held that where national 
security is threatened or there is the real likelihood of it being threatened, human rights or 
individual rights of those responsible would take second place. It concluded that the 
human rights or the individual rights must be suspended until the national security can be 
protected. 
The logic of this judgment is that once government pleads national security in any 
case involving the denial of personal liberty, the dispute is effectively settled in favor of 
not upholding that constitutional right. The military used this to great effect for the period 
they were in power both to control the opposition and gag the press.766 A claim that 
national security or interest is in danger therefore forecloses any need to evaluate the 
allegation, holding it up to close scrutiny and establishing its truthfulness. Conceived in 
this manner, it is a catch-all claim that could endanger free speech as well as the freedom 
of movement and assembly. This has the potential of only giving effect to political rather 
than legal judgments in such cases as often the allegation of threatening national security 
is made by the ruling government against its political opponents. Though Dokubo could 
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not be considered a politician, his travails more than illustrate the attitude of the courts to 
cases that may have political overtones.  The political issues brought to question in this 
case included the nature of Nigeria’s federal structure and how to deal with minority 
agitations. These are all sensitive political questions striking at the heart of the country’s 
political and economic stability. 
The scenario of this case in fact ties effectively into its volatile background. It 
arose from government’s pacification activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria 
necessitated by a need to preserve the peace to enable natural resource exploitation, 
particularly crude oil. Such efforts were intended to enforce peace and remove the threat 
to government budget that the crisis in that region was causing. First it engages all the 
previous points already made about courts being habituated to an ideology that in all 
cases lofts national security above individual rights. But more than that, it also shows 
how regime political interests could be conflated to national security demands that are 
unreviewable once pleaded. 
As effectively articulated by Kapiszewski, judges are principally balancing six 
different considerations when faced with politically sensitive cases. They could be 
following their own individual ideologies or the interests of the judicial institution. They 
could be protecting the interests of the elected branches of government or perhaps be 
concerned about the possible economic and political consequences of their decision. 
Finally, they could be swayed by public opinion regarding the case or be driven by plain 
law and legal considerations.767 In the Dokubo case, the court claimed legal 
considerations which are without doubt the easiest justifications to put out in the open. 
This is not surprising because of all the six factors that Kapiszewski identified; only the 
law and legal one could be somehow objectively stated. The rest are heavy on residual 
subjectivity. In this particular case, though unstated in the court’s reasoning, there were 
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more economic and political considerations involved than the court was willing to 
acknowledge.        
 The cases of Chukwuma and Others v Commissioner of Police768 and Inspector 
General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party and Others769 are also very relevant for my 
purposes here.  They both deal with situations in which an incumbent regime could use 
the law to suppress political opposition and the role of the judiciary in such situations. 
The law in question here was the Public Order Act of 1990 which prohibits the holding of 
public assemblies except with a police permit. This law was made during the colonial era 
and had remained the Nigerian statute books ever since. In these two cases, the question 
was whether it was constitutional, given the guarantee of the right to association and 
assembly under the 1999 Constitution, for the Public Order Act to require a police permit 
to properly and peacefully conduct public assemblies, meetings and processions. Both 
were decided by the Court of Appeal though at two different divisions.  
 The police in the first case had invaded the venue where some Nigerian citizens 
who all belonged to a socio-cultural organization were gathered for a meeting. The law 
enforcement officials broke up the gathering which was already in progress. They then 
sealed off the venue on the pretext that no police permit had been obtained to organize 
the gathering. The venue was a private hotel. The Court of Appeal held that the police 
were right to disband the meeting because the organizers did not obtain any permit for the 
assembly. In its judgment, the court did not even as much as consider the constitutional 
right to assemble and its relationship to the Public Order Act, particularly with regard to 
balancing the right against the social good of maintaining public peace.    
 In the second case, twelve registered Nigerian political parties commenced the 
action by way of an originating process requesting the court to answer the question 
whether a police permit or any other similar written official authority is required to hold a 
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rally or procession in any part of Nigeria. They also sought to know whether the 
provisions of the Public Order Act which prohibit the holding of rallies or processions 
without a police permit is not illegal and unconstitutional having regard to the guarantee 
of the right of assembly under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution.  
 In this case, the court, in my opinion correctly called the main question that it had 
to answer: whether the provisions of the Public Order Act, particularly that which 
required conveners of meetings or political rallies to obtain police permits in the exercise 
of their constitutional rights to freedom of assembly and expression, could be held to be 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.770 The Court of Appeal here came to the 
conclusion that the requirement of police permit cannot be used as camouflage to stifle 
the fundamental rights of citizens. It held several sections of the Public Order Act to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution and declared them null and void.  
 In the latter case, the court (though it referred to the former) was ambiguous 
whether or not it was overruling that older judgment. It attempted to distinguish both but 
in a manner that is, to me, harmful of the right rather than protective of it. It is “harmful” 
because the court in the latter case, after recalling that the earlier one had preserved the 
Public Order Act, then stated: 
[T]he court never decided that the Inspector General of Police [IGP] was 
empowered to issue police permit or disrupt any public gathering for 
which no license has been issued by the Governor of a state or his 
authorized agent. Superior police officers referred to under section 4 of the 
Police Order Act means the Commissioner of Police or any of the senior 
police officers under the state police command. The [IGP] has no statutory 
backing to usurp the powers of the governor to issue license for public 
meetings or delegate such powers to the Commissioner of Police. The 
appellant has failed to appreciate the trend in all democratic countries 
whereby the right to hold meetings and assemblies is no longer subject to 
the whims and caprices of the government or security agents.771  
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The above reasoning of the court shows a lot of hesitance at both ends of the justification 
spectrum. It did not overrule the earlier decision. Yet it did not preserve it in the manner 
it was initially rendered. The court’s difficulty here appears to arise from a reluctance to 
act decisively by overruling the earlier decision. In drawing a distinction between IGP 
and the Commissioner of Police in terms of who has overall competence over the 
issuance of licenses for meetings and assemblies, it avoided the larger question whether 
the Public Order Act could possibly co-exist with the rights enshrined under the 
constitution. And though the court in this case reached the correct verdict overall, its 
failure to reject and nullify the Chukwuma verdict makes for too much uncertainty in 
jurisprudence.  
 But more than the contradiction in the overall outcome of both cases there is the 
larger issue of an absence of any structured justification for each of the decisions. This 
further strengthens the finding in the fourth chapter that there is a lack of clear judicial 
standards for justifying intrusions on constitutionally protected rights in Nigerian law. Let 
us even assume for once that the court in the earlier case created a structure or standard 
from which its decision was derived. It would be well-nigh impossible for the same court 
in the latter case to take a totally different route. This again reflects the Bourdieuan 
nightmare. The court could not very much avoid its historical shadow. While struggling 
to act within “objective constraints”772 (as in interpreting the Public Order Act closely), 
the court nonetheless fell into some subjective “forms of consciousness”773 created by the 
English legal culture that rules the adjudicatory system. 
 Both cases dealt with interpretation of the Public Order Act. This is a colonial law 
that was applied for the complete subordination of the colonized by the colonizers. After 
independence, it should have been repealed. But it was not; apparently because its 
objective fitted also the oppressive inclinations of the post-independence regime. This 
decision also marked a moment of crass reflexivity in judicial attitude that I already 
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mentioned elsewhere in this study. The decision is emblematic of the tendency to leave 
open-ended rationalizations of the judgments which makes it hard to pin the courts to any 
discernible reasoning pattern. Could this be a deliberate ploy by judges to create a fluid 
environment in which justifications shift arbitrarily? If this is the case, what reasons 
could be adduced for it? 
 The answer to this question may not be too far removed from the context for these 
cases, especially the ANPP case. The party was the main opposition to the one in power 
at this time. The government applied the Public Order Act to prevent its members from 
organizing what they had called “mass action” to protest alleged rigging of the 2003 
general elections. But that ended up being the case where the court perhaps reached the 
correct verdict in terms of outcome. This in fact is what makes the judgment puzzling; 
especially if my argument that the courts tend to favor the government in cases similar to 
this is applied to it. The court completely blew that argument out the water but without 
offering any strong justification for doing so. In other words, it may seem that not always 
are the courts swayed by simple political calculations. But it nonetheless confirms the 
courts’ “one step forward-two steps backward” character which is not good for the 
stability of judicial orientation.     
 The case of Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria v Minister of Labor 
and Productivity and Others774 provides evidence of the gate-keeping mindset of the 
courts on matters relating to trade union formation. The third respondent in that case 
(Registered Trustees of Nigerian Association of Community Health Practitioners) applied 
to the Nigerian Minister of Labor for registration as a trade union. The Minister referred 
the application to the office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, the second respondent in 
the appeal. Upon 2nd respondent’s recommendation, 1st respondent denied the application 
for registration. Third respondent therefore filed an action for judicial review of the 
decision to deny the application. Before this application could be determined on its merits 
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the appellant in this suit applied to be joined in it as a co-defendant, a request that the 
court did not hesitate in granting.  
Upon hearing 3rd respondent’s application for judicial review, the court decided in 
their favor. It held the decision to deny 3rd respondent request for registration to be 
invalid and unconstitutional because it violated the right to associate and to belong to a 
trade union recognized by the constitution, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention to which Nigeria is a 
signatory. The appellant was dissatisfied with the decision and appealed. 3rd respondent 
was also not happy with the court decision joining appellant as a co-defendant in the 
action and appealed that portion of the court judgment. 
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal reiterated that the right to freedom of 
association granted by section 40 of the 1999 Constitution is not absolute but subject to 
the limitation provisions of section 45. The court then concluded, without attempting any 
balancing effort,  that the provisions of sections 3 and 5 of the Trade Unions Act, cap 437 
containing the conditions to be met by an applicant before it could be registered as a trade 
union are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution.  
At the time this dispute arose, the relationship between the government and the 
organized labor movement had deteriorated significantly. As shown further below, 
government and labor were at odds over certain government economic policies that labor 
said undermined the interests of workers. Government was concerned about what it 
thought to be exceedingly excessive clout of the labor movement and sought through 
various ways, especially registration and legislation, to cut the body to size. Denying the 
appellants in this case the opportunity of registration would seem to enhance this goal. 
The court was willing to lend a helping hand as would be the case in many other 
instances where government and labor tangled in dispute. Not only was the government’s 
political or economic objectives fulfilled, the judges stood to benefit as well by avoiding 
confrontation with government.   
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6.3.4. Transitional [De] Sensitivities 
A thread of thinking that animates this research is my belief which is shared by 
transitional justice theorists that political transition should be much more than a change 
from one regime type to another. If democracy is considered to be a better form of 
government than say, military rule it is often because certain legal and political values 
could be more easily realized under the former regime type than the latter. But if despite 
the transition, the realization of those values still remains illusory, it follows that the 
transition itself could not be described as successful. The extent to which human rights 
that were repressed under an authoritarian context are realizable under a resulting 
democratic transition is among several ways of assessing the success or failure of that 
transition. Therefore in dealing with human rights complaints post-political transition, 
courts ought to take into account the altered legal context and factor this change into their 
decisions. To what extent could it be said that this has happened since the Nigerian 
transition of 1999? This is the issue that I examine in this section. 
 In the next chapter, I will argue that there has not been sufficient clarity in the 
attitude of Nigerian courts to human rights complaints since the conclusion of transition 
from military rule. I blame this on the lack of adequate “signalling” from the other 
political branches. But while ordinarily this apparent lack of “signalling” could be viewed 
as a major constraint upon the courts, Ginsburg rather sees it as an opportunity for 
innovation that the courts should grasp.775 The next line of cases takes a close look at 
some of the decisions emanating from Nigeria’s superior courts that engages this question 
and how the courts responded to them. 
 In the case of Ekanem v Assistant Inspector General of Police (Zone 6)776 the 
appellant was a witness to a beating carried out by a mob of about 50 able-bodied, armed 
men. They were attending a village meeting when this mob showed up in three vehicles 
and started beating one ACP Inyang once they had identified him. The mob tried to force 
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Inyang into one of their vehicles but he resisted with the assistance of some village 
youths. Inyang reported the assault on him to the police. Appellant was called as someone 
who had witnessed the beating. After making a statement to the police, he was promptly 
arrested and detained. He brought a suit to enforce his fundamental rights, claiming the 
violation of his right to personal liberty as well as inhuman and degrading treatment. Not 
only had he been detained, the police also denied him sleeping materials. Therefore in 
detention, appellant slept while standing most of the time or slept on the bare floor. The 
trial court declined jurisdiction to hear the case. The judge suggested instead that the case 
should be taken to Akwa Ibom state where the criminal case was with the police and not 
in Calabar where the appellant was being detained. The appellant appealed this 
abdication. 
 The appeal court correctly ruled on the first limb of the claim that to hold the 
appellant in detention for about two weeks without charge or bail was a violation of his 
right to personal liberty. The court also held that suspicion that a person had committed a 
crime even where based on reasonable grounds is not justification for detention in 
anticipation of a criminal charge. Moreover, the court held that in this case the suspicion 
upon which the appellant was detained was uncertain. But on the second leg of the 
application dealing with the denial of sleeping materials, the court took a rather 
contestable course when seeming to describe this request as “utopian.” It relied for this 
conclusion on “the Nigerian context” in which this kind of denial is routine whether the 
victim was detained by the police or held in prison. The judge who wrote the majority 
decision concluded in these words: 
I am also of the view that the relief sought is not justiciable. Fundamental 
rights are in the realm of domestic law and they are fundamental because 
they have been guaranteed by the constitution… I do not know of any 
guaranteed right to be provided on arrest with a bed to sleep on though it 
is practicable to expect a detained person to sleep. Where he lies on before 
he sleeps is another matter. Every human is entitled to a fundamental right 
only when he is not subject to any constitutional disability. A person who 
is detained from an offence within the law is subject to a constitutional 
disability. 
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There might be benefit in taking a closer look at the reasoning in this case. The court’s 
position furnishes additional evidence of reflexivity in the approach of Nigerian courts to 
human rights complaints. It is standing on very weak legal foundation but has far 
reaching implications because courts lower on the hierarchy than the Court of Appeal in 
Nigeria are bound by it. What the court did in this case was to decouple the right to 
liberty and freedom from arbitrary arrest/detention (that is the right not to be arrested or 
detained except there is legal justification) from the right to the dignity of the human 
person (in other words the right to be treated humanely and in a dignified manner when in 
detention).  
The logic of this judgment therefore is that the right to dignity is abolished in the 
case of any individual whose right to liberty is legitimately curtailed. In other words, if as 
in this case a suspect is arrested and detained as part of an on-going criminal process (or 
what the court refers to as “constitutional disability”), the arrest and detention would 
actually justify holding the said suspect in less than dignifying conditions. This 
conclusion lacks any clear legal justification. The right to personal liberty and the right to 
dignity are separate rights recognized under the constitution. None should count more 
than the other in an ideal situation. Both rights deal with constitutional guarantees to 
ensure that the human rights of persons being processed through the criminal justice 
system are respected. In fact, it might well be that the right to dignity of the person is 
recognized specifically for the benefit of such persons knowing the natural tendency to 
treat persons suspected of criminal behavior with little regard for their human dignity. 
This portion of the decision could as well have been given under the military 
regime without consequences. In those days there was no constitution to guide courts (it 
had been nullified by decrees) and judges therefore negotiated such cases with extreme 
caution. While under the dictatorship detainees could be treated without regard to their 
dignity, the same ceased being the case after the transition. Or so it should have been. 
The “Nigerian context” that the court referenced to justify its reasoning was actually that 
of the military. It belonged to the past. Yet the court showed a lack of sensitivity to this 
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fact. This is therefore what I would describe as “de-sensitivity” of the kind that ignores 
the transition from the military to a democracy or a change from authority to justification 
through constitutionality.        
 The case of Abacha v Fawehinmi777 was among the most important cases dealt 
with by the Supreme Court in the early months after the transition to civil rule. It had in 
fact meandered its way through the years and the entire judicial structure while the 
military were in power before ending up at the Supreme Court as civil rule was restored. 
The first issue contested in the case was whether the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights was applicable in Nigeria. The second was whether an international 
treaty rule incorporated into Nigerian domestic law prevailed over another conflicting 
domestic statute. The case revolved around the right to personal liberty. 
  In that case, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, a Lagos lawyer was arrested on 30 January 
1996 by the State Security Services for actions deemed contrary to national security. An 
application for the enforcement of his fundamental rights was immediately lodged by his 
attorney with the Federal High Court in Lagos. In the application, Chief Fawehinmi 
argued that his arrest and continued detention without charge violated his rights under the 
1999 constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (‘African 
Charter’), as incorporated in Nigerian legislation. The respondents, General Sani Abacha 
(at the time military President of Nigeria), the Attorney-General of the Federation, the 
State Security Service, and the Inspector-General of Police filed an objection with the 
High Court. They contended that Fawehinmi had been detained pursuant to an order 
signed by the Inspector-General of the Police under the provisions of the State Security 
(Detention of Persons) Decree No 2, 1984 (‘Decree No 2’) (as amended). They argued 
that the Court therefore had no jurisdiction to hear the action as its jurisdiction had been 
ousted by the Decree.  
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The High Court, after hearing arguments on the objection, held that its jurisdiction 
was ousted by the Decree. Chief Fawehinmi appealed, and the Court of Appeal ruled 
partly in his favor, remitting “the case back to the trial Court to consider the issue of the 
detention for the four days of the (detention of the appellant) which is apparently not 
covered by the order.” Both sides in the case appealed the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal to the Supreme Court. The principal issues raised in this case were very 
significant for the times within which they occurred. But far more substantial were 
collateral issues that the case explored in its wake. 
 For example, apart from the personal liberty issue raised in this case, the court’s 
decision had implications as well for the manner in which international agreements to 
which Nigeria is a state party become laws of the land. I dealt with this in great detail in 
chapter five. I will not repeat the points I made then. That leaves me with the personal 
liberty portion of the judgment to deal with. On that, the cross-appeal by Chief 
Fawehinmi was upheld. The Court found no evidence that Chief Fawehinmi had been 
detained pursuant to a detention order under Decree No 2. It therefore remitted the case to 
the Federal High Court for trial of his claims.  
 The relevance of this case in this section is not so much for the verdict reached as 
with the fact that the court was silent on the issue of transition within which the case was 
caught up. Here was Fawehinmi who had engaged in a long-running test of will with the 
military and suffered series of detentions in the process. His case had survived the 
military regime and that is not an insignificant fact. While it is unclear what impact the 
transition had on the case and particularly whether the court took the change in political 
environment into consideration in reaching its decision, not stating so, to my mind, is a 
serious omission. As shown in the South African case of AZAPO778 earlier discussed 
under the transitional justice theory of adjudication, there is always a one-off opportunity 
for the highest court in a transitioning society to demonstrate its sensitivity to the 
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transitional moment. This case was such an opportunity for the Nigerian Supreme Court. 
The court clearly did not utilize it effectively.     
 
6.3.5. Rational Choice Dilemmas: What Interests are Nigerian Judges 
Maximizing? 
 
In this section, I return again to what private interest motivations might be engaged when 
Nigerian judges render decisions in specific human rights cases. My goal here is to show 
whether or not such interests could be said to have been at play in decisions reached by 
Nigeria’s superior courts in human rights cases for the period that the study covers. The 
relevant paradigm which I earlier identified as likely to be implicated is the rational 
choice theory. It posits that judges, like all rational actors in society, decide cases only in 
ways that would most probably maximize their self-interest. Kapiszewski extends this a 
little further by suggesting that the considerations at play could be a judge’s particular 
ideology (social, political, religious or cultural) or the interests of the judiciary as an 
institution. This happens to be the case especially when political sensitivity undergirds 
judges’ own personal interests. 
As Robertson theorized, most court decisions involve the judges in the exercise of 
a certain level of discretion. And where this discretion is available to judges,779 they tend 
to exercise them according to their personal beliefs and attitudes. In the Nigerian context, 
such attitudes could be formed through professional, social or political connection. In 
terms of political exposure, it could be argued that though the judiciary is a distinct 
branch of government, it still has to collaborate with the other branches to formulate and 
implement broad governmental policies. Some form of bureaucratic connection is of 
course unavoidable against this background.  This could also fit the personal interest of 
the judges to enter (and remain in) the good books of the government whose help they 
may need to advance professionally. This would therefore place their attitude within the 
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rational choice or self-interest theory of adjudication discussed in chapter 2.  On the 
contrary, in some other cases that do not engage the interest of the government as a 
threshold dilemma, the courts tend to be freer to make choices that conformed to the 
strength of the cases that the parties presented. 
I will illustrate this judicial challenge with some decided cases. In Provost, Lagos 
State College of Education and Others v Kolawole Edun and Other,780 the question was 
about how private property could be validly acquired for public purpose and what 
statutory requirements must be fulfilled for the acquisition to be effective. Respondent in 
that case claimed to have bought a piece of land in 1972 and entered immediate 
possession. He established a poultry farm on the land. The appellants claimed that the 
Lagos State government in the same 1972 acquired the same piece of land for public 
purpose.  
When the appellants entered the land in 1982, they found the respondent’s poultry 
on it and immediately issued encroachment notices against the respondents. The 
respondents then petitioned the Lagos state government. But while waiting for the 
outcome of this petition, agents of the 1st appellant entered the land, fenced it off and 
destroyed all structures and property belonging to the respondents. Action filed by the 
respondents at the High Court was dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment 
and found in favor of the respondents. 
 On further appeal, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of fortissime contra 
preferentes which permits exproprietory statutes to be construed strictly against the 
acquiring authority and in favor of the citizen whose proprietary rights are being 
impeded. The court held the view that the provision of section 25 of the Public Lands 
Acquisition (Amendment) Edict 1976 did not offend the equivalent sections of the 1979 
Constitution under which that litigation was commenced and which provided for the 
compulsory acquisition of property upon payment of prompt compensation.  
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On grounds of bare facts, this case ought to have produced similar outcome as in 
Victor Ndoma Egba781 above. Both cases involved expropriation and the application of a 
specific doctrine. But they produced contradictory decisions. The only difference is that 
in the latter case, state government was one of the parties. It is a little difficult to assign 
any theoretical justification to this decision. The rational choice theory may have been 
appropriate. But the decision was delivered by the Supreme Court and rather than the 
federal government only a state government was involved. To apply this theory 
effectively to the case one would need to isolate what personal benefits the Supreme 
Court judges stood to derive from a state government that exercises absolutely no powers 
over them. This is an enormous challenge indeed. This notwithstanding, there is still 
something to be said about the contradiction in the two decisions. It would seem to 
suggest that to the courts, government is government whether at the state or federal 
government. And since there would seem to be private benefits for judges to be more 
sensitive to government concerns, applying the rational choice theory to this case may in 
fact be appropriate. 
6.3.6. Economic Stability versus Rights: Applying Baxi’s TREMF Thesis    
In this section I turn to a different theoretical model that I suggested could be used to 
understand human rights adjudication in Nigeria from 1999 to 2009. I mentioned Baxi’s 
trade-related market friendly human rights paradigm as representative of this model. The 
model suggests a displacement of the UDHR human rights paradigm by a new one that 
emphasizes the needs of neoliberal markets. It simply postulates that contemporary state 
developmental progress is measurable only by looking at how good a host that state is to 
global capital. To make this possible, the TREMF model favors deregulation and the 
migration of government away from the commercial arena. In essence it denies any 
economic redistributive role for the state. Human rights concerns are secondary in such a 
state and could be delegitimized to make the environment more conducive to the interests 
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of global capital. This is an issue of concern to transitioning states, including those in 
Africa (of which Nigeria is one). The reason is that often political transition occurs 
contemporaneously with economic transformation. Because of its very nature, the 
TREMF paradigm would more relate to economic issues than otherwise.     
Not always is it clear where the boundaries between political stability and 
economic development could be drawn. Nor is it certain how human rights adjudication 
could be a factor in that process. Almost all the cases that I have analyzed dealt with 
violations of civil and political rights. This is obviously because the legal status of social 
and economic rights is contested in Nigeria both with regard to their placement in the 
constitution and their interpretation by the courts. But this notwithstanding, situations 
have arisen in which the interpretation of some domestic statutes placed simultaneous 
attention on certain elements of socio-economic rights.  
An area that this occurred sporadically was with regard to the right of workers to 
strike as an extension of the right to work. Though the right to work is as fraught in the 
Nigerian context as several other socio-economic rights, some domestic laws such as the 
Trade Disputes Act, 1990 protect the rights of workers to collective bargaining and to 
strike in order to protect that and other rights. As exemplified by some cases that I 
discuss below, the few instances when it appeared socio-economic rights are engaged in 
litigation during the review period have invariably been in the area of right of workers to 
strike. This is not surprising given the collision that often exists between the rights of 
workers and the interests of profit-motivated businesses in deeply deregulated transitional 
environments. 
 Among those few cases is Bureau of Public Enterprises v National Union of 
Electricity Employees.782 The questions before the court were as to what qualified to be 
described as a trade dispute and whether the action taken in this case by the government 
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body charged with privatizing public corporations which was aimed at preventing a strike 
was a trade dispute within the meaning of the Trade Disputes Act, 1990. The facts of that 
case were as follows. The appellant is the government agency charged with privatizing 
government corporations while respondents were employees of the National Electric 
Power Authority (NEPA), one of the corporations marked out to be privatized. 
Respondents threatened a strike action should the appellant proceed with its plans to 
privatize NEPA. Appellant filed the suit to forestall the planned strike action. 
Respondents objected to the suit on grounds that appellant lacked locus standi to institute 
it because there was no relationship of employer/employee involved. After a hearing on 
the objection, the court ruled that the suit belonged to the National Industrial Court and 
struck it out. Appellants contended on this appeal that no trade dispute was disclosed and 
therefore the High Court had jurisdiction to decide the case. Respondents also filed a 
cross-appeal. 
 In its judgment the Court of Appeal held that by virtue of section 47(1) of the 
Trade Disputes Act 1990, “trade dispute” is defined as any dispute between the 
employers and workers or between workers and workers which is connected with 
employment or non-payment or the terms of employment and physical conditions of 
work of any person. It found that the case before it did not indicate a trade dispute within 
the meaning of the statute since it was neither between the employer and employees, nor 
employees and employees. On this basis, the court concluded that if there was no trade 
dispute within the meaning of the statute, the High Court and not the National Industrial 
Court had jurisdiction to hear it. 
 Before analyzing this decision within the context of the TREMF paradigm, let me 
first dispose of a preliminary issue. This decision turned only on the question of which 
court had jurisdiction over the case. It had nothing to do with whether or not the 
threatened strike action could be legally justified. But this particular point (that a 
proposed strike is not in order) is implied in the court’s reasoning that since there was not 
a trade dispute within the meaning of the Act, then the main question could be answered. 
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Interestingly, the dispute arose from a plan to privatize a corporation that had been run by 
government for several decades. It is understandable why the workers were reluctant to 
buy into the privatization plan: jobs are always the initial casualties in the corporate post-
privatization agenda.  
The fact that the court did not answer the major question arising for consideration 
in this case reduces the opportunity to apply the TREMF thesis to its decision. But the 
court’s rather dim view of what could amount to a trade dispute would seem to suggest it 
possessed a mindset more favorable to the privatization scheme. The court was not 
willing to recognize the Bureau of Public Enterprises as the employer within the meaning 
of the Act. This is notwithstanding that the Bureau had powers under the law to sell off 
NEPA, which in the courts view would be the employer. But the alternative view would 
seem more persuasive. It is that whoever had powers to fire the employer is actually the 
putative employer.  
But when this decision is placed beside the new government’s single minded 
determination to see through its privatization agenda, it would make sense if viewed 
through the TREMF filter. The government trumpeted the position that to attract foreign 
capital in the form of direct investments, monopolies like NEPA had to be broken and 
businesses needed to be competitive.783 Government had to withdraw from commercial 
activities and settle into the simple role of creating the right business environment. The 
labor movement had disagreed with this position and had challenged it at every turn. 
Cases like this prove that organized Labor’s complaints were also framed in legal and 
litigatory terms. The courts had to state clearly on whose side they were. As will be 
shown below, they were ambivalent in their posture though the superior courts tended to 
side with the government and private capital.            
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 The decision of the court in the case above may be as questionable as it was 
predictable. But the same could also be said of some cases taken to the courts in the wake 
of a particular government policy that the organized labor movement in Nigeria 
considered harmful to their members. From 1999 to 2007 or thereabout, the labor 
movement waged a relentless battle to resist the policy of the government hiking the 
pump price for gasoline across the country.784 In early 2004, the Nigerian government 
decided to impose another price hike on this essential commodity. Each time this hike 
had taken place previously, retail prices, transportation costs and cost of other 
goods/services often spiraled out of control, causing great economic hardship to the most 
vulnerable segments of the population. 
 In response to the proposed government action, the labor movement served a 
notice on the government threatening to launch a strike in protest against the price 
increase.785 The government then commenced this action seeking an injunction 
restraining the labor movement from going on strike. Like in the other case discussed 
above, the government hinged its claim on the contention that the strike notice was not in 
contemplation of or in furtherance of a trade dispute. It further argued that the labor 
movement lacked standing to challenge the political and economic decisions of the 
government on such a platform. On its part, the labor movement argued that the price 
hike was illegal and unconstitutional. It also contended that the government could not 
validly implement the price hike policy without a law passed to that effect by the 
National Assembly. The High Court ruled in favor of the government, holding that the 
price hike did not qualify as a trade dispute entitling the labor movement to carry out 
strikes to oppose it. A dissatisfied labor movement appealed the decision. 
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 As with the BPE case earlier examined, the Court of Appeal in its judgment held 
that the dispute in order to come with the Trade Disputes Act must involve trade as 
distinct from a political dispute. It reasoned that what the labor movement set out to 
achieve in this case (including calling out its allies such as market women and school 
children and causing the permanent cessation of all vehicular movement and shutting 
down of airlines) did not fall within the meaning of the Act. This, the court further held, 
was the case because “one cannot put these other persons [market women, school 
children, etc.] within the employment covered by the trade unions being used.”786     
 The court’s reasoning in this case has attracted some negative commentary. 
Okafor decries its approach and describes it as “much too cursory and far too 
unsystematic to provide much insight into the logic that underpins it.”787 On the question 
whether a hike in the price of gas could trigger a trade dispute, he further questioned the 
court’s reasoning in these words: 
For one, the court devoted barely two double-spaced pages to its own 
reasoning concerning this pivotal and highly consequential aspect of its 
decision (much of which was in any case taken up by a paraphrase of the 
relevant legislative provision). The court offered no analysis at all of the 
elements of the definition of a trade dispute on which it relied. These 
elements were simply reproduced from the relevant legislation. The court 
made no attempt systematically and carefully to relate this definition to the 
facts of the case. The reader is thus left in the dark as to what exactly it is 
about the NLC’s fuel pricing dispute with the government that disqualifies 
from meeting the definition of a trade dispute.788      
 
In the same piece, Okafor did refer to at least one decision that seemed to uphold the 
position of the labor movement. That case789 had been filed earlier in 2004 and was 
adjudicated before the latter case that ended up at the Court of Appeal. The main issue in 
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this case was not much different from the one canvassed in the case analyzed above. The 
Federal government asked the court to declare that mass protests and strikes, or any other 
form or manner of protests as the defendants, the NLC decided or may decide to embark 
upon is illegal, unlawful and is contrary to peace and order of the nation. It also urged the 
court to declare that the NLC is not entitled to embark on any protests or strikes in 
respect of any matter not within the purview of the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Acts. 
 The High Court in this case decided that Nigerian law does not bar workers 
(whether or not they are associated with the NLC) from striking over issues that concern 
their interests. According to the court, the word “interest” had not been clearly defined 
and cannot therefore be limited only to matters regulating the terms and conditions of 
employment of workers as stipulated in the Trade Unions Act. But whatever benefit 
could have been derived from this decision is relatively diminished because it is only a 
High Court decision with limited precedential value. With the latter Court of Appeal 
decision in the case already discussed above, it could be reasonably concluded that this 
very judgment is impliedly overruled. I have therefore mentioned this decision neither 
because it represents the current formal legal position nor even that it fits within the level 
of cases that I am discussing in this study. It is only indicative that alternative tendencies 
did exist within the judiciary in general at the time in question. 
 Baxi’s TREMF paradigm is no doubt relevant to the assessment of these 
decisions. The Nigerian Court of Appeal at least on one occasion in these labor-inspired 
cases seemed to have been an enthusiastic ally in the realization of shift towards a 
TREMF reasoning. In Adams Oshiomhole’s case, it held that the rights of the members of 
the Nigeria Labor Congress to assemble or express themselves cannot be at the expense 
of the public good. The court shied away from defining what this public good is. One 
could thus conclude on the basis of events leading to this litigation that “public good” 
amounted to no more than keeping the peace so that private capital could thrive. It did not 
matter that government embodied this undefined “public good” or that the human rights 
of Nigerians to assemble, associate and express themselves freely were being sacrificed 
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at its shrine. Because this particular judgment has not been overturned, it represents the 
law on the subject at least for the time being.  
6.3.7. Analytic Summary 
To summarize this chapter, it is not in doubt that the approach of the courts to the cases 
analyzed in this study supports my overall argument as to their possible theoretical 
underpinnings. The reasoning in the judgments considered clearly oscillated along 
several ideological trajectories. There is a palpable lack of consistency while reflexivity 
was at the heart of the decisions. As a result, contradictions occurred rather frequently. 
Against this background, I would have been justified in refusing to pin the courts down to 
any particular theoretical tradition. That said, however, it is also evident that some 
paradigms featured more significantly than others in the overall court culture. 
There is a sense in which it could be argued that judicial orientation acquired 
through exposure to the British legal education system dominates judicial consciousness 
in Nigeria. That would be an important argument to make because it is that theoretical 
background that predominantly structures the country’s judicial praxis. This orientation 
appears to (in one form or another) taint almost all the cases considered in this study. It 
could also account for the difficulty that the courts face in constructing objective 
standards for the review of human rights cases. Invariably, however much the judges 
would want to present their decisions from an analysis of law as an object (that is 
incorporating objective standards), there seemed to be more value instead in 
understanding them as flowing from experience. As Cotterrell argues, 
When jurists were recruited from a single stratum of the social, their 
subjective views of the meaning and character of law could appear 
objective. Now, the jurisprudence of difference shows that what law is ‘in 
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reality’ depends on the standpoint from which it is seen, and the way it is 
experienced.790  
  
Difference as used by Cotterrell could be based on class, gender, race or other minority 
viewpoint. But I use it here to refer to the particular difference existing between the 
culture of a dominant legal system (as in the empire or the colonial) when it is imposed 
on a subordinate culture (of the colonized or subaltern). It also incorporates the process 
by which this experience is cultivated and nourished.     
Thus, habitus in its original Bourdieuan formulation seems to be the most 
dominant theory for understanding the human rights adjudicatory traditions of Nigerian 
courts. It holds that the traditions of the legal profession in practical and judicial terms 
cannot escape cultivated experiences or the process through which the legal field forms 
its members. Education, training and socialization are all integral to this process of 
professional formation. They mostly inform legal practice and adjudication as individuals 
can only apply knowledge that have been thus acquired and internalized. It is from the 
pressures of the legal habitus791 that orthodoxy and literalism become manifest. In other 
words literal/formalistic orthodoxy is being fed the crops of the legal habitus.  
As old habits really die hard, to create a new paradigm, and therefore a different 
habitus, would require the same process of teaching, learning and internalization of 
values. Applied to this study, and having regard to the preceding analyses, for Nigerian 
courts to give up their British traditions would require a different kind of legal education. 
For example, to move from mere orthodoxy to something different, the legal habitus 
would need to be transformed. But for the present, it may not be empirically stated that 
there is a strong connection between the ambivalence of the courts and on-going human 
rights abuses. Yet if lack of legal accountability fuels impunity and encourages human 
rights violators, holding them accountable through legal means would most likely have 
                                                          
790Roger Cotterrell, “The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality” (2008) 4 Int’l J Law in 
Context 373 at 376.  
791Menachem Mautner, “Three Approaches to Law and Culture” (2010-2011) 96 Cornell L Rev 840.   
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the opposite effect. It could therefore be concluded that effective judicial intervention is 
necessary to ensure legal accountability and ameliorate impunity.  
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Chapter Seven 
Post-Transition Blues: Challenges, Constraints, Opportunities 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I discussed and evaluated the performance of Nigerian courts in 
the enforcement of human rights from 1999-2009 and how judicial activities in this area 
were shaped by the framework established under the 1999 Constitution. I examined the 
attitude of the courts when confronted with a variety of human rights claims. In doing 
this, I applied certain theoretical threads to the work of the courts as a way of 
understanding the orientation and ideology of their decisions. I concluded that the work 
of the courts is not being helped by internalized attitudes of the judicial system which 
needs to transform through education and training to form a new legal habitus. 
 In this chapter I shift attention to the other challenges that may have impeded the 
courts in human rights enforcement during the period that this research covers. My 
analysis in this chapter will therefore respond to the second component of the 
overarching question in this research. The conclusion from the last chapter would seem to 
be that the courts have not quite lived up to their roles since the transition. If this happens 
to be the case, it could be safely concluded that this fact may have contributed to on-
going impunity and abuse of human rights. The question then is why this has been the 
case. What factors in addition to those already discussed may have been implicated in 
this? Are there opportunities to redress the situation? 
For a start, it is all too easy to hold the courts to standards that are incompatible 
with the legal and social realities under which their constitutional responsibilities are 
discharged. The judicial institution is (as I have sometimes done in this research) often 
attacked for alleged failure to live up to its constitutional duties especially in the area of 
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human rights enforcement.792 While those attacks could be sometimes justified, most of 
the time they show lack of appreciation for the limits placed on judicial performance by 
structural as well as legal limitations.793  
Different segments of the third and fifth chapters identified Nigeria’s colonial 
history and particularly the impact on legal education and training as a major factor in the 
development of Nigeria’s foggy human rights adjudication culture.  This has fostered a 
system ill-suited to the country’s constitutional model.  The lack of an objective standard 
for the review of human rights cases is an important offshoot of this culture. That is 
therefore a substantial part of the challenges to effective judicial intervention in human 
rights cases. I have analyzed it in great detail as such. There is no need to return to 
arguments already advanced in that regard. Therefore, other challenges and limitations 
engage my attention in the rest of this chapter. When looked at closely, the factors that I 
discuss below could also relate to some of the theories of human rights adjudication that I 
identified in the second chapter and applied to this research in the sixth one. 
7.2. A Broken Transition: Getting Away with Impunity  
 The first factor that I discuss is related to the link between the present (civil rule) 
and the past (military dictatorship) in the Nigerian context. My initial argument is that 
civil dispensation cannot be secured without properly accounting for the use of power 
during the military era. To do otherwise, would be to condone past impunity which could 
then come back to haunt the present. 
                                                          
792In a recent interview, for example, the head of a Nigerian non-governmental organization which petitions 
the courts often to advance economic, social and cultural rights blames the courts in part for lack of 
effective human rights enforcement. He alleged that the judges possess an “acrobatic tradition” in this 
regard. See Olayinka Adesina, “Nigerian Lawyers don’t have in-depth Knowledge of Rights Laws” 
Nigerian Compass online 
<http://www.compassnewspaper.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3956%3Anigerian
-lawyers-dont-have-in-depth-knowledge-of-rights-laws&catid=90%3Afront-page->.  
793See AA Olowofoyeku, “The Beleaguered Fortress: Reflections of the Independence of Nigeria’s 
Judiciary” (1989) 33 J Afr L 55 at 62; Ade Adesomoju, “Lack of Independence of State Judiciary 
dangerous – CJN” Punch online <http://www.punchng.com/news/lack-of-independence-of-state-judiciary-
dangerous-cjn/>.   
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Before now, I had pointed out how the Nigerian judiciary struggled to assert its 
authority during the long period of military rule. In that period repression wore the guise 
of military laws (known either as decrees at the federal level or edicts at the state level) 
and the courts were required to implement those laws.794 While some Nigerian judges 
were zealous in lending their high offices to the self-serving objectives of the military,795 
a good number of them showed uncommon courage and hesitated to bow to the dictates 
of authoritarian rule.796 Some of them paid extraordinarily high prices for their show of 
moral strength. On the one hand, to have such courageous judges kicked out of office was 
routine throughout that period.797 On the other hand, those judges who stood on the side 
of a repressive junta were “rewarded” for the positions that they took.798 
 At the time when civil rule was restored in 1999, it was imperative that the 
dictatorial reflex which the courts had acquired throughout the time that the military was 
in power had to give way to judicial orientation more suited to a democratic and 
constitutional dispensation. And in no area did this understanding cry more for 
fulfillment as in the area of protection of human rights. With a constitution that 
enumerated several human rights guarantees, it was expected that the courts which had 
                                                          
794 Basil Ugochukwu, Repression as Law: The Arbitrary Use of Military Decrees in Nigeria (Lagos: 
Constitutional Rights Project, 1994). 
795The human rights jurisprudence of Justice Babatunde Belgore who for almost two decades was Chief 
Judge of the Federal High Court has been analyzed along these lines. See Ibidapo-Obe, supra note 408 at 
66.  
796 Oyelowo Oyewo, “The Judiciary in Periods of Political Crisis and Conflicts in Nigeria” (1998) 10 Afr J 
Int’l & Comp L 507 at 512 where the author provided evidence of the reluctance of the Supreme Court to 
validate the abuse of power by the military regime. 
797 Under the dictatorship of General Muhammadu Buhari in April 1985 about 32 Judges were summarily 
purged from the judiciary making a legal scholar to conclude that “with the exception of [a] few judges…, 
the AFRC [Armed Forces Ruling Council] may remove summarily, without consultation and without 
giving any reasons, any judge who the government does not wish to continue in office.” Olowofoyeku, 
supra note 793 at 62. 
798 Lewis, for instance, noted what he called “the flagrant manipulation of the judiciary during the [1993] 
transition impasse” when the judge responsible for granting an order for the June 12, 1993 presidential 
election not to hold “was mysteriously transferred to the Abuja High Court from an obscure provincial 
bench only weeks before the [ultimately annulled] presidential poll.” See Peter Lewis, “Endgame in 
Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition” (1994) 93 Afr Affairs 323 at 332. 
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ostensibly been freed from their shackles would more readily seize the initiative and step 
up on behalf of a citizenry still recovering from the trauma of military rule.   
 However, since the courts do not operate in a vacuum, their position had to align 
properly with that taken by the other branches of the government in the resulting 
transition. Yet any expectation that the courts would take a trajectory completely opposed 
to that of the other political constituencies amounted to mere wishful fantasy. Any 
observable improvement in orientation from the military era did not have to start and end 
with the courts. That there had been a change from military to civil rule, for example, did 
not mean that the courts had become completely detached from political control. Rather, 
the more the judiciary tried to assert its independence and authority even under a civil 
democratic setup, the more dependent on them the other branches of government tried to 
make it. If this situation had to change, it required from the very beginning of the 
transition period an important effort on the part of those charged under the new civil 
dispensation to signal the dawn of a new legal order. Unfortunately, this did not seem to 
be the case. 
 There is often general public expectation that the courts would act proactively 
after a transition to remedy at once all the ills of the prior era. The context for such 
judicial intervention would, however, have to be carefully weighted especially in 
“divided societies,”799 those that have had difficult political histories or are 
“conflicted.”800 In the specific task of enforcing human rights, while what is better known 
                                                          
799 Sujit Choudhry, “Constitutionalism in Divided Societies” (2007) 5 Int’l J Const L 573. Nigeria was 
mentioned as belonging to such societies that form a collective which are not just “ethnically, linguistically, 
religiously, or culturally diverse. What particularly identifies a divided society is that these differences are 
politically salient – that is, they are persistent markers of political identity as well as bases for political 
mobilization. Political claims are refracted through the lens of identity, and, thus, political conflict can 
become synonymous with conflict among ethnocultural groups.”  
800 Fionnuala Ni Aolain & Colm Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies” (2005) 
27 Hum Rts Q 172 at 176. The authors here defined “conflicted democracy” in terms of a two-part test both 
elements of which must be met. “First, there must be a deep seated and sharp division in the body politic, 
whether on ethnic, racial, religious, class, or ideological grounds… Second, this division must be so acute, 
and the political circumstances such as to have resulted in or threaten significant political violence.” 
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is the “checking” character of judicial review, Alexander Bickel urges an understanding 
of a “legitimating” quality as well.801 Quoting Black,802 he states that judicial review 
“means not only that the Court may strike down a legislative action as unconstitutional 
but also that it may validate it as within constitutionally granted powers and as not 
violating constitutional limitations.”803 Which tendency the judiciary adopts after (or 
during) a transition will set the tone for how human rights guarantees would be made 
effective or otherwise. 
Bickel’s “legitimating” role of the courts in judicial review parallel’s to a large 
extent Mureinik’s concept of “justification” as it relates to transitional human rights 
adjudication.804 Mureinik was writing against the background of South Africa’s 
progression from apartheid white minority rule to a multi-party constitutional democracy. 
He noted that apartheid had been characterized by a culture of authority, where unjust 
laws were enforced not because of their content, but because of the power wielded by 
those who made them. He saw the future of democratic South Africa in a movement from 
the culture of authority to one of justification. This model warrants constitutional 
justification for every exercise of governmental power as well as an environment in 
which “the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in 
defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command.”805  
For this reason ostensibly, Prempeh contends that the mere grant of judicial 
review power, even under conditions of judicial independence, offers no assurance that 
the power will be employed in the cause of constitutionalism.806 He adds that “the fate of 
                                                          
801 Bickel, supra note 118 at 29. 
802 Charles L Black, The People and the Court (New York: Macmillan, 1960) at 34.  
803 Ibid. 
804 Etienne Mureinik, “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 S Afr J Hum 
Rts 31. 
805 Ibid. See also Michael Bishop, “Why must I Cry? Justification, Sacrifice, Loneliness, Madness and 
Laughter in Post-Apartheid Judicial Decision-Making” (2007) 1 Pretoria Stud L Rev 33. 
806 H Kwasi Prempeh, “Africa’s ‘Constitutionalism Revival’: False Start or New Dawn?” (2007) 5 Int’l J 
Const L 469 at 504.  
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constitutionalism, where it must depend primarily on judicial review, will hinge crucially 
on the set of values, norms, and assumptions that informs judicial reasoning and decision 
making, especially when it comes to interpreting and applying open-textured 
constitutional provisions.”807 
Transition or “political transformation” as Teitel describes it carry significant 
legal consequences for the society transitioning or being transformed. She argues that in 
such situations, the problem of legality is distinct from the problem of the theory of law 
as it arises in established democracies in ordinary times.808 Questions often arise (as it did 
in Nigeria) about the role of the transitional judiciary as well as about the overall 
legitimacy of the new regime.809 And “[T]he choice of principles of adjudication implies 
a related question about where, as an institutional matter, the work of transformation 
should lie: judiciary or legislature?”810  
Often, as was the case with Nigeria, resolving this problem lie only at the margins 
of the transitional process. The major objective that propelled the Nigerian transition was 
the exit of one kind of regime (military) and its replacement with another (“civil”, 
“democratic”, and “constitutional”). The mood of the public and politicians as well 
seemed to be that such institutional questions as the one Teitel identifies would ultimately 
be resolved once the military departed, their immediate departure, on hindsight, being 
considered more important than finding solutions to any institutional problems.  
However, the haste to see off the military without close attention to institutions, and 
especially those with capacity to alter the existing culture of irresponsible power and 
impunity, would prove detrimental to the entire transitional exercise. 
Because human rights had been diminished under the military, it was important 
that the new dispensation made an attempt to distance itself from that legacy. The 
                                                          
807 Ibid.  
808Ruti Teitel, “The Role of Law in Political Transformation” (1997) 106 Yale L J 2009 at 2030. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Ibid. 
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military throughout the period of its rule dealt unkindly with human rights as already 
noted in this study. In addition to the blanket suspension of the constitutional provisions 
enshrining human rights, the military also passed decrees directed at specific human 
rights guarantees.811 In a sense therefore, military rule did not have uniform impact on all 
human rights. Rather some rights suffered more than others in that dispensation.  
Democratic constitutionalism during a transitional period should offer a different 
outlook. However, a lot would depend on the nature and depth of the transition. Often the 
question faced is: what should the constitution be doing for the polity in transition. Teitel 
again says the construction of new constitutional arrangements in periods of radical 
political change is informed by a transitional conception of constitutional justice.812 She 
argues that constitutional law is commonly conceptualized as the most forward-looking 
form of law. But it is ambivalent in the directions that it takes. While what she calls “the 
revolutionary generation” views the content of principles of constitutional justice as 
relating back to past injustice, the transitional perspective views as contextual and 
contingent that which is considered constitutionally just.813 
Further, Teitel believes that studying constitutionalism in periods of political 
change suggests that transitional modalities vary in constitutional continuity. In its 
“codifying” modality, constitutionalism expresses existing consensus, rather than 
transformative purpose. In its transformative modality, however, the successor 
constitution explicitly reconstructs the political order associated with injustice.814 
Transitions therefore often are a meshed balance of law (and the constitution) with 
political reality on the ground. In fact, law and justice in the context of political 
transformation “straddles the middle ground between law and politics; it is a politicised 
                                                          
811See Ugochukwu, supra note 794.  
812 Teitel, supra note 808 at 2057. 
813 Ibid. 
814 Ibid. 
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form of law involving the application of judicial processes in the context of what…is 
politically possible in the circumstances of a particular transition.”815 
That Nigerians had long been fatigued by authoritarian rule and wanted the 
military out of power did not allow for the kind of negotiations necessary to define a 
proper transitional agenda. It was unclear what would happen once the military were 
gone from the stage. The country had two options open to it in this regard if the 
prevailing practices of dealing with the movement from authoritarianism to democracy in 
Africa offered any guide. The country could have chosen to do nothing and “to seek to 
wipe the slate of the past clean by resort to one or more of such devices as blanket 
amnesties or self-conscious bouts of national amnesia, and/or a deliberate exercise in the 
rewriting of history.”816 Or it could have settled for the approach that involved “the 
winners arresting or rounding up the losers – or a sample of the losers – and subjecting 
them to some form of sanction.”817  
The military institution which over the years had demonstrated its political 
astuteness did not sleep on guarantees that were either speculative or uncertain. They 
therefore used their almost total control of the transition to manipulate it to an outcome 
favourable to their members. They allowed only a perfunctory debate of the transitional 
constitution yet contrived to decree a not so popular document such that more than a 
decade after the transition, Nigerians are still clamoring for what they call a peoples 
constitution.818  
The military also conducted their own version of the “vetting” or “lustration” 
procedures; but only in reverse. As such while it was possible for the transition to throw 
                                                          
815 John Daniel & Marisha Ramdeen, “Dealing with Africa’s Post-Independent Past: Truth Commissions, 
Special Courts, War Crimes Trials and other Methods” in Roger Southal ed., South Africa’s Role in 
Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006) 191 at 192. 
816 Ibid. 
817 Ibid. 
818 Basil Ugochukwu, “Pin in the Haystack: Tracking Process and Discovering Nigerian Values in the 
Nigerian Constitution” online: Social Science Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1528468>. 
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up persons supportive of the objectives of the military institution, those with the dimmest 
hint of dislike for it were weeded out of the process. It was therefore not surprising that 
the new post-transition power brokers were either retired military personnel or those who 
had benefited from the military establishment in the past and therefore sympathetic to its 
cause. The transition in essence threw up a system that Ebohon refers to as a “praetorian 
democracy,”819 that is essentially a ‘post-military order navigated with civil command; 
driven by authoritarian culture and psychology.”820 According to him, the organizing 
ideology of praetorian democracy “recognizes the need for accommodation of democratic 
structures even in their distorted forms… it seeks to accommodate a large gamut of the 
social forces and sectors of society without altering the command culture inherent in the 
praetorian absolutist order.”821      
 The above conclusion was further emblematized by the underwhelming efforts of 
the new civil regime in Nigeria to investigate and discover the truth about those found to 
have been responsible for the most severe cases of human rights atrocities committed 
prior to the restoration of civil rule in 1999.  The failure of that truth-seeking process and 
the role the courts played in it had the possibility of fostering impunity across the social 
and political spectrum. That failure also passed on the unwanted message that it was 
profitable for the business of human rights repression to continue under the civilian 
regime as under the military that it replaced.  
 To be sure, there are no easy choices for transitional regimes caught at these 
crossroads. Orentlicher expertly articulates the dilemma of such regimes thus: “With a 
                                                          
819 S I Ebohon, “Post-Militarism: Provenance of Praetorian Democracy in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007” (2009) 8 
Global J Soc Sc 129 at 131. 
820 Ibid. 
821 Ibid. He states that the praetorian absolutist model applied in the context of military regimes 
“acknowledges that the military rules in an environment that has other multiple actors and interests. Its 
praetorian identity derives from the fact that the military is not only dominant, military interests are also 
super ordinate… The unique character of this model is that, while recognizing other interests, it violates the 
constitution and elevates the military to the status of major consumer of fiscal resources of states.” at 130-
131.   
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tenuous grip on power, some of the fledgling democracies have been presented with a 
Hobson’s choice between their very survival and the principles upon which their 
existence was founded.”822 It is an uneasy balance or what Oko calls “a major 
challenge”823 as such between the demands of justice and the continued dangers posed to 
the system by those individuals and institutions responsible for past transgressions.824
 Two weeks after his inauguration on May 29, 1999, the newly elected Nigerian 
President Olusegun Obasanjo announced the establishment of the Human Rights 
Violations Investigation Commission which later became popular as the “Oputa Panel.” It 
was so named after the Commission’s Chairperson, Justice Chukwudifu Oputa, a well-
respected and retired judge of the Nigerian Supreme Court. Although the Nigerian 
Commission is considered by many to be equivalent in scope and mandate to the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission which investigated apartheid era 
violations in that country, the manner of their establishment and the results that they 
achieved differed substantially.  
 Unlike in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa,825 for instance, the Nigerian 
commission from the outset stood on sinking sand. It was not accommodated under the 
constitution. Worse still, it was not established under a specific law. Instead the President 
Olusegun Obasanjo, himself a retired army general reflexively announced the setting up 
of the Commission under a law passed only a few years after independence in 1960. 
There did not seem to have been any consultations or discussions within the government 
before the commission was established. Nothing could have been more demonstrative of 
Obasanjo government’s a priori subversion of the Commission than the fact that rather 
than by legislative authority, the Commission was established by executive 
pronouncement. It did not matter much that Obasanjo referenced the Tribunals of Inquiry 
                                                          
822 See Orentlicher, supra note 39 at 2539; see also Diane Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts’ Revisited: 
Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency” (2007) 1 Int’l J Transitional Justice 10. 
823See Oko, supra note 9 at 92. 
824 Ibid. 
825 Ibid. 
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Act826 initially promulgated on June 2, 1966 as the legal framework for the Commission’s 
task.827 But even more worrying was that at the same time the Commission was required 
to seek out the truth and reconcile perpetrators with their victims, the Obasanjo regime 
rounded up only a tiny fraction of the violators and put them on criminal trial. As it 
turned out, this was an unclear step and further poisoned a tense atmosphere.828 
 It is, however, understandable why Obasanjo chose a cocktail of executive 
discretion and a dated law as the pillars on which to build such an important transitory 
institution. It is very unlikely that the establishment of the Commission would have 
materialized had he chosen the option of opening its establishment up for parliamentary 
debate.  To expand on a point earlier made, a transition could represent any of two 
possibilities. The first possibility is one built on a commitment to the rule of law and a 
clear understanding of what happened prior to the transition and the assigning of 
accountability for any atrocities that may have taken place. Because of the new 
orientation that this entails, it is important here to ensure that those who had participated 
in previous abuses are not only brought to justice but also are prevented from wielding 
substantial power in the post-transition period.829  
To permit such individuals major opportunities to retain power post the transition, 
will be incentivize them to subvert whatever procedures are put in place to hold them 
                                                          
826 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, c 447. 
827 See Elizabeth Knight, “Facing the Past: Retrospect Justice as a Means to Promote Democracy in 
Nigeria” (2003) 35 Conn L Rev 867 at 890. 
828 As of the time of writing this dissertation some of those rounded up in 1999 for committing human 
rights atrocities were still on trial. While some had been released by the courts, none had been convicted for 
the most serious abuses. See NAN, “Politicians urge FG to Release Al-Mustapha” Next online: 
<http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/Metro/Politics/5737697-146/story.csp>; Innocent Anaba, 
“Abdulsalami wanted OBJ Killed – Al-Mustapha” Vanguard online: 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/abdulsalami-wanted-obj-killed-al-mustapha/>.   
829 Oko, supra note 9 at 93 (wherein the author identifies a bouquet of strategies that could fall under this 
rubric, including “criminal prosecutions  either before domestic courts or an International Criminal Court; 
forgiving transgressors either through a blanket amnesty that bars future prosecutions of offenders or 
through inaction; establishing a fact-finding tribunal, often called ‘Truth Commission,’ to investigate and 
document abuses and make non penal recommendations to the government; lustration whereby citizens 
who engaged in violations are stripped of their official positions and barred from holding positions in 
government; and civil remedies.”) 
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accountable for their actions while in power. The second possibility is to inadvertently or 
with full knowledge wipe the slate clean, ignore the experiences of the past and close all 
ears to the cries of abused victims of the prior era. In simple terms, the post-transitional 
regime acquires the peculiar disease called “inaction.”830 Whichever choice a transiting 
society makes between these two possibilities would have consequences for how the 
post-transitional period plays out. 
 Some scholars view the path to transitional justice as a political decision.831 Citing 
Huntington,832 Oduro states that a country’s dealings with the past has little to do – 
practically speaking – with moral and legal considerations because the “torturer problem” 
is shaped by politics, the nature of the democratization process, and the distribution of 
political power during and after the transition.833 In fact, Huntington distinguishes 
between “replacement transition” and “transplacement” transition. In the former, the 
transition represents a complete collapse of the previous authoritarian government while 
in the latter, democratic transition is achieved through negotiation or is imposed by the 
existing powers.834 While dealing with abusers in “replacement” transition, for example, 
through criminal prosecutions is possible, under the transplacement model, this is 
difficult or unattainable.835 Nigeria falls squarely into to this latter model hence both the 
attempt to find out the truth about the past with the Commission as vehicle and to 
criminally hold those responsible for abuses accountable were both frustrated.   
                                                          
830 Ibid. 
831 Franklin Oduro, “Reconciling a Divided Nation through a Non-Retributive Justice Approach: Ghana’s 
National Reconciliation Initiative” (2005) 9 Int’l J Hum Rts 327 at 331.  
832 Samuel P Huntington, “Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century” in Neil J Kritz, 
ed., Transitional Justice, Vol 1 (Washington DC: USIP Press, 1995) at 72. 
833 Odura, supra note 831 at 331. 
834 Ibid. See also Lydia Kemunto Bosire, “Overpromised, Underdelivered: Transitional Justice in Sub-
Saharan Africa” (2006) 5 SUR – Int’l J on Hum Rts 71 at 75 (stating that most transitional regimes in 
Africa implemented the transitional justice measures “following negotiated transitions, without a clear 
break with the past and/or with ongoing conflicts.”) 
835 Ibid. 
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 In the country’s peculiar context, it was not clear during the planning of the 
transition how those responsible for past human rights violations were to be treated after 
the transition. In that event, persons who had been part of the past human rights atrocities 
either actively participated in elections forming part of the transition or loomed large in 
the background as substantial power brokers and kingmakers. Because of the funds such 
individuals had stashed from the public treasury while in power, they had all the 
necessary financial resources to leverage themselves and/or their cronies into powerful 
positions after the restoration of civil rule. This provided the background for the 
establishment of the Oputa Commission. As such Obasanjo would have been frightened 
at the prospects of seeking legislative approval for the Commission’s introduction 
especially given that most members of the then National Assembly were either personally 
involved or somewhat connected to those responsible for the abuses to be investigated. 
The lack of a satisfactory legal framework for the task of the Commission, among several 
other factors, eroded its credibility from the very beginning. 
 The other factors at play included Obasanjo’s own personal interest in how the 
Commission executed its work. At the beginning, he limited the Commission’s mandate 
to the period December 31, 1983 to May 29, 1999 when military generals Muhammadu 
Buhari and Sani Abacha were in power. However, perceptive Nigerians were quick to 
point out that human rights atrocities in the country neither started nor ended within the 
period covered. They also noted that Buhari and Abacha were not the only past rulers of 
the country to who human rights atrocities could be attributed. They pointed in fact to 
Obasanjo’s own transgressions when he was military Head of State between 1976 and 
1979 as well as those committed by the military when they organized the first ever 
military coup in 1966. These Nigerians were of the view that if Nigeria was serious about 
investigating the past, the process had to go back in time so that no perpetrator or victim 
was left out. 
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 Obasanjo responded to these concerns by amending the mandate of the 
Commission to now cover from the time of the first military coup in 1966 until 1999.836 
But even that did not do much to erase public skepticism regarding the Commission nor 
nurture its overall acceptance. The major question remained: what did the government 
intend to achieve by instituting the Commission? Would investigation yield 
accountability for transgressors through criminal prosecutions? Was the government only 
interested in knowing the truth and therefore bound to commit itself to a general amnesty 
for those who feared punishment but would otherwise be willing to let out the truth? 
What form/forms of redress would victims whose injuries are acknowledged receive? 
Absent clear answers to these questions, it stood very much to reason how much success 
the Commission would achieve. 
 The mandate of the Commission was to: 
[1] ascertain or establish the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations or 
abuses with particular reference to all known or suspected cases of mysterious 
deaths and assassinations or attempted assassinations committed in Nigeria 
between January 15, 1966 and May 28, 1999; 
[2] identify the person or persons, authorities, institutions or organizations which may 
be held accountable for such mysterious deaths, assassinations or attempted 
assassinations or other violations or abuses of human rights and determine the 
motives of the violations or abuses, the victims and circumstances thereof and the 
effect on such victims or the society generally of the atrocities; 
[3] determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of deliberate state 
policy or policy of any of its organs or institutions or whether they arose from 
                                                          
836 While the original document establishing the Commission was Statutory Instrument No 8 of 1999, when 
the mandate was expanded, it was through an amendment to the original document, that is, Statutory 
Instrument No 13 of 1999. See also Gani Fawehinmi & Anor v Ibrahim Babangida & Ors, Ng Sup Ct 
360/2001, [2003] CHR 1 at 2.  
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abuses by State Officials of their office or whether they were acts of any political 
organizations, liberation movements or other groups or individuals; 
[4] recommend measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, 
legislative or institutional to redress the injustices of the past and prevent or 
forestall future violations or abuse of human rights; and 
[5] make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of the Judicial 
Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the evidence. 
The manner in which the Commission was constituted and carried out its task has been 
described as a case study in how not to run such a commission.837 In fact the Nigerian 
public expected far more than it was possible for the Commission to deliver given the 
several factors that assailed it from the commencement of its work. Though those who 
commented on its work often dressed it up as a Truth Commission, the instrument 
establishing it called it a Judicial Commission of Inquiry.838 It “had no legal authority to 
compel witnesses to testify, nor did it have any inducements (like the possibility of 
amnesty as in the South African case) with which to entice those ‘with something to 
say.’”839 In addition, the Commission’s composition seemed remarkably oblivious to the 
ethnic and religious sensitivities of Nigeria. The Commission was understaffed and 
under-resourced. Its budget could not be passed for seven months, paralyzing the early 
stages its activities. At the end, of the more than 10, 000 complaints placed before it, the 
Commission dealt with only 200.840    
 When the Commission eventually commenced examination of those individual 
complaints, it didn’t take too long for the entire exercise to turn showy and dramatic. 
                                                          
837 Daniel & Ramdeen, supra note  815 at 195 
838 Scott Pegg, “Human Rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta” (2001/2002) 4 Indiana Int’l Hum Rts L Bull 5 
(The author states quite authoritatively that “Nigeria launched its equivalent of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) called the Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission 
(HRVIC)”).  
839 Daniel & Ramdeen, supra note 815 at 196. 
840 Ibid. 
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According to Pegg, while some of the victims’ families in South Africa were critical of 
the country’s TRC for granting amnesty to those who confessed their atrocities and for 
not bringing them to trial, that process at least served the beneficial purpose of bringing 
the truth to light in many cases.841 But in the case of Nigeria, Pegg continues, this did not 
happen. Instead what resulted was a “fatally flawed process which I characterize as 
‘reconciliation’ without truth or justice. South Africans might have had reconciliation 
without justice, but at least they got some truth. Nigerians were denied even truth and 
subjected to a process that routinely descended into a farce.”842  
 Where the public hearings did very little to enhance the Commission’s public 
perception, it suffered its most severe setback through judicial intervention which struck 
at both its validity and legal status.843 At the center of the case were three past military 
rulers and the process itself came as no surprise to some Nigerians. Gani Fawehinmi, a 
Lagos lawyer had waged a one man war to expose those responsible for killing the 
journalist Dele Giwa through a parcel bomb in 1986.844 Up to the time of setting up of the 
Oputa Commission, all his efforts had been fruitless. With the Commission’s 
establishment, he saw another window of opportunity to obtain information from the 
                                                          
841 Pegg, supra note 838 at 5. 
842 Ibid. See also Mike Ikhariale, “The Oputa Reports: An Unfinished Job” online: 
<http://nigerdeltaworldcongress.org/articles/oputa_reports.pdf>. See also Greg Campbell, “Days of 
Atonement: Searching for Justice in Nigeria” online: … (“If you want to draw a comparison, the difference 
I saw with the South African example is that the participants actually came out and confessed. In the 
Nigerian example what we saw was like a circus. Nobody ever came out and said ‘I did this’. That is the 
contrast and failure for me. No one pleaded reconciliation for their sins.”) It seems therefore that what 
happened in Nigeria is not seriously regarded both within and outside the country. For example from 15-19, 
September, 2008 the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in partnership with the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) organized in Cape Town, South Africa a Workshop under the 
general theme of Transitional Justice and Development in Africa. There were twenty seven participants and 
Speakers drawn from ten African countries. None of the participants or Speakers came from Nigeria. My 
conclusion is that the organizers did not think there was anything to learn from Nigeria’s failed process. 
Similarly, the Ugandan truth-telling process is generally written off as sub-standard much like the Nigerian 
variant. See report of the Workshop online: <http://ictj.org/static/Publications/ICTJ-
JICA_TJandDevelopment_rp2008.pdf>. 
843 Nlerum S Okogbule, “The Abortion of Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Nigeria: The Oputa Panel in 
Perspective” (2009) 15 East Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 441 at 444. 
844 Dele Olojede & Onukaba Adinoyi – Ojo, Born to Run: The Story of Dele Giwa (Ibadan: Spectrum 
Books, 1987). 
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leader of the regime that many Nigerians believed caused Giwa’s death. In Fawehinmi’s 
petition before the Commission, he accused Ibrahim Babangida, Nigeria’s military ruler 
at the time of Giwa’s death, Halilu Akilu, former Director of Military Intelligence under 
Babangida and Kunle Togun who at the time was the Deputy Director of the State 
Security Services (SSS) of responsibility in the assassination of Giwa. 
 To enable them answer to this allegation, the Commission served them summons 
to appear before it. They ignored the Commission and instead filed a case in court 
questioning the competence of the Commission to compel their attendance of its 
hearings. The Nigerian Supreme Court845 held that the Tribunals and Inquiry Act, 1966 
promulgated by the military for the entire country qualified as an existing law under 
section 315 of the 1999 Constitution and is deemed an Act enacted by the National 
Assembly for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja only as well as a law enacted by a 
State House of Assembly under the residual powers of both legislatures.  
The court therefore concluded that the Nigerian National Assembly had no 
powers under the Constitution to enact a general law on Tribunals of Inquiry to have 
effect throughout the country.846 The court also held that as an existing law, the Act 
covered only the Federal Capital Territory alone and therefore not operative throughout 
Nigeria. If this were the case, it meant the Commission lacked powers to issue summons 
to be served outside the Federal Capital Territory for the appellants to appear before it. 
 Though this judgment was only on the narrow issue of the extent of the 
Commission’s powers to summon witnesses before it, not a few people saw it as a major 
setback in the Commission’s work. It gave the Commission away as a toothless 
institution and set the stage for how it was generally perceived by Nigerians thereafter. 
Nevertheless, the Commission put that blow behind it, plodded on and was able to 
ultimately deliver a report. While making the presentation, the Commission’s 
                                                          
845 Gani Fawehinmi & Anor. v Ibrahim Babangida & Ors, supra note 836. 
846Ibid.  
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chairperson, Justice Oputa reported that the greatest offenders and gross violators of the 
rights of fellow Nigerians were the military dictatorships and their over-zealous security 
outfits.847 In receiving the report, Obasanjo did deliver an apology to all Nigerians in 
general and to the direct victims of the human rights atrocities. He also announced the 
formation of a Committee to coordinate the implementation of the Commission’s 
recommendations.848 
But irretrievable damage had already been done to the Commission. Was it 
established so that such a blanket offer of apology as Obasanjo directed at Nigerians 
could be accomplished? If that was its main objective, it would only amount to an 
unserious and reductionist framing of its work. Even so, more disappointments lay in 
store. Quite significantly, the government after receiving the report failed to make it 
public, further muddying the transition waters. Not publishing the report therefore 
dampened the Commission’s work and apparently nullified any possibility that its 
recommendations would ever be implemented as indeed turned out to be the case.  
After waiting patiently for months on the government to release the report and 
issue a White Paper on it to no avail, a section of the Nigerian civil society published it 
instead. And that marked the end for a Commission that promised so much yet delivered 
very little. To date, none of its recommendations had been implemented. The promised 
reconciliation did not materialize. The country has since moved on as if that past never 
happened. This then leads me to the next factor, a crisis in the rule of law situation, which 
is nourished appropriately by the many mixed signals of the transitional process.  
 
 
                                                          
847 Knight, supra note 827 at 896. Continuing, Oputa had stated: “But they are not the only culprits. We 
wounded one another in communal clashes and religious riots. We are all therefore equally guilty. While 
the powers that be have all to apologise to Nigerians, we the citizenry have also to apologise to one 
another.” 
848 Ibid. at 897 
 303 
 
7.3. Symptom of a Deeper Rule of Law Crisis 
In this section, I look at how the failure of the truth-telling and reconciliation process 
only compounded a pattern of erosion of legal standards. I will also show how this 
anomaly as would be expected undermined the role of the judicial institution. In a sense, 
rather than go the length of establishing the Oputa panel and pouring resources down the 
drain in the process as the Obasanjo regime did, it could have decided instead to take the 
perpetrators of those atrocities to justice and applied the laws in force against their 
actions.  But the futile truth-telling and reconciliation efforts, as they turned out, only 
provided a bird’s eye view of deeper rule of law challenges that had dogged Nigeria and 
which only a transition from arbitrary military rule could accentuate. 
 The human rights regime forms part of the larger legal system. That system is 
institutionalized to ensure the smooth application of laws. The law itself occupies an 
important position in social, political and economic organization. It must operate 
unhindered and undiluted if the goals of society, whether they are social, economic, 
political or cultural, are to be achieved. In other words, to reach its objectives, a given 
politically ordered society must allow the rule of law to reign. I intend to show in this part 
of my analysis that effective human rights protection will be illusory under conditions of 
disregard for the rule of law. This is even more so in a transitional situation where respect 
for the law and its processes is sought to be promoted in contrast to the impunity and 
arbitrariness of the pre-transitional era. 
 This concern connects excellently to the failure of the Nigerian post-transitional 
truth-seeking and reconciliation efforts. There is no need to recast some of the earlier 
points canvassed in this regard. However, it is important to demonstrate how the failure 
of that process provides evidence of and justification for, continuing impunity and rule of 
law travails since the restoration of civil rule. When persons who were responsible for 
abuse of power and violations of human rights are allowed to bury the truth, escape 
effective scrutiny and, worse still, command strategic political positions in the aftermath 
of those atrocities, the efficacy of law as a means of social control is called into question. 
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But as earlier discussed, transitional justice is a controversial, often painful, engagement. 
This is especially so when it is examined through a rule of law optic.  
Where law (with a commitment to “pure legal justice)849 and transitional politics 
(arising out of a “transitional necessity”)850 converge as is often the case in transitional 
situations, Teitel observes the tendency to suspend criminal accountability in order not to 
put the transition into peril.851 On the other hand, what is downplayed or ignored, 
according to McAuliffe, is the “long-term impact on the administration of justice in the 
transitional state of the tendency of transitional responses to past human rights abuses to 
readily depart from the core values we associate with the rule of law.”852 Continuing, he 
notes that 
Notwithstanding our intuitions about the link between the rule of law and 
transitional accountability, the experience of transitional justice in 
countless post-conflict states successfully mediated the passage from 
repression or conflict to peace has often been partly (and sometimes 
paradigmatically) contradictory to what is ordinarily understood as the 
rule of law.853 
 
McAuliffe seems to argue that the anxiety to suspend accountability so as not to endanger 
a transition is not a phenomenon peculiar to Nigeria. Because this is not a research on the 
rule of law as a concept, I will not delve much into its theoretical characteristics 
especially given that it is very much a contested concept.854 However, for my purpose, I 
will adopt largely the understanding of the concept promoted by Thomas Carothers. 
According to him, the rule of law consists of a system in which the laws are public 
                                                          
849 Padraig McAuliffe, “Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: The Perfect Couple or Awkward 
Bedfellows?” (2010) 2 HJRL 127 at 129. 
850 Ibid. 
851 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 224. 
852 McAuliffe, supra note 849 at 129. 
853 Ibid. 
854 See Richard H Fallon, “The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse” (2007) 97 Colum L 
Rev 1 at 6; Jeremy Waldron, “Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida) (2001) 21 
Law & Philosophy 137; Adriaan Bedner, “An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law” (2010) 2 HJRL 
48. 
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knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone.855 Those laws enshrine 
and uphold the political and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human 
rights over the last half-century.856 He then proceeds to outline the major attributes of 
societies applying the rule of law: 
…anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is 
presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal 
system, including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, 
competent and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent, not subject 
to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important, the 
government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials 
accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the 
government seeks to be law-abiding.857 
 
While one could evaluate Nigeria’s post-transitional practices regarding compliance or 
non-compliance with each of the above identified components, I will be more concerned 
with the idea of government’s embeddedness in a legal framework and its commitment to 
be law abiding. One of the most essential responsibilities of government is to enforce the 
law and prevent anarchy. However, government loses all moral authority to exercise this 
responsibility if it operates outside legal boundaries, or to put it more directly, it is 
lawless. Not only does this undermine government capacity to maintain order, it also 
ripples through the entire social fabric with dire consequences.  
 Sadly, impunity, abuse of power and plain lawlessness has characterized 
government behavior in Nigeria starting from colonial times. This worsened with the 
intrusion of the military into the arena of governance. But while allowance could be made 
                                                          
855 Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006) at 4. 
856 Ibid. 
857 Ibid. See also Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival” (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 95 at 96. For 
other perspectives on the concept see Guillermo O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law Matters” (2004) 15 
Journal of Democracy 32; Jeremy Waldron, “Is the Rule of Law an Essentially contested Concept (in 
Florida)?” (2002) 21 Law & Philosophy 137; Robert Summers, “A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law” 
(1993) 6 Ratio Juris 127; Jeremy Waldron, “The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory” (1989) 2 
Ratio Juris 79. 
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for such behavior under the military, its perpetuation after the restoration of civil rule 
could hardly be justified. Abuse of power and impunity has manifested in various ways in 
Nigeria since 1999 when the military relinquished power to civil politicians. While all the 
dimensions of this practice may not be captured in this study, I will nevertheless highlight 
and exemplify one of the ways in which it has been expressed the most: government 
disobedience of lawfully entered court orders.  
 Though this is behavior more associated with military regimes in Nigeria as stated 
above, it has somehow outlasted the military and become a vice of the civilian 
governments as well. Under the military, governments disregarded court proceedings and 
disobeyed court orders in what a judge of the Supreme Court would refer to as “executive 
lawlessness.”858 Judicial summons and court orders were simply ignored while in some 
cases the executive military government disregarded due process of law in carrying out 
actions affecting the fundamental rights of citizens.859  
 The behavior has been carried over to the democratic dispensation for the simple 
reason that old habits die hard. Early in 2006 (that is seven years after the restoration of 
civil rule) the then Chief Justice of Nigeria in an action more reminiscent of the defunct 
military era had to publicly slam the civilian administration for its penchant for 
disregarding court judgments.860 More recently, participants at a conference to find 
solutions to government disobedience of court orders in Nigeria similarly rebuked the 
government for endangering the rule of law by such behavior. According to Joseph 
Daudu, President of the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA) unless the judgments and orders 
of courts are enforced, the adjudicatory system tends to be useless. Continuing, he states:  
                                                          
858 Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 20 at 232. 
859 Ibid. See also Basil Ugochukwu & Chijioke Ononiwu, Review of the Rule of Law and Administration of 
Justice in Nigeria, 1998 (Lagos: Legal Defence Centre, LDC, 1999). 
860 Fatula Olugbemi Arsikhia, “Weighing the Travails of Justice and Human Rights in Nigeria” (2009) 15 
East Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 451 at 459. 
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Enforcement of court orders and judgments in Nigeria is an integral part of 
our adjudicatory system. When parties submit themselves or are brought 
before an adjudicatory body, the end result is not the sentence, judgment 
or order or award made by the body. The process can only be described as 
concluded when there is compliance, enforcement or execution of the 
judgment or order of the adjudicatory body.861 
 The practice of not honoring court decisions is unacceptable to the extent that it strikes at 
the very root of political legality and judicial legitimacy. It encourages resort to self-help 
even among private citizens for the settlement of disputes. This is notwithstanding that 
non-compliance with court decisions does not usually occur in the context of court-
ordered resolution of disputes involving private individuals.862 The coercive power of the 
state generally usually stands behind such judgments to ensure they are carried out. 
Things, however, become more complicated when the order in question is addressed to 
the government when, rather than live by example, the same government summons those 
coercive powers to thwart the court order and prevent its enforcement against it. 
 This has numerous implications for the individual judge whose order is flouted 
and as well the judiciary as an institution. The fear that its order may be disregarded by 
the government often is prior restraint and has a chilling effect on a court’s decision-
making capacity however much that court might wish to dispense justice regardless of 
such fears. In Nigeria where the ability of the courts to meaningfully intervene in human 
rights cases is constrained by a more restricted adjudicatory ideology, the fear of 
rendering judgments that would be ultimately ignored further erodes the capacity for 
courage so direly needed by judges when faced with difficult choices. Obviously, this is 
especially so in cases where the government is one of the parties to litigation. Therefore, 
conscious of acting in vain and calling their powers to question, judges frequently rather 
                                                          
861 Patience Ogbo, “Disregard of Court Rulings Worries Lawyers” Next (12 July 2011) online: Next 
Newspapers < http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5730623-
146/disregardfor_court_rulings_worrieslawyers__.csp>.  
862 Ibid. 
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sidestep difficult situations even where individual liberties are at stake or become more 
sensitive to the feelings of government in such cases.       
 This situation is as worrying for would-be litigants as it is to judges. When the 
government is capable of getting away with about any action no matter how illegal, such 
government develops the persuasion of omnipotence. When this is the case, persons who 
fall victim to illegal actions of the government tend to believe it is useless to try to hold 
the institution accountable for such actions. This is a significant scenario from a rule of 
law perspective. The whole essence of law is to find within it answers to social, economic 
and political problems notwithstanding the status or office of the litigants. Its potency in 
this regard is weakened if citizen apathy to law’s authority brings to the surface its 
legitimacy as a controlling and ordering mechanism. Such could be the very recipe for 
lawlessness and social tension.863  
 It also engages the ability of the courts to assert their independence. An important 
pillar of the rule of law is that the courts be left independent and unfettered in resolving 
disputes brought before them. This independence suffers erosion where courts have to 
worry whether or not their judgments would be enforced. There is therefore the important 
need to, as a matter of practical importance, secure the institutional security864 of the 
courts as part of the larger rule of law enterprise. In Nigeria, the courts have fewer such 
institutional security measures. They practically cannot do much if the government 
decides not to enforce their judgments. Even though on paper they can invoke their 
powers to cite transgressors for contempt of their orders, putting the mechanism in place 
                                                          
863 MAO Aluko, “Sociological Dimensions of Human Rights Violations in Nigeria” (2003) 7 J Soc Sci 161 
at 169 (“Human rights violations makes [sic] people lack respect for the rule of law as people are forced 
into a situation where they take the laws into their own hands because justice could no longer be got 
through the normal channels. Again, this makes the courts to be relegated to the background in the polity 
whereas the judiciary is one of the arms of government”).  
864 This has been defined as “the court’s capacity to resist real or threatened attacks on its independence.” 
See Theunis Roux, “Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa” (2009) 7 Int’l J 
Const L 106 at 108. 
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depends, for example, essentially on the police which as an institution are also not free 
from governmental control.  
 Until recently, the executive and legislative arms of government could undermine 
the judiciary by reducing its budget or with-holding its funds. At the present, the judicial 
budget still hangs on the judgment of the legislature though once the appropriation is 
made, the funds are chargeable as a first line on the Consolidated Revenue of the 
federation.865 This has not solved the challenge of funding as a fundamental one for the 
Nigerian judiciary yet it has removed some of the limitations that the prior system placed 
on that institution. Understanding these issues is therefore perhaps crucial to knowing 
what interests Nigerian judges maximize according to the rational choice theory. Because 
they have to balance job security against public expectations, they are frequently left with 
very difficult choices. These are all structural challenges that the judicial institution must 
contend with. The next category of obstacles could be institutional or procedural in 
nature. I start with the question of access to courts and the duty of would-be human rights 
litigators to show their standing.  
7.4. Throwing away the Key to Access: Standing and other Procedural Issues 
The question of legal standing to present legitimate human rights questions in court is 
critical to judicial intervention in such cases. In the fourth chapter, I intimated that until 
the passage of the Nigerian Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules of 2009, 
an individual needed to show a personal injury to be able to present a valid human rights 
complaint. If such an individual could not show such personal injury, the doctrine of 
locus standi barred her/him from presenting the case.  
 This doctrine was strictly interpreted by the courts as I would presently show. It 
discouraged public-spirited institutions or individuals from intervening on behalf of 
                                                          
865Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (First Alteration) Act, 2010 s 6 which amended the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 s 81 to include the judiciary among government 
institutions whose yearly budget shall be a First Line charge item on the Consolidated Revenue of the 
Federation.  
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others for violations which those institutions or individuals may not have suffered 
personally. Because poverty often discourages human rights litigation, access to the 
courts because of this strict standing rule was only open to those with the financial 
muscle to pursue their claims. The weakest and most vulnerable members of the society 
were priced out of the system. Yet it is important from a rule of law perspective for all 
citizens to, as much as possible, find answers to their alleged victimization within the 
confines of law. Therefore in several societies, those who are too poor to be able to take 
advantage of legal processes often have socially activist organizations becoming their 
voices and fighting their legal battles for them. 
 This challenge speaks essentially to the need to establish flexible rules of access 
to enhance what is known generally as locus standi.866 Nigeria is one of many 
jurisdictions where the impact of activist social groups acting on behalf of the poor and 
deprived had long been blunted by a rigid regime of legal standing. The Nigerian 
Constitution as earlier stated is very clear that before a person could challenge an alleged 
action violating one or more of the human rights that it enshrines, the challenging party 
must show how the alleged action affected him/her personally.867 Clearly, the 
Constitution did not make allowance for what is known generally as public interest 
                                                          
866Hardly do legal scholars define this concept. When they do, they often leave too many gaps to fill in the 
understanding offered. For example “standing” has been defined as the “entitlement to seek judicial remedy 
apart from questions of the substantive merits and the legal capacity of the plaintiff.” This scholar offers 
further a narrower definition in which standing means “the interest of the plaintiff in the matter to be 
decided.” See Thomas A Cromwell, Locus Standi: A Commentary on the Law of Standing in Canada 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 7. For this reason, and speaking in historical terms, the concept is most 
popular for its fluidity and the controversy that it generates. It was described as “a hodge-podge of special 
instances and contradictions.” Louis Jaffe, “Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions” (1961) 75 
Harv L Rev 255 at 258. It was argued also that “the law of standing lacks a rational conceptual framework, 
[it] is little more than a set of disjointed rules dealing with a common subject. ‘Standing’ has no meaning 
unless the particular doctrines grouped together under that name are identified and then appropriately 
applied.” Mark Tushnet, “The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment” (1977) 62 Cornel L Rev 
663. In Nigeria, the courts considered it “troubling” while scholars viewed it as a “perennial problem.” See 
Tunde Ogowewo, “The Problem of Standing to Sue in Nigeria” (1995) 39 J Afr L 1.  
867 Attorney General, Adamawa State v Attorney General, Federation, [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt 958) 581 at 
604 where the Supreme Court held: “It is not enough for a plaintiff to merely state that an Act is illegal or 
unconstitutional. He must show how his civil rights and obligations are breached or threatened.” 
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litigation.868 Therefore, public interest litigators had to present their cases in the names of 
actual victims of the alleged violations or their actions would be barred for want of locus 
standi. I will show later on how this orientation is changing in Nigeria since the 
promulgation of new fundamental rights enforcement rules in 2009. 
 In the field of human rights and litigation around the subject in Nigeria, locus 
standi used to be (and could very well still be) a contested and often controversial issue. 
It presented the first refuge for the judge whose interest might be to sidestep the 
application to redress a violation of human rights. This is more so in cases where the 
question whether the claimant has standing could not be answered in an unequivocal 
manner. Lawyers representing government officials and institutions alleged to have been 
involved in human rights abuses often held it as shield from the very beginning. Victims 
of those abuses and their lawyers loathed the unscrupulous use to which the principle of 
locus standi was frequently put to deny them access to the courts. According to 
Ogowewo: 
Ever since the standing rule was assumed to have been discovered by the 
Nigerian Supreme Court in Adesanya v President of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, the law reports have become littered with cases on the standing 
rule. Consequently, the rule has attracted considerable academic ink. Its 
prominence even extends beyond legal circles. Nigerian newspapers are 
replete with stories of cases being thrown out of court for lack of standing. 
For this reason, the term “locus standi” have even entered the lexicon of 
the layperson in Nigeria.869 
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and the Challenges of the ‘New Public Interest Law’” (2005) 2005 Wisc L Rev 455; Tunji Abayomi, 
“Continuities and Changes in the Development of Civil Liberties Litigation in Nigeria” (1990-1991) 22 U 
Tol L Rev 1035; Raymond Atuguba, “Human Rights and the Limits of Public Interest Law: Ghana’s 
Reaction to a Messy World Phenomenon” (2008) 13 UCLA J Int’l L & Foreign Aff 97; Eva Brems & 
Charles Olufemi Adekoya, “Human Rights Enforcement by People Living in Poverty: Access to Justice in 
Nigeria” (2010) 54 J Afr L 258. 
869 Ogowewo, supra note 452 at 528-529. 
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 Prior to 1999 when the new constitution took effect (and even several years 
thereafter) Nigerian courts organized their locus standi jurisprudence in the most 
stringent and restrictive incarnation. The courts generally denied standing to all except 
those whose direct legal rights are affected by the resolution of the substantive legal 
questions presented for determination. As the court set it out in the Adesanya case:870 
[If] a legislative enactment appears to be ultra vires the Constitution or an 
act infringes any of its provisions dealing with Fundamental Rights, who 
has locus standi to challenge its constitutionality? Does any member of the 
public have the right to sue? Or should locus standi be confined to those 
persons whose vested legal rights are directly interfered with by the 
measure ... or to persons whose interests are liable to be specially affected 
by its operation? 
   
In answering this question, Bello JSC formulated a test that would for many years shape 
the understanding of the locus standi doctrine in Nigeria. According to him, “standing 
will only be accorded to a plaintiff who shows that his civil rights and obligations have 
been or are in danger of being violated or adversely affected by the act complained of.”871  
 However, the majority judgment of Fatayi-Williams CJN amply demonstrated the 
court’s anxieties in that case. He first reasoned that a member of an organized society 
believing that there has been an infraction of any of the provisions of its constitution or 
that any law passed by its legislature is unconstitutional should not be denied access to a 
court to air his/her grievance. To do otherwise on the grounds of a lack of sufficient 
interest, he continued, would “provide a ready recipe for organized disenchantment with 
the judicial process.”872 Further, the CJN said: 
Any person, whether he is a citizen of Nigeria or not, who is resident in 
Nigeria or who is subject to the laws in force in Nigeria, has an obligation 
to see to it that he is governed by a law which is consistent with the 
provisions of the Nigerian Constitution. Indeed, it is his civil right to see 
that this is so. This is because any law that is inconsistent with the 
                                                          
870Adesanya v President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Another, [1981] 1 All NLR 1 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
871Ibid, at 39. See also Ogowewo, supra note 866; LA Atsegbua, “Locus Standi: Beyond Section 6(6)(b) of 
the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria: A Comparative Study” (1990) 2 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 314.  
872Adesanya, supra note 870 at 20.  
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provisions of that Constitution is, to the extent of that inconsistency, null 
and void…873  
 
Where this reasoning should have yielded recognition of the plaintiff’s standing to 
present this claim, the court concluded otherwise. It held that the plaintiff lacked standing 
because he had participated in the process (a senatorial confirmation hearing) from which 
his complaint arose. Ogowewo notes that this conclusion is “at complete odds with [the 
Judge’s] reasoning”874 because the court conflated remedial discretion which judges 
possess in declaratory applications and the justiciability component of the standing 
principle. The court also made indirect reference to the possibility of opening the 
floodgates of litigation if it expanded the standing corridor more than it had done in this 
case.875  
 Thus, for many years after this judgment, Nigerians, in order to be granted 
standing, had to show exceptional burden on them from the application of any law or 
action that they felt aggrieved by. Such burden had to be far and above that which other 
Nigerians also experienced. In other words if it was a general law or action affecting all 
persons, to be able to merit legal standing to challenge the law or action, a person needed 
to prove a personal interest beyond that which all other persons have in redressing the 
grievance. This effectively nullified the possibility of public interest litigation as almost 
all cases litigated on this basis invariably stumbled at the standing barrier.  Expectedly, 
locus standi restrictions featured prominently on the list of impediments to effective 
human rights litigation throughout that period.876  
 This continued to be the case after the promulgation of the 1999 constitution and 
some ten years thereafter. In 2009 the Chief Justice of Nigeria issued new rules of 
procedure for the presentation of human rights claims otherwise known as the 
                                                          
873Ibid at 24-25.  
874Ogowewo, supra note 866 at 7.  
875Ibid at 8. 
876Enyinna Nwauche, “The Nigerian Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Procedure Rules 2009: A Fitting 
Response to Problems in the Enforcement of Human Rights in Nigeria” (2010) 10 Afr Hum Rts L J 502 at 
507.  
 314 
 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. Apart from the standing 
question, the rules made under the 1979 constitution for the legal enforcement of human 
rights provisions lacked in other areas as well. For example, a human rights application 
had to be presented no more than one year after the completion of the action giving rise 
to it. Any period beyond that time-frame would have to be accounted for by the applicant 
to the satisfaction of the court for it to retain its jurisdiction over the suit.877 
 Further, in Ladejobi v Attorney General of the Federation,878 the court decried 
gaps in the rules. It wondered whether the court dealing with litigation could apply its 
own rules whenever it noticed those gaps. As well in Bonnie v Gold,879 the appeal court 
identified deficiencies in the 1979 rules. It singled out committal proceedings as a 
specific controversial area. In addition to the above shortcomings, the 1979 rules were 
also criticized for duplicating the process of commencing human rights applications and 
dichotomizing jurisdiction between the Federal and State High Courts.880 These were 
compounded by the needless differentiation between principal and accessory claims 
which is discussed later in this chapter.881 
 It was because of these long-standing complaints about the old rules that there 
arose a pressing need to redress them by establishing new ones. The new rules came in 
the shape of the 2009 proclamation of the Chief Justice of Nigeria which expectedly dealt 
with most of the procedural shortcomings in the 1979 rules. The new rules contain an 
                                                          
877Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 Order 1, Rule 3(1) “Leave shall not be 
granted to apply for an order under these Rules unless the application is made within twelve months from 
the date of the happening of the event, matter, or act complained of, or such other period as may be 
prescribed by any enactment or, except where a period is so prescribed, the delay is accounted for to the 
satisfaction of the Court or Judge to whom the application for leave is made.” 
878[1982] 3 NCLR 563 [Lag Hg Ct].  
879[1996] 8 NWLR (Pt 465) 234 [Ng Ct App].  
880Abiola Sanni, “Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 as a Tool for the Enforcement 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria: The Need for Far-reaching Reform” 
(2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts L J 511 at 516-517. See also Dakas CJ Dakas, “Judicial Reform of the Legal 
Framework for Human Rights Litigation in Nigeria: Novelties and Perplexities” in Epiphany Azinge & 
Dakas CJ Dakas eds., Judicial Reform and Transformation in Nigeria (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, 2012) 334.  
881Ibid at 518. 
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expansive preamble laying down its broad objectives and the role of judges and lawyers 
in ensuring that they are achieved. Not only does it require the courts to interpret the 
constitution, and in particular its human rights provisions in an expansive and purposeful 
manner, it also enjoins them to respect domestic, regional and international human rights 
instruments called to their attention.882  
 Moreover the new rules encourage enhanced access to justice for all classes of 
litigants but especially the poor, illiterate, uninformed, vulnerable, incarcerated and 
unrepresented. To further affirm this objective, the rules require courts: 
[t]o encourage and welcome public interest litigation in the human rights 
field. In particular human rights activists, advocates or groups and non-
governmental organizations may institute human rights actions on behalf 
of any potential applicants. No human rights case may be dismissed or 
struck out for want of locus standi.883   
 
By this specific provision, the new rules appeared to revolutionize the regime of legal 
standing in human rights litigation in Nigeria. In addition the rules as could be observed 
responded to almost all of the much highlighted lapses of the 1979 rules.  
  Unlike previously when the courts insisted that human rights litigation must be 
initiated by specific originating procedures, the new rules would accept any originating 
process for the commencement of action.884 There is, for instance, a departure from strict 
personal service of court documents on the parties to litigation. A respondent could now 
be served through an agent and that would be recognized as effective personal service.885 
The new rules also abolished the old requirement that human rights complaints be 
commenced within a year of the completion of the violation alleged. Finally, rather than 
previously when a human rights case could only be commenced through an ex parte 
application for leave of court which if granted then opened the door for the responding 
                                                          
882Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 para 3(b) of the preamble. 
883Ibid, para 3(e) of the Preamble.  
884Ibid, appendix A.  
885Ibid, order V r II. 
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party to be notified of the complaint, under the new rules only the latter application 
sufficed. The ex parte component was abolished altogether.886  
 Without a doubt, the 2009 rules did significantly meet public yearnings to the 
extent that it seemed to address prior identified shortcomings. But while those past 
concerns may have been exorcised sort of, the rules triggered new ones in their wake. 
The major concern with the 2009 rules is also the most substantial: did the Chief Justice 
exceed his constitutional powers when articulating the rules? Some commentators already 
think that this question should yield a positive answer. It would seem that the Chief 
Justice has dressed normativity up in the garb of procedure. In essence, some portions of 
the new rules actually amount to amendments of the 1999 constitution by implication. 
Yet the power to amend the constitution resides with the National Assembly and not the 
Chief Justice by any stretch of the imagination.  
 Sanni, for example, insists that the power of the Chief Justice under the 
constitution to regulate human rights litigation is limited to the issues of practice and 
procedure.887 He seemed to suggest that under the guise of the new rules, the Chief 
Justice usurped the powers of the National Assembly “to confer additional powers on the 
High Court for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its jurisdiction more 
effectively.”888 He takes particular issue with the new rules’ requirement that Nigerian 
courts “respect” international instruments in dealing with human rights cases. According 
to him, this would seem to be at variance with the provision of section 12(1) of the 
constitution requiring such instruments to have first been domesticated by parliament 
before they could apply in the Nigerian legal system.889 Yet he remains cautionary 
because such a conclusion is not very self-evident given the choice of words used in the 
                                                          
886Ibid, order II r I.  
887Sanni, supra note 880 at 526.  
888Ibid.  
889Ibid at 527.  
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2009 rules. The word “respect” would seem to require a persuasive rather than obligatory 
deference on the courts in applying those international instruments.890 
 What is true of the above analyzed provisions of the 2009 regulation is 
substantially true also of its impact on the Nigerian locus standi regime in human rights 
cases. From every indication, the standing doctrine had previously been established on 
the provisions of section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 constitution. This section required 
complainants in such cases to show how the law or action being questioned violates their 
“civil rights and obligations.” The question arising from the interaction between this old 
position and the new rules is whether the constitution could be amended to expand 
standing by a subsidiary law made under powers derived from it. Without a doubt the 
answer to this question is negative. Section 9(1) of the constitution is very clear that only 
the National Assembly is competent to alter any of its provisions. In one case at least, the 
Nigerian government has objected to the expansion of the standing requirement under the 
new rules, albeit unsuccessfully.891 
 The categorization of principal and accessory human rights claims was included 
as one of the shortcomings of the 1979 rules. I do not think this should have been the case 
because the 1979 rules make no provision to that effect. As would be shown below, this 
dichotomy is a distinctly judicial formulation without any constitutional, legislative or 
regulatory provenance. It is therefore not surprising that the 2009 rules did not address it. 
What this indicates is that if this dichotomy was a challenge for human rights litigation 
under the 1979 rules, the same remains the case under the 2009 rules. Because of its 
antecedents as a formulation of the courts, it seems futile to expect that this problem 
could be addressed by means of procedural proclamations. It might therefore require a 
rethinking of its jurisprudential underpinnings by the judiciary as an institution to remove 
it as an impediment to effective human rights litigation.                   
                                                          
890Ibid at 528.  
891Supra note 880.  
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7.5. Jurisdictional Questions and the Challenge of Decentralization 
 
In this section, I examine questions of concurrent jurisdiction as well as a decentralized 
judicial model as factors that could negatively impact judicial intervention in human 
rights cases. I stated already that in terms of judicial involvement in human rights cases 
and the overall practice of judicial review of governmental action, Nigeria adopted a 
decentralized model in which no one court on the judicial hierarchy has exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide constitutional matters and by extension human rights cases. This 
attitude has certain factors recommending it as well as some disadvantages that it brings 
to the table. In this section, I intend to discuss some of the challenges posed to the 
judicial system when several courts within the hierarchy are involved in the subject 
matter of constitutional interpretation and enforcement as opposed to when a distinct 
court deals with such questions. 
 On the positive side, this kind of decentralization brings with it the possibility that 
more judges would be exposed to thinking seriously about, and acting on, the issue at 
stake, which in this case is the question of how to better and more satisfactorily 
adjudicate human rights complaints. This would have the tendency to spark the 
development of a large pool of judicial personnel having the required level of 
competence, awareness and experience in dealing with such cases. When this happens, 
human rights consciousness permeates the entire legal system. Even judges at the early 
stages of their judicial careers become acquainted with the subject and its ramifications 
so much so that when they progress through the ranks, there is always confidence in the 
knowledge that they already have the exposure and competence required to effectively 
navigate such constitutional questions when raised before them. 
 In addition to the above, decentralization also engages the problem of access. It 
would allow the courts to be closer to the population that they serve. This is particularly 
pertinent in the developing world where there is often uneven development between the 
cities the rural communities. Where a specialized court is exclusively mandated to answer 
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all constitutional questions, the tendency would be for such a court to be cited in one of 
the bigger cities in the country in which case a general accessibility to it would be 
hampered by both cost and distance. When this is the case, there is real likelihood that 
majority of the citizens who live in the poor rural communities would have little incentive 
to use such a court however much they would want to.  
 Yet, notwithstanding the above benefits of decentralizing jurisdiction in 
constitutional cases, it could also come at a heavy price. One of the major advantages of 
having a distinct court charged with answering all constitutional questions is the 
certainty, predictability and stability892 that the practice brings to the entire legal system. 
Speaking several decades ago on the practices of judicial review in Austria, Hans Kelsen 
hinted that the centralization of judicial review of legislation was “highly desirable” if 
only from the point of view of safeguarding the interest of the authority of the 
constitution.893 The reason he made this suggestion is very instructive for the insight it 
provides into the points that I make here. His views merit being reproduced in extenso. 
He states:           
It must be added that in Austria, as well as in many other countries of the 
European continent there were other courts besides the ordinary courts, 
especially administrative courts which occasionally had to apply the same 
statutes as the ordinary courts. Hence a contradiction between 
administrative courts and ordinary courts was not at all precluded. The 
most important fact, however, is that in Austria the decisions of the 
highest ordinary court…concerning the constitutionality of a statute or an 
ordinance had no binding force upon the lower courts. The latter were not 
forbidden to apply a statute which [the highest ordinary court] had 
previously declared unconstitutional and which it had, therefore, refused 
                                                          
892 Victor Ferreres Comella, “The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward 
Decentralization”? (2004) 2 Int’l J Const L 461 at 491(“An important reason traditionally given to justify 
the European [centralized] model relates to the principle of legal certainty… If all courts were authorized to 
review the constitutionality of legislation, a divergence of judgments would emerge among them as to the 
constitutionality of a particular statute. In the United States, this potential for interpretative plurality is 
neutralized by the doctrine of precedent, which makes decisions that are rendered by the highest courts 
binding on the lower courts”). 
893 Kelsen, supra note 462 at 186. 
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to apply in a given case. The [highest ordinary court] itself was not bound 
by the rule of stare decisis. Accordingly, the same statute which the court 
had declared in a given case unconstitutional could be declared by the 
same court as constitutional and be applied in another case.894   
 
Though the above is a particularly grim and challenging picture, it does mirror to a large 
extent the problems associated with a diffuse judicial review system which Nigeria has 
adopted. It must be recognized though that not all the dimensions of the challenge as 
Kelsen detailed them are as applicable to the Nigerian as the European or Austrian 
context. In Nigeria, the doctrine of stare decisis is very well rooted in the judicial system 
and therefore lower courts cannot refuse to apply decisions of the Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court.895 Even so, courts, though they have the powers to override their earlier 
decisions do not do so lightly. Even courts on the same hierarchy that under the stare 
decisis doctrine are not bound to apply decisions reached by judges of concurrent 
jurisdiction still generally defer to the decisions of coordinate courts. 
 These facts, however, still do not detract from the clear existence of areas of 
fragility and near permanent stricture in the coordination of judicial practices in this field 
of law in Nigeria. At least, it is evident from the machinery of the courts in Nigeria that 
stare decisis alone is no fixed guarantee of certainty in judicial pronouncements. The 
doctrine notwithstanding, it is not unusual to encounter cases where decisions of 
coordinate courts are contradictory without any clear justification896 or in which one 
coordinate court renders a judgment in a given case without acknowledging an earlier 
judgment on the same subject matter by another coordinate court. The detrimental impact 
of this to the smooth administration of justice cannot be overstated. The effect is more 
                                                          
894 Ibid. 
895 See for example Oshinowo v National Bank of Nigeria Ltd, [1998] 11 NWLR (Pt 574) 408 [Ng Ct App] 
where the Nigerian Court of Appeal held that “The doctrine of stare decisis dictates that a trial judge, even 
if he finds the decisions of the Supreme Court to be contradictory, should not refuse to apply them and is 
bound to follow them…even if the Supreme Court’s decisions on a doctrine (on a point) are found to be 
conflicting…the High Court being a lower court in the judicial hierarchy cannot depart from or refuse to 
apply them.” 
896 See Enefiok Essien, “Conflicting Rationes Decidendi: The Dilemma of the Lower Courts in Nigeria” 
(2000) 12 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 23. 
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debilitating, however, when such decisions are given by superior courts on the judicial 
hierarchy where courts further down the ladder are not properly guided on which decision 
to follow.  
 A very good example for present purposes concerns two cases decided by two 
different divisions of the Nigerian Court of Appeal which yielded two different decisions 
even though the facts of both cases were substantially similar at least to the extent that 
both actions challenged the same legislative enactment. The first case897 was decided in 
2005 by the Court of Appeal while the second case898 was decided two years later by the 
same court. I discussed these cases in great detail in the previous chapter. A careful 
reading of them places the problem of jurisprudential inconsistency in clearer 
perspective.   
 What makes them quite interesting is that the latter decision did not sufficiently 
acknowledge the earlier one let alone rely on it. Though it is within its powers to reverse 
itself in the latter judgment, the Court of Appeal could only do this in clear and 
unambiguous terms. Cogent reasons had to be offered for the departure from the 
precedent earlier set. I am reluctant to accept that the court in the latter case deliberately 
misinterpreted its earlier decision. My inclination is to think that the earlier judgment was 
only slightly referenced in the latter case based on a mistaken analysis. I pointed this 
mistake out in the last chapter as well.  
 This scenario could also be problematic for a totally different reason. I had argued 
elsewhere that a court faced with the same or similar facts in two different cases that 
arrives at two contradictory decisions in disposing of them is placed in a difficult 
situation in terms of accounting for that contradiction.899 For precedent to be effective 
therefore as a means of ensuring the certainty it is expected to bring to the judicial 
function, there are several factors that deserve serious consideration. Law reporting 
would have to be regular, comprehensive and accessible. They should be available to 
                                                          
897 Chukwuma & Others v Commissioner of Police, supra note 768. 
898 Inspector General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party & Others, supra note 769. 
899Ugochukwu, supra note 204 at 79. 
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judges and lawyers alike and there should be a mechanism for tracking jurisprudential 
changes and surrounding legal developments in such a manner that it is possible to 
actually test whether cases are still valid or have been overruled.900 The regularity of 
reporting court decisions and the necessary integrity of those reports obviously count 
much more than the number of such reports. There may in fact be many published reports 
but if they are irregular or are published at cross purposes, not much benefit would be 
derived however much it is essential to have them. 
 Nigeria is not lacking in the number and quantity of law reports generated around 
the activities of her courts at various levels. But while this may be encouraging and 
positive from precedential standpoint, it does as well present considerable challenges if 
there is no streamlining of the legal information thereby generated. There must be a way 
of connecting the reports and the cases they contain so that cases could be assigned 
proper precedential value. This does not seem to be the case presently in Nigeria. There’s 
what has been described as “a plethora of law reports” in the country some of which 
strive with some success to meet the essentials of a good law report, while most have 
adopted the print and dump formula which is to obtain and report cases with minimum 
editorial attention.”901 This is cause for concern because this commentator further states 
that: 
                                                          
900 It is instructive that information and communication technology has revolutionized law reporting in 
contemporary times in many jurisdictions across the world. Though law reports continue to be published in 
book form, the internet has made this task easier and many jurisdictions can now meaningfully track the 
validity of jurisprudence and know when a case contains useful law or when the law enunciated in a court 
decision has become obsolete. In Canada, for example, the “noting up” feature in the Westlaw and 
Quicklaw databases have become very powerful for researching case-law and changes therein. See Shelley 
Kierstead, Suzanne Gordon & Sherifa Elkhadem, The Law Workbook: Developing Skills for Legal 
Research and Writing (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2012) at 162. 
901 See O Ayorinde, “Judicial Precedent, Law Reporting and need for Regulation” online: 
<http://www.thenigeriandaily.com/2011/07/19/judicial-precedent-law-reporting-and-need-for-regulation/>. 
This author identified the following as reports currently in existence in Nigeria: All Federation Weekly 
Law Reports, All Nigeria Law Reports, Appellate Courts Landmark Cases, Commercial Law Reports, 
Constitutional Law Classicus, Criminal Appeal Cases, Customary Law in Nigeria through the cases, 
Eastern Region of Nigeria Law Reports, Election Petition Reports, Failed Banks Tribunal of Nigeria Law 
Reports, Federal Reporters, Federation of Nigeria Law reports, Federation Weekly Law Reports, 
Investment and Securities Law Reports, Judgments of Nigerian Superior Courts (JNSC), Land Law Appeal 
Cases, Law Reports of Nigeria, Monthly Judgments of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Nigerian Law 
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The flooding of the Nigerian legal space with all manner of publications 
being paraded as law reports is therefore worrisome. This situation has 
persisted because of the lack of any form of regulation. There is a clear 
and present danger that practitioners are unduly exposed to badly edited 
reports. Cases which pass without discussion or consideration are 
regularly reported. Cases which are substantially repetitions of what is 
already reported are now to be found in many of our law reports. Not only 
are such reported cases valueless as precedent, their continuous 
appearance and re-appearance in these reports tend to bring confusing 
interpretation of already settled principles of law. The result, therefore, is 
not only lawyers being unable to clearly state the law but the courts will 
begin to give conflicting judgments in similar cases902 
   
7.6. Following the Bribe: Corruption and Other Undue Influences 
 The Nigerian judiciary is often at the center of corruption claims and 
allegations.903 The institution is seen by many to have in its ranks corrupt judges who not 
only are influenced in their decision-making roles by considerations based on corruption 
but have in fact risen to their positions through corrupt means. There is no better or more 
significant illustration of this than that at the time of this study in 2011, Nigeria’s two 
topmost judicial officials, the Chief Justice of the Federation and the President of the 
Court of Appeal threw decency to the winds and literally brawled in the open. 
Allegations of corruption and undue influence provided the background to this big 
quarrel that placed the judicial institution on the spotlight for all the wrong reasons. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Report, Nigerian Commercial Law Cases, Nigerian Constitutional Law Reports, Nigerian Monthly Law 
Reports, Nigerian Revenue Law Reports, Nigerian Supreme  Court Cases, Nigerian Supreme Court 
Quarterly Law Reports of Nigeria, Selected Judgments of the West African Court of Appeal (WACA), 
Sharia Law Reports of Nigeria, Supreme Court Monthly, Supreme Court of Nigeria Judgments, Supreme 
Court Reports, Telecommunications Law Reports, Weekly Reports of Nigeria. 
902 Ibid. 
903Augustine Nwabuzor, “Corruption and Development: New Initiative in Economic Openness and 
Strengthened Rule of Law” (2005) 59 Journal of Business Ethics 121; Bryane Michael, “What do African 
Donor-Sponsored Anti-Corruption Programmes Teach us about International Development in Africa?” 
(2004) 38 Social Pol’y & Admin 320; Nlerum S Okogbule, “An Appraisal of the Legal and Institutional 
Framework for combating Corruption in Nigeria” (2006) 13 J Financial Crime 92. 
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 The disagreement between the two top judicial officials started without prior 
inkling. But it turned out later that it had been in the closet for a while and the two 
ranking judicial officials had only barely kept straight faces in the open. Their spat had 
been tightly concealed up to this time to the point of dissembling. But as it blew open, the 
President of the Court of Appeal, Isa Salami would accuse the Chief Justice, Aloysius 
Katsina-Alu of attempting to promote him to the Supreme Court without due process. 
Ordinarily, being elevated from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court is the healthy 
ambition of every judge. Yet not once in the history of the Nigerian judiciary had a sitting 
Court of Appeal president (who occupies the same hierarchical position as all other 
Supreme Court judges, bar the CJN) been elevated to the Supreme Court. But in Salami’s 
case, he obviously reasoned that his purported elevation amounted to being served wine 
in a poisoned chalice. He therefore kicked against it. “I regret to say I am not taken in,”904 
he stated in a personal letter to Katsina-Alu, adding “I am contented with being the 
President of the Court of Appeal. Indeed it is common knowledge that I had even in a 
more auspicious moment declined for good reason to be appointed to the Supreme Court. 
Nothing has changed since then.”905 
 Not surprisingly, politics provided the raw material for the disagreement, with 
Salami accusing Katsina-Alu of meddling in the appeal involving the 2007 Sokoto state 
                                                          
904 Soji Bamidele & Gowon Emakpe, “Politics in the Court’s Yard” Next online: 
<http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/National/5740073-146/story.csp# > See also Jide Ajani, 
Abdulwahab Abdulah & Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “As CJN Retires: Leaving the Judiciary in Turmoil” 
Vanguard online: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/as-cjn-retires-leaving-the-judiciary-in-turmoil/ >. 
See further “Corruption: Obasanjo’s Eight Years worse than Abacha’s – Ribadu” Vanguard online: 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/corruption-obasanjo%E2%80%99s-eight-years-worse-than-
abachas-ribadu/ > where the report quoted the then Chair of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission. According to the report “The EFCC czar then commented that despite his overall problems 
with the judiciary as judges were always being bribed, it had held up democracy more than some of the 
other government branches. The judiciary and judges here are very corruptible and this corruption has 
played a role in some of the tribunal cases to date, he commented. Nigeria needs something in its 
constitution to put a check and balance on the judiciary.” 
905Ibid; John Emmanuel Gyong, “Good Governance and Accountability in a Democracy” (2011) 7 Eur 
Scientific J 71 at 82; Abiola Ogunyemi, “Overcoming Governance Handicaps in a Developing Economy” 
in Charles Despres ed, Proceedings of the 7th European Conference on Management, Leadership and 
Governance  (Reading: Academic Publishing Limited, 2012) at 334. 
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governorship election to pervert its outcome. The Court of Appeal President alleged that 
Mr Katsina-Alu asked him to compromise the Court of Appeal’s verdict on the protracted 
governorship legal tussle by either disbanding the original panel, which he (Katsina-Alu) 
believed was about to give a verdict adverse to the state governor’s interest or direct the 
panel to give judgment in the governor’s favor.906 When Salami refused to do so, it was 
alleged, the CJN took laws into his own hands. On the basis of claims that he had 
received petitions against the appeal Tribunal as well as to protect “public peace” he 
personally “arrested” the Tribunal’s judgment. Though Katsina-Alu ultimately got his 
wish, this would go on to poison his relationship with Salami who apparently felt slighted 
at the CJN’s intrusion into a matter over which neither the Supreme Court as an 
institution nor the CJN as an individual had any constitutional competence.907  
 Salami had not been free of allegations of wrong-doing himself. He presided in 
person or established appeal panels after the 2007 elections which reversed victories 
earlier awarded to the ruling party the PDP in favor of opposition parties. It would later 
be alleged that he had engaged in unofficial communication with lawyers representing the 
opposition parties while those appeals were pending, allegedly developing in the process 
a soft spot for the opposition.908 Meantime, the Court of Appeal President was willing to 
                                                          
906 Next, supra note 904. 
907 Nigeria’s elections usually generate hundreds, sometimes, thousands of legal challenges. The country’s 
2007 general elections was no exception. Resolving those cases presents the courts with considerable 
difficulties, not the least of which are claims that judges had taken bribes or had otherwise been 
inordinately influenced to decide these political cases one way or the other. Sometimes those allegations 
are confirmed. Often, they are not proved but exist only at the realm of perception. See generally 
Ugochukwu, “The Pathology of Judicialization” supra note 202; Basil Ugochukwu, Democracy by Court 
Order: An Analytical Evaluation of the 2007 Election Petition Tribunals in Nigeria (Lagos: Legal Defence 
Centre, 2009); Basil Ugochukwu, “Reform of the Electoral Justice System” in Joseph Otteh ed., Reforming 
for Justice: A Review of Justice Sector Reforms in Nigeria 1999-2007 (Lagos: Access to Justice, 2007) 144 
at 147.  See further “Wikileaks Cable: Yar’Adua gave Justices $57 Million to uphold his Election; 
Aondoakaa wrote the Verdict” Sahara Reporters online: <http://saharareporters.com/news-page/wikileaks-
cable-yar%E2%80%99adua-gave-justices-57-million-uphold-his-election-aondoakaa-wrote-verd>.   
908 See Ochereome Nnanna, “GEJ’s Judiciary Letdown” Vanguard online: 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/gej%E2%80%99s-judiciary-letdown/>. 
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pursue his claim of victimization against the CJN in court but was prevailed upon to drop 
the legal action for a more traditional approach to repairing the rift between them.  
But the CJN pounced on this opportunity and used his near total control of the 
National Judicial Council (NJC) to contrive an investigation which culminated in the 
equally disputed verdict that Salami lied on oath when he claimed that the CJN 
pressurized him to pervert the course of justice in the Sokoto election appeal. The 
investigating panel also found that the CJN had truly meddled in the Sokoto appeal but 
that he had acted in good faith to “arrest” the court’s judgment to prevent a breach of 
public peace. A second panel recommended that Salami deliver a written apology to the 
CJN and NJC. For the second time, Salami rebuffed them and headed to the courts. In the 
interim and while his suit was pending in court, he was suspended and removed from 
office as President of the Court of Appeal. The NJC has since reversed itself and 
recommended that Salami be recalled to office. But while the President acted swiftly on 
his suspension, claiming to be only following the rule of law, he has been less eager to 
implement his recall. 
7.7. A Bolt out of the Blues: The Main/Accessory Claims Dichotomy 
The Nigerian judiciary maintains that its duty in human rights cases is served when 
giving effect to the plain meaning of constitutional provisions that govern that aspect of 
the law. They eschew and deny any law-making component to that duty. Yet by drawing 
a distinction between what they call a main claim and an accessory one in the context of 
solving litigation in human rights cases, the courts seem to have added to the existing 
law, even if only procedurally speaking. The constitution provides that those who allege 
that their rights under it have been, are being or will likely be contravened could 
challenge the contravention in question. However, in terms of the procedure for putting 
the legal challenge into effect, the courts introduced an element that distinguishes human 
rights claims from all other kinds of legal claims that a complaining litigant may have. 
The position which the courts have adopted is that when complaining of a human rights 
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violation, the person presenting the complaint should make that human rights complaint 
the main or principal claim. It should not be presented as an accessory or subsidiary to a 
legal claim of a non-human rights nature. 
 This doctrine was derived from a case decided during the period of military rule 
but has continued to control litigation launched after the restoration of civil rule. In terms 
of its development, the doctrine came nothing less than as a bolt out of the blues. It has 
been described as “dubious, irrelevant…impossible to make and leads to a miscarriage of 
justice.”909 The writer who made this claim goes further to argue that: 
Whatever gains have been made by the constitutionalization of 
fundamental human rights in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions are 
gradually being eroded by this principle. Whether it is a principle of 
jurisdiction as the courts have held, or a principle of justiciability as it 
appears to be, it is clear that it has led to judicial avoidance of key human 
rights issues, robbing the legal system of the considered opinion of the 
judiciary very much needed to nurture an emergent human rights 
culture.910  
The case from which the doctrine emanated was that of Tukur v Government of Gongola 
State911 in which a major question was the extent of the jurisdiction of the Federal High 
Court in human rights cases. I had stated earlier that jurisdiction in human rights 
litigation in Nigeria is shared at the first instance stage between the federal and state High 
Courts. In this case where the subject matter was the deposition of a Chief in the then 
Gongola state, the Supreme Court held that such a case should have been commenced 
before a state high court and not a federal one. Taking this hint, the applicant brought 
forward a fresh action before the Taraba state High Court. At no time in the earlier case 
did the Supreme Court raise the question of distinction between a principal and an 
accessory claim. 
                                                          
909 See Nwauche, supra note 157 at 67. 
910 Ibid. 
911 [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt 117) 517 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
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 Things would however change dramatically and in historically momentous terms 
when the second litigation got to the Supreme Court as the second Tukur case.912 In this 
latter incarnation as in the first one, the applicant claimed by way of human rights 
enforcement procedure that the order deposing him as the Emir of Muri violated his right 
to fair hearing under the Constitution because he was not given the opportunity of being 
heard before the order was imposed. In a judgment that was puzzling at the time it was 
delivered, and that has perplexed lawyers and scholars alike ever since, the Supreme 
Court came to the conclusion that because the main or principal claim in the case was not 
the enforcement of human rights, no court jurisdiction existed for its determination under 
the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. It held that the action should 
have been commenced by a writ of summons instead. In reaching this conclusion, the 
court placed great reliance on its earlier decision in the old case of Madukolu & Others v 
Nkemdilim913 on the twin issues of jurisdiction and competence to resolve legal issues.  
 This decision has been criticized on the grounds that it inordinately conflates the 
general principles of the courts’ jurisdiction with their particular jurisdiction in human 
rights cases and for merging human rights cases with non-human rights complaints 
without justification.914 It sometimes may be the case that human rights complaints will 
arise from a variety of legal relationships in which in fact multiple legal claims could be 
sustained simultaneously. Some of them may be of human rights nature and others not of 
such a nature. What should be the attitude of the courts when such cases are presented 
before them?  
                                                          
912 Tukur v Government of Taraba State, [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt 510) 549 [Ng Sup Ct]. Note that the name of 
the state involved had changed from Gongola to Taraba state owing to a military-engineered states creation 
exercise that altered the boundaries of already existing states after new ones were added to their number. 
913 [1962] 2 SCNLR 34. In this case the Supreme Court held that a court is competent to decide a case when 
(1) it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench and no 
member is disqualified for one reason or another; and (2) the subject matter of the case is within 
jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 
(3) the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law, and upon the fulfillment of any 
condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. 
914 Nwauche, supra note 157 at 75. 
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The major aim of the constitutional entrenchment of human rights is obviously to 
separate them from all other legal claims not of a similar nature. Human rights claims are 
therefore independent, autonomous claims inuring to the benefit of those challenging 
abuses meted to them. A litigant faced with a scenario of multiple legal claims should be 
free to decide which component to pursue first and which forum to initially approach. If 
all those claims arose from a single transaction, the litigant should in fact be permitted to 
bundle them all together to save cost and avoid multiplicity of actions.915 Quite clearly, 
while the Supreme Court decision above aimed at creating a principal/accessory claim 
binary, what it achieved in reality was to couple human rights claims to other complaints 
that may have only tenuous relationship to those kinds of complaints.   
 The decision is also questionable for a completely different but no less cogent 
reason. The courts have stated repeatedly that technical considerations should not be 
allowed to defeat applications for the enforcement of fundamental human rights. In Sea 
Trucks Nigeria Ltd v Payne,916 the Court of Appeal held that in matters relating to the 
enforcement of fundamental rights, the courts are less slavish to the rules of court and 
their application. It, in effect, came to the conclusion that technical rules of procedure 
used for the ordinary and routine civil cases are inappropriate for human rights litigation. 
The court offered for this view the justification that the enforcement of human rights 
often involves questions of life and liberty of the citizen. It is unclear how this view sits 
with the principal/accessory claim binary because it seems to give the courts away as 
enforcing technical justice in deleterious fashion. 
                                                          
915 On the contrary the posture of the courts encourages such multiplicity of claims. In Sea Trucks Nigeria 
Limited v Payne, [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt 607) 514 the Court of Appeal held that “where a set of facts or cause 
of action gives rise to multiple causes of action including a breach or threatened contravention of a 
fundamental right under the constitution, the party so affected as plaintiff would have to bring two different 
actions at the same time. One of such actions by writ of summons according to the provisions of the High 
Court Civil Procedure Rules and the other by motion ex parte in accordance with the provisions of the 
Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules.” 
916 [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt 607) 514 [Ng Ct App]. 
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 The attitude of the courts with which we are already familiar, however, warrants 
only a cautious acceptance of dicta like the one in Sea Truck. There is a huge amount of 
reflexivity in delivering such pronouncements that seems to make them only useful to the 
case at hand rather than for future purposes. In a legal system whose stability rests on the 
utility of precedents, this is a rather inappropriate course to take. We have seen this 
magnitude of inconsistency replayed now and again in various areas of the human rights 
adjudication process in Nigeria that it cannot any longer be safely dismissed as 
inconsequential. In comments like the one above on the abhorrence of technicalities the 
courts raise hopes to high levels about their commitments to substantial justice. They then 
turn around to erode such expectations in actual practice by their fidelity to existing 
procedural booby traps as the one on the principal/accessory claim dichotomy.  
 Notwithstanding the comments in the Sea Truck case, the courts have continued 
to make the distinction between principal and accessory claims. The question is: what 
formula or standard does the court apply to come to the determination that a particular 
claim is principal and another accessory or subsidiary? In all the cases that I have seen so 
far on the issue, there is no formula or standard. The court involved simply bifurcates and 
labels the claims, (one main, the other accessory), and proceeds to pronounce judgment. 
In Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board v Adebiyi,917 the applicant 
had alleged that in terminating his employment, the respondents violated his right to a 
fair hearing. He applied to be reinstated if he could prove this claim. The Court of Appeal 
held that the principal claim was that of wrongful termination while the allegation of 
denial of fair hearing was only an accessory claim. It therefore concluded that the action 
was wrongly commenced by way of fundamental rights enforcement and dismissed it.918 
                                                          
917 [1999] 13 NWLR (Pt 633) 16 [Ng Ct App].  
918See also Nwokorie v Opara, [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt 587) 389 [Ng Ct App].  
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 In Sea Trucks Nigeria Limited v Payne,919 the Court of Appeal held that a person 
who complains of unlawful termination of employment should commence litigation by 
taking out a writ of summons and not approach the court by way of human rights 
enforcement. But in this case as in the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund case above 
the plaintiff had filed the action alleging that he was not given a fair hearing before the 
termination was implemented. Similarly in Ibrahim Abdulhamid v Talal Akar,920 the 
Supreme Court decided that a claim at common law could be joined to a human rights 
application so long as the said common law claim is only secondary or collateral to the 
human rights complaint. But where it is the main claim, it has to be commenced by some 
procedure other than the procedure prescribed for the enforcement of human rights.921  
 These decisions provide sufficient indication that the Supreme Court believes 
strongly in the dichotomy it has created. But other than a pandering to strict technical and 
formal procedural requirements, the distinction has not produced any worthwhile benefits 
to the human rights cause. Instead it has produced an avalanche of cases where the basic 
claim of the victim of a human rights violation was ignored even as the court searched for 
unclear and often non-existent reasons to split it up and erode its content. Needless to say, 
this has added to the burden of would-be litigants in human rights cases. Yet there is no 
reason for this dichotomy as I have argued.  
Anyone familiar with the Nigerian human rights field would know that though 
these challenges have been identified, the list is by no means an exhaustive one. They are 
however united on one front: these are problems some of which the courts could have a 
role to play in addressing them. The courts may be hampered in terms of creating a 
political environment conducive to the strict application of the rule of law. It is not their 
                                                          
919Supra note 915. 
920[2006] 13 NWLR (Pt 996) 127 [Ng Sup Ct].  
921The following cases turn on this same doctrine: Sokoto Local Government and Others v Tsoho Amale, 
[2001] 8 NWLR (Pt 714) 224 [Ng Ct App], University of Ilorin v Oluwadare, [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt 1000) 
751 [Ng Sup Ct].  
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decision or worldview alone that could bring this about. But they could and should be 
positive in opening up rather than blocking judicial access to human rights victims. They 
should abolish the unwarranted principal/accessory claims dichotomy. Certainly the 
courts could incentivize jurisprudential stability by acting less arbitrarily in decision-
making and more consistently.         
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
8.1. Summary of Major Findings 
This chapter concludes this study. In concluding it, I will first summarize the key findings 
contained in the previous chapters. Thereafter I will use the challenges identified in 
efforts to use the judiciary as a platform for human rights enforcement in Nigeria as 
background to propose reforms of the human rights adjudicatory system. As the 
following factual anecdote would indicate, the Nigerian legal system recognizes the 
judiciary as a critically important institution for the construction and realization of human 
rights policy. Therefore going forward, the judiciary will need to live up to this 
reputation. 
In 2001, about two years after the restoration of civil rule in Nigeria, the Nigerian 
government inaugurated the Steering and Coordinating Committees of the National 
Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (hereinafter NAP). The 
country was responding to a recommendation in the Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action adopted at the Second World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, 
Austria in 1993. That recommendation enjoined states to “consider the desirability of 
drawing up a national action plan identifying steps whereby States would improve the 
promotion and protection of human rights.”922  
The inauguration of the Nigerian Committees in turn followed a series of 
consultations involving the National Human Rights Commission, the Office of the 
Attorney General of the Federation and a broad segment of Nigeria’s civil society. These 
consultations included a working visit to South Africa to study the process that led to the 
                                                          
922Online: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/plan_actions/index.htm>.  
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development of the South African National Action Plan on Human Rights.923 Following 
nationwide consultations, the Committees completed their tasks and issued the first NAP 
in 2006.924 The plan was re-issued in 2009 and covers the period commencing that year 
and terminating in 2013.925 
The drafters of the NAP left absolutely no doubts that if its goals were to be met, 
the judicial role would be at its core. The plan identified several areas that required 
effective attention in order to deliver on its objectives. The judiciary was mentioned as a 
significant role-player for monitoring and implementation in each of those areas. In fact 
going by the summary contained in the NAP, it is impossible to realize major human 
rights policy in Nigeria without the involvement of the judiciary.  
I started this study by looking at the hope Nigerians had in 1999 that a 
democratized country would experience less human rights violations than under the 
departed authoritarian military regime. I suggested that continuing human rights abuses 
seemed to have betrayed that expectation. The main question of this study therefore is 
why this seeming betrayal took place and whether it could be linked to judicial 
performance during the period covered. I examined what it meant to transition from 
dictatorship and impunity to a new democratic beginning as well as the important role 
courts play in securing the goals of transformation. I also discussed the difficulties and 
challenges of using judicial strategies for the protection of human rights and especially 
how the very process of transition could accentuate those challenges. 
 The findings of the first chapter occurred at two levels. The initial conclusion is 
that it is legitimate and valid to expect that legal and political conditions would change 
for the better after the transition from dictatorship to democracy. However, this 
                                                          
923See National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2006 online: 
<http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/NAP%20for%20promotion%20and%20protection%20of%20hua
mn%20rigths%20in%20Nigeria%20-.pdf>.  
924Ibid.  
925See supra note 923.   
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expectation is not always met. This is because societies vary in their political behavior 
and democratic culture takes a while to nurture. Further, the failings of the judiciary as an 
institution could be a stumbling block to the consolidation of transition. Yet the judiciary 
might have doubts cast on its credibility especially if it had through its activities enabled 
human rights violations committed by the regime from which the society in question is 
transiting. 
In the second chapter I looked at adjudication generally and human rights 
adjudication in particular. Specifically, I identified various theories that could be used to 
explain judicial reasoning in human rights litigation especially in transitional societies 
like Nigeria. I explained how challenging it would be to fit the reasoning method of 
Nigerian courts in human rights cases into a single theoretical lens. This is apparently 
because there are far too many calculations that have to be taken into account in the 
process of resolving every single human rights case. I suggested how this argument 
complies with Roscoe Pound’s counsel to lawyers not to atomize law and jurisprudence 
but to examine other fields and how their methodologies could be used to understand law 
and its processes.  
The history of human rights constitutionalization engaged my attention in the 
third chapter. I pointed out how the colonial experience was obviously detrimental to the 
human rights cause as well as how this fact foregrounded the post-independence human 
rights agenda. I narrated the reason for discussions that led to the inclusion of human 
rights guarantees in the Nigerian independence constitution. I also mentioned that the 
extant British parliamentary system at the time was different from the Bill of Rights 
model that the independence constitution delivered. Further, I observed that this 
distinction laid the foundation for persisting incoherence in the adjudicatory practices of 
Nigerian courts. The major finding of this chapter therefore was that traditions of English 
law inculcated during colonialism and after independence through the activities of British 
trained judges stunted the development of an analytical method suited to the post-
independence constitutional model that Nigeria adopted. 
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I expanded on the major finding of the third chapter in the next by comparing the 
method used by Nigerian courts in reviewing human rights cases with those of other 
jurisdictions. I first examined the British system because of its colonial consequences in 
the Nigerian context. I also discussed the American model because of its relative 
similarity to the constitutional Bill of Rights system used by Nigeria at independence and 
thereafter. In addition, I analyzed the South African system because like its Nigerian 
counterpart limitations of rights form part of the text of the constitution. Finally I traced 
the Nigerian model. The objective of this comparison was to see how similar or different 
the other systems are to the Nigerian and whether the latter could borrow from the other 
systems. The conclusion of this chapter is that while in all the other three systems there is 
a progression towards balancing and proportionality analysis, the system used by 
Nigerian courts is uncertain and unsystematized. A combination of chapters three and 
four responds to the questions posed at the outset. The first is whether the colonial origins 
of Nigerian courts reflect their performance in human rights cases. The second is whether 
Nigerian courts use a definite standard for reviewing such cases.   
In chapter five, I examined what I refer to as Nigeria’s human right architecture. I 
looked first at the sources of human rights norms applied in Nigerian courts. I then 
examined what the doctrine of “judicial review” means in the Nigerian context for human 
rights adjudication. In addition, I discussed how human rights norms produced within the 
domestic legal system interact with international norms. I came to the conclusion that 
Nigeria operates the concrete kind of judicial review because human rights cases must 
arise from a clear legal controversy.  
I also concluded that the nature of obligation Nigerian assumes when it signs and 
ratifies international treaties is unclear because of its dualist system for the reception of 
international law. The question I asked is whether Nigeria after signing and ratifying 
international instruments could avoid the responsibility they place on it by arguing that 
they had not been domesticated as mandated under the constitution? This chapter 
therefore answers the question whether having to choose from a plurality of norms 
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hampers Nigerian courts in human rights adjudication. These findings indicate that while 
controversies persist in this area, the challenges they present are ones that the courts can 
effectively deal with. 
In the light of what could be considered an over-generalization with regard to the 
conclusion drawn in the fifth chapter, the sixth chapter utilizes case analysis to further 
buttress that conclusion. Here, I applied cases interpreting and enforcing the human rights 
provisions of the 1999 constitution decided by the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, 
and for the period covered by this study. I carefully examined those cases to see if there 
was consistency in the method of analysis used by the courts concerned. I not only did 
this with regard to the civil and political rights that are justiciable under the constitution 
but also as relates to economic, social and cultural rights whose justiciability under the 
constitution is very much up in the air.  
On the basis of the analyses conducted, I concluded that the courts are far too ad 
hoc and unstructured in their approach and that this leads to reflexivity and inconsistency 
in decision-making as well as instability in jurisprudence. This chapter deals with the 
question of what informs the approach that Nigerian courts use in human rights cases and 
justifies a distinction that could be made between what the courts claim to do and what it 
is that they do in actual practice. 
In this chapter as well, I tested the theoretical approaches identified in chapter two 
to real cases decided by the courts. It was evident from looking at the possible theoretical 
analysis of individual judgments that the initial decision not to box the courts into a 
single theoretical optic seems to a large extent justified. However, two different 
theoretical strands stood out prominently. There was a lot in the decisions by way of a 
conservative approach built upon the viewpoint that judges should defer to the judgment 
of constitutional framers and law makers in the legislature. This in turn led to positivist 
literalism in textual interpretation. In most cases the courts stuck to the ordinary meaning 
of words used even if they brought about absurd outcomes.  
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Secondly, the law and society model exemplified by Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus 
was also very pronounced. Several court decisions indicated a habituation of Nigerian 
courts (through education, experience and professional socialization) to a particular 
thought-model that grew from the colonial imprint on the legal system. The conclusion to 
be drawn from this chapter is that to break this hold on the legal system requires the 
choice of a different direction in terms of legal education. In particular there is need to 
foster a more comparative approach to legal and judicial training. 
In chapter seven I discussed more structural challenges that place obstacles on the 
road to better judicial performance in human rights cases in Nigeria. I looked particularly 
at the ambivalence of the government regarding the proper direction of the transition 
from military rule. It was uncertain whether the government wanted to punish previous 
human rights violators or grant them amnesty or whether it just wanted to discover the 
truth of what happened prior to the transition and no more. Without such a signal about 
where the transition was headed, the government and to a lesser degree the courts, 
seemed to continue business as usual. This had serious consequences for the rule of law 
and by extension human rights protection. 
These were, however, by no means the only problems facing the courts in 
responding to human rights claims. I also discussed the issue of locus standi which for 
long constrained various aspects of human rights litigation until its apparent amelioration 
by the 2009 Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. I also mentioned 
problems associated with jurisdiction in human rights cases and how this feeds into 
questions around the decentralization of judicial competence in human rights cases. I did 
examine corruption as a challenge to effective judicial protection of human rights as well 
as the needless dichotomy that the Supreme Court created between what it describes as 
principal and accessory claims in human rights litigation. There were also more 
contextual problems like poor infrastructure, lack of secure tenure for judges, lack of 
financial autonomy and poor remuneration of judges. I concluded that these challenges 
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would have to be substantially addressed for the courts to live up to expectation in human 
rights adjudication. 
8.2. Recommendations: Peering into the Future 
Given the analyses that are contained in this study and the various challenges facing 
effective judicial approach to human rights adjudication in Nigeria, what should the 
future of law and jurisprudence in this area look like? The adoption and revision of the 
NAP as well as the promulgation of new rules for the enforcement of human rights in 
2009 might suggest that there is concern at responsible quarters to make human rights 
protection in Nigeria more meaningful. Those are positive developments that would need 
to be consolidated. Yet more malignant challenges are identified in this study that if 
addressed would greatly improve the ability of the courts to respond effectively to human 
rights claims. The most significant of the recommendations are summarized below. 
 From all indications, the biggest problem afflicting human rights adjudication in 
Nigeria is the lack of a clear standard for reviewing laws and actions to see if they could 
be considered reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society. Granted that having 
such a standard for judicial decision-making could still be unpredictable and 
unprincipled, it is still better than the current situation where no specific standard exists. 
The lack of standard creates a culture where human rights cases are approached on an ad 
hoc case-by-case basis with the possibility that contradictory decisions could be delivered 
on cases with similar facts. Because of the lack of objectivity in such decisions, the courts 
are often accused of having rendered them for less than honorable calculations.  
The practices of some comparative jurisdictions discussed in this study indicate 
that this is a concern that must be grappled with to breathe confidence into any human 
rights adjudication process. There seems to be a convergence around establishing 
relatively clear standards for resolving the questions which human rights cases present to 
a legal system. Such standards could be accomplished through balancing or 
proportionality analysis. The message which the development of a structured standard of 
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review delivers should be clear; that the ultimate decision (whether it is negative to the 
litigant or positive) is not more important than the reasoning process that produced it. 
In Nigeria’s case, dealing with this specific challenge has not been helped by the 
country’s legal history and doctrines of the British legal system that a colonial 
relationship fostered after independence. While the British system from which the 
Nigerian equivalent was based has gone through intensive transformation culminating in 
the passage of the 1998 Human Rights Act and the movement of British courts towards a 
substantive standard of human rights review based on proportionality, the Nigerian 
system remains rooted in the immediate post-independence traditions. It cannot be soon 
enough for this tradition that has not helped the legal protection of human rights to be 
reformed. Legal education which inculcates these concerns (and in particular comparative 
doctrine) is therefore necessary at this point. In this regard, legal education through the 
development of appropriate curricula is particularly of the essence. 
More importantly, the courts cannot act alone in bringing about the changes 
desired. And here we have to sympathize with the Nigerian judiciary that has to juggle 
multiple considerations just to resolve a single human rights complaint. Most of these 
considerations revolve around the rule of law possibility. If the overall government and 
political system operates outside the boundaries of law, there is little the judiciary could 
do to alter the situation. As I pointed out in chapter seven, court judgments are not self-
executing. They require the support of other government agencies to be implemented. 
Where those other government agencies are reluctant to perform their own duties, the 
courts are incapacitated. Often the courts are unwilling to take particularly strong 
positions in some cases in order not to render judgments that would be ultimately ignored 
by the powers that be.  
Therefore the independence of the judiciary as a government institution is 
imperative to judicial effectiveness whether in human rights adjudication specifically or 
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adjudication in a more general sense.926 The tenure of judges has to be secured under law. 
The judiciary should not continue to be an unequal partner in the relationship among 
governmental branches. Judges would have to be appropriately remunerated to remove 
the temptation to be corrupt or unduly influenced. Court infrastructure has to be adequate 
and their personnel must be well-trained. The courts should specifically be made 
conducive to the deployment of new technology which reduces the physical burden on 
judges and judicial staff.    
 The point I made earlier about judicial training and development of comparative 
curricula deserves re-iteration. This recommendation hangs alongside that requiring 
recognition of the colonial origins of current approaches to human rights adjudication in 
Nigeria and doing something to change it. When one of these is tackled, the likelihood is 
that the other would be addressed concurrently. The current approach originated almost 
exclusively from British administrative law principles. Those principles did not demand 
the standard of scrutiny required for the effective protection of human rights norms. 
Though constitutional human rights guarantees could also have administrative law 
components, the standards required to review cases arising from the two fields ought to 
be different. While the British system evolved to accommodate this understanding, the 
Nigerian system has remained under administrative law influences.   
In administrative law deference to legislative judgment is given priority. On the 
contrary constitutional human rights guarantees constitute a check on legislative 
authority. While in the former the temptation is to preserve the law or administrative 
action, in the latter the goal should be to preserve the right that is being threatened or 
actually violated. In other words while administrative law gives the benefit of doubt to 
the challenged law or action, constitutional human rights leans in favor of the victim of 
the human rights violation.  
                                                          
926Justice Modibo Ocran, “Nation Building in Africa and the Role of the Judiciary” (2008) 2 N Ill U L Rev 
169.  
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 These demarcations have to be imbibed deeply at the level of education and 
training. As things stand presently, Nigerian courts have not moved effectively from the 
administrative law shackles on human rights adjudication arising from the impact of 
colonialism. It does not also seem as if the training delivered at faculties of law in 
Nigerian universities has responded adequately to these concerns. This is the new frontier 
that needs to be challenged in order to ameliorate a conservative judicial orientation. In 
fact, the door is now wide open for further research into this and other areas of human 
rights practices in Nigeria that could be conducted with strong comparative components.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 343 
 
Bibliography 
Legislation 
[1] Nigerian Documents 
[A] Constitutions 
Constitution of the Federal Republic if Nigeria, 1979 ss 42(3), 44(2), 230, 251. 
 
Constitution of the Federal Republic if Nigeria, 1999, ss 1(3), 4(4)(a), 6(6), 7, 12(1), 24, 
33-46, 215(5), 233, 235, 241, 295. 
 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963, ss 18-33. 
 
 
[B] Statutes and Regulations 
 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) 
Procedure Act, 1990.  
 
Child Rights Act of Jigawa State, 2007. 
 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No 1, 1966. 
 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No 107 1993, s 230. 
  
Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree No 28, 
1970. 
 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, Order 1(2). 
 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, Orders 2(1), 3(b), 4(3)(iii), 
4(2). 
 
High Court Law of Anambra State 1987, s 18(1). 
  
Newspapers Decree No 43 of 1993. 
 
Offensive Publications (Proscription) Decree No 35 of 1993.  
 
Prohibition of Infringement of a Widow’s and Widower’s Fundamental Rights Law of 
Enugu State, 2001. 
 344 
 
 
Public Lands Acquisition (Amendment) Edict of Lagos State, 1976. 
 
Public Order Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. 
 
State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No 2, 1984. 
 
Trade Disputes Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. 
 
 
[2] Non-Nigerian Documents 
 
[A] Constitutions 
 
Constitution Act of Canada, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (United 
Kingdom), 1982. 
 
Constitution of Ethiopia, 1995, Article 9(4).  
 
Constitution of Namibia, 1990, s 144. 
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, ss 36, 39, 79, 80, 121, 122, 172, 233. 
 
Constitution of the United States of America, 1789, Article I(10), IV. 
  
 
[B] Statutes and Regulations 
 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada, 1982. 
 
Human Rights Act United Kingdom, 1998, c 42. 
 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of South Africa, 1995. 
 
United States Supreme Court Rules 1980, Rule 15.  
  
 
[3] International Materials 
 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 
ILM 58 (1981). 
  
 345 
 
Conflict Prevention Framework of the Economic Community of West African States, 
Reg/MSC/Reg1/01/08 (2008). 
 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, (2000). 
 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, GA res 39/46 annex 39 UN GAOR supp (No 51) at 197, UN Doc A/39/51 
(1984). 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, GA res 
34/180, 34 UN GAOR supp (No 46) at 193, UN Doc A/34/46 (1979). 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA res 44/25, annex 44 UN GAOR supp (No 49) 
at 167, UN Doc A/34/49 (1989). 
 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS, 213 UNTS 
222 (1950).  
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res 2200A (XXI), GAOR sup 
(No 16) at 52, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171. 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA res 2200A (XXI), 
21 UN GAOR supp (No 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3.  
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 115 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (1969). 
 
 
Jurisprudence 
[1] Nigerian Cases 
Abacha v Fawehinmi, [2000] 4 NWLR (Pt 660) 228 [Ng Sup.Ct]. 
 
 Abdulraheem & Others v Olufeagba, [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt 1008) 280 [Nig Ct App]. 
  
Adams Oshiomhole and Another v Federal Government of Nigeria and Another, [2007] 8 
NWLR (Pt 1035) 58 [Ng Ct App].  
 
Adegbenro v Attorney General of the Federation, [1962] 1 ALL NLR 431. 
 
Adesanya v President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Another, [1981] 1 All NLR 
1 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
 346 
 
Ali v Central Bank of Nigeria, [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt 498) 192 [Ng Ct App]. 
 
Amalgamated Press of Nigeria Limited v The Queen, [1961] 1 All NLR 199.  
 
Attorney General of Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation and others, [2006] 7 
NILR 1 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
Attorney General of Anambra State v Uba, [2005] 15 NWLR (Pt 947) 44 [Ng Ct App]. 
 Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation and others, [2003] 
6 SC (Pt 1) 24 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation and others, [2002] 
2 SC (Pt 1) 1 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
Attorney General, Adamawa State v Attorney General, Federation, [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt 
958) 581 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
  
Barclays Bank of Nigeria Limited v Central Bank of Nigeria, [1976] 6 Sup Ct 177. 
 
Bonnie v Gold, [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt 465) 234 [Ng Ct App]. 
  
Bronik Motors Limited v Wema Bank Limited, [1983] 6 Sup Ct 158. 
  
Bronik Motors Ltd v WEMA Bank, [1983] 6 SC 158.  
 
Brown Uzuda & Others v Ezekiel Ebigah & Others, [2009] 15 NWLR (Pt…) 1 [Nig Sup 
Ct]. 
 
Bureau of Public Enterprises v National Union of Electricity Employees, [2003] 13 
NWLR (Pt 837) 382 [Ng Ct App]. 
Cheranci v Cheranci, [1960] NRNLR 24. 
 
Chima Ubani v The Director, State Security Services, [1991] 11 NWLR (Pt 625) 129 [Ng 
Ct App]. 
 
Chudi Ofodile v Egwuatu, [2006] 1 NWLR (Pt 961) 421 [Nig Ct App]. 
 
Dokubo Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria, [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt 991) 324 [Ng Ct 
App]. 
 
DPP v Chike Obi, [1961] 1 All NLR (Pt 2) 186. 
 347 
 
 
Ekanem v Assistant Inspector General of Police, Zone 6, [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt 1079) 97 
[Ng Ct App].  
 
Esanubor v Faweya, [2009] FWLR (Pt 478) 380 [Ng Ct App]. 
Eugene Meribe v Joshua Egwu, [1976] 3NSCC 23.  
Federal Government of Nigeria and Another v Adams Oshiomhole and Another, Suit No. 
FCT/CV/350/2004 [FCT Fed High Ct].  
Fred Egbe v Babatunde Belgore, [2004] 8 NWLR (Pt 875) 336 [Ng Ct App]. 
 
Gani Fawehinmi & Anor v Ibrahim Babangida & Ors, NGSC 360/2001, [2003] CHR 1. 
  
Global Excellence Communications Limited v Duke, [2007] 16 NWLR (Pt 1059) 22 [Ng 
Sup Ct]. 
 
Gokpa v Police, [1961] All NLR 423. 
 
Guardian Newspapers Limited & Ors v Attorney General of the Federation & Anor, 
[1995] 5 NWLR (Pt 398) 703 [Ng Ct App].  
 
Ikem v Nwogwugwu, [1999] 13 NWLR (Pt 633) 140 [NG Ct App].  
Independent National Electoral Commission and others v Balarabe Musa and others, 
[2003] 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 72 [Ng Sup Ct].  
Inspector General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party & Others, [2007] 18 NWLR (Pt 
1066) 457 [Ng Ct App]. 
 
Jeremiah Abalaka v Minister of Health & Others, [2006] 2 NWLR (Pt 965) 105 (Nig Ct 
App]. 
 
 Ladejobi v Attorney General of the Federation, [1982] 3 NCLR 563 [Lag Hg Ct].  
 
 Lagos State College of Education & Others v Kolawole Edun & Others, [2004] 4 NWLR 
(Pt 870) 476 [Ng Sup Ct].  
Lakanmi v Attorney General (Western Nigeria), [1969] 1 U Ife L Reps [Pt II] 201. 
  
Madukolu v Nkemdilim, [1962] 2 SCNLR 34.  
 
 348 
 
Mbanefo v Molokwu & Others, [2009] 11 NWLR (Pt 1153) 431 [Nig Ct App]. 
 
Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo, [2001] FWLR (Pt 
44) 542 [Ng Sup Ct].  
 
 Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria v Minister of Labor and Productivity & 
Others, [2005] 17 NWLR (Pt 953) 120 [Ng Ct App].  
Mike Nkwocha v MTN Communication Limited & Another, [2008] 11 NWLR (Pt 1099) 
439 [Nig Ct App]. 
 
Mojekwu v Iwuchukwu, [2004] 4 Sup Ct (Pt 1) 1. 
 
Mojekwu v Mojekwu, [1997] 7 NWLR (Pt 512) 283 [Ng Ct App].  
 
Momoh v Senate, [1981] 1 NCLR 105 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
 Nafiu Rabiu v The State, [1981] 2 NCLR 293 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
National Electric Power Authority v Akinola Arobieke, [2006] 7 NWLR 245 [Ng Ct 
App]. 
 
Nico Oliver v Dangote Industries Limited, [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt…) 467 [Nig Ct App]. 
 
Nigeria Bar Association v Moses Odiri & Another, [2007] 8 NWLR (Pt 1035) 203 [Legal 
Practitioners Disciplinary Committee]. 
 
 Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation v O’Silvawax International Limited, [2006] 7 
NWLR (Pt 980) 588 [Ng Ct App]. 
Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board v Adebiyi, [1999] 13 NWLR 
(Pt 633) 16 [Ng Ct App]. 
 
Nnamdi Azikiwe University v Nwafor, [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt. 585) 116 [Nig Ct of App]. 
 
Nwokorie v Opara, [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt 587) 389 [Ng Ct App]. 
 
Nwosu v Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority, [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt 135) 688 
[Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
Ojiegbe & Another v Ubani & Another, [1961] 1 All NLR 277.  
 
 349 
 
Okogie (Trustees of Roman Catholic Schools) and others v Attorney General, Lagos 
State, [1981] 2 NCLR 337 [Ng Ct App].  
 
Okonkwo v Okagbue, [1994] 12 NSCC 40. 
 
Okoroafor Nkpa v Jacob Nkume, [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt 710) 543 [Ng Ct App]. 
 
Olafisoye v Federal Republic of Nigeria, [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt 864) 580 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
Olasoji and another v Attorney General of Western Nigeria, [1965] NMLR 111. 
 
Olawoye & Others v Commissioner of Police, [2006] 2 NWLR (Pt 965) 427 [Nig Ct 
App]. 
 
Olisa Agbakoba v The Director, State Security Services & Anor, [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt 
595) 314 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
Onwo v Oko, [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 456) 584 [Ng Ct App]. 
 
Oshinowo v National Bank of Nigeria Ltd, [1998] 11 NWLR (Pt 574) 408 [Ng Ct App].  
 
Oyegbami v Attorney General, [1981] 1 NCLR 895 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
Power Holding Company of Nigeria v Alabi, [2010] 5 NWLR (Pt 1186) 65 [Nig Ct App]. 
 
Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of 
Nigeria & Others v Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria, [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt 
1072) 575 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
 
Sadau v The State, [1968] 1 All NLR 124. 
 
Sea Trucks (Nigeria) Limited v Payne, [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt 607) 514 [Ng Ct App].  
Shugaba Abdulrahaman Darman v Minister of Internal Affairs, [1982] 2 NCLR 915. 
 
Sokoto Local Government and Others v Tsoho Amale, [2001] 8 NWLR (Pt 714) 224 [Ng 
Ct App]. 
  
Sunday Omotesho & Others v Abubakar Abdullahi & Others, [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt 1072) 
527. 
 
Tukur v Government of Taraba State, [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt 510) 549.  
 
 350 
 
Tukur v Governor of Gongola State, [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt 117) 517. 
 
Ugwumadu v University of Nigeria, [2001] 13 WRN 181 [Fed HgCt, Enugu]. 
 
Ukegbu v National Broadcasting Commission, [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt 1055) 551 [Ng Ct 
App].  
University of Ilorin v Oluwadare, [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt 1000) 751 [Ng Sup Ct].  
 
Uzoukwu v Ezeonu II, [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt 200) 708 [Ng Ct App]. 
 
Victor Ndoma-Egba v Chukwuogor & Ors, [2004] 6 NWLR (Pt 869) 382 [Ng Sup Ct]. 
Williams v Majekodunmi, [1962] 1 ALL NLR 413. 
 
Wing Commander Adamu v Akukalia, [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt 1023) 65 [Nig Ct App]. 
 
Yusuf & Others v Obasanjo & Others, [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt 956) 96 [NG Ct App].  
 
[2] Other Domestic Courts 
 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1 KB 223.  
 
Barron v Baltimore, [1833] 32 US 243. 
 
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374. 
 
Craig v Boren, [1976] 429 US 190. 
 
Investigating Directorate Services Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit [2001] 1 SA 545 at 588 
(CCSA). 
 
Korematsu v United States, [1944] 323 US 214. 
 
Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] AC 206. 
 
Marbury v Madison, [1803] 5 US 137.  
 
Ministry of Transport v Noort, [1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
 
R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex p International Trader’s Ferry Ltd, [1999] 2 AC 418. 
 351 
 
 
R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, [1996] QB 517. 
 
R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
 
R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Hammersmith and Fulham London 
Borough Council, [1991] 1 AC 521 at 597. 
 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind, [1991] 1 AC 696. 
 
S v Zuma & Others, [1995] (2) SA 642. 
 
San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, [1973] 411 US 1. 
 
SR Bommai v Union of India, [1994] 2 SCR 644.  
 
The Azania People’s Organization & Others v The President of the Republic of South 
Africa & Others, CCT/96. 
 
Thornhill v Alabama, [1940] 310 US 88.  
 
United States v Caroline Products, [1938] 304 US 144. 
  
Vlandis v Kline, [1973] 412 US 441. 
 
Zimbabwe Township Developers v Lou’s Shoes Ltd, [1984] 2 SA 778 at 783 (SCA). 
 
 
Books and Monographs 
 
 
Abraham, Henry The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the 
United States, England and France (London: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 
Ademoyega, Adewale. Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup (Ibadan: 
Evans Brothers, 1981). 
  
Ajayi, Ade & Akinseye-George, Yemi. Kayode Eso: The Making of a Judge (Ibadan: 
Spectrum Books, 2002). 
 
Ajomo, MA. Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria 
(Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1991).  
 
 352 
 
Akinola, Richard. Salute to Courage: The Story of Justice Yaya Jinadu (Lagos: Nigeria 
Law Publications, 1989). 
 
Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, 1996). 
 
Anderson Gavin W, ed, Rights &Democracy: Essays in UK-Canadian Constitutionalism 
(London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1999) at 131-132. 
 
Anghie, Anthony. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
Barak, Aharon. The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
 
Baxi, Upendra. The Future of Human Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
Beatty, David M. The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
 
Bell, John. French Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
 
Bickel, Alexander M. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics (Yale: Yale University Press, 1986). 
 
Blackstone, William. Commentaries 1 (London: University of Chicago Press, 1979). 
 
Bradley, Anthony & Ewing, Keith. Constitutional and Administrative Law (Pearson 
Longman, 2007). 
 
Carothers, Thomas Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 
 
Chenwi, Lilian. Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights 
Perspective (Cape Town: ABC Press, 2007). 
 
Civil Liberties Organization, Annual Report on Human Rights in Nigeria (1990 – 1996). 
 
Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, 1997 Annual Report on The Human Rights 
Situation In Nigeria (1998). 
 
Craig, PP. Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989). 
 
Cromwell, Thomas A. Locus Standi: A Commentary on the Law of Standing in Canada 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986). 
 353 
 
  
Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2003).  
 
Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1989).  
 
Durkheim, Emile. Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
 
Dworkin, Ronald. Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
 
Effah, Josephine. Modernised Slavery: Child Trade in Nigeria (Lagos: Constitutional 
Rights Project, 1996).  
 
Ehonwa, Osaze Lanre. Behind the Wall: A Report on Prison Conditions in Nigeria and 
the Nigerian Prison System (Lagos: Civil Liberties Organization, 1996).  
 
Elias, Taslim Olawale Law in a Developing Society (Benin City: Ethiope Publishing, 
1972). 
 
Elias, TO & Jegede, MI. Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence (Lagos: MIJ Publishers 
Limited, 1993). 
 
Elster, Jon. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). 
 
Ely, John Hart. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980).  
 
Epp, Charles. The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in 
Comparative Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
 
Eze, Osita. Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (Lagos: Nigeria Institute of 
International Affairs & Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Limited, 1984). 
 
Gahia, Chukwuemeka. Human Rights In Retreat: A Report Of Human Rights Violations 
Of The Military Regime Of General Ibrahim Babangida (Lagos: Civil Liberties 
Organization, 1992).  
 
Gauri, Varun & Brinks, Daniel M. eds Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of 
Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
 
 354 
 
Gbulie, Ben. Nigeria’s Five Majors: Coup d’Etat of 15th January 1966, First inside 
Account (Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers, 1981).  
 
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey. ed Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006) 266. 
 
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey. Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
 
Gunther, Gerald. Constitutional Law (New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1985). 
  
Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James & Jay, John. The Federalist Papers (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
  
Harding Andrew & Leyland, Peter. Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study 
(London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2009). 
 
Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada (Student Edition) (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2005).  
 
Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2009: Events of 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 
2009). 
  
Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2010: Events of 2009 (Human Rights Watch, 
2010). 
 
Hunt, Murray. Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1998). 
 
Ibidapo-Obe, Akin. Essays on Human Rights Law in Nigeria (Lagos: Concept 
Publications, 2005).  
 
Ides, Allan & May, Christopher. Examples and Explanations: Constitutional Law 
Individual Rights (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2010). 
 
International Commission of Jurists, ICJ Report Attacks on Justice: Federal Republic of 
Nigeria online: International Commission of Jurists 
<http://www.icj.org/IMG/NIGERIA.pdf >. 
 
Karibi-Whyte, Adolphus G. The Relevance of the Judiciary in the Polity – in Historical 
Perspective (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1987). 
 
Karl Maier, This House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis (London: Penguin Books, 2000). 
 355 
 
 
Kierstead, Shelley, Gordon, Suzanne & Elkhadem, Sherifa. The Law Workbook: 
Developing Skills for Legal Research and Writing (Toronto: Emond Montgomery 
Publications, 2012). 
 
Kommers, Donald P. The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989). 
 
Lindsay, AD. The Modern Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press, 1943). 
 
Lugard, Frederick. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Routledge, 
1965). 
 
Nwabueze, B O. A Constitutional History of Nigeria (London: Longman Inc, 1982). 
 
Nwabueze, Ben O. Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa: The Role of Courts in 
Government (London: C Hurst, 1977). 
 
Nwabueze, Ben. The Judiciary as the Third Estate of the Realm (Ibadan: Gold Press Ltd, 
2007). 
 
Nwankwo, Clement, Ugochukwu, Basil & Mbachu, Dulue. Human Rights Practices in 
the Nigerian Police, (Lagos: Constitutional Rights Project, 1994).  
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philip & Whitehead, Laurence. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).  
 
Odemwingie, Osaro. A Harvest of Blooms (Lagos: Media Rights Agenda, 2000). 
 
Ojo, Abiola. Constitutional Law and Military Rule in Nigeria (Ibadan: Evans Brothers 
Ltd, 1987). 
  
Olojede, Dele & Adinoyi – Ojo, Onukaba. Born to Run: The Story of Dele Giwa (Ibadan: 
Spectrum Books, 1987). 
 
Osiatynski, Wiktor. Human Rights and their Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
 
Parkinson, Charles. The Emergence of Domestic Human Rights Instruments in British 
Overseas Territories (London: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
 
 356 
 
Roosevelt III, Kermit. The Myth of Judicial Activism: Making Sense of Supreme Court 
Decisions (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
 
Sagay, Itse. A Legacy for Posterity: The Work of the Supreme Court, 1980-1988 (Lagos: 
Nigeria Law Publications, 1988). 
 
Saro-Wiwa, Ken Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy (Port Harcourt: Saros 
International, 1992).  
 
Sathe, SP. Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
Schubert, Glendon. ed Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Rand 
McNally & Co, 1964).  
 
Schubert, Glendon. Political Culture and Judicial Behavior: Subcultural Analysis of 
Judicial Behavior: A Direct Observational Study (Maryland: University Press of 
America, 1985).  
 
Simmons, Beth. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
 
Skaar, Elin. Human Rights Violations and the Paradox of Democratic Transition: A 
Study of Chile and Argentina (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens Institute, 1994).  
 
Simmons, Beth. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
 
Skaar, Elin. Human Rights Violations and the Paradox of Democratic Transition: A 
Study of Chile and Argentina (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens Institute, 1994).  
 
Smith, SA de. Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Penguin Education, 
1971). 
 
Spaeth, Harold J. “The Attitudinal Model” in Lee Epstein ed., Contemplating Courts 
(Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1995). 
 
Stammers, Neil. Human Rights and Social Movements (London: Pluto Press, 2009). 
 
Sweet, Alec Stone. Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
Teitel, Ruti. Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 357 
 
 
The Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, Annual Report of the State of Human 
Rights 1997 (Lagos: CDHR, 2008). 
 
Toobin, Jeffrey. The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2007, 2008). 
 
Ugochukwu, Basil & Ononiwu, Chijioke. Review of the Rule of Law and Administration 
of Justice in Nigeria, 1998 (Lagos: Legal Defence Centre, LDC, 1999). 
 
Ugochukwu, Basil Democracy by Court Order: An Analytical Evaluation of the 2007 
Election Petition Tribunals in Nigeria (Lagos: Legal Defence Centre, 2009). 
 
Ugochukwu, Basil. Repression as Law: The Arbitrary Use of Military Decrees in Nigeria 
(Lagos: Constitutional Rights Project, 1994). 
 
Van Ert, Gib. “Canada” in David Sloss ed., The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty 
Enforcement: A Comparative Study (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
 
Welch, Claude E. Human Rights and Development in Africa (State University of New 
York Press, 1984). 
 
Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New 
York: WW Norton & Company, 2004). 
 
Journal Articles and Book Chapters 
 
Abass, Ademola “The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations 
and Problems” (2000) 5 J Conflict & Sec L 211. 
 
Abayomi, Tunji. “Continuities and Changes in the Development of Civil Liberties 
Litigation in Nigeria” (1991) 22 U Tol L Rev. 
  
Abdul, OY. “Prerogative Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition within the Nigerian 
Legal System” (2002) 1 UDUS L J 178. 
  
Abdullahi An-Na’im & Francis M Deng eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1990). 
 
Ackerman, Bruce. “Beyond Carolene Products” (1985) 98 Harv L Rev 713. 
 
 358 
 
Ackermann, LWH. “Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: Judicial Review” (1989-
1990) 21 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 59. 
  
Adamolekun, Ladipo. “Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria” (1991) 21 Publius 1.  
 
Adams, Maurice & Van Der Schyff, Gehard. “Political Theory Put to the Test: 
Comparative Law and the Origins of Judicial Constitutional Review” (2010) 10 Global 
Jurist (Article 8) 1. 
 
Adjami, Mirna. “African Courts, International Law, and Comparative Case Law: 
Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?” (2002) 24 Mich J Int’l L 103.  
 
Aguda, Akinola & Aguda, Oluwadare. “Judicial Protection of some Fundamental Rights 
in Nigeria and in the Sudan before and during Military Rule” (1972) 16 J Afr L 130. 
 
Ahiauzu, Nkiruka. “Naming Struggles: African Ideologies and the Law” (2007) 1 Afr J 
Legal Theory 24. 
 
Ahunwan, Boniface. “Contextualizing Legal Theory: Economic Analysis of Law and 
Jurisprudence from the African Perspective” (2000) Afr J Int’l & Comp L 240. 
 
Aidoo, Akwasi. “Africa: Democracy without Human Rights” (1993) 15 Hum Rts Q 703. 
Aihe, DO. “Fundamental Human Rights and the Military Regime in Nigeria: What did 
the Courts Say?” (1971) 15 J Afr L 213. 
 
Ajomo, MA. “Human Rights under the Nigerian Constitutions” in Kalu, Awa & 
Osinbajo, Yemi eds, Perspectives on Human Rights (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Justice, 
1992).  
 
Aka, Philip C. “Nigeria since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule and 
Human Rights Violations under President Olusegun Obasanjo” (2003) 4 San Diego Int’l 
L J 209. 
 
Aka, Philip C. “Prospects for Igbo Human Rights in Nigeria in the New Century” (2004 – 
2005) 48 Howard L J 165. 
 
Aka, Philip C. “Prospects for Igbo Human Rights in Nigeria in the New Century” (2004) 
48 Howard L J 165.  
 
Akinrinade, Sola. “Nigeria’s lingering Political Crisis: Internal Combustion, International 
Inaction” (1998) 87 The Roundtable: Commw J Int’l Aff 313. 
  
 359 
 
Akinwale, Akeem. “Repression of Press Freedom in Nigerian Democratic Dispensations” 
(2010) 35 Afr Dev 47. 
  
Aleinikoff, T Alexander. “Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing” (1987) 96 Yale L 
J 943. 
 
Alexy, Robert. “The Construction of Constitutional Rights” (2010) 4 Law & Ethics Hum 
Rts 20. 
 
Alfange Jr, Dean. “Marbury v Madison and the Original Understandings of Judicial 
Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom” (1993) Sup Ct Rev 329. 
 
Allan, TRS. “The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual 
Conundrum or Interpretative Inquiry” (2002) 61 Cambridge L J 87. 
 
Allars, Margaret. “One Small Step for Legal Doctrine, One Giant Leap towards Integrity 
in Government: Teoh’s Case and the Internationalization of Administrative Law” (1995) 
17 Sydney L Rev 204. 
 
Alston, Philip. “A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or 
Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?” (1982) 29 Neth Int’l L Rev 307. 
 
Alston, Philip. “Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control” 
(1984) 78 Am J Int’l L 607. 
 
Aluko, MAO “Sociological Dimensions of Human Rights Violations in Nigeria” (2003) 7 
J Soc Sci 161. 
 
Amachree, Godfrey. “Fundamental Rights in Nigeria” (1965) 11 Howard L J 463. 
 
Ambe, Nicoline. “A Legal Analysis of the Domestic Enforcement of International 
Human Rights Law: The Rule of Law Imperative” (1998) 47 UNBLJ 109. 
 
Amechi, Emeka Polycarp. “Litigating Right to Healthy Environment in Nigeria: An 
Examination of the Impacts of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 
2009, in ensuring Access to Justice for Victims of Environmental Degradation” (2010) 6 
L Env & Dev J 320. 
  
Anber, Paul. “Modernisaton and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos” (1967) 5 J 
Modern Afr Stud 163.  
 
Anderson, Elizabeth S. “Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny” (2002) 77 
NYU L Rev 1195.  
 360 
 
 
Ani, Comfort Chinyere, “Access to Justice in Nigerian Criminal and Civil Justice 
Systems” in Epiphany Azinge & Bolaji Owasanoye, eds, Rule of Law and Good 
Governance (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2009). 
 
An-Na’im, Abdullahi. “The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The Case of 
Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Countries” (1997) 11 Emory Int’l L Rev 
29.  
 
An-Na’im, Abdullahi. “The Legal Protection of Human Rights in Africa: How to do 
More with Less” in Austin Sarat & Thomas R Kearns, eds., Human Rights: Concepts, 
Contests and Contingencies (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002). 
 
Arsikhia, Fatula Olugbemi. “Weighing the Travails of Justice and Human Rights in 
Nigeria” (2009) 15 East Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 451. 
 
 Asare, SK. “Accounting for Judiciary Performance in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons 
from Ghana” (2006) 4 Botswana L J 57. 
  
Assensoh, Akwasi. “African Writers: Historical Perspectives on their Trials and 
Tribulations” (2001) 31 J Black Stud 348. 
 
Atsegbua, LA. “Locus Standi: Beyond Section 6(6)(b) of the 1979 Constitution of 
Nigeria: A Comparative Study” (1990) 2 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 314. 
 
Atuguba, Raymond. “Human Rights and the Limits of Public Interest Law: Ghana’s 
Reaction to a Messy World Phenomenon” (2008) 13 UCLA J Int’l L & Foreign Aff 97.  
 
Backer, David. “Watching the Bargain Unravel? A Panel Study of Victims’ Attitudes 
about Transitional Justice in Cape Town, South Africa” (2010) 4 Int’l J Transitional Just 
443. 
 
Baer, Susanne. “Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court” (1998) 
5 Colum J Eur L 249.  
 
Baker, Bruce. “When the Bakassi Boys Came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism” 
(2002) 20 J Contemp Afr Stud 223. 
Balkin, Jack M “What Brown Teaches us about Constitutional Theory” (2004) 90 Va L 
Rev 1537. 
 
Ballard, Megan J. “The Clash between Local Courts and Global Economics: The Politics 
of Judicial Reform in Brazil” (1999) 17 Berkeley J Int’l L 230. 
 
 361 
 
Banks, Richard R. “Race-based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection 
Doctrine and Discourse” (2001) 48 UCLA L Rev 1075. 
 
Barak, Aharon. “Proportionality and Principled Balancing” (2010) 4 Law & Ethics Hum 
Rts 1. 
 
Barber, NW. “The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2011) 9 Int’l J Const L 144. 
  
Barua, Pradeep P. “Ethnic Conflict in the Military of Developing Nations: A 
Comparative Analysis of India and Nigeria” (1992) 19 Armed Forces & Soc’y 123. 
 
Baxi, Upendra. “Market Fundamentalism: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights” 
(2005) 5 Hum Rts L Rev 1. 
 
Bedner, Adriaan. “An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law” (2010) 2 HJRL 48. 
 
Beiner, Ronald. ed Hannah Arendt Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
 
Bell, Christine & Keenan, Johanna. “Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and 
Problems of Transition” (2004) 26 Hum Rts Q 330. 
 
Bewaji, John Ayotunde. “Human Rights: A Philosophical Analysis of Yoruba 
Conceptions” (2006) 37 Cambrian L Rev 49.  
 
Bichler, Margaret. “Suspicious Closets: Strengthening the Claim to Suspect 
Classification and Same-Sex Marriage Rights” (2008) 28 B C Third World L J 167.  
 
Bilder, Mary S. “Corporate Origins of Judicial Review” (2006-2007) 116 Yale L J 503 at 
504. 
  
Bishop, Michael. “Why must I Cry? Justification, Sacrifice, Loneliness, Madness and 
Laughter in Post-Apartheid Judicial Decision-Making” (2007) 1 Pretoria Stud L Rev 33. 
 
Black, Charles L The People and the Court (New York: Macmillan, 1960). 
 
Black, Hugo L. “The Bill of Rights” (1960) 35 N Y U L Rev 882. 
 
Blasi, Gerald & Cingranelli, David “Do Constitutions and Institutions Help Protect 
Human Rights?” in Cingranelli, David ed. Human Rights and Developing Countries 
(Connecticut: JAI Press, 1996). 
 
 362 
 
Bone, Robert G. “Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy between 
Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation” (1995) 75 BU L Rev 1273. 
 
Borda, Aldo Zammit. “Constitutional Law in the Commonwealth: A Brief Comparative 
Analysis” (2009) 18 Commonw Lawyer 37. 
 
Bosire, Lydia Kemunto “Overpromised, Underdelivered: Transitional Justice in Sub-
Saharan Africa” (2006) 5 SUR – Int’l J on Hum Rts 71. 
 
Botha, Henk. “Freedom and Constraint in Constitutional Adjudication” (2004) 20 S Afr J 
Hum Rts 249. 
 
Boudon, Raymond. “Limitations of Rational Choice Theory” (1998) 104 Am J Sociology 
817. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field” (1987) 
38 Hastings L J 814. 
 
Boyer, Allen Dillard. “Understanding, Authority, and Will”: Sir Edward Coke and the 
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review” (1997-1998) 39 BC L Rev 43. 
  
Brace, Paul R & Hall, Melinda Gann. “The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, 
and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice” (1997) 59 J Pol 1206. 
 
Brems, Eva & Adekoya, Charles Olufemi. “Human Rights Enforcement by People Living 
in Poverty: Access to Justice in Nigeria” (2010) 54 J Afr L 258. 
 
Brems, Eva. “Conflicting Human Rights: An Exploration in the Context of the Right to a 
Fair Trial in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms” (2005) 27 Hum Rts Q 294.  
 
Brett, Lionel. “The Role of the Judiciary in a Federal Constitution with Particular 
Reference to Nigeria” in Constitutional Problems of Federalism in Nigeria (Lagos: 
Times Press, 1961). 
 
Bryant, Stephen B & Keenan, Patrick J. “Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding 
between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases” (1995) 75 BU L Rev 
759. 
 
Campbell, AH. “Courts on Trial” (1950) 13 Mod L Rev 445. 
 
Campbell, Ian. “Nigeria’s Failed Transition: The 1993 Presidential Election” (1994) 12 J 
Contemp Afr Stud 179. 
 363 
 
 
Campbell, Marion. “Witnessing Death: Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Crisis” (2002) 5 
Postcolonial Studies 39. 
  
Cappalletti, Mauro & Adams, John Clarke. “Comment, Judicial Review of Legislation: 
European Antecedents and Adaptations” (1966) 79 Harv L Rev 1207. 
 
Carey, Henry F. “The Postcolonial State and the Protection of Human Rights” (2002) 
Comp Stud South Asia, Afr & Middle East 59. 
 
Carothers, Thomas. “The Rule of Law Revival” (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 95. 
 
Chang, Wen-Chen. “Strategic Judicial Responses in Politically Charged Cases: East 
Asian Experiences” (2010) 8 Int’l J Const L 885. 
 
Chayes, Abram. “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv L Rev 
1281. 
 
Chen, Paul. “Federalism and Rights: A Neglected Relationship” (1999) 40 S Tex L Rev 
846.  
 
Chirwa, Danwood Mzikenge. “In Search of Philosophical Justifications and Suitable 
Models for the Horizontal Application of Human Rights” (2008) 8 Afr Hum Rts L J 294. 
  
Choudhry, Sujit. “Constitutionalism in Divided Societies” (2007) 5 Int’l J Const L 573. 
  
Choudhry, Sujit. “So what is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality 
Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 501. 
  
Choudhry, Sujith. “After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the Postconflict State” 
(2010) 6 Ann Rev Law Soc Sci 301. 
  
Chukwuma, Innocent. “The Legal Structure of the Police and Human Rights in Nigeria” 
(1996-1997) Third World Legal Stud 41. 
  
Clark, David S. “Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America” (1974-1975) 2 
Hastings Const L Q 405.  
 
Clark, David S. “Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America” (1974-1975) 2 
Hastings Const L Q 405. 
 
Cohen-Eliya, Moshe & Porat, Iddo. “American Balancing and German Proportionality: 
The Historical Origins” (2010) 8 Int’l J Const L 263.  
 364 
 
 
Cohen-Eliya, Moshe & Porat, Iddo. “Proportionality and the Culture of Justification” 
(2011) 59 Am J Comp L 463. 
 
Cohn, Margit. “Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Substantive Review of the 
Administration in the United Kingdom” (2010) 58 Am J Comp L 583. 
 
Collier, JG. “Is International Law Really Part of the Law of England?” (1989) 38 Int’l & 
Comp L Q 924.  
 
Comella, Victor Ferreres. “The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: 
Toward Decentralization”? (2004) 2 Int’l J Const L 461. 
 
Cooper, Jeremy. “Poverty and Constitutional Justice: The Indian Experience” (1992) 
Mercer L Rev 611. 
 
Corwin, Edward S. “Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review” (1914) 12 
Mich L Rev 538. 
 
Cotterrell, Roger. “The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality” (2008) 4 
Int’l J Law in Context 373.  
 
Cowan, Thomas A. “Group Interests” (1958) 44 Va L Rev 331. 
 
Craig, Paul P. “Proportionality, Rationality and Review” (2010) New Zealand L Rev 265. 
 
Crawford, James. “The Right to Self-Determination in International Law: Its 
Development and Future” in People’s Rights 24 (Philip Alston ed, 2001). 
 
Cross, Frank B. “Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance” (1997-1998) 92 Nw U L Rev 251. 
  
Cross, Frank B. “The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection” (1999) 19 Int’l Rev 
L & Econ 87.  
 
Cummings, Scott L & Rhode, Deborah L. “Public Interest Litigation: Insights from 
Theory and Practice” (2009) 36 Fordham Urb L J 603. 
  
Cutler, Claire A. “Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumption of International 
Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy” (2001) 27 Rev Int’l Stud 133. 
  
D Re, Judge Edward. “Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective Remedies” (1993) 
67 St John’s L Rev 581. 
 365 
 
 
Daima, Amani. “Challenges for Emerging African Democracies” (1998) 10 Peace Rev 
57. 
 
Dakas, Dakas CJ. “Confronting the Poverty and Tyranny of Judicial Passivity in Nigeria: 
Bolstering up the Case for Judicial Activism with Reference to Jewish Law” (1998) 10 
Sri Lanka J Int’l L 63. 
 
Dakas, Dakas CJ. “Judicial Reform of the Legal Framework for Human Rights Litigation 
in Nigeria: Novelties and Perplexities” in Azinge, Epiphany & Dakas Dakas CJ eds, 
Judicial Reform and Transformation in Nigeria (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, 2012). 
  
Daniel, John & Ramdeen, Marisha. “Dealing with Africa’s Post-Independent Past: Truth 
Commissions, Special Courts, War Crimes Trials and other Methods” in Roger Southal, 
ed, South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa (Cape Town: 
HSRC Press, 2006). 
 
Davenport, Christian A. “Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-
National Time-Series Investigation of why Political and Civil Liberties are Suppressed” 
(1996) The Journal of Politics 627. 
 
David, Roman. “Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Lustration 
Policy in Czech Republic and Poland (1989-2001) (2003) 28 Law & Soc Inquiry 387. 
 
Davis, DM “South African Constitutional Jurisprudence: The First Fifteen Years” (2010) 
6 Annu Rev L Soc Sci 285. 
  
 De Waal, Alex. “What’s New in the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’”? 
(2002) 78 Int’l Affairs 463. 
 
Deener, David. “Judicial Review in Modern Constitutional Systems” (1952) 46 Am Pol 
Sci Rev 1079. 
 
Dembour, Marie-Benedicte. “What are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought” (2010) 
32 Hum Rts Q 1.  
 
Denise Reaume, “What’s Distinctive about Feminist Analysis of Law?” (1996) 2 Legal 
Theory 265. 
 
Desmedt, Axel. “Proportionality in WTO Law” (2001) 4 J Int’l Econ L 441. 
 
 366 
 
Devlin, Richard F. “Jurisprudence for Judges: Why Legal Theory Matters for Social 
Context Education” (2001) 27 Queen’s L J 161. 
 
Donnelly, Jack. “Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights” (1984) 6 Hum Rts Q 
400. 
 
Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-
Western Human Rights Conceptions” (1982) 76 Am Pol Sci Rev 303.  
 
Donnelly, Jack. “Post Cold-War Reflections on the Study of International Human Rights” 
in Joel H Rosenthal, ed, Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1995). 
 
Dore, Isaak I. “Constitutionalism and the Post-Colonial State in Africa: A Rawlsian 
Approach” (1996-1997) 41 St Louis U L J 1302. 
 
Douglas, Davison M “The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v Madison: The Emergence of the 
‘Great Case’” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L Rev 375. 
 
Downs, Anthony “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy” (1957) 65 J 
Pol Econ 135. 
 
Doyle, John & Wells, Belinda “How Far can the Common Law Go towards Protecting 
Human Rights?” in Philip Alston, ed., Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: 
Comparative Perspectives, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
 
Drahos, Peter. “The Regulation of Public Goods” (2004) 7 J Int’l Econ L 321. 
 
Du Plessis, L. “The Status and Role of Legislation in South Africa as a Constitutional 
Democracy: Some Exploratory Observations” (2011) 14 Per 92 online: 
<http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/viewFile/68747/56817>. 
 
Dudziak, Mary. “Working toward Democracy: Thurgood Marshall and the Constitution 
of Kenya” (2006) 56 Duke L J 721. 
 
Dupuy Pierre Marie, “Proliferation of Actors” in Rudiger Wolfrum & Volker Roben, eds, 
Development of International Law in Treaty Making (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2005) 537. 
 
Dyzenhaus, David, Hunt, Murray & Taggart, Michael. “The Principle of Legality in 
Administrative Law: Internationalization as Constitutionalization” (2001) 1 OUCLJ 5. 
 
Dyzenhaus, David. “Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law” 
(2001-2004) 10 Otago L Rev 345 at 345. 
 367 
 
 
Ebeku, Kaniye SA. “Constitutional Guarantee of Personal Liberty and Preventive 
Detention in Nigerian Law” (1995) 7 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 620. 
 
Ebeku, Kaniye SA. “Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment and Human Rights 
Approaches to Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v Shell Revisited” (2007) 
16 RECIEL 312.  
 
Ebiede, Tarila Marclint. “Conflict Drivers: Environmental Degradation and Corruption in 
the Niger Delta Region” (2011) 1 Afr Conflict & Peacebuilding Rev 139. 
 
Ebohon, SI. “Post-Militarism: Provenance of Praetorian Democracy in Nigeria, 1999 – 
2007” (2009) 8 Global J Soc Sc 129 at 131. 
 
Edeko, Sunday. “The Legality of the Constitution Versus the Dictates of Military Power 
in a State of Revolution” (2011) 1 Sacha J Pol’y & Strategic Stud 137. 
 
Egede, Edwin. “Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the Domestication of 
Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria” (2007) 51 J Afr L 249. 
 
Egede, Edwin. “Human Rights and the Environment: Is there a legally enforceable Right 
of a Clean and Healthy Environment for the ‘Peoples’ of the Niger Delta under the 
Framework of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria?” (2007) 19 Sri 
Lanka J Int’l L 51.  
 
El Khawas, Mohamed A. “Musharraf and Pakistan: Democracy Postponed” (2009) 20 
Mediterranean Q 94. 
 
Elliot, Mark. “The HRA 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review” (2002) 7 Jud Rev 
97. 
 
Elliott, Mark “The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review” 
(2001) 60 Cambridge L J 301.  
 
Elmendorf, Christopher. “Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a 
Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?” (2007-2008) 35 Hastings Const L Q 644.  
 
Elobaid, Elobaid A & Appiaagyei-Atua, Kwadwo. “Human Rights in Africa – A New 
Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present” (1995-1996) 41 McGill L J 819.  
 
Emerson, Thomas I. “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment” (1963) 72 Yale 
L J 877.  
 
 368 
 
Enabulele, AO. “Implementation of Treaties in Nigeria and the Status Question: Whither 
Nigerian Courts?” (2009) 17 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 326. 
 
Epstein, Lee, Knight, Jack & Shvetsova, Olga. “The Role of Constitutional Courts in the 
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government” (2001) 35 Law 
& Soc’y Rev 117. 
  
Epstein, Richard. “The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public 
Choice Theory” (1990) BYU L Rev 827. 
 
Erasmus, Gerhard. “The Namibian Constitution and the Application of International 
Law” (1989-1990) 15 S Afr Y B Int’l L 81. 
 
Essien, Enefiok. “Conflicting Rationes Decidendi: The Dilemma of the Lower Courts in 
Nigeria” (2000) 12 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 23. 
 
Ette, Mercy. “Agent of Change or Stability? The Nigerian Press Undermines 
Democracy” (2000) 5 Harv Int’l J Press/Politics 67. 
  
Ewelukwa, Uche. “Posthumous Children, Hegemonic Human Rights and the Dilemma of 
Reform – Conversations across Cultures” (2008) 19 Hastings Women’s L J 211. 
  
Ewing, KD. “A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, 
Accountable and Independent Judiciary” (2000) 38 Alta L Rev 709. 
 
Eze, Mark & Okafor, Emeka E. “The Prison as an Instrument of Social Reformation and 
Rehabilitation: A Study of Nigerian Prisons (Medium) Kiri-kiri, Lagos” (2007) 4 
Pakistan J Soc Sci 23. 
 
Fallon, Richard H. “The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse” (2007) 
97 Colum L Rev 1. 
 
Feit, Edward. “Military Coups and Political Development: Lessons from Ghana and 
Nigeria” (1968) 20 World Politics 179. 
 
Ferrarese, Maria Rosaria. “When National Actors become Transnational: Transjudicial 
Dialogue between Democracy and Constitutionalism” (2009) 9 Global Jurist 1.  
 
Fields, A Belden & Narr, Wolf-Dieter. “Human Rights as a Holistic Concept” (1992) 14 
Hum Rts Q 1. 
 
Fiss, Owen M. “Foreword: The Forms of Justice” (1979) 93 Harv L Rev 39. 
  
 369 
 
Fitzgerald, Peter L. “Constitutional Crisis over the Proposed Supreme Court for the 
United Kingdom” (2004) 18 Temp Int’l & Comp L J 233. 
 
Francioni, Francisco. “International Law as a Common Language for National Courts” 
(2001) 36 Tex Int’l L J 587.  
 
Frantz, Laurent B. “Is the First Amendment Law? – A Reply to Professor Mendelson” 
(1963) 51 Cal L Rev 729. 
 
French, Robert. “Protecting Human Rights without a Bill of Rights” (2010) 19 
Commonw Lawyer 28.  
 
Friedman, Barry. “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road 
to Judicial Supremacy” (1998) 73 NYU L Rev 333.  
 
Friedman, Barry. “The Politics of Judicial Review” (2005-2006) 84 Tex L Rev 257. 
 
Fudge, Judy & Glasbeek, Harry. “The Politics of Rights: A Politics with Little Class” 
(1992) 1 Social & Legal Stud 45.  
 
Fudge, Judy. “What Do We Mean by Law and Social Transformation?” (1990) CJLS 47.  
 
Fuller, Lon L. “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978-1979) 92 Harv L Rev 353. 
 
Galotto, John. “Strict Scrutiny for Gender, via ‘Croson’” (1993) 93 Colum L Rev 508. 
  
Gardbaum, Stephen “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” (2001) 49 
Am J Comp L 707 at 709. 
 
Gardbaum, Stephen, “Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” 
(2010) 8 Int’l J Const L 167. 
 
Gardbaum, Stephen. “Limiting Constitutional Rights” (2007) 54 UCLA L Rev 789. 
 
Gardbaum, Stephen. “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of Constitutional Rights” (2003-2004) 102 
Mich L Rev 387. 
 
Garlicki, Lech. Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts” (2007) 5 Int’l J Const L 
44. 
 
Gavison, Ruth. “Human Rights” in Gavison, Ruth & Shneidor H. eds (1991) 1 Human 
Rights And Civil Liberties in Israel – A Reader 25. 
 
 370 
 
Gavison, Ruth. “The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies” (1999) 33 Isr L Rev 216.  
 
Gelly, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T. “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory 
Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases” (1990) 6 J Law 
Econ & Org 263. 
 
Gibson, James L & Caldeira, Gregory A. “Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, 
Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court” (2003) 65 J Pol 1. 
  
Glendon, Mary Ann. “Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (1997-
1998) 73 Notre Dame L Rev 1153. 
 
Goldsmith, Jack & Levinson, Daryl. “Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law” (2009) 122 Harv L Rev 1791. 
 
Goldstein, Leslie Friedman. “From Democracy to Juristocracy” Book Review of “From 
Democracy to Juristocracy? The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and 
Democracy” by Carlo Guarneri & Patrizia Pederzoli, “Governing with Judges: 
Constitutional Politics in Europe” by Alec Stone Sweet & “Towards Juristocracy: The 
Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism” by Ran Hirschl, (2004) 38 Law 
& Soc’y Rev 611. 
  
Graafland, Johan. “Profits and Principles: Four Perspectives” (2002) 35 J Business Ethics 
293 & 294.  
 
Graber, Mark A. “Foreword: From the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to Juristocracy and 
the Political Construction of Judicial Power” (2006) 65 Md L Rev 1. 
 
Gray, David. “An Excuse-centered Approach to Transitional Justice” (2006) 74 Fordham 
L Rev 2621. 
 
Grim, Patrick. “The ‘Right’ to a Fair Trial” (1978) 2 J Libertarian Stud 115. 
  
Grimm, Dieter. “Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence” 
(2007) 57 UTLJ 383.  
 
Grossman, Joel B. “Social Background and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory” 
(1967) 29 The Journal of Politics 334. 
 
Grove, David Lavan. “The ‘Sentinels’ of Liberty? The Nigerian Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights” (1963) 7 J Afr L 152. 
 
 371 
 
Grover, Sonja. “Democracy and the Canadian Charter notwithstanding Clause: Are they 
Compatible?” (2005) 9 Int’l J Hum Rts 479. 
 
Halpin, Andrew. “The Theoretical Controversy concerning Judicial Review” (2001) 64 
Mod L R 500. 
  
Handsley, Elizabeth. “Legal Fictions and Confusion as Strategies for Protecting Human 
Rights: A Dissenting View of Teoh’s Case” (1997) 2 Newcastle L Rev 56.  
 
Hannum, Hurst. “The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National 
and International Law (1995-1996) 25 Ga J Int’l & Comp L 287.  
 
Harlow, Carol. “Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values” 
(2006) 17 Eur J Int’l L 187. 
 
Harris, Angela P. “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (1989-1990) 42 
Stan L Rev 581. 
 
Harris-Short, Sonia. “International Human Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept and 
Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child” 
(2003) 23 Hum Rts Q 130. 
  
Hartney, Michael. “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights” (1991) 4 Can JL & 
Jur 293. 
 
Heffernan, Nathan S. “Judicial Responsibility, Judicial Independence and the Election of 
Judges” (1996-1997) 80 Marq L Rev 1031. 
 
Helmke, Gretchen & Rosenbluth, Frances. “Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial 
Independence in Comparative Perspective” (2009) 12 Annu Rev Pol Sci 345.  
 
Henkin, Louis. “Revolutions and Constitutions” (1988-1989) 49 La L Rev 1023. 
 
Heydon, Dyson. “Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law” (2001-2004) 10 
Otago L Rev 493. 
 
Heyns, Christof. “African Human Rights Law and the European Convention” (1995) 11 S 
Afr J Hum Rts 252. 
 
Hillgenberg, Hartmut. “A Fresh Look at Soft Law” (1999) 10 Eur J Int’l L 499.  
 
Hilson, Chris “The Europeanization of English Administrative Law: Judicial Review and 
Convergence” (2003) 9 Eur Pub L 125. 
 372 
 
 
Hirschl, Ran. “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through 
Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions” (2000) 25 Law & 
Soc Inquiry 91. 
Hirschl, Ran. “The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment 
through Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, (2000) 36 Stan J Int’l L 74. 
 
Hirschl, Ran. “The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment 
through Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities” (2000) 36 Stan J Int’l L 73. 
 
Horowitz, David L. “The Courts as Guardians of the Public Interest” (1977) 37 Pub 
Admin Rev 148. 
  
Horowitz, Donald. “The Judiciary: Umpire or Empire?” (1982) 6 Law & Hum Behavior 
129. 
 
Howard, Rhoda & Donnelly, Jack. “Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political 
Regimes” (1986) 80 Am Pol Sci Rev 80. 
  
Howard, Rhoda. “Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community” (1993) 15 Hum 
Rts Q 315. 
  
Howard, Rhoda. “Group versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on Human 
Rights” in Howard, Rhoda. “Human Rights and Personal Law: Women in Sub-Saharan 
Africa” (1982) 12 Issue: A Journal of Opinion 45. 
 
Howard, Rhoda. “Legitimacy and Class Rule in Commonwealth Africa: 
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law” (1985) 7 Third World Q 323. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. “Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century” in 
Neil J Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice, Vol 1 (Washington DC: USIP Press, 1995). 
 
Hutchinson, Allan & Colon - Rios, Joel. “What’s Democracy Got to do with it?: A 
Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism” (Osgoode Hall Law School, 3 (4) Comparative 
Research in Law & Political Economy, CLPE Research Paper 29, 2007) online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1017305>. 
 
Hutchinson, Allan C & Monahan, Patrick J. “Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal 
Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought” (1984) 36 Stan L Rev 202. 
 
Hutchinson, Allan C. “Heydon’ Seek: Looking for Law in all the Wrong Places” (2003) 
29 Monash U L Rev 85. 
 
 373 
 
Hutchinson, Allan C. “Judges and Politics: An Essay from Canada” (2004) 24 Legal Stud 
275. 
 
Hutchinson, Allan C. “The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship” 
(1985) 48 Mod L Rev 293. 
Hutchinson, Allan. “A ‘Hard Core’ Case Against Judicial Review” (2008) 121 Harv L 
Rev F 57. 
 
Ibhawoh, Bonny. “Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy 
of Human Rights in the African State” (2000) 22 Hum Rts Q 838. 
 
Ihonvbere, Julius. “Where is the Third Wave? A Critical Evaluation of Africa’s Non-
Transition to Democracy” (1996) 43 Africa Today 343.  
 
Ikelegbe, Augustine. “Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of 
Nigeria: Ramifications of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle” (2001) 39 J 
Modern Afr Stud 437. 
 
Ikelegbe, Augustine. “The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from 
Nigeria” (2001) 39 J Modern Afr Stud 1. 
 
Ilesanmi, Simeon. “Constitutional Treatment of Religion and the Politics of Human 
Rights in Nigeria” (2001) 100 Afr Affairs 529.  
 
Issacharoff, Samuel. “Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies” (2003-
2004) 82 Tex L Rev 1861. 
 
Issacharoff, Samuel. “Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political 
Fairness” (1992-1993) 71 Tex L Rev 1643.  
 
Iwobi, Andrew U. “Tiptoeing through a Constitutional Minefield: The Great Shari’a 
Controversy in Nigeria” (2004) 48 J Afr L 133.  
 
Jackson, Larry. “Nigeria: The Politics of the First Republic” (1972) 2 J Black Stud 277.  
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. “Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR 
Theory” (2008) 34 Rev Int’l Stud 42. 
 
Jacobs, Francis G. “Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European 
Community Law” in The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe Evelyn Ellis, 
ed, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999). 
 
Jacobson, Gary Jeffrey. “Bommai and the Judicial Power: A View from the United 
States” (2008) Indian J Const L 38.  
 374 
 
 
Jacot – Guillarmord, Olivier. “Rights Related to Good Administration of Justice (Article 
6)” in J Macdonald, F Matscher and H Petzold, eds, The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). 
 
Jaffe, Louis “Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions” (1961) 75 Harv L Rev 
255.  
 
Jenkins, David. “Common Law Declarations of Unconstitutionality” (2009) 7 Int’l J 
Const L 183. 
 
Jeremy Waldron, “Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida) 
(2001) 21 Law & Philosophy 137. 
 
Joireman, Sandra Fullerton. “Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa 
and the Colonial Legacy” (2001) 39 J Modern Afr Stud 571.  
 
Jones, J Warren. “The Healthcare Professional and the Bolam Test” (2000) 188 Brit 
Dental J 237. 
 
Jowell, Jeffrey. “Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law” 
(1988) 14 Commw L Bull 858.  
 
Jowell, Jeffrey. “In the Shadow of Wednesbury” (1997) 2 Jud Rev 75. 
 
Kamba, WJ. “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework” (1974) 23 Int’l & Comp L Q 
485. 
 
Kapiszewski, Diana. “Tactical Balancing: High Court Decision Making on Politically 
Crucial Cases” (2011) 45 Law & Soc Rev 471. 
 
Katz, Ellis & Tarr, G Alan,“Introduction” in Ellis Katz & G Alan Tarr, eds, Federalism 
and Rights (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996). 
 
Kaul, Inge, Grunberg, Isabelle & Stern, Marc. “Defining Global Public Goods” in Inge 
Kaul et al, eds, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
  
Kay, Richard S. “The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the 
Independence of Constitutional Law” (1993) 10 Const Comment 329.  
 
Keay, EA. “Legal and Constitutional Changes in Nigeria under the Military Government” 
(1966) 10 J Afr L 92.  
 375 
 
 
 Keith, Linda Camp & Ogundele, Ayo. “Legal Systems and Constitutionalism in Sub-
Saharan Africa: An Empirical Examination of Colonial Influences on Human Rights” 
(2007) 29 Hum Rts Q 1065. 
Keith, Linda Camp. “National Constitutions and Human Rights Protection: Regional 
Differences and Colonial Influences” in Sabine Carey & Steven Poe, eds., Understanding 
Human Rights Violations (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2004). 
 
 Kelsen, Hans. “Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and 
American Constitutions” (1942) 4 J Pol 183. 
 
Kelsen, Hans. “La Garantie Jurisdictionnelle de la Constitution” (1928) 45 Revue De 
Droit Public 197.  
 
Kende, Mark S. “The Fifth Anniversary of the South African Constitutional Court: In 
Defence of Judicial Pragmatism” (2002) 26 Vt L Rev 753.  
 
Kennedy, David. “A New Stream of International Law Scholarship” (1988) 7 Wis Int’l L 
J 14. 
 
Khatiwada, Apurba. “Constitutionalism of Transition” (2008) 1 Kathmandu L Rev 41 at 
45. 
 
Kingsbury, Benedict, Krisch Nico & Stewart, Richard. “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Probs  15. 
 
Kingsbury, Benedict. “The Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance” (2005) 
99 Am Soc’y Int’l L Proc 143. 
  
Kinley, David. “Human Rights, Globalization and the Rule of Law: Friends, Foes or 
Family?” (2003) 7 UCLA J Int’l L & Foreign  Aff 239.  
 
Klarman, Michael. “Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution” (1996) 
82 Va L Rev 1.  
 
Kludze, A Kodzo Paaku. “Constitutional Rights and their Relationship with International 
Human Rights in Ghana” (2008) 41 Isr L Rev 677. 
 
Klug, Heinz. “Introducing the Devil: An Institutional Analysis of the Power of Judicial 
Review” (1997) 13 S Afr J Hum Rts 185. 
 
Klug, Heinz. “Transnational Human Rights: Exploring the Persistence and Globalization 
of Human Rights” (2005) 1 Ann Rev Law Soc Sci 85. 
 376 
 
 
Knox, John H. “Horizontal Human Rights Law” (2008) 102 Am J Int’l L 1.  
 
Koopmans, T. “Comparative Law and the Courts” (1996) 45 Int’l & Comp L Q 545.  
 
Kreimer, Seth. “Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census 
of the 1990s” (1997) 5 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 427. 
 
Krishnan, Jayanth Kumar. “Public Interest Litigation in Comparative Context” (2001-
2002) 20 Buff Pub Interest L J 19.  
 
Kumar, Satish. “Human Rights and Economic Development: The Indian Tradition” 
(1981) 3 Hum Rts Q 47. 
  
Kuria, Gibson Kamau & Vazquez, Algeisa M. “Judges and Human Rights: The Kenyan 
Experience” (1991) 35 J Afr L 142. 
 
Lakin, Stuart. “Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor 
of Legality in the British Constitution” (2008) 28 Oxford J Leg Stud 709. 
 
Lange, Matthew. “British Colonial Legacies and Political Development” (2004) 32 
World Dev 905. 
 
Law,  David S. “How to Rig the Courts” (2011) 99 Geo L J 779. 
 
Law, David S. “Generic Constitutional Law” (2005) 89 Minn L Rev 652. 
 
Lawal, MA et al. “Tuberculosis in a Nigerian Medium Security Prison” (2009) 11 Benin 
J Postgraduate Medicine. 
 
 Levinson, Sanford. “Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of 
Professional Identity (1993) 14 Cardozo L Rev 1577. 
 
Lewis, Peter. “Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition” 
(1994) 93 Afr Affairs 323. 
 
Lewis, Peter. “Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition” 
(1994) 93 Afr Affairs 323. 
 
Los, Maria. “Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe” 
(1995) 20 Law & Soc Inquiry 117. 
  
 377 
 
Ludwig, Frieder. “Christian-Muslim Relations in Northern Nigeria since the Introduction 
of Shari’ah in 1999” (2008) 76 J Am Acad Relig 602. 
  
Ludwig, Frieder. “Christian-Muslim Relations in Northern Nigeria since the Introduction 
of Sharia in 1999” (2008) 76 J Am Acad Relig 602. 
 
MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech” (1985) 20 Harv CR-
CLL Rev 1. 
  
Maluwa, Tiyanjana. “The Incorporation of International Law and its Interpretational Role 
in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Exploratory Survey” (1998) 23 S Afr Y B Int’l 
L 45. 
 
Mashamba, J Clement. “Are Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Judicially 
Enforceable?” (2009) 15 E Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 225.  
Mautner, Menachem. “Three Approaches to Law and Culture” (2010-2011) 96 Cornell L 
Rev 840. 
 
McAuliffe, Padraig. “Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: The Perfect Couple or 
Awkward Bedfellows?” (2010) 2 HJRL 127. 
 
Mcevoy, Kieran & Mcgregor, Lorna. “Transitional Justice from Below: An Agenda for 
Research, Policy and Praxis” in Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor eds., Transitional 
Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Oxford & 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008). 
 
McEvoy, Kieran & Rebouche, Rachel. “Mobilizing the Professions: Lawyers, Politics, 
and the Collective Legal Conscience” in John Morison, Kieran McEvoy & Gordon 
Anthony eds., Judges, Transition and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
 
McGowan, Patrick J. “African Military Coups d’Etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and 
Distribution” (2003) 41 J Modern Afr Stud 339.  
 
Meiklejohn, Alexander. “The First Amendment is an Absolute” (1961) The Sup Ct Rev 
245. 
Mendelson, Wallace. “On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the 
Balance” (1962) 50 Cal L Rev 821. 
 
Mendelson, Wallace. “The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr 
Frantz” (1963-1964) 17 Vand L Rev 479. 
 
 378 
 
Merry, Sally Engle. “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the 
Middle” (2008) 108 Am Anthropologist 38. 
 
Meydani, Assaf & Mizrahi, Shlomo. “The Politics and Strategies of Defending Human 
Rights: The Israeli Case” (2006) 39 Isr L Rev 39. 
 
Mingst, Karen. “Judicial Systems of Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Neglect” (1988) 
31 Afr Stud Rev 135. 
 
Mitchell, Neil J & McCormick, James M. “Economic and Political Explanations of 
Human Rights Violations” (1988) 40 World Politics 476.  
 
Morgan-Forster Jason G. “Reverse Moderate Relativism Applied: Third Generation 
International Human Rights from an Islamic Perspective” (Bepress Legal Series, Paper 
No. 235, 2004) Online: <http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/235>. 
 
Mureinik, Etienne. “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 
10 S Afr J Hum Rts 31. 
 
Mureinik, Etienne. “Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution” 
(1992) 8 S Afr J Hum Rts 464.  
 
Mustapha, Abdul Raufu. “The National Question and Radical Politics in Nigeria” (1986) 
13 Rev Afr Pol Econ 81.  
 
Mutua, Makau wa. “The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An 
Evaluation of the Language of Duties” (1994-1995) 35 Va J Int’l L 339. 
 
Mutua, Makau. “The Iraq Paradox: Minority and Group Rights in a Viable Constitution” 
(2006) 54 Buffalo L Rev 927. 
 
Nagel, Joane & Olzak, Susan. “Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension 
of the Competition Model” (1982) 30 Soc Probs 127. 
 
Nedelsky, Jennifer. “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges of Law” (1997) 42 McGill 
L J 91 at 106. 
 
Nelson, Matthew J. “Pakistan in 2008: Moving Beyond Musharraf” (2009) 49 Asian 
Survey 16.  
 
Ni Aolain, Fionnuala & Campbell, Colm. “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted 
Democracies” (2005) 27 Hum Rts Q 172 at 176.  
 
 379 
 
Nnamuchi, Obiajulu. “Kleptocracy and its many Faces: The Challenges of Justiciability 
of the Right to Healthcare in Nigeria” (2008) 52 J Afr L 42. 
 
Nowrot, Karsten. “Reconceptualizing International Legal Personality of Influential Non-
State Actors: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities” (2006) 
80 Philippines L J 563. 
 
Nwapi, Chilenye. “International Treaties in Nigeria and Canadian Courts” (2011) 19 Afr 
J Int’l & Comp L 38. 
 
Nwauche, Enyinna S. “Law, Religion and Human Rights in Nigeria” (2008) 8 Afr Hum 
Rts L J 568.  
 
Nwauche, Enyinna S. “Regional Economic Communities and Human Rights in West 
Africa and the African Arabic Countries” in Anton Bosl & Joseph Diescho eds., Human 
Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives in their Protection (Windhoek: Macmillan 
Education, 2009). 
Nwauche, Enyinna. “The Nigerian Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Procedure Rules 
2009: A Fitting Response to Problems in the Enforcement of Human Rights in Nigeria” 
(2010) 10 Afr Hum Rts L J 502. 
 
Nwauche, Enyinna. “You may not refuse a Blood Transfusion if you are a Nigerian 
Child: A Comment on Esanubor v Faweya” (2010) 10 Afr Hum Rts L J 309.  
 
Nwauche, ES & Nwobike, JC “The Judicial Enforcement of Human Rights in Nigeria” 
(2002) 12 Caribbean L Rev 45. 
  
Nwauche, ES. “The Dubious Distinction between Principal and Accessory Claims in 
Nigerian Human Rights Jurisprudence” (2008) 52 J Afr L 66. 
 
Nwoko, Kenneth C. “Trade Unionism and Governance in Nigeria: A Paradigm Shift from 
Labour Activism to Political Opposition” (2009) 2 Inf Soc’y & Justice 139. 
  
Nyerere, Julius. “Ujaama – The Basis of African Socialism” in Freedom and Socialism 
(London: London University Press, 1968). 
 
O’Cinneide, Colm. “Democracy, Rights and the Constitution – New Directions in the 
Human Rights Era” (2004) 57 Curr Legal Probs 175. 
 
Obiagwu, Chinonye & Odinkalu, Chidi Anselm. “Nigeria: Combating the Legacies of 
Colonialism and Militarism” in An-Na’im, Abdullahi ed. Human Rights under African 
Constitutions: Realizing the Promise for Ourselves (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
 380 
 
 
Obono, Daniele. “Trade Unions as Social Movements and Political Actors in Nigeria 
(1994-2004)” (2011) 20 Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift fur Kritische Afrikastudien 95. 
 
Odinkalu, Chidi Anselm. “Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritizing for the 
Protection of Human Rights in Africa” (2003) 47 J Afr L 1. 
 
Odinkalu, Chidi Anselm “Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language” 
(2000) 2 Hum Rts Dialogue 3.  
 
Oduro, Franklin “Reconciling a Divided Nation through a Non-Retributive Justice 
Approach: Ghana’s National Reconciliation Initiative” (2005) 9 Int’l J Hum Rts 327. 
 
Ogbondah, Chris & Onyedike,Emmanuel. “Origins and Interpretation of Nigerian Press 
Laws” (1991) 5 Afr Media Rev 59. 
 
Ogbondah, Chris W “Political Repression in Nigeria, 1993-1998: A Critical Examination 
of One Aspect of the Perils of Military Dictatorship” (2000) 35 Afr Spectrum 231. 
Ogbondah, Chris W. “The Pen Is Mightier than the ‘Koboko’: A Critical Analysis of the 
Amakiri Case in Nigeria” (1991) 8 Pol Comm & Persuasion 109. 
 
Ogbondah, Chris. “Media Laws in Political Transition” in Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie 
& Folu Ogundimu eds, Media and Democracy in Africa (New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 2003). 
  
Ogbondah, Chris. “Press Freedom in West Africa: An Analysis of one Ramification of 
Human Rights” (1994) 22 J Opinion 21. 
 
Ogbu-Nwobodo, Samuel. “Pluralism in the Nigerian Constitutional Framework: A 
Comparative Study of United States of America and Republic of India” in Chima Centus 
Nweze, ed, Contemporary Issues on Public International and Comparative Law: Essays 
in Honor of Professor Christian Nwachukwu Okeke (Lake Mary: Vandeplas Publishing, 
2009). 
 
Ogowewo, Tunde I. “Self-Inflicted Constraints on Judicial Government in Nigeria” 
(2005) 49 J Afr L 39.  
 
Ogowewo, Tunde I. “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is 
Imperative for the Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy” (2000) 44 J Afr L 135.  
 
Ogowewo, Tunde I. “Wrecking the Law: How Article III of the Constitution of the 
United States led to the Discovery of a Law of Standing to Sue in Nigeria” (2000-2001) 
26 Brook J Int’l L 527. 
 381 
 
 
 Ogowewo, Tunde. “The Problem of Standing to Sue in Nigeria” (1995) 39 J Afr L 1.  
 
Oguibe, Olu. “Lessons from the Killing Fields” (1998) 77 Transitions 86. 
 
Ogunbadejo, Oye. “Conflict Images: Colonial Legacy, Ethnicity, and Corruption in 
Nigerian Politics, 1960-1966” (1979) 4 Utafiti 85. 
 
Ogunniran, Iyabode. “The Child Rights Act versus Sharia Law in Nigeria: Issues, 
Challenges & a Way Forward” (2010) 30 Child Legal Rts J 62.  
 
Ojo, Abiola. “The Search for a Grundnorm in Nigeria – The Lakanmi Case” (1971) 20 
Int’l & Comp L Q 117.  
 
Ojo, Tokunbo. “The Nigerian Media and the Process of Democratization” (2007) 8 
Journalism 545.  
 
Okafor, Obiora & Ugochukwu, Basil. “Have the Norms and Jurisprudence of the African 
Human Rights System been Pro-Poor?” (2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts L J 396.  
Okafor, Obiora C. “Remarkable Returns: The Influence of a Labour-led Socio-Economic 
Movement on Legislative Reasoning, Process and Action in Nigeria, 1999-2007” (2009) 
47 J Mod Afr Stud 241.  
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu & Agbakwa, Shedrack. “On Legalism, Popular Agency and 
‘Voices of Suffering’: The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission in Context” 
(2002) 24 Hum Rts Q 662. 
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu “The Precarious place of Labour Rights and Movements in 
Nigeria’s Dual Economic and Political Transition 1999-2005” (2007) 51 J Afr L 68.  
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu. “Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on an Emergent Trade-Related 
Market-Friendly Human Rights Paradigm: Recent Evidence from Nigerian Labor-led 
Struggles” (2007) 1 Law, Soc Justice & Global Dev J 1. 
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu. “Between Elite Interests and Pro-Poor Resistance: The Nigerian 
Courts and Labour-led Anti-Fuel Price Hike Struggles (1999-2007)” (2010) 54 J Afr L 
95.  
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu. “Between Elite Interests and Pro-Poor Resistance: The Nigerian 
Courts and Labor-led Anti-Fuel Price Hike Struggles (1999-2007)” (2010) 54 J Afr L 95.  
 
 382 
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu. “Modest Harvests: On the Significant (but limited) Impact of 
Human Rights NGOs on Legislative and Executive Behaviour in Nigeria” (2004) 48 J 
Afr L 23 at 27. 
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu. “Remarkable Returns: The Influence of Labor – led Socio-
Economic Rights Movement on Legislative Reasoning, Process and Action in Nigeria, 
1999 – 2007” (2009) 47 J Modern Afr Stud 241. 
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu. “The Fundamental Right to a Passport under Nigerian Law: An 
Integrated Viewpoint” (1996) 40 J Afr L 53. 
 
Okafor, Obiora Chinedu. “What should Organized Human Rights Activism in Africa 
Become? Contributory Insights from a Comparison of NGOs and Labor-led Movements 
in Nigeria” (2010) 16 Buff Hum Rts L Rev 113. 
 
Okeke, Phil. “Reconfiguring Tradition: Women’s Rights and Social Status in 
Contemporary Nigeria” (2000) 47 Afr Today 49.  
 
Okemgbo, Christian, Omideyi, Adekunbi & Odimegwu, Clifford. “Prevalence, Patterns 
and Correlates of Domestic Violence in Selected Igbo Communities of Imo State, 
Nigeria” (2002) 6 Afr J Reprod Health 101.  
Okere, B Obinna. “Judicial Activism and Passivity in Interpreting the Nigerian 
Constitution” (1987) 36 Int’l & Comp L Q 788. 
 
Okere, Obinna. “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under 
the Nigerian Constitution” (1983) 32 Int’l & Comp L Q 214. 
 
Oko, Okechukwu “Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes towards a 
More Pragmatic Approach” (2003-2004) 11 Cardozo J Int’l & Comp L 89. 
 
Oko, Okechukwu. “Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes towards a 
more Pragmatic Approach” (2003-2004) 11 Cardozo J Int’l & Comp L 89. 
 
Oko, Okechukwu. “Lawyers in Chains: Restrictions on Human Rights Advocacy under 
Nigeria’s Military Regimes” (1997) 10 Harv Hum Rts J 257.  
 
Okogbule, Nlerum S. “The Abortion of Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Nigeria: The 
Oputa Panel in Perspective” (2009) 15 East Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 441. 
 
Okonkwor, R Chude. “The Legal Basis of Freedom of Expression in Nigeria” (1978) 8 
Cal W Int’l L J 256. 
 
 383 
 
Olowofoyeku, AA. “The Beleaguered Fortress: Reflections of the Independence of 
Nigeria’s Judiciary” (1989) 33 J Afr L 55 at 62. 
 
Olowu, Dejo. “Human Rights and the Avoidance of Domestic Implementation: The 
Phenomenon of Non-Justiciable Constitutional Guarantees” (2006) 69 Sask L Rev 56. 
 
Olukotun, Ayo. “Authoritarian State, Crisis of Democratization and the Underground 
Media in Nigeria” (2002) 101 Afr Affairs 317. 
 
Omotola, Shola. “Democratization, Good Governance and Development in Africa: The 
Nigerian Experience” (2007) 9 J Sustainable Dev Afr 247. 
 
Opong, Richard Frimpong. “Re-imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent 
Trends in the Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa 
(2007) 30 Fordham Int’l L J 296. 
 
Orentlicher, Diane F. “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime” (1990-1991) 100 Yale L J 2537. 
 
Orentlicher, Diane F. “Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with 
Local Agency” (2007) 1 Int’l J Transitional Justice 10. 
 
Oretuyi, SA. “The Nigerian Attempt to Secure Legal Representation by a Bill of Rights: 
Has it Achieved its Objective?” (1975) 17 Malaya L Rev 149. 
 
Osaghae, Eghosa. “Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: The 
Nigerian Experience” (1998) 36 J Mod Afr Stud 1. 
  
Osiander, Andreas. “Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth” 
(2001) 55 Int’l Org 251. 
  
Oyewo, Oyelowo. “The Judiciary in Periods of Political Crisis and Conflicts in Nigeria” 
(1998) 10 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 507. 
 
Park, Kyung S. “Korean Principle of Proportionality, American Multi-leveled Scrutiny, 
and Empiricist Elements in U.S. – Korean Constitutional Jurisprudence” (2001) 1 J 
Korean L 105. 
 
Paul, James CN. “Some Observations on Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and Rule of 
Law in Africa” (1974) 35 Ohio St L J 851.  
 
Pegg, Scott. “Human Rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta” (2001/2002) 4 Indiana Int’l Hum 
Rts L Bull 5  
 384 
 
 
Perju, Vlad. “Proportionality and Freedom: An Essay on Method in Constitutional Law” 
Boston College Law School Paper Series, 7-1-2011.  
 
Perry, Michael J. “Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?” 
(2003) 38 Wake Forest L Rev 635. 
 
Petman, Jarna. “Human Rights, Democracy and the Left” (2006) 2 Unbound 63. 
 
Pettinga, Gayle Lynn. “Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by any other 
Name” (1986-1987) 62 Ind L J 779. 
 
Pfeiffer, Steven B. “The Role of the Judiciary in the Constitutional Systems of East 
Africa” (1978) 16 J Modern Afr Stud 33. 
 
Phillipson, Gavin. “The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal Effect’ and the Common Law: A 
Bang or a Whimper?” (1999) 62 Mod L Rev 824.  
 
Plucknett, Theodore. “Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review” (1926-1927) 40 Harv L Rev 
30. 
 
Pogge, Thomas. “Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of 
the Global Poor” (2005) 18 Leiden J Int’l L 717. 
Posner, Richard. “What do Justices Maximize? (The same Thing Everybody else does)” 
(1993) 3 Sup Ct Econ Rev 1. 
 
Pound, Roscoe. “Law in Books and Law in Action” (1910) 44 Am L Rev 12.  
 
Powell Jr, Lewis. “Carolene Products Revisited” (1982) 82 Colum L Rev 1087.  
 
Prempeh, H Kwasi. “A New Jurisprudence for Africa” (1999) 10 Journal of Democracy 
135.  
 Prem 
peh, H Kwasi. “Africa’s ‘Constitutionalism Revival’: False Start or New Dawn?” (2007) 
5 Int’l J Const L 469.  
 
Pritchard, Kathleen. “Comparative Human Rights: An Integrative Explanation” (1986) 15 
Pol’y Stud J 110. 
 
Proust, Kimberly. “International Cooperation: A Commonwealth Perspective” (2003) 16 
S Afr J Crim Just 295. 
 
Raikes, PL. “Ujaama and Rural Socialism” (1975) 3 Rev Afr Pol Econ 33. 
 385 
 
 
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. “Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the 
Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement Perspective” (2007) 18 Hum Rts Rev 
157. 
 
Ramraj, Victor. “Constitutional Tipping Points: Sustainable Constitutionalism in Theory 
and Practice” (2010) 1 Transnat’l Legal Theory 191. 
 
Ratnapala, Suri. “Bills of Rights in Functioning Parliamentary Democracies: Kantian, 
Consequentialist and Institutionalist Scepticisms” (2011) 34 Melb U L Rev 592. 
  
Rawlings, Richard. “Modelling Judicial Review” (2008) 61 Curr Legal Probs 95. 
 
Read, James S. “The New Constitution of Nigeria, 1979: ‘The Washington Model’” 
(1979) 23 J Afr L 131. 
 
Reay, Diane. “Feminist Theory, Habitus, and Social Class: Disrupting Notions of 
Classlessness” (1997) 20 Women’s Stud Int’l Forum 225. 
 
Reitz, John C. “How to do Comparative Law” (1998) 46 Am J Comp L 617. 
 
Reitz, John. ‘Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues” (2002) 50 Am J Comp L 437. 
 
Rheinstein, Max. “Comparative Law – Its Functions, Methods and Usages” (1968 – 
1969) 22 Ark L Rev 415. 
 
Richard Goldstone, “The South African Bill of Rights” (1997) 32 Tex Int’l L J 451. 
 
Rivers, Julian. “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review” (2006) 65 Cambridge 
L J 174. 
 
Robertson, David. “Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords: A Jurimetric Analysis” 
(1982) 12 Brit J Pol Sci 1. 
 
Robert-Wray, Kenneth. “Human Rights in the Commonwealth” (1968) 17 Int’l & Comp 
L Q 908. 
 
Robinson, Darryl. “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and 
the International Criminal Court” (2003) 14 Eur J Int’l L 481. 
 
Rosenfeld, Michel. “Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: 
Paradoxes and Contrasts” (2004) 2 Int’l J Const L 633.  
 
 386 
 
Rotimi, Ajayi Ola & Ihonvbere, Julius. “Democratic Impasse: Remilitarization of 
Nigeria” (1994) 15 Third World Q 669. 
 
Roux, Theunis. “Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa” 
(2009) 7 Int’l J Const L 106. 
 
Samuel Decalo, “Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa” (1973) 11 J Modern 
Afr Stud 105. 
 
Sandberg, Haim “Legal Colonialism: Americanization of Legal Education in Israel” 
(2010) 10 Global Jurist 1. 
 
Sanni, Abiola “Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 as a Tool for the 
Enforcement of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria: The Need 
for Far-reaching Reform” (2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts L J 511.  
 
Sarkin, Jeremy. “The Political Role of the South African Constitutional Court” (1997) 
114 S Afr L J 134. 
 
Sarkin, Jeremy. “The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, 
Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with 
Genocide” (2001) 45 J Afr L 143. 
 
Schmidhauser, John R. “Legal Imperialism: Its Enduring Impact on Colonial and Post-
Colonial Judicial Systems” (1992) 13 Int’l Pol Sci Rev 321.  
 
Schor, Miguel. “Mapping Comparative Judicial Review” (2008) 7 Wash U Global Stud L 
Rev 257.  
 
Schwartz, Herman. “The New East European Constitutional Courts” (1992) 13 Mich J 
Int’l L 741.  
 
Scott, Craig & Macklem, Patrick. “Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable 
Guarantees: Social Rights in a New South African Consitution?” (1992) 141 U Pa L Rev 
1.  
 
Segal, Jeffrey. “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and 
Courts” (1997) 91 Am Pol Sci Rev 28. 
 
Seidman, Robert B. “Judicial Review and Fundamental Freedoms in Anglophone 
Independent Africa” (1974) 35 Ohio St L J 820. 
 
 387 
 
Seidman, Robert. “Administrative Law and Legitimacy in Anglophone Africa: A 
Problem in the Reception of Foreign Law” (1970) 5 Law & Soc Rev 161. 
 
Selway, Bradley. “The Principle Behind Common Law Judicial Review of 
Administrative Actions: The Search Continues” (2002) 8 Adel L Rev 1.  
 
Seng, Michael P. “Democracy in Nigeria” (1984-1986) 9 Black L J 113. 
 
Shapiro, Martin. “The New Constitutional Politics of Europe” (1994) 26 Comp Pol Stud 
397. 
 
Shivji, Issa G. “Constructing a New Rights Regime: Promises, Problems and Prospects” 
(1999) 8 Soc & Leg Stud 253. 
 
Shriffin, Steven. “The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General 
Theory of the First Amendment” (1983) 78 Nw U L Rev 1212. 
 
Sidebotham, Naomi. “Judicial Review: Is there still a Role for Unreasonableness?” 
(2001) 8 Murdoch UEJL 1. 
 
Skelton Jr, John W. “Standards of Procedural Due Process under International Law Vs. 
Preventive Detention in Selected African States” (1979-1980) 2 Hous J Int’l L 307.  
 
Sklar, Richard L. “Nigerian Politics in Perspective” (1967) 2 Government & Opposition 
524. 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “A Global Community of Courts” (2003) 44 Harv Int’l L J 191. 
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International 
System” in Yves Dezelay & Bryant Garth, eds, Global Perspectives: The Production, 
Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2002). 
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “Judicial Globalization” (2000) 40 Va J Int’l L 1103. 
 
Sloane, Robert. “Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of 
International Human Rights” (2001) 34 Vand J Transnat’l L 527.  
 
Smith, Brian. “Federal-State Relations in Nigeria” (1981) 80 Afr Affairs 355. 
 
Smith, SA de. “Fundamental Rights in the New Commonwealth (1)” (1961) 10 Int’l & 
Comp L Q 83. 
 
Srikrishna, BN. “Pre British Human Rights Jurisprudence” (2010) 3 NUJS L Rev 129. 
 388 
 
Stammers, Neil. “Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights” 
(1999) 21 Hum Rts Q 980. 
 
Stemplewitz, Jan. “Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Case for Parliamentary 
Responsibility for Human Rights Protection” (2002) VUWL Rev 14. 
 
Stohl, Michael et al. “State Violation of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of 
Measurement” (1986) 8 Hum Rts Q 592. 
 
Stone, Adrienne. “Judicial Review without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic 
Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review” (2008) 28 Oxford J Legal Stud1. 
 
Strauss, David A. “Common Law Constitutional Interpretation” (1996) 63 U Chi L Rev 
877. 
 
Suberu, Rotimi. “Religion and Institutions: Federalism and Management of Conflicts 
over Sharia in Nigeria” (2009) 21 J Int’l Dev 547.  
 
Sweet, Alec Stone & Matthews, Jud. “Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72. 
 
Sweet, Alec Stone & Matthews, Jud. “Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72.  
 
Sweet, Alec Stone. “Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review: And Why it May 
Not Matter” (2003) 101 Mich L Rev 2744. 
T Jeremy Gunn, “Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis” (2005) 19 
Emory Int’l L Rev 465.  
 
Taggart, Michael. “Legitimate Expectation and Treaties in the High Court of Australia” 
(1996) 112 Law Q Rev 50. 
 
Taggart, Michael. “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury” (2008) New Zealand L Rev 
423. 
  
Taiwo, Olufemi. “The Legal Subject in Modern African Law: A Nigerian Report” (2006) 
7 Hum Rts Rev 17. 
 
Tamuno, Tekena. “Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914” (1970) 8 J. Modern Afr 
Stud 563. 
 
Tarr, G Alan. “The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism” (1994) 24 Publius 
63.  
 389 
 
 
Tayyab, Mahmud. “Jurisprudence of a Successful Treason: Coup d’etat & Common 
Law” (1994) 27 Cornell Int’l L J 49. 
 
Teitel, Ruti. “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation” 
(1996-1997) 106 Yale L J 2009. 
 
Teitel, Ruti. “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation” 
(1996-1997) 106 Yale L J 2009. 
 
 Teitel, Ruti. “Transitional Justice Genealogy” (2003) 16 Harv Hum Rts J 69. 
 
Terdiman, Richard. “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field - 
Translator’s Introduction” (1987) 38 Hastings L J 805 at 806. 
 
Tobi, Niki. “Development of Constitutional Law and Military Regimes in Nigeria” in 
Bello, Emmanuel G & Ajibola, Bola A eds. 1 Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale 
Elias (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992). 
 
Tomkins, Adam. “In Defence of the Political Constitution” (2002) 22 Oxford J Legal 
Stud 157.  
 
Trubek, Louis G. “Crossing Bondaries: Legal Education and the Challenges of the ‘New 
Public Interest Law’” (2005) 2005 Wisc L Rev 455. 
 
Tsakyrakis, Stavros. “Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?” (2009) 7 Int’l J 
Const L 468.  
 
Tushnet, Mark “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and 
Democracy-Based Worries” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L Rev 813. 
 
Tushnet, Mark. “The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment” (1977) 62 Cornel 
L Rev 663. 
 
Tussman, Joseph & TenBroek, Jacobus. “The Equal Protection of the Laws” (1949) 37 
Calif L Rev 341.  
 
Udombana, Nsongurua J “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
the Development of Fair Trial Norms in Africa” (2006) 6 Afr Hum Rts L J  299 at 311. 
 
Udombana, Nsongurua. “Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting States’ 
Obligations under the African Human Rights Charter” (2004) 40 Stan J Int’l L 105. 
 
 390 
 
Udombana, Nsongurua. “Human Rights, Eurocentrism, and Africa: Towards a 
Multicultural Dialogue” in Chima C Nweze et al., Beyond Bar Advocacy: Essays in 
Honour of Anthony Mogboh, SAN (Lagos: Odede Publishers, 2010). 
 
Udombana, Nsongurua. “Interpreting Rights Globally: Courts and Constitutional Rights 
in Emerging Democracies” (2005) 5 Afr Hum Rts J 47 at 57. 
 
Udombana, Nsongurua. “Mission Accomplished? An Impact Assessment of the UDHR 
in Africa” (2008) Hamline J Pub L & Pol’y 335. 
 
Ugochukwu, Basil “Reform of the Electoral Justice System” in Joseph Otteh ed., 
Reforming for Justice: A Review of Justice Sector Reforms in Nigeria 1999-2007 (Lagos: 
Access to Justice, 2007) 144.   
 
 Ugochukwu, Basil “The Pathology of Judicialization: Politics, Corruption and the Courts 
in Nigeria” (2011) 4 L & Dev Rev Article 4. 
Ugochukwu, Basil. “Advancing Human Rights Using the Fundamental Rights 
(Enforcement Procedure) Rules” in Basil Ugochukwu, ed, Update on Human Rights 
Litigation in Nigeria (Lagos: Legal Defence Centre, 2003). 
 
Ugochukwu, Basil. “The State Security Service and Human Rights in Nigeria” (1996 - 
1997) Third World Legal Stud 71.  
 
Ukiwo, Ukoha. “Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in 
Nigeria” (2003) 41 J Mod Afr Stud 115.  
 
Uzoma, Rose C. “Religious Pluralism, Cultural Differences, and Social Stability in 
Nigeria” (2004) BYU L Rev 651.  
 
Van Der Walt, Johan. “Blixen’s Difference: Horizontal Application of Fundamental 
Rights and the Resistance to Neo-Colonialism” (2003) J S Afr L 311.  
 
Van Zyl Smit, Dirk. “The Death Penalty in Africa” (2004) 4 Afr Hum Rts L J 1.  
 
Voyvodic, Rose. “Lawyers meet the Social Context: Understanding Cultural 
Competence” (2005) 84 Can Bar Rev 565. 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale L J 
1346. 
 
Webb, Hoyt. “The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and 
Comparative Constitutional Law” (1998-1999) 1 U Pa J Const L 205.  
 
 391 
 
Webber, Gregoire CN. “Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights 
Scholarship” (2010) 23 Can JL & Jur 179. 
 
Wechsler, Herbert. “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law” (1959) 73 Harv L 
Rev 1. 
 
Weinrib, Lorraine. “Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?” (2002) 6 Rev Const 
Stud 119. 
 
Wellington, Harry H. “The Nature of Judicial Review” (1981-1982) 91 Yale L J 486. 
 
White, G Edward. “From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and 
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America” (1972) 58 Va L Rev 999. 
 
Whitman, James Q. “Western Legal Imperialism: Thinking about the Deep Historical 
Roots” (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 305. 
Widner, Jennifer. “Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social 
Scientist’s Perspective on the African Case” (2001) 95 Am J Int’l L 64. 
 
Wilkins, David B. “The New Social Engineers in the Age of Obama: Black Corporate 
Lawyers and the Making of the First Black President” (2010) 53 Howard L J 557. 
 
Williams, FRA. “Fundamental Rights and the Prospect for Democracy in Nigeria” (1966-
1967) 115 U Pa L Rev 1073. 
 
Williams, Susan H. “Feminist Legal Epistemology” (1993) 8 Berkeley Women’s L J 63.  
Wood, Gordon S “The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court 
Made More out of Less” (1999) 56 Wash & Lee L Rev 787.  
 
Woolman, Stuart. “Application” in Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop, Constitutional 
Law of South Africa (Cape Town: Juta Law, 2002).  
 
Wright, Lord. “The Study of Law” (1938) Law Q Rev 185. 
 
Yakubu, John Ademola. “Trends in Constitution-Making in Nigeria, (2000) 10 Transnat’l 
L & Contemp Probs 424.  
 
Yoshikazu, Natakani. “State and Democracy Besieged by Globalization” (2010) 7 
Ritsumeikan L Rev 1. 
 
Young, Ernest A. “Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Problem: The 
Case of the National Healthcare Law” (2012) 75 Law & Contemp Probs 157. 
 
 392 
 
Young, Joseph K. “State Capacity, Democracy, and the Violation of Personal Integrity 
Rights” (2009) 8 J Hum Rts 283.  
 
Yusuf, Hakeem. “Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and 
Judicial Accountability in Nigeria” (2008) 30 Law & Pol’y 194.  
 
Yusuf, Hakeem. “The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions: A Critique” (2007) 
7 Global Jurist (Advances, Art. 4)11. 
 
Yusuf, Hakeem. “The Judiciary and Political Change in Africa: Developing Transitional 
Jurisprudence in Nigeria” (2009) 7 Int’l J Const L 654. 
 
Zahn, Rebecca. “Human Rights in the Plural Legal System of Nigeria” (2009-2010) 1 
Edinburg Student L Rev 66. 
  
Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 22. 
Zamir, Itzhak. “Unreasonableness, Balance of Interests and Proportionality” (1992) 11 
Tel Aviv U Stud L 131. 
 
Zarifis, Ismene. “Rights of Religious Minorities in Nigeria” (2002) 10 Hum Rts Brief 22.  
 
Zyl, Paul van. “Dilemmas of Transitional  Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission” (1999) 52 J Int’l Affairs 647. 
 
 
Miscellaneous Sources 
           
“Corruption: Obasanjo’s Eight Years worse than Abacha’s – Ribadu” Vanguard online: 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/corruption-obasanjo%E2%80%99s-eight-years-
worse-than-abachas-ribadu/>. 
  
“Musharraf Suspends Pakistan’s Constitution: State of Emergency Declared, Chief Judge 
Replaced and Communications cut in Capital” online: 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/03/world/main3448594.shtml>.  
 
“National Judicial Institute, Canada: The Social Context Education Project” online: 
<http://www.nji.ca/nji/internationalforum/SCEP_summary.pdf>. 
 
 “The Nigerian Political Economy in Transition” (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006) at 7 
online: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/03522.pdf>. 
  
“Wikileaks Cable: Yar’Adua gave Justices $57 Million to uphold his Election; 
Aondoakaa wrote the Verdict” Sahara Reporters online: 
 393 
 
<http://saharareporters.com/news-page/wikileaks-cable-yar%E2%80%99adua-gave-
justices-57-million-uphold-his-election-aondoakaa-wrote-verd>.  
  
Ajani, Jide, Abdulah Abdulwahab & Nnochiri, Ikechukwu. “As CJN Retires: Leaving the 
Judiciary in Turmoil” Vanguard online: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/as-cjn-
retires-leaving-the-judiciary-in-turmoil/ >.  
 
Ayorinde, O “Judicial Precedent, Law Reporting and need for Regulation” online: 
<http://www.thenigeriandaily.com/2011/07/19/judicial-precedent-law-reporting-and-
need-for-regulation/>. 
 
Bamidele, Soji & Emakpe, Gowon. “Politics in the Court’s Yard” Next online: 
<http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/National/5740073-146/story.csp#>. 
 
Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms 
and on Government under the Law online: 
<http://www.genderandtrade.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BA2407AAC-A477-
491D-ABA4-A2CADF227E2B%7D_BANGALORE%20PRINCIPLES.pdf>. 
 
Campbell, Greg “Days of Atonement: Searching for Justice in Nigeria” online: 
<http://ictj.org/static/Publications/ICTJ-JICA_TJandDevelopment_rp2008.pdf>. 
 
Ekiyor, Thelma. “ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF): A New Approach 
to an Old Challenge” WACSI Op-ed (2008) online: 
<http://www.wacsi.org/wacseries/785vc7691r2u3h68594OP-ED.pdf>. 
 
Freire, Alonso Reis. “Evolution of Constitutional Interpretation in Brazil and the 
Employment of Balancing ‘Method’ by Brazilian Supreme Court in Judicial Review” 
online:<http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w15/Paper%20by%20Prof%20Alonso%20Reis%2
0Freire.pdf>. 
 
Gbenga, Ariyibi. “Ekiti passes Gender-based Violation law” Vanguard Online: 
<http://odili.net/news/source/2011/nov/8/304.html>.  
 
Ginsburg, Tom. “Courts and New Democracies: Recent Works” The University of 
Chicago Law School, Public Law and Theory Working Paper No 388, June 2012.  
 
Ikhariale, Mike. “The Oputa Reports: An Unfinished Job” online: 
<http://nigerdeltaworldcongress.org/articles/oputa_reports.pdf>. 
 
Lewis, Peter & Bratton Michael. “Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria” 
(Michigan State University, Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa, 
Afrobarometer Paper 3, 2000). 
 394 
 
 
 
Macleod, Jennifer. “Resistance to Diversity among Judges is misguided” The Guardian 
Online: <https://apps.facebook.com/theguardian/law/2011/nov/03/resistance-diversity-
judges-misguided>. 
 
National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2006 online: 
<http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/NAP%20for%20promotion%20and%20protecti
on%20of%20huamn%20rigths%20in%20Nigeria%20-.pdf>. 
 
Nnanna, Ochereome. “GEJ’s Judiciary Letdown” Vanguard online: 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/gej%E2%80%99s-judiciary-letdown/> 
 
Ogbo, Patience. “Disregard of Court Rulings Worries Lawyers” Next (12 July 2011) 
online: Next Newspapers < http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5730623-
146/disregardfor_court_rulings_worrieslawyers__.csp>. 
 
Osinuga, Omoba Oladele. “The Impeachment Process, Ouster Clauses, Non-Justiciable 
Provisions and the Interpretation of Nigeria’s Constitution” online: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1658921>. 
 
Perlez, Jane. “Musharraf Declares State of Emergency” New York Times (3 November 
2007) online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/03/world/asia/04pakistan.html>. 
 
Report by the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in London in July and 
August, 1953 Cmd 8934 (London: HMSO, 1953). 
 
Report Of The Commission Appointed To Inquire Into The Fears Of The Minorities And 
The Means Of Allaying Them Cmd 505 (London: HMSO, 1958). 
 
Shaw, Jane S. Public Choice Theory, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, online: 
<http://www.freeuni.edu.ge/uploads/public_choice_theory_by_jane_s._shaw__the_conci
se_encyclopedia_of_economics__library_of_economics_and_liberty.pdf>. 
 
Ugochukwu, Basil “Pin in the Haystack: Tracking Process and Discovering Nigerian 
Values in the Nigerian Constitution” online: Social Science Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1528468>. 
 
Ukhuegbe, Solomon. Human Rights Decision-Making in Emergent Courts: The Supreme 
Court of Nigeria, 1961-2000 (PhD Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2009, 138) 
[unpublished]. 
 
